Ex Parte Aldrey et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 14, 2018

13359992 (P.T.A.B. May. 14, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/359,992 01127/2012
25537 7590 05/16/2018
VERIZON
PA TENT MANAGEMENT GROUP
1320 North Court House Road
9th Floor
ARLINGTON, VA 22201-2909
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Raul I. Aldrey
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
20110621 9289
EXAMINER
OYEBISI, OJO 0
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/16/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
patents@verizon.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RAUL I. ALDREY, ANTHONY M. LEMUS,
DONALD H. REL YEA, and BRIAN F. ROBERTS
Appeal2016-005790
Application 13/359,992 1
Technology Center 3600
Before ALLEN. R. MacDONALD, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, and
JON M. JURGOV AN, Administrative Patent Judges.
JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1-3, 5-17, and 23-27. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm. 2
1 Appellants identify Verizon Communications Inc. as the real party in
interest. (Appeal Brief 4.)
2 Our Decision refers to the Specification ("Spec.") filed Jan. 27, 2012, the
Final Office Action ("Final Act.") mailed Apr. 2, 2015, the Appeal Brief
("App. Br.") filed Sept. 18, 2015, the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") mailed
Mar. 22, 2016, and the Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed May 11, 2016.
Appeal2016-005790
Application 13/359,992
CLAIMED INVENTION
The claims are directed to maintaining a customer premises profile
specifying customer premises equipment ("CPE") devices for which to track
near field communication ("NFC") transactions, and providing a service
based on the tracked NFC transactions. Spec. i-f 8. The service may
comprise a feature (such as media content) provided by a first CPE device
that is enabled when tracked NFC transactions indicate that a second CPE
device is located at the customer premises (i.e., a home or work place), and
that is disabled when tracked NFC transactions indicate the second device is
not at the customer premises. Spec. i-fi-134--38. For example, this provides a
parent the capability to restrict access to certain media content when NFC
transactions of the recited second device appear to indicate that the parent
(assumed to be in possession of the second device) is not present at the
premises. Claims 1, 23, and 25 are independent. Claims 1 and 12 are
reproduced below:
1. A method comprising:
maintaining, by a computing system, a customer premises
profile that is defined by a user of customer premises equipment
("CPE") devices and that specifies the CPE devices for which to
track near field communication ("NFC") transactions;
tracking, by the computing system, the NFC transactions
between the CPE devices that are specified by the customer
premises profile and that are located at a customer premises; and
providing, by the computing system, a service based on
the tracked NFC transactions between the CPE devices specified
by the customer premises profile and located at the customer
premises, wherein the providing of the service comprises:
enabling access to a feature provided by a first CPE
device included in the CPE devices specified by the
customer premises profile and located at the customer
premises when the tracked NFC transactions indicate that
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a second CPE device included in the CPE devices
specified by the customer premises profile is physically
located at the customer premises; and
disabling access to the feature provided by the first
CPE device included in the CPE devices specified by the
customer premises profile and located at the customer
premises such that an additional user of the first CPE
device is unable to access the feature when the tracked
NFC transactions indicate that the second CPE device
included in the CPE devices specified by the customer
premises profile is not physically located at the customer
premises.
12. The method of claim 1, wherein the service further
comprises providing a user credit rating based on the tracked
NFC transactions.
App. Br. 35, 38 ("Claims App") (emphasis added).
REJECTION
Claims 1-3, 5-17, and 23-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 6-8. 3
ANALYSIS
§ 1 OJ Rejection
Patent eligibility is a question of law. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674
F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, as follows:
3 The Examiner withdrew the claim objections and rejections based on
35 U.S.C. § 112, first and second paragraphs. See Advisory Action dated
Jul. 7, 2015.
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[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.
In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court emphasizes that patent
protection should not preempt "the basic tools of scientific and technological
work." Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012); Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). The rationale is that
patents directed to basic building blocks of technology would not "promote
the progress of science" under the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8, but instead would impede it. Accordingly, laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patent-eligible subject matter. Thales
Visionix Inc. v. U.S., 850 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Alice, 134
S. Ct. at 2354).
The Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for subject matter
eligibility in Alice. 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step is to determine
whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76-77). If so, then the eligibility analysis proceeds to the
second step of the Alice/ Mayo test in which we "examine the elements of the
claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to
'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application."
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 79). The "inventive
concept" may be embodied in one or more of the individual claim
limitations or in the ordered combination of the limitations. Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355. The "inventive concept" must be significantly more than the
abstract idea itself, and cannot be simply an instruction to implement or
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apply the abstract idea on a computer. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. "'[W]ell-
understood, routine, [and] conventional activit[ies]' previously known to the
industry" are insufficient to transform an abstract idea into patent-eligible
subject matter. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
Independent Claims 1, 23, and 25
Method claim 1 and system claim 25 recite similar limitations.
Claim 23 differs from these claims in specifying enabling or disabling access
to "media content" rather than the broader "feature" of claims 1 and 25. The
independent claims are argued together as a group. App. Br. 10-33. We
likewise address the independent claims as a group in our decision. See
47 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Appellants argue the Patent Office has not set forth a prima facie case
ofunpatentability under§ 101. App. Br. 10-14. Appellants argue the
Examiner must
[i]n the rejection, [1] identify the exception by referring to
where it is recited (i.e., set forth or described) in the claim and
[2] explain why it is considered an exception. Then, if the
claim includes additional elements, [3] identify the [additional]
elements in the rejection and [4] explain why they do not add
significantly more to the exception.
App. Br. 10-11 (citing 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,618, 74,624 (Dec. 16, 2014)); Reply Br. 6-8.
Specifically, Appellants contend the Examiner failed to establish a
prima facie case of unpatentability under § 101 because the Examiner does
not identify where the claims recite the abstract idea identified by the
Examiner. App. Br. 10-14, Reply Br. 6-9. In addition, Appellants contend
the Examiner's identification of the abstract idea is conclusory and does not
explain why the identified idea is abstract or amounts to "an idea of
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organizing human activities," nor does the Examiner cite to any relevant
cases or provide factual evidence for the assertion. Id.
Regarding step two of the Alice/Mayo test, Appellants also contend
the Examiner failed to identify the "additional elements" in each of the
claims, and argues the references cited by the Examiner, Baek and Arling,
fail to suggest the "disabling" operation recited in claim 1. App. Br. 12, 19-
24; Reply Br. 7-16. Appellants also argue "the claims are not currently
rejected under § 103, and the Patent Office's use of prior art in attempting to
set forth the§ 101 rejection is flawed." Id. Appellants further contend "the
Patent Office has not performed any§ 101 analysis with respect to any of
the additional elements recited in the dependent claims." App. Br. 12-13.
Finally, regarding preemption, Appellants argue
claim 1 would not pre-empt the field of providing a service and
enabling a feature based on tracked NFC transactions between
CPE devices specified by a profile and at a location in
circumstances that do not include disabling access to a feature in
the manner recited in claim 1, and the Patent Office has not
shown, nor can it show, that claim 1 would pre-empt all forms of
providing a service and enabling a feature based on tracked NFC
transactions between CPE devices specified by a profile and at a
location.
App. Br. 30-31; Reply Br. 24--31. Thus, Appellants emphasize the
claimed "disabling" in their pre-emption argument.
We do not agree with Appellants' arguments. Applying the test set
out by the Supreme Court, we first note the claimed methods (claims 1-3
and 5-17, 23, and 24) and systems (claims 25-27) fall within the respective
categories of "process" and "apparatus" in the statute, and thus ostensibly
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fall within the ambit of§ 101. However, this is not the end of the inquiry as
we must proceed to apply the Alice/Mayo test.
Under step one of Alice/Mayo, we agree with the Examiner the claims
are directed to the abstract idea of "providing a service and enabling4 a
feature based on tracked NFC 5 transactions between CPE devices 6 specified
by a profile and at a location." Final Act. 7. The claims do indeed recite
this abstract idea in the "maintaining," "tracking," and "providing" steps or
functions. The Examiner finds inter alia the abstract idea is either a
fundamental economic practice or a method of organizing human activities,
which are examples of judicially recognized abstract ideas set forth in Alice.
Final Act. 7; Ans. 2.
We agree with the Examiner that the identified idea recited in the
claims amounts to "a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our
4 We note that "enabling" implies the capability of "disabling" so the
Examiner's identification of the abstract idea agrees with what is recited in
the claims.
