Ex Parte Aleksandrov et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 15, 2017

13480301 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/480,301 05/24/2012 Anton Aleksandrov RSW920120080US2 8397
75949 7590
IBM CORPORATION
C/O: Fabian Vancott
215 South State Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, THU HA T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2444
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/17/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patents @ fabianvancott.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANTON ALEKSANDROV, AMIT BEN-SHEFFER,
RAANAN AVIDOR, YOAV BODOR, ISHAI BOROVOY,
YARON GOLDBERG, TODD ERIC KAPLINGER,
IDDO LEVIN, RAN ENRIKO MAGEN, RON PERRY, and
ARTEM SPECTOR
Appeal 2016-004742
Application 13/480,301
Technology Center 2400
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, STEPHEN C. SIU, and JAMES W. DEJMEK,
Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
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Application 13/480,301
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1—25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). This case is related to
prior appeals 2016-001240 and 2016-001242.
We affirm.
The claims are directed to updating web resources. Claims 1 and 22,
reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system for updating web resources, comprising:
at least one processor to access and execute computer
readable instructions stored on a computer readable storage
medium;
said computer readable instructions to cause said at least
one processor to
download an application to a client device;
extract web resources from said application to a local file;
and
query an external server for web resource updates specific
to at least one operating condition specific to said client device.
22. A system for updating web resources, comprising:
at least one processor to access and execute computer readable
instructions;
said computer readable instructions to cause said at least one
processor to
generate an update bundle for web resources that were
originally downloaded in an application package downloaded
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on a client device, said update bundle comprising at least one
update that is specific to an operating condition of said client
device; and
send said update bundle to a server that is capable of
receiving update queries from said client device.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Higgins et al. US 2007/0067373 A1 Mar. 22, 2007
Lee et al. US 2008/0046449 Al Feb. 21, 2008
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1—25 are provisionally rejected on the ground of non-statutory
double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1—25 of co-pending
Application No. 13/474,063 and claims 1—25 of co-pending Application
No. 13/481,169. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not
patentably distinct from each other because claims 1—25 of instant
application recite all limitation of claims 1—25 of co-pending applications.
Claims 1—21 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Higgins in view of Lee.1
Claims 22—25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Higgins.
1 The Examiner has applied different prior art than applied in the two related
appeal cases (2016-001240 and 2016-001242). The Examiner should
consider the additional prior art in any further prosecution on the merits.
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ANALYSIS
Obviousness-Type Double Patenting2
Appellants do not respond to the rejection and state “[wjithout
addressing the merits of this rejection, Appellants request that this
provisional rejection be held in abeyance until the claims are otherwise in
condition for allowance.” (App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 4).
The Examiner maintains “[i]n response to appellant's argument, the
examiner submits that the appellant does not provide any arguments and
hasn't filed a terminal disclaimer, thus the Provisional Double Patenting
Rejection is maintained.” (Ans. 3) (See generally Reply Br. 4). We agree
with the Examiner and summarily affirm the obviousness-type double
patenting rejection of claims 1—25.
35 U.S.C. § 102—Anticipation
With respect to the independent claim 22 and dependent claims 23 —
25,3 Appellants repeat the portions of the Higgins reference relied upon by
2 We note patent number 9,525,587, issued on December 20, 2016 (based
upon application serial number 13/474,371). The Examiner should consider
this patent in any additional prosecution on the merits. We note that
patented claim 21 of patent number 9,525,587 contains similar limitations to
application claim 22, but the bundle is sent to the client rather than the
server. Appellants and the Examiner should clarity whether the present
claim 22 is directed to generating the bundle and saving it at the server
versus sending the bundle from the server to the client and the corresponding
support in the Specification.
3 We note that Appellants’ Summary of the Claimed Subject Matter refers to
the processor 700, which is located in the client, and then refers to the
generating step as “107” which is disclosed as being in the server and the
two steps being performed recite “send said update bundle to a server” rather
than to the client relying upon paragraph 40 of the Specification which is
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the Examiner in the grounds of the rejection and contend paragraph 109 of
the Higgins reference “merely defines an ‘application’ and fails to teach or
suggest web resources being incorporated into the application for subsequent
extraction.” (App. Br. 28). Appellants further contend with respect to
paragraph 136 of the Higgins reference:
This describes that an application can be provided as a data
package, but fails to teach or suggest “an update bundle for web
resources that were originally downloaded in an application
package downloaded on a client device, said update bundle
comprising at least one update that is specific to an operating
condition of said client device.” (Claim 22) (emphasis added).
(App. Br. 28).
We disagree with Appellants and find that paragraph 109 of the
Higgins reference discloses “the routines executed to implement the
embodiments of the invention may be implemented as part of an
operating system or a specific application, component, program,
object, module or sequence of instructions referred to as ‘programs’”
and Figure 13 of the Higgins reference clearly discloses the update of
the workflow according to the “current operating condition” (element
2503).
Appellants’ response repeats the language of claim 22 and generally
contends that the Higgins reference does not disclose all the claimed
elements. (App. Br. 27—29). We disagree with Appellants and find that
Appellants’ argument is directed to the content of the application on a client
device, but the invention recited in the language of independent claim 22 is
directed to the server sending the client bundles in response to queries. We
leave it to the Examiner and Appellants to remedy the apparent deficiency in
claim 22. We note that paragraph 85 of the Specification and Figure 13
contend to parallel the claim language, but this is not the correlation
provided by Appellants in the “Summary of the Claimed Subject Matter.”
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directed to “[a] system for updating web resources . . . generate an update
bundle for web resources . . . and send said update bundle to a server that is
capable of receiving update queries from said client device.” Consequently,
Appellants’ argument does not show error in the Examiner’s finding of
anticipation.
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner that the Higgins reference
discloses generating updates at a server and sending those updates in
response to queries. We further find that the updates necessarily must be
present on the server to be sent and hence must have been generated.
Merely reciting the language of the claim is insufficient. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim
recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the
claim.”). Merely alleging that the references fail to support an anticipation
rejection is insufficient to persuade us of Examiner error. Attorney
arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual
evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip op. at 7—8 (BPAI
Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd09004693.pdf.
Here, we find Appellants’ arguments are conclusory in nature and fail
to address the thrust of the Examiner’s anticipation rejections.
“Argument in the brief does not take the place of evidence in the
record.” In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965) (citing In re Cole,
326 F.2d 769, 773 (CCPA 1964)). This reasoning is applicable here.
On this record, we find Appellants have failed to present substantive
arguments and supporting evidence persuasive of Examiner error. Cf. In re
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Baxter TravenolLabs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the
function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by
an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”).
Additionally, Appellants argue:
However, as similarly presented above in connection
with independent claims 1,18, and 20, Higgins merely defines
an “application” and fails to describe web resources being
incorporated into the application for subsequent extraction.
Therefore, for at least the same reason presented above in
connection with independent claims 1,18, and 20, the rejection
of claim 22 should not be sustained.
Consequently, the cited references will not support a
rejection of claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and Graham.
Therefore, for at least the reasons explained here, the rejection
based on Higgins and Lee of claim 22 and its dependent claims
should not be sustained.
(Reply Br. 17).
We note that Appellants’ arguments are generally directed to an
obviousness rejection, but the Examiner has rejected claims 22—25 based
upon anticipation. As a result, Appellants’ general argument to obviousness
does not show error in the Examiner’s finding of anticipation under 35
U.S.C. § 102, and Appellants’ arguments do not show error in the
Examiner’s finding of anticipation.
