Ex Parte Akiyoshi et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 21, 2019

14357840 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 21, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
14/357,840 05/13/2014 Koichi Akiyoshi
22850 7590 05/23/2019
OBLON, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P.
1940 DUKE STREET
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
433385US8PCT 7819
EXAMINER
PELTON, NATHANIEL R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/23/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentdocket@oblon.com
OBLONPAT@OBLON.COM
iahmadi@oblon.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KOICHI AKIYOSHI and YOICHI URAMOTO
Appeal2017-009625
Application 14/357,840
Technology Center 2800
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
STEPHEN E. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
all pending claims, namely, claims 1, 3---6, and 8-17. App. Br. 2. An oral
hearing via videoconference was held on May 16, 2019 in both this appeal
and related appeal No. 2018-000409. A joint transcript of the combined
hearings will be placed in the record in due course. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify SONY CORPORATION as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 1.
Appeal2017-009625
Application 14/357,840
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Claimed Invention
Appellants' invention generally relates to a wireless charging system,
or more particularly, "a power feeding system that performs power supply
( electricity transmission, or power transmission) in a noncontact manner to a
power-feeding objective unit such as an electronic unit." Spec. ,r 1.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject
matter on appeal:
1. A power feeding unit, comprising:
a power transmission circuit performing power
transmission using one of a magnetic field and an electric field
to a power-feeding objective unit having a battery; and
a power transmission controller controlling a power
transmission operation of the power transmission circuit,
wherein the power transmission controller:
allows the power transmission operation to be suspended
when charge of the battery is completed based on power provided
through the power transmission, and
allows the power transmission operation to be restarted
based on whether or not the power-feeding objective unit is in an
activated state and whether or not a quantity of power remaining
in the battery is equal to or larger than a predetermined threshold
after completion of the charge.
App. Br. i (Claims Appendix).
References
The Examiner relied on the following references as evidence of
unpatentability of the claims on appeal:
Park
Sugaya
Takahashi
US 2008/0211455 Al
US 2009/0251008 Al
US 2010/0066305 Al
2
Sept. 4, 2008
Oct. 8, 2009
Mar. 18, 2010
Appeal2017-009625
Application 14/357,840
Matsumoto (W0)2 WO 2011/118371 Al
Matsumoto (US) US 2012/0313579 Al
(as English translation)
Rejections
Sept. 29, 2011
Dec. 13, 2012
The Examiner made the following rejections of the claims on appeal:
Claims 1, 3-5, 8-12, and 14--17 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as obvious over Takahashi and Matsumoto (WO).
Claim 6 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as obvious
over Takahashi, Matsumoto (WO), and Sugaya.
Claim 13 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
obvious over Takahashi, Matsumoto (WO), and Park.
ANALYSIS 3
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3---6, and
8-17 as obvious under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § I03(a). See App. Br. 3-7;
Reply Br. 2--4. Appellants argue these pending claims as a group. See App.
Br. 2, 3, 7. Thus, for purposes of our analysis, we select independent
claim 1 as the representative claim, and any claim not argued separately will
2 The Examiner considers Matsumoto (US) to be the English translation of
Matsumoto (WO) (Final Act. 3), and cites to Matsumoto (US) in the Final
Action and Examiner's Answer. Appellants do not dispute the Examiner's
reliance on Matsumoto (US) as a translation, and also cite to Matsumoto
(US) in their briefs. As such, we too cite to Matsumoto (US) herein and do
so simply as "Matsumoto."
3 Throughout this Decision, we have considered Appellants' Appeal Brief
filed January 18, 2017 ("App. Br."); Appellants' Reply Brief filed July 3,
2017; the Examiner's Answer mailed May 3, 2017 ("Ans."); the Final Office
Action mailed August 19, 2016 ("Final Act."); and Appellants' Specification
filed May 13, 2014 ("Spec.").
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Application 14/357,840
stand or fall with our analysis of the rejection of claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) (2016).
Appellants argue "the combination of the teachings of Takahashi and
Matsumoto would [not] have rendered obvious the subject matter of
independent claims 1, 14, and 15." App. Br. 3. We tum to the teachings of
Takahashi and Matsumoto and the Examiner's findings.