5 Near field communication (NFC) is a technology that allows two devices
in close proximity (in contact or within a few inches of each other) to
establish a wireless connection and exchange communications. Spec. ,-r 1.
6 A customer premises equipment (CPE) device "may include any device
that is physically located at a customer premises or that may be physically
located at a customer premises such as a home or workplace." Spec. ,-r 22.
Examples include appliances (e.g., a refrigerator, freezer, oven, stove,
microwave, furnace, air conditioning unit, water softener, water filter, etc.),
a utilities monitoring device (a gas or power consumption monitoring
device), personal computer, consumer electronics devices (e.g., a set-top box
device, digital video recorder device, gaming console, media server, router,
modem, etc.). Id. The CPE device may include an active or passive
NFC-enabled device. Id.
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system of commerce." Ans. 2; see Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356. For example,
credit card transactions had been performed using NFC-enabled mobile
phones for years prior to the claimed invention, as evidenced, for example,
by King, which was cited in the Final Office Action. Final Act. 7. See King
Abstract, i-f 375. In the typical NFC credit card transaction, a user places an
NFC-enabled mobile phone in close proximity to a point-of-sale (POS)
terminal to purchase an item. As described in the Specification, because the
NFC-enabled mobile phone and POS terminal may be located in a user's
home or work place, they are considered CPE devices. See Spec. i-f 22, and
footnote 6 above. Such NFC-enabled phones can be enabled or disabled to
perform NFC credit card transactions, and only communicate when the
mobile phone and POS terminal detect they are in close proximity to one
another. The mobile phone provides credit card information to the POS
terminal which communicates with the card issuer/bank using well-known
credit infrastructure to complete a purchase. The credit card is associated
with an account specifying the card holder's name, address, and phone
number, etc. (i.e., "profile") and the credit card transactions under the
account (including NFC transactions and the locations of the POS terminals
where the transactions occurred). The "user" and "additional user" can be
construed in various ways. For example, a parent (user) owning the mobile
phone may buy an item or service for a child (additional user). As another
example, a store clerk (user) assists a customer (additional user) in operating
the POS terminal. Credit card transactions, including NFC-enabled ones, are
certainly a "fundamental economic practice." In these scenarios, the
"service" may be regarded as provision of credit services using a credit card,
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and the "feature" may be regarded as the use of the NFC-enabled POS
terminal.
Moving on to step two of Alice/Mayo, we agree with the Examiner the
claims do not recite any "inventive concept" or "meaningful limitation" that
could transform the abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. See
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (quotation omitted) and Mayo at 73. Specifically,
the Examiner states
[T]he claims as a whole, considering all claim elements both
individually and in combination, do not amount to significantly
more than an abstract idea. The claim merely amounts to
applying the abstract idea (i.e. providing a service and enabling
a feature based on tracked NFC transactions between CPE
devices specified by a profile and at a location) on a computer,
and is considered to amount to nothing more than requiring a
generically described computer system merely to carry out the
abstract idea itself. This is because the claims do not effect an
improvement to another technology or technical field, the claims
do not amount to an improvement to the functioning of a
computer itself, and the claims do not move beyond a general
link of the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological
environment. Accordingly, the Examiner concludes that there
are no meaningful limitations in the claim that transform the
judicial exception into a patent eligible application such that the
claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception
itself. Therefore, the claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as
being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Final Act. 7-8. We agree with the Examiner's determinations.
In particular, the Examiner relied on the combination of Thompson
and King to teach tracking when a CPE device is in a profile and on the
premises. Final Act. 7. Thompson mentions collecting and maintaining
status of communication devices in a profile. Thompson Abstract. King
mentions receiving on a mobile client information relating to a transaction
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between the mobile client and a transaction host, using near-field
communication (NFC) link, and updating a user profile on the mobile client
based on the received transaction information, and receiving, selecting, and
displaying one or more targeted content messages on the mobile client based
on the updated user profile. King Abstract. The Examiner further states that
Baek teaches enabling access by automatically logging a user in or out of a
service and/or service feature, and that Arling teaches enabling home control
features such as location-based control setup and operation. Final Act. 7;
see, e.g., Baek i-f 63; Arling Abstract.
Thus, the Examiner demonstrates that the claimed invention is an
assemblage of things well-known in the art that does not add an "inventive
concept" to transform the recited abstract idea into a patent-eligible one. In
other words, maintaining a profile and tracking NFC transactions of
specified CPE devices (as taught by King and Thompson), and providing a
service based on tracked NFC transactions that involves enabling and
disabling a feature based on presence or absence of a device from customer
premises (as taught by Baek and Arling) were well-known in the art.
Accordingly, Appellants have not shown the claimed invention is more than
the combination of well-known things from the prior art that are combined
and used according to their established purposes yielding predictable results,
or that there is any meaningful limitation resulting from the combination that
amounts to "significantly more" than the abstract idea itself.
In this regard, we note that the claims do not recite that any element
determines the location of a CPE device based on tracked NFC transactions.
As such, the claims can be broadly but reasonably construed as meaning the
tracked NFC transactions merely reflect an enabled NFC transaction
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capability (the claimed "feature") associated with a credit card service
("service") when an NFC-enabled mobile phone ("second CPE device") is
near a POS terminal ("first CPE device") on customer premises (home or
workplace of the claimed "user") and a disabled NFC transaction capability
when the NFC-enabled mobile phone is not near a POS terminal on
customer premises. In other words, the claims do not recite determining
when the first CPE device is on customer premises using tracked NFC
transactions that result from the second CPE device interacting with CPE
devices other than the first CPE device. The inquiry is "whether the claims
[] focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery." McRO,
Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(citing Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1048
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). In the absence of any claim element to determine where
the second CPE device is located relative to the customer premises based on
tracked NFC transactions with devices other than the first CPE device, the
claims recite no element that constitutes a technical improvement but instead
recite a mere result or effect invoking generic machinery such as used in
NFC-enabled credit card transactions.
That the claimed methods or systems involve a "computing system"
does not transform the claimed invention into a patent-eligible application of
the abstract idea. "For the role of a computer in a computer-implemented
invention to be deemed meaningful in the context of this analysis, it must
involve more than performance of 'well-understood, routine, [and]
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conventional activities previously known to the industry."' Content
Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass 'n, 776 F.3d
1343, 1347--48 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at
73)). "The mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-
ineligible idea into a patent-eligible invention." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358.
Maintaining a profile, tracking NFC transactions between CPE devices, and
providing a service involving enabling and disabling a feature, are well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities computers were well-known
to perform, as indicated by the cited references.
The meaning ascribed to the term "CPE device" in the Specification is
broad and depends on whether a device is something that is or may be
located at a customer's premises. See footnote 6. Where a device is located,
however, does not generally change its structure or functionality. Thus, the
term "CPE device" is not a meaningful limitation in these claims,
particularly considering the vast breadth of what is encompassed by "CPE
device." The term as claimed is the sort of "vague" description determined
insufficient to confer eligibility. See In re TL! Commc 'ns. LLC Patent Litig.,
823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("Such vague, functional descriptions of
server components are insufficient to transform the abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention.").
Moreover, "service" and "feature" are virtually unrestricted in what
they may be in the claimed invention. According to the Specification, "[t]he
services and/or service features may make the performance of one or more
user activities more efficient, convenient and/or reliable than before." Spec.
i-f 10. Almost any service or feature falls within this description. As a result,
the claims cover an enormous range of possibilities, and fail to recite a
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patent-eligible application of the abstract idea embodied therein. See, e.g.,
TL!, 823 F.3d at 613 (holding that claims failed to recite any elements that
individually or as an ordered combination transformed the abstract idea of
classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner into a
patent-eligible application of that abstract idea); see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79). Accordingly, we agree with the
Examiner that the claims do not recite an "inventive concept" sufficient to
transform the claimed invention into a patent-eligible one.
We also note that significant preemption would result from a patent
on maintaining a customer premises profile specifying CPE devices,
tracking NFC transactions between CPE devices specified by the profile and
located at customer premises, and providing a service based on the tracked
NFC transactions in which the service comprises enabling a feature of one
CPE device when the NFC transactions indicate presence of another CPE
device at the customer premises, and disabling the feature when the NFC
transactions indicate the other CPE device is not at the customer premises.