35 U.S.C. § 103—Obviousness
With respect to independent claims 1,18, and 20, Appellants set forth
separate arguments for patentability, and we address Appellants’ arguments
in the order set forth in the Appeal Brief. Appellants have not set forth
separate arguments for patentability of dependent claims 3, 5, 7, 9-15, and
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19 and these claims will fall with their respective parent claims. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Claim 1
With respect to independent claim 1, Appellants contend “claim 1
recites ‘to download an application to a client device’ and ‘extract web
resources from said application to a local file.’ Context for these claim
recitations is given in Appellant’s specification.” (App. Br. 11). Appellants
support their contention by reference to Appellants’ Specification and
Appellants contend:
Thus, Appellant describes a scenario in which resources,
which are available online, are also packaged with an application
that is downloaded to a client device. These web resources are
then extracted and stored locally so that the client device can use
them and operate as if it were online even if there is no “internet
connectivity to access the web resources.” (Id.). This is the
context of claim 1 which expressly recites a processor “to
download an application to a client device; [and to] extract web
resources from said application to a local file.” (Claim 1).
(App. Br. 12). Appellants further contend:
Thus, Lee does not teach or suggest the subject matter for
which it was cited. Lee does not teach or suggest to “extract web
resources from said [downloaded] application to a local file.”
(Claim 1). Rather, Lee describes preloading the images
referenced in a web page.
First, a web page is a document, not an application. A web
page may include embedded applets, but Lee is not describing or
suggesting to extract web resources packaged into an applet
embedded in a web page. Thus, Lee is inapposite to the claimed
subject matter, i.e., to “extract web resources from said
application to a local file.” (Claim 1) (emphasis added).
Second, the images being preloaded are not being
extracted from a downloaded version of the web page. Rather,
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they are simply downloaded from on-line sources. (Lee,
paragraphs 0026). Thus, again, Lee is not relevant to the claimed
subject matter, i.e., to “extract web resources from said
[downloaded] application to a local file.” (Claim 1) (emphasis
added).
Thus, the combination of Higgins and Lee does not teach
or suggest “to download an application to a client device; [and]
extract web resources from said application to a local file.”
(Claim 1). The Action cautions against “attacking references
individually where the rejections are based on combinations of
references.” (Action, p. 2). Similarly, the Action cannot cite
Lee's teachings about a web page and then change those
teachings to apply to an application, rather than a web page,
simply because Higgins talks about an application. Putting these
two references together does not change the fact that there is no
teaching or suggestion in either reference to “extract web
resources from said [downloaded] application to a local file.”
(Claim 1) (emphasis added). For at least this reason, the
rejection of claim 1 should not be sustained.
(App. Br. 13-14).
Appellants further contend that claim 1 recites a query for updates
where:
Additionally, claim 1 further recites to “query an external
server for web resource updates specific to at least one operating
condition specific to said client device.” This is explained in
Appellant’s [sic] specification as follows.
[0040] The external server (106) may include update
bundles for updates targeted to client devices with
different operating conditions. For example, some updates
may be specific to a particular type of operating system or
a particular version of a native container and may be
unsuited for applications running on client devices
operating with different types operating systems or
different versions of the native container. Thus, multiple
versions of an update may be made, with each version
tailored for specific operating conditions of the client
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device. On the other hand, some updates may be common
updates that are targeted to multiple operating conditions.
(Appellant’s [sic] specification, paragraph 0040).
If, for the sake of argument, the web page described by
Lee is considered to be an application, which it is not, and the
URLs extracted from the web page are considered to be web
resources extracted from an application, the combination still
cannot then teach or suggest to “query an external server for web
resource updates specific to at least one operating condition
specific to said client device.” The combination of Higgins and
Lee does not teach or suggest querying an eternal [sic, external]
server for changes to the URLs that previously referenced images
used in the underlying we [sic, web] page. This is further
problematic because if the URLs are changing, it may become
impossible to find the file referenced. Thus, the URLs described
by Lee are not likely to be subject to any updates at all. The
comparison of Higgins and Lee to claim 1 completely breaks
down at this point.
Additionally, even if the URLs were being updated and
Lee were suggesting to query for updated URLs, which it
certainly does not, that would still ignore the language in claim
1 that the query is for “web resource updates specific to at least
one operating condition specific to said client device. ” (Claim
1) (emphasis added). If a URL of an image stored online is
changed, that update is relevant to any client device seeking to
access that image. There is nothing “specific to at least one
operating condition specific to said client device ” about such a
hypothetical update to an image URL. (Claim 1). For this
additional reason, the combination of Higgins and Lee fails to
teach or suggest all the elements of claim 1.
Specifically, the combination of Higgins and Lee does not
teach or suggest “to download an application to a client device;
[and] extract web resources from said application to a local file,”
and to “query an external server for web resource updates
specific to at least one operating condition specific to said client
device.” (Claim 1). For at least this additional reason, the
rejection of claim 1 should not be sustained.
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(App. Br. 14—15). Appellants’ argument generally relies upon the context as
disclosed in the Specification, but does not identify any specific definition to
differentiate the conditions disclosed in the Higgins reference from the
claimed invention. (See generally Reply Br. 6—8).
“In the patentability context, claims are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretations . . . limitations are not to be read into the claims
from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Any special meaning assigned to a term
“must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from
common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the
field of the invention.” Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133
F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Helmsderfer v. Bobrick
Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A patentee
may act as its own lexicographer and assign to a term a unique definition
that is different from its ordinary and customary meaning; however, a
patentee must clearly express that intent in the written
description.”). Absent an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a
claim term, the words take on the ordinary and customary meanings
attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art. Brookhill-Wilk 1,
LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted).
The Examiner maintains “the examiner asserts that Higgins does teach
querying an external server for web resource updates specific to at least one
operating condition specific to said client device (par. 0091, 0149, 0156-
0159,0282).” (Ans. 6).
We note that figure 2 of the Higgins reference recognizes the software
operating platform in element 205, and figure 13 element 2503 recognizes
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the operating condition. Additionally, the Higgins reference discloses the
“method module is different from what is in the cache, the method processor
can replace the version of the method module in the cache with the latest
available version of the method module. Thus, the application can be hot
updated without having to restart or shutdown.” (Higgins 1156).
Consequently, we agree with the Examiner that some condition with
respect to the client device is used in determining updates to the specific
client device, and Appellants have not identified how the claimed invention
differentiates from the combination of the Higgins and Lee references.
Appellants generally contend that the combination of cited references
does not teach or suggest any of the claimed limitations beyond having “at
least one processor to access and execute computer readable instructions
stored on a computer readable storage medium.” (App. Br. 16).
We disagree with Appellants’ general contention and find Appellants’
argument does not show error in the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness
of independent claim 1.
Claim 18
With respect to independent claim 18, Appellants generally contend
that “Higgins and Lee are irrelevant to the claimed subject matter.” (App.
Br. 17). Appellants repeat the language of the claim multiple times and
generally contend that the Graham factors have not been shown by the
Examiner in the analysis and conclusion of obviousness. (App. Br. 17—18).
Appellants generally present similar arguments as addressed with
respect to independent claim 1, but with regards to a computer readable
program code as recited in the language of independent claim 18.
Appellants generally contend that the Examiner has not provided any
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analysis or explanation of how the relied upon paragraphs teach or suggest
the claimed invention. (App. Br. 17—18). We find Appellants’ arguments to
be unpersuasive for the same reasons as discussed above with independent
claim 1. Consequently, we sustain the obviousness rejection of independent
claim 18.
Claim 20
With respect to independent claim 20, Appellants contend that “the
combination of Higgins and Lee does not actually teach or suggest to
‘extract web resources from said application to local files.’” (App. Br. 19).
Appellants repeat the language of the claim multiple times and generally
contend that the Graham factors have not been shown by the Examiner in the
analysis and conclusion of obviousness. (App. Br. 19-21). Additionally,
Appellants contend that the Higgins reference does not mention a “native
container” and a “native container identification.” (App. Br. 20) (emphasis
omitted).
