Ex Parte AmanoDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 22, 201713438714 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 22, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 1946-0318 2994 EXAMINER RAHMAN, SM AZIZUR ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2458 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 13/438,714 04/03/2012 142241 7590 02/23/2017 Paratus Law Group, PLLC 1765 Greensboro Station Place Suite 320 Tysons Corner, VA 22102 Naoki AMANO 02/23/2017 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte NAOKI AMANO Appeal 2016-000978 Application 13/438,714 Technology Center 2400 Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, ADAM J. PYONIN, and JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judges. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—6 and 9—13. Claims 7 and 8 have been canceled. See App. Br. 17—19 (Claims App’x). We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Sony Corporation. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2016-000978 Application 13/438,714 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s Invention Appellant’s invention generally relates to “an information processing apparatus, an information processing method, and a program that are configured to allow the selection of a desired device by linking two or more applications with each other.” Spec. 1. Claim 1, which is representative, reads as follows: 1. An information processing apparatus comprising: a storage block configured to store information about a combination of devices being selected to be controlled by a function of a first application and devices being selected to be controlled by a function of a second application, wherein said first application is an application having a function of transmitting a signal by use of infrared radiation and said second application is an application for controlling a device compliant with a DLNA standard, DLNA standing for Digital Living Network Alliance; and a selection block configured to select, among the devices controllable by the function of said second application, a device in the same combination being selected to be controlled by the function of said first application on the basis of the abovementioned information stored in said storage block. Rejection Claims 1—6 and 9-13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Reeves et al. (US 2012/0124245 Al; published May 17, 2012) and Schwartz et al. (US 2009/0248702 Al; published Oct. 1, 2009). Final Act. 3—6. 2 Appeal 2016-000978 Application 13/438,714 ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s conclusions. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final Office Action from which this appeal is taken and the reasons set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. Final Act. 3—6; Ans. 3—5. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows. Issue 1: Did the Examiner err by finding that the combination of Reeves and Schwartz teaches or suggests “wherein said first application is an application having a function of transmitting a signal by use of infrared radiation and said second application is an application for controlling a device compliant with a DLNA standard,” as recited in claim 1? Appellant contends the combination of Reeves and Schwartz fails to teach or suggest “wherein said first application is an application having a function of transmitting a signal by use of infrared radiation and said second application is an application for controlling a device compliant with a DLNA standard,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 11—14; Reply Br. 4—5. Appellant contends Reeves fails to teach or suggest the disputed limitation because Reeves does not teach or suggest that a second application is an application for controlling a device compliant with a DLNA standard, as required by claim 1. App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 4. Appellant contends Schwartz fails to teach or suggest the disputed limitation because “[a]t best, Schwartz merely discloses DLNA compliant devices, but certainly not both a first application (for infrared) and a second application (for DLNA), as recited in the claims.” 3 Appeal 2016-000978 Application 13/438,714 App. Br. 12. We do not find Appellant’s contentions persuasive. As found by the Examiner (Ans. 4), Reeves teaches that a universal remote control is able to store, serve, compute, communicate, and/or display information to enable a user to control one or more peripheral devices (Reeves 120). Reeves teaches that the universal remote control may be a handheld device, such as a smartphone, and can have one or more communication interfaces including an infrared interface, a radio frequency interface, and an Ethernet interface. Reeves 120. Reeves further teaches that the universal remote control is configured to communicatively couple with a PC and a TV either wired or wirelessly over a LAN and is configured to communicatively couple with a DVD/CD/VCR player, a fan, a heater, and the TV using infrared. Reeves 121. Based on these teachings, the Examiner finds, and we agree, Reeves teaches or suggests “wherein said first application is an application having a function of transmitting a signal by use of infrared radiation and said second application is an application for controlling a device.” Ans. 5 (citing Reeves, Figs. 1A, IB, 2; H 20, 21). The Examiner finds, and we agree, Schwartz teaches: [A] system and a method that would allow a user to browse, search, manage and/or render content from multiple devices and/or servers in the network while the network may be a home network which is based on Ethemet/wired LAN and/or IEEE 802.11 (“Wi-Fi”) network technologies and connection technologies such as Universal Plug and Play (“UPnP”) and Digital Living Network Alliance (“DLNA”). Ans. 4—5 (citing Schwartz || 5, 59, 60). Based on these findings, the Examiner concludes the combination of Reeves and Schwartz teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Ans. 5. Appellant’s contentions fail to 4 Appeal 2016-000978 Application 13/438,714 address the combined teachings of the references and, therefore, are unpersuasive of error. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Reeves and Schwartz teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Issue 2: Did the Examiner err in combining Reeves and Schwartz? Appellant contends the combination of Reeves and Schwartz is improper. App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 5. Appellant contends the combination is improper because “there is nothing reasonably related to the claimed ‘first application’ and ‘second application’ that makes Schwartz analogous prior art to Reeves (which is admitted to be deficient).” App. Br. 5. We do not find Appellant’s contentions persuasive. A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. Klein, 647 F.3d at 1348. Appellant’s contentions fail to address either test with respect to the claimed invention. Instead, Appellant’s contentions are directed to whether Schwartz is analogous art with respect to Reeves and, therefore, are not persuasive of error. For the first time in the Reply Brief, Appellant argues the combination is based on improper hindsight. Reply Br. 5. As this argument is not 5 Appeal 2016-000978 Application 13/438,714 responsive to an argument presented for the first time in the Examiner’s Answer, and good cause has not been shown as to why the argument was not earlier presented, the arguments will not be considered for the purposes of this appeal. 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1; and claims 2—6 and 9-13, not argued separately with particularity. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—6 and 9—13. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation