Ex Parte Aleksovski et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 27, 2018

13944070 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/944,070 07/17/2013 Zarko Aleksovski
24737 7590 03/29/2018
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus A venue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2011P01851US01 2718
EXAMINER
COBY, FRANTZ
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2454
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/29/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
patti. demichele@Philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ZARKO ALEKSOVSKI, ROLAND JOHANNES OPFER,
MERLIJN SEVENSTER, and ARVID RANDAL NICOLAAS
Appeal2017-009290
Application 13/944,070
Technology Center 2400
Before JOHN A. EV ANS, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.
PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection
of claims 1-15 and 19-23, which are all of the claims pending in this
application. Claims 16-18 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify Koninklijke Philips N.V. as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 1.
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Application 13/944,070
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants generally describe the disclosed and claimed invention as
follows:
A report analyzing system is described. A text
processing unit analyzes a text portion of a report. The text
portion is in a natural language. The processing unit identifies
a concept in the text portion, to obtain a set of identified
concepts. A concept ranking unit ranks the concepts of the set
of identified concepts based on a ranking criterion, to obtain a
ranking. A concept selector selects at least one concept of the
set of identified concepts based on the ranking, to obtain at least
one selected concept. An associating unit associates a visual
representation with the report based on the at least one selected
concept. The selected concept may belong to an ontology, e.g.
a medical ontology.
Abstract (reference numbers omitted). 2
Claim 1 is representative and reproduced below (with the disputed
limitations emphasized in italics):
1. An apparatus for analyzing a report, comprising:
one or more computers configured to:
analyze a text portion of the report to identify concepts in
the text portion and obtain a set of identified concepts;
rank concepts of the set of identified concepts based on a
ranking criterion;
2 Our Decision refers to the Final Action mailed Aug. 8, 2016 ("Final Act.");
Appellants' Appeal Brief filed Dec. 20, 2016 ("App. Br.") and Reply Brief
filed June 22, 2017 ("Reply Br."); the Examiner's Answer mailed Apr. 28,
2017 ("Ans."); and the original Specification filed July 17, 2013 ("Spec.").
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select at least one concept of the set of identified
concepts based on the ranking; and
associate a visual summary with the report indicative of
said at least one selected concept; and
a display configured to display the visual summary.
App. Br. 20 (Claims App'x).
Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1, 2, and 4--10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Kawai et al. (US 2014/0122495 Al; published May
1, 2014) ("Kawai") and Evans (US 2005/0182764 Al; published Aug. 18,
2005).
Claims 3, 13, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Kawai, Evans, and Kirk et al. (US 5,768,578; issued
June 16, 1998) ("Kirk").
Claims 11 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Kawai, Evans, and Pedro et al. (US 8,229,881 B2;
published July 24, 2012) ("Pedro").
Claims 14, 15, 19, 20, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Kawai, Evans, Pedro, and Kirk.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants'
arguments in the Briefs and are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Unless
otherwise noted, we adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by
the Examiner in the Office Action from which this appeal is taken (Final
Act. 2-17) and in the Examiner's Answer (Ans. 17-21), and we concur with
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the conclusions reached by the Examiner. For emphasis, we consider and
highlight specific arguments as presented in the Briefs.
Rejection of Claims 1, 2, and 4-10 under§ 103(a)
Appellants assert that the Examiner relies on Kawai in rejecting claim
1, except for the limitation of "rank concepts of the set of identified concepts
based on a ranking criterion," which the Examiner finds is taught by Evans.
App. Br. 3; see Final Act. 3--4 (citing Evans Title, Abstract, Fig. 2, i-fi-f 11,
42). Appellants argue the invention of Kawai is directed to calculating a
score for concepts extracted from documents, and the documents are then
clustered based on the scores. App. Br. 3 (citing Kawai i-fi-f 13, 14).
According to Appellants, "the Examiner's undoing of these steps" by
combining the teachings of Evans with Kawai "would destroy the
functionality of Kawai." Id.; Reply Br. 3--4. Specifically, Appellants argue
as follows:
Similarly, replacing the scoring system of Kawai with the
ranking function of Evans would destroy the function of Kawai.
For example, paragraphs [0013] and [0014] of page 2 of Kawai
state that the invention of Kawai is directed to calculating a
score for concepts extracted from documents. The documents
are then clustered based on the scores. The Summary Section
of Kawai, along with independent claim 1 of Kawai, set forth
that this is the invention of Kawai. It is this function that would
have to be replaced with the "ranking" function of Evans in
order to arrive at the subject matter of claim 1.