The Examiner generally responds and relies upon a mere listing of
paragraphs in the Higgins reference to teach the use of “a native container”
and “a native container identification.” (Ans. 8—9).
Appellants contend that the Higgins reference does not teach or
suggest the claimed “query an external server for web resource updates with
a query that contains a native container identification.” (See generally Reply
Br. 10-12).
We find the Examiner’s abbreviated response, which lists paragraphs
in the Higgins reference without further explanation, to be unresponsive to
an Appellants’ argument. We agree with Appellants that the Examiner has
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not shown that the Higgins nor the Lee reference teaches or suggests the use
of “a native container” and “a native container identification.”
Moreover, from our review of the identified portions of the Higgins
reference, we find no express teaching or disclosure of a “native container”
or a “native container version identification.” Nor has the Examiner
explained the relevant teachings from which the Examiner relies upon to
teach or suggest the claimed limitations.4 As a result, we cannot sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 20 and dependent claim 21.
Dependent claims 2, 4, 6, 8, 16, and 17
Claim 2
With respect to dependent claim 2, Appellants contend:
Higgins fails to describe, however, any teaching or suggestion of
a “native container” or that an operating condition on which a
web resource update is selected is a version of a native container,
i.e., “wherein said at least one operating condition comprises a
version of a native container used to implement said application.”
(Claim 2). The Action has failed to demonstrate anything
relevant in the cited reference to the subject matter of claim 2.
Consequently, the cited references will not support a rejection of
claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and Graham.
(Reply Br. 13).
The Examiner sets forth the same list of paragraphs for the native
container as set forth with respect to independent claim 20. Because we
found the Examiner’s response to Appellants’ argument unresponsive to
4 The Examiner should consider the references in the related cases which
teach the well-known use of “native” components and “containers.” See
Holmes 2008/0077941 Al, published Mar. 27, 2008
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show that the Higgins or the Lee reference teaches or suggests a native
container, we similarly find error in the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness of dependent claim 2.
Claim 4
With respect to dependent claim 4, Appellants repeat the language of
the claim and the portions of the Higgins reference relied upon and generally
contend “There is nothing here relevant to a web resource version.” (App.
Br. 24). Appellants additionally contend:
There is nothing in the cited references that approximate the
claimed “web resources.” Further, as demonstrated in the
Appeal Brief, there is no teaching or suggestion here that
selection of a web resource update is made based on a web
resource version, i.e., “where said at least one operating
condition comprises a web resource version.”
(Reply Br. 13).
The Examiner identifies paragraphs 15—24 and 150-155 to evidence
the web resource version. We agree with the Examiner that the Higgins
reference generally teaches and fairly suggests keeping track of the version
of the software and data. Specifically, the Higgins reference discloses:
During the execution of a workflow method which calls a method
module (or a task module), the method processor may check for
the latest version of the method module (or the task module). If
the latest available version of the method module is different
from what is in the cache, the method processor can replace the
version of the method module in the cache with the latest
available version of the method module. Thus, the application
can be hot updated without having to restart or shutdown the
application.
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(Higgins 1156) (See also Higgins Figures 22—27). As a result, Appellants’
general argument does not show error in the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness of dependent claim 4.
Claim 6
With respect to dependent claim 6, Appellants repeat the language of
the claim and generally contend:
However, the Action provides no analysis or explanation as to
how these paragraphs teach or suggest the claimed subject
matter.
In reality, Higgins does not even mention a native
container, let alone a native container version identification.
(App. Br. 25; see also Reply Br. 14).
With regards to the limitation “to cause said at least one processor to
send a query that comprises... ,” the Examiner maintains “Higgins does
teach the feature of ‘query an external server for web resource updates with
a query that contains a native container identification’ as shown in par.