Well-known technologies would be foreclosed by a patent on the claimed
invention, such as NFC credit card transactions using a mobile phone and
POS terminal. As mentioned, the terms "computer system," "CPE devices,"
"service," and "feature" are broadly defined in the claimed invention and
would significantly foreclose use of the abstract idea embodied in the
claims. Even if the claims do not entirely preempt use of the abstract idea,
"the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Considering all of the foregoing, we determine that the claims as
presented are directed to non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Dependent Claim 11
Claim 11 recites "[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the service further
comprises providing a maintenance notification based on the tracked NFC
transactions, the maintenance notification configured to notify a user of a
recommended maintenance activity for a CPE device included in the CPE
devices specified by the customer premises profile and located at the
customer premises." App. Br. 38 (Claims App'x). Appellants argue that
these "additional features" of claim 11 "improve the functioning of the CPE
devices located at the customer premises by increasing efficiency of the CPE
devices" and "ensure that claim 11 does not pre-empt all practical
applications of the asserted abstract idea of providing a service and enabling
a feature based on tracked NFC transactions between CPE devices specified
by a profile and at a location." Id. at 33-34 (citing Spec. i-f 57). We are not
persuaded by Appellants' arguments.
Claim 11 incorporates the defects of claim 1 by dependency and does
not recite a patent-eligible invention. Claim 11 is directed to the abstract
idea of providing a maintenance notification, and the claim does not recite
an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claim into a patent-eligible
one.
For example, Baek teaches
The home network system includes a master device which
is a home appliance for controlling an operation of the other
home appliances or monitoring a status thereof, and a slave
device which is a home appliance having a function of
responding to the request of the master device and a function of
notifying a status change according to properties of the home
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appliances or other factors. Here, the home appliances include
home appliances for the living network service such as a washing
machine and a refrigerator as well as home appliances for the IT
network service and the AV network service.
Baek i-f 6. A person of ordinary skill would have appreciated that notifying a
user of a status change according to properties of the home appliances at
least suggests the possibility that the home appliance is not working properly
and constitutes a recommendation of performance of a maintenance
activity. 7 Accordingly, the claim recites a limitation known in the art and
does not provide an "inventive concept" to transform the claim into
patent-eligible subject matter. Moreover, preemption posed by the claim is
significant and virtually unrestricted in terms of what the CPE device or
recommended maintenance activity might be.
For these reasons as well as those stated above with respect to claim 1,
we determine dependent claim 11 is not patent-eligible.
Dependent Claim 12
Claim 12 depends from claim 1 and thus incorporates the mentioned
deficiencies. Although claim 12 was not separately argued on appeal, we
draw attention to this claim because it recites that "the service further
comprises providing a user credit rating based on the tracked NFC
transactions." Providing a user credit rating is a "fundamental economic
practice." Basing it on tracked NFC transactions, which were well-known
and do not amount to an "inventive step," does not provide "significantly
more" than the abstract idea embodied in the claim.
7 We note that appliances such as washing machines and dryers have been
manufactured for years before the claimed invention to display error codes
that notify users of malfunctions and needed repairs.
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Our reviewing court has found claims in similar cases to be ineligible.
For example, in Dealertrack, supra, the court found claims directed to
computer-aided processing of credit applications over electronic networks
statutorily ineligible. In Smart Systems Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017), our reviewing court found
ineligible for patent protection claims that were directed to validating entry
into a transit system using a bank card terminal and credit or debit cards.
Similarly, Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Services Inc., 811
F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) held claims directed to assisting borrowers to
obtain loans patent-ineligible.
Because credit rating is a common practice in the credit industry, and
because our reviewing court has found similar cases involving credit to be
ineligible, we likewise find claim 12 directed to ineligible subject matter.
We further note that claim 12 is necessarily narrower in scope than
claim 1 due to its dependency. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 4th paragraph. Thus, claim
12 also establishes that claim 1 encompasses ineligible subject matter. For
this additional reason, we determine that claim 1 is directed to ineligible
subject matter.
Remaining Claims
No further arguments are submitted for the remaining dependent
claims, which fall for the reasons stated for their respective independent
claims. See 3 7 C.F .R. § 41.3 7 ( c )( 1 )(iv).
DECISION
We affirm the rejection of claims 1-3, 5-17, and 23-27 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
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AFFIRMED
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