Ex Parte ALSHINNAWI et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 30, 2016

13545391 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/545,391 07/10/2012 SHAREEF F. ALSHINNA WI
139287 7590 09/01/2016
Law Office of Jim Boice
3839 Bee Cave Road
Suite 201
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
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ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
RPS920120047US1 4381
EXAMINER
SALTARELLI, DOMINIC D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2421
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/01/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
j ennifer@boiceip.com
Emily@BoiceIP.com
Jim@BoiceIP.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SHAREEF F. ALSHINNA WI, GARY D. CUDAK,
EDWARD S. SUFFERN, and J. MARK WEBER
Appeal2015-000598
Application 13/545,391
Technology Center 2400
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JON M. JURGOV AN, and
JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges.
JURGOV AN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final
Rejection of claims 1-5, 8-15, and 18-20.2 We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm. 3
1 Appellants identify International Business Machines Corporation as the
real party in interest. (App. Br. 2.)
2 Claims 6, 7, 16, and 1 7 are canceled.
3 Our Decision refers to the Specification filed July 10, 2012 ("Spec."), the
Final Office Action mailed Jan. 17, 2014 ("Final Act."), the Appeal Brief
filed June 13, 2014 ("App. Br."), the Examiner's Answer mailed Aug. 4,
2014 ("Ans."), and the Reply Brief filed Oct. 3, 2014 ("Reply Br.").
Appeal2015-000598
Application 13/545,391
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to generating an inattention alert directing a
content transmitting server to stream only audio content in response to
determining that a user is no longer watching a video component of a
multimedia stream. (Spec. Abstract.) Claim 1, reproduced below with the
argued limitation in italics, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A processor implemented method of conserving
bandwidth capacity in a communication channel between a
content transmitting server and a content receiving client
computer while streaming multimedia content, the computer
implemented method comprising:
receiving, by a content receiving client computer, a
multimedia streaming content from a content transmitting server,
wherein the multimedia streaming content has a video
component and an audio component;
displaying the multimedia streaming content on a video
display; and
in response to determining that a user of the content
receiving client computer is no longer watching the video
component of the multimedia streaming content that is currently
visible to the user on the video display, a processor generating
and transmitting an inattention alert to the content transmitting
server, wherein the inattention alert directs the content
transmitting server to stream only the audio component of a
remaining portion of the multimedia streaming content to the
content receiving client computer.
(App. Br. 11-Claims App'x.)
REJECTIONS
Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for
lack of enablement. (Final Act. 3.)
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Application 13/545,391
Claims 1-5, 8-16, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
based on Bhogal (US 2011/0145708 Al, pub. June 16, 2011) and Reisman
(US 2003/0229900 Al, pub. Dec. 11, 2003). (Final Act. 3-8.)
ANALYSIS
Rejection under§ 112, First Paragraph
Appellants present no argument in response to the Examiner's
rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for lack of
enablement. Accordingly, we summarily sustain the rejection of claim 20.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) and M.P.E.P. § 1205.02 (If a ground of
rejection stated by the examiner is not addressed in the appellant's brief,
appellant has waived any challenge to that ground of rejection and the Board
may summarily sustain it, unless the examiner subsequently withdrew the
rejection in the examiner's answer.)
Rejection under 35 USC§ 103(a)
Claim 1
Appellants argue Bhogal fails to disclose the italicized limitation of
claim 1. (App. Br. 4--8.) According to Appellants, Bhogal alerts a media
server to discontinue streaming content that is blocked from view as a result
of the user's interaction with a display interface. (Id. citing Bhogal i-f 44.)
Appellants further argue Reisman teaches adjustment of only visible video
content by changing its format. (App. Br. 7-8; Reply Br. 2-3 citing
Reisman i-fi-1705, 706.) Appellants argue, if Bhogal blocks video content,
then Reisman would not be able to modify such video content according to
its teachings. Appellants further contend the Examiner's rejection renders
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Application 13/545,391
Reisman unsatisfactory for its intended purpose and requires an
impermissible change of its principle of operation. (Id.)
The Examiner responds to Appellants' arguments as follows:
Reisman discloses determining that a user is not paying attention
to a particular window, which is visible to the user, and will
automatically minimize said window (Reisman, paragraph
0706). Bhogal sends the inattention alert which causes the server
to cease broadcasting the video portion in response to
minimizing a window (Bhogal, paragraph 0044). Thus the
combination of Bhogal and Reisman teaches detecting when a
user is not paying attention to a window containing broadcast
video, minimizing said window, and halts the streaming of said
broadcast video in response.
(Ans. 3).