0014-0015, 0086, 0089, 0157-0159, 0161, 0258-0259, 0282,” (Ans. 8). We
agree with the Examiner that the portions of the Higgins reference relied
upon teaches and suggests the tracking of the version and
requesting/querying for updates. As a result Appellants’ argument does not
show error in the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness of dependent claim
6.
Additionally, we note the language of parent independent claim 1
does not recite or detail a native container or a native container version
identification. Consequently, Appellants’ argument is solely directed to a
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non-functional descriptive material label for data which does not
differentiate the claimed invention from the prior art combination. As a
result, Appellants’ argument does not show error in the Examiner’s
conclusion of obviousness of dependent claim 6. (We note the difference
between dependent claim 2 which recited the condition was a version of the
native container, but in dependent claim 6, the content of data—rather than
the actual native container—is being claimed.)
Initially, we note that the features argued by Appellants merely
constitute non-function descriptive material and statements of intended use
of the recited applications. The claim simply recites “send a query that
comprises a native container version identification.” The act of “send[ing] a
query” the data is the same regardless of what the actual data
constitutes. Moreover, the steps utilized to produce the data (i.e., how the
data is produced) or the origin of the data (i.e., where (what application) the
data comes from) do not further limit the claimed invention either
functionally or structurally. The data/query sent constitutes non-functional
descriptive material, which “does not lend patentability to an otherwise
unpatentable computer-implemented product or process.” Ex parte Nehls,
88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889 (BPAI 2008) (precedential). See Ex parte Curry, 84
USPQ2d 1272, 1274 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (Fed. Cir. Appeal No.
2006-1003), aff’d, (Rule 36) (June 12, 2006) (“wellness-related” data in
databases and communicated on distributed network did not functionally
change either the data storage system or the communication system used in
the claimed method). See also In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Nehls, 88 USPQ2d at 1887—90 (discussing non-functional descriptive
material). Similarly, “[a]n[ Jintended use or purpose usually will not limit
the scope of the claim because such statements usually do no more than
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define a context in which the invention operates.” Boehringer Ingelheim
Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2003). Accordingly, we need not attribute any distinguishing character to
the asserted claim features. Consequently, Appellants’ argument does not
show error in the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness of dependent claim
6.
Claim 8
With respect to dependent claim 8, Appellants repeat the language of
the claim and generally contend that the Higgins reference does not teach the
claimed web resources. (App. Br. 25; see also Reply Br. 14). As discussed
above with regards to versions, we disagree with Appellants and find
Appellants’ argument to be unpersuasive of error in the Examiner’s
conclusion of obviousness of dependent claim 8.
Claims 16 and 17
With respect to claims 16 and 17, Appellants repeat the language of
the claims and generally contend that the cited portions of the Higgins
reference do not teach or suggest the claimed invention, and Appellants do
not provide further explanation. (App. Br. 26; Reply Br. 15—16). We
disagree with Appellants and find that the cited portions of the Higgins
reference generally discuss the use of status and sending updates of
resources which would be a form of “notice.” We further note that
Appellants have not identified any specific claim interpretation or
corresponding context from Appellants’ Specification with which to define
or differentiate the claimed limitations from the prior art combination. As a
result, Appellants’ general argument does not show error in the Examiner’s
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conclusion of obviousness of dependent claims 16 and 17, and we sustain
the rejection thereof.
CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1—25 under obviousness-
type double patenting. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 22—25
based upon anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102. The Examiner did not err in
rejecting independent claims 1 and 18 based upon obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103 and dependent claims 3, 5, 7, 9—15, and 19 not separately
argued. The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 4, 6, 8, 16, and 17
based upon obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, but the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 20 and dependent claims 2 and 21 based upon
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we summarily sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness-type double patenting rejection of claims 1—25; we sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 22—25; and we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 3—19 based upon obviousness, but we
reverse the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 20 and
dependent claims 2 and 21. No time period for taking any subsequent action
in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
19