Reply Br. 4.
We not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Instead, we agree with
the Examiner that "Evans would not destroy Kawai" and "would have
enhanced the versatility of Kawai by allowing Kawai to more efficiently
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present concepts in a visual representation." Ans. 18. Contrary to
Appellants' arguments, we do not understand the Examiner's rejection to
require replacing the scoring system of Kawai with the ranking function of
Evans. Instead, the Examiner's combination would supplement Kawai's
scoring system with Evans ranking system. Appellants have not provided
persuasive reasoning or explanation why combining Evans' ranking system
with Kawai would require "undoing" or replacing the scoring function of
Kawai. We find that combining the ranking system of Evans with the
teachings of Kawai as proposed by the Examiner would have merely
resulted in "the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007). We are further mindful that the skilled artisan would "be able to fit
the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle," because
the skilled artisan is "a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton."
KSR, 550 U.S. at 420-21.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 under
§ 103(a). Appellants argue that claims 2, 4--7, and 10 are allowable at least
by virtue of their dependency from claim 1. App. Br. 9--12. Accordingly,
we also sustain the rejection of claims 2, 4--7, and 10 under§ 103(a).
Claim 8
Claim 8 recites that "the one or more computers are configured to
rank each concept of the set of identified concepts of the report with the
ranking criterion ... including at least one of a context of the report and
identified concepts in other reports within a record." Appellants argue that
although the portions of Evans cited by the Examiner, Figure 4 and
paragraphs 53-57, "disclose ranking concepts by cumulative scores," this
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does not constitute "a ranking criterion that includes at least one of a context
of the report and identified concepts in other reports within a record," as
recited in claim 8. App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 4.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner
erred. As the Examiner finds, Evans teaches ranking cluster concepts by
cumulative scores. Ans. 18-19 (citing Evans Fig. 4 (item 113), i-fi-153-57).
The Examiner also finds, and we agree, that each cluster concept can be
evaluated against an acceptance criteria, including whether the concept is
contained in a minimum of two documents or 30% of the documents in the
cluster. Id. at 19 (citing Evans i-fi-153, 55). Thus, we agree with the
Examiner that the ranking criterion of Evans "includ[ es] ... identified
concepts in other reports within a record," as recited in claim 8.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 8 under
§ 103(a).
Claim 9
Claim 9 recites "the one or more computers are configured to rank a
first identified concept higher than a second identified concept . . . the first
identified concept being less frequently identified in the reports within the
record than the second identified concept." Appellants argue that neither
paragraph 41 nor 42 of Evans, both of which are cited by the Examiner,
teach the features of claim 9. App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 5. Specifically,
Appellants argue as follows:
The Examiner further cites paragraph [0042] of Evans as
allegedly disclosing these features. This cited portion of Evans
discloses that the document concepts for each cluster are ranked
into ranked cluster concepts based on cumulative document
concept scores. However, Evans does not disclose how these
document concept scores are calculated. In addition, this cited
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portion of Evans does not recite anything related to ranking a first
concept higher than a second concept if the first concept is less
frequently identified in the reports than the second concept, as
recited in claim 9.
In the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner additionally cites
paragraph [0041] of Evans as allegedly disclosing these features
of claim 9. Paragraph [0041] discloses that document concepts
are scored based on frequencies of occurrences in reports to
generate document concept scores 48. These document concepts
scores 48 are different from the cumulative document concept
scores 51 disclosed in paragraph [0042] of Evans. While Evans
discloses how the document concept scores 48 are calculated,
Evans does not disclose how the cumulative document concept
scores 51 are calculated.
Reply Br. 5.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. The Examiner finds,
and we agree, that the teachings of paragraph 41 of Evans "lead to" or are
applicable to the teachings of paragraph 42 of Evans. Ans. 20. Paragraph
41 of Evans specifically teaches "[ e Jach concept and term is then scored
based on frequency, concept weight, structural weight, and corpus weight."
Although Evans does not expressly teach ranking a first concept higher than
a second concept based on the first concept being less frequently identified
in the reports, we find this feature as recited in claim 9 is at least suggested
by Evans. See Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc., 874 F.2d 804,
807---08 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("'[T]he question under 35 [U.S.C. §] 103 is not
merely what the references expressly teach but what they would have
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made"'). Because Evans teaches the use of criteria other than frequency for
scoring concepts, including "concept weight, structural weight, and corpus
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weight," this reasonably suggests that these other variables could override
"frequency" in a given situation, in which event a first concept cited less
frequently would be ranked higher than a second concept. Thus, we sustain
the Examiner's rejection of claim 9 under§ 103(a).
Rejection of Claims 3, 13, 21, and 22 under§ 103(a)
Claim 3
Claim 3 recites:
each visual summary includes a plurality of visual
representations, each visual representation indicating a selected
concept and including:
text with highlighted words or phrases indicative of the at
least one selected concept; and
one or more pictures identifying the at least one selected
concept.
Appellants note the Examiner finds Figures 6 and 7 of Kirk, and the
accompanying description in column 26, lines 47---64, teach or suggest the
limitations of claim 3. App. Br. 12. Appellants argue, however, "neither
Figure 6 nor Figure 7 show highlighted text and pictures which illustrate the
selected concepts." Id. Appellants also argue "the graphics shown in
Figures 6 and 7 of Kirk are not illustrative of a selected concept." Id. at 13.
Appellants further argue:
The Examiner alleges that a hypertext link 620 constitutes the
selected concept, and that the graphic 606 is a picture of the
selected topic. The link 620 recites "Strawberry Pop-Tart Blow-
Torches." It is unclear how the boxed graphic 606 is indicative
of Strawberry Pop-Tart Blow-Torches. Figure 7 of Kirk does not
show a corresponding link, and thus the text shown in Figure 7
is not related to a selected concept.
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Reply Br. 6.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Instead, we agree
with the Examiner that Figures 6 and 7 of Kirk, and the description in
column 26, lines 50-53, teach or suggest the limitations of claim 3. See
Ans. 20-21. Regarding Figure 6, we agree with the Examiner's findings that
it is a visual representation in which (1) component 620 corresponds to a
selected concept, Strawberry Pop-Tart Blow-Torches, (2) the corresponding
text portion is displayed with highlighted words, component 608, and (3) a
related picture 606. The highlighted words, Dave Barry, relate to the
concept because the text refers to Dave Barry as a columnist who "noted that
Kellogg's Strawberry Pop-Tarts (SPTs) could be made to emit flames 'like a
blow torch."' The Abstract of the text mentions "[t]oasters which fail to
eject Pop Tarts cause the Pop tarts to emit flames 10-18 inches in height."
Thus, we find the shape of picture 606 reasonably identifies or suggests the
concept of a pop-tart that could be placed in a toaster, which if not properly
ejected could emit flames and become one of the notorious "Strawberry Pop-
Tart Blow-Torches." Regarding Figure 7, we find it is a visual
representation relating to the selected concept of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and contains related text with portion 708 highlighted and
a picture of the then current Commissioner Bruce Lehman. Thus, we sustain
the Examiner's rejection of claim 3 under§ 103(a).
Claims 13, 21, and 22
Appellants advance no separate, substantive arguments for claims
13, 21, and 22. Instead, Appellants argue claim 13 is patentable for the
reasons discussed in relation to claims 1 and 3. App. Br. 13-14. Appellants
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argue claim 21 is patentable for the reasons argued in regard to claim 8, and
claim 22 is patentable for the reasons argued in regard to claim 9. Id. at
14--15. These arguments are not persuasive for the reasons discussed supra
regarding claims 1, 3, 8, and 9. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of
dependent claims 13, 21, and 22 under§ 103(a).
Rejection of Claims 14, 15, 19, 20, and 23 under§ 103 (a)
Appellants advance no separate, substantive arguments for claims 14,
15, 19, 20, and 23. Instead, Appellants argue (1) claim 14 is patentable for
the reasons discussed in regard to claims 1, 3, and 13, (2) claims 15 and 20
are patentable because they depend from claim 14, (3) claim 19 is patentable
for the reasons argued in regard to claims 1, 3, 13, and 14, and (4) claim 23
is patentable forthe reasons argued in regard to claims 8, 9, 21, and 22.
App. Br. 16-18. These arguments are not persuasive for the reasons
discussed supra regarding claims 1, 3, 8, 9, and 13. Therefore, we sustain
the rejection of claims 14, 15, 19, 20, and 23 under§ 103(a).
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-15 and 19-23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 3
3 In the event of further prosecution, we invite the Examiner to consider
whether the claims implicate 35 U.S.C. § 101 as reciting non-statutory
subject matter (an abstract idea). See "2014 Interim Guidance on Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility," 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014); "July 2015
Update on Subject Matter Eligibility," 80 Fed. Reg. 45429 (July 30, 2015);
"May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Update," 81 Fed. Reg. 27381 (May 6,
2016). Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
§ 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so.
See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02.
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