Appellants' arguments do not rebut the Examiner's finding that
Reisman's teaching of minimizing the window in response to user inattention
would result in the window content no longer being displayed (i-f 706). The
resulting blocked video content would trigger Bhogal' s inattention alert to
the media server, causing such server to discontinue streaming video content
while maintaining audio content (i-f 44). The Examiner thus demonstrates
the claimed invention is nothing more than the combination of known
elements, taught or suggested by Bhogal and Reisman, which are used for
the purposes set forth in those references. KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). ("The combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.")
Regarding Appellants' argument that Reisman is limited to modifying
only visible content, as the Examiner shows, this assertion is factually
incorrect because Reisman teaches window minimization, which a person of
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Application 13/545,391
ordinary skill would understand to result in video content no longer being
displayed. "Minimize" is defined as "computers: to make (a program's
window) change to a very small form that takes almost no room on a
computer's screen." http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minimize
(last viewed 8/22/2016). This definition suggests any video in a minimized
window would be blocked from view in Reisman. Accordingly, we do not
agree with Appellants' argument that Reisman is limited to modifying only
visible video content.
Furthermore, the Examiner's explanation of the rejection establishes
the intended purpose and principle of operation are not defeated by their
combination. (Ans. 3) As noted, Reisman's minimization of a window so
that it is no longer visible (i-f 706) would cause video content to be blocked,
thus triggering Bhogal's sending of the inattention alert to the media server
to stop streaming the blocked content (i-f 44). The references are thus
logically linked and piece together seamlessly without changing the intended
purpose or principle of operation of either reference. See KSR at 420 ("[I]n
many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.") We agree with the
Examiner that the person of ordinary skill would have understood the
combination of references to teach, or at least suggest, the argued limitation
of claim 1.
Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Instead, we
adopt as our own the Examiner's finding and conclusion of obviousness as
set forth in the Final Office Action and Answer.
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Application 13/545,391
Claim 18
Claim 18 recites "determining, by one or more processors, that the
user has not been watching the video component of the multimedia
streaming content for more than a predefined length of time; and in response
to determining that the user has not been watching the video component of
the multimedia streaming content for more than the predefined length of
time, transmitting, by one or more processors, the inattention alert to the
content transmitting server." (App. Br. 14- Claims App'x.)
Appellants contend Reisman teaches that its eye tracker requires the
user to be viewing the content but at different levels of attention ("at
attention" versus "at ease"). (App. Br. 9 citing Reisman i-f 705.) To the
contrary, the Examiner notes that Reisman teaches "[a] further use of
attention-based methods might be to adapt the level of detail/resolution
presenting in a window, or a portion of a window, depending on whether,
where, and how a user was viewing it." (Ans. 4--5 citing Reisman i-f 706.)
As the Examiner finds, this statement suggests, by the use of the word
"whether", that Reisman contemplates the user may not be viewing the
window at all. (Id.) "A reference must be considered not only for what it
expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests." In re Bell, 991 F. 2d
781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993) quoting In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179
(CCPA 1979). Thus, we do not find Appellants' argument persuasive.
Appellants also contend Reisman's eye tracker fails to determine how
long a user has not been watching the video (App. Br. 10, Reply Br. 4--5
citing Reisman i-f 706.) To the contrary, the Examiner finds that comparison
to a time threshold is inherent and mandatory for an eye tracker to
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distinguish between levels of attention a user is paying to displayed
components. (Ans. 4--5 citing Reisman i-f 706.)
We agree with the Examiner a person of ordinary skill would have
understood that determination of a user's level of attention, specifically, that
the user is not paying attention to viewable content, would require some
period of observation (i.e., a predefined length of time) of the user's
behavior. For example, if the user moves or blinks at the moment of image
capture with the eye tracker, inferences drawn from the image captured at
that moment may result in incorrect assessment of the user's attentiveness.
Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand some period of
observation is required to infer the user's attentiveness correctly. To perform
such an observation, a computer must be programmed with a "predefined"
length of time during which to observe the user with the eye tracker.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Instead,
we adopt as our own the Examiner's findings and conclusion of obviousness
for claim 18.
Remaining Claims
No separate arguments are presented for the remaining claims and
therefore we sustain the rejection for the reasons previously stated. 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv), In re King, 801F.2d1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Conclusion
An obviousness rejection under§ 103(a) requires that "there must be
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441F.3d977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
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Application 13/545,391
(internal quotations omitted)). On this record, we find the Examiner's
reasoning and underpinning adequate to support the conclusion of
obviousness.
DECISION
We summarily affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claim 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for lack of enablement.
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-5, 8-16, 18 and
19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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