Takahashi is generally directed to a contactless charging system that
recharges an electronic device, like a mobile phone, with electric power
supplied from a charger. Takahashi ,r 1. Takahashi discloses:
[I]n the case that the mobile phone 100 again needs recharging
after completion of recharge, the contactless charging system is
imparted with a function of restarting charge in the present
embodiment. When the mobile phone 100 is left on the
contactless charger 200 after having finished being recharged,
there are cases where the voltage of the battery cell 160
decreases. Even in such a case, the contactless charging system
of the present embodiment is arranged so as to automatically
restart charge, thereby enhancing usability. . . . When the
voltage detected by the voltage detection circuit 178 has
decreased to a predetermined value or less, the determination
circuit 179 transmits to the control section 171 a voltage drop
status showing that the voltage has decreased to a predetermined
value or less. The control section 1 71 transmits a recharge
command for requesting recharge to the contactless charger 200
Takahashi ,r 135 (emphases added). Based in part on this disclosure, the
Examiner finds "Takahashi discloses the power transmission operation
restarting but does not explicitly disclose whether or not the power-feeding
objective unit is in an activated state." Final Act. 4. The Examiner further
explains: "Even though Takahashi teaches initiating recharging when the
electronic device's battery drops in voltage, as the Final Office Action states,
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Application 14/357,840
Takahashi failed to explicitly disclose determining [i.e., doing so] when the
electronic device is in an activated state." Ans. 3 (emphasis added).
Like Takahashi, Matsumoto also is generally directed to "a contactless
power supply device that uses electromagnetic induction to perform power
transmission between devices in a contactless manner." Matsumoto ,r 1.
Matsumoto discloses that "input current may increase at a timing at which
the current consumption of the contactless power reception device 20
increases ( e.g., when the cell phone receives a call or when a backlight is
illuminated)." Matsumoto ,r 56 (emphases added). Based on this disclosure,
the Examiner finds "Matsumoto teaches determining whether or not a
power-feeding objective unit is in an activated state." Final Act. 4. The
Examiner further explains:
[I]n Matsumoto the portion of the "cell phone receives a call"
and "when a backlight is illuminated" results with the current
consumption of the electronic device being increased which is
what the rejection is equating to the claimed activated state. For
example, when the electronic device is activated by a phone call
or illumination of the backlight the current consumption of the
electronic device is increased and consequentially depletes
energy from the battery, i.e. a drop in battery voltage, and
therefore is in an activated state. The combination of the
references results with the benefit of ensuring the electronic
device stays fully charged even during an activated state in which
the power consumption is increased and depletes the battery.
Ans. 3.
Appellants argue Takahashi and Matsumoto do not teach allowing a
power transmission operation to be restarted based on whether or not the
power-feeding objective unit is in an activated state. See App. Br. 4--7;
Reply Br. 2--4. Appellants also argue that Matsumoto's disclosure of input
current increasing when the cell phone receives a call or when a backlight is
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Application 14/357,840
illuminated is disclosed in the context of a "charging state," not restarting
charging, as claimed. See App. Br. 5. However, Appellants do not explain
why this principle of a cell phone drawing increased current upon receiving
a call is limited to only a charging state. Appellants further argue the
Examiner improperly "bifurcat[ es] one clause from the rest" of the relevant
claim language, and fails "to consider the teachings of Matsumoto as a
whole." App. Br. 6-7; see Reply Br. 2-3. We find Appellants' arguments
unpersuasive.
In particular, we agree with the Examiner and find:
(1) Takahashi teaches automatically restarting charging in "cases
where the voltage of the battery cell 160 decreases" (Takahashi ,r 135; see
Final Act. 4; Ans. 3);
(2) Takahashi teaches restarting charging where the voltage of a
mobile phone battery "has decreased to a predetermined value or less" after
completion of recharge (Takahashi ,r 135; see Final Act. 4; Ans. 3); and
(3) Matsumoto teaches such cases where voltage of a battery cell
decreases include "when a cell phone receives a call or when a backlight is
illuminated," which cases constitute an "activated state" of the phone, as
admitted by Appellants (Matsumoto ,r 56; see Final Act. 4; Ans. 3; App.
Br. 5 (Appellants admitting it "may be considered to be the case" that
Matsumoto teaches "determining when the electronic device is in an
activated state.")). We conclude that the combination of Takahashi and
Matsumoto teaches or fairly suggests Appellants' claim 1, including
restarting charging based on whether or not a power-feeding objective unit,
such as a mobile phone, is in an activated state, such as receiving a call, and
whether or not power remaining in a battery of the power-feeding objective
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unit is equal to or larger than a predetermined threshold after completion of
the charge. See In re Burckel, 592 F .2d 117 5, 1179 (CCP A 1979)
("[A] reference must be considered not only for what it expressly teaches,
but also for what it fairly suggests.").
Appellants also argue the Examiner's combination of Takahashi and
Matsumoto is based on "impermissible hindsight reasoning." App. Br. 5. It
is improper to base a conclusion of obviousness upon facts gleaned only
through hindsight. "To draw on hindsight knowledge of the patented
invention, when the prior art does not contain or suggest that knowledge, is
to use the invention as a template for its own reconstruction-an illogical
and inappropriate process by which to determine patentability." Sensonics,
Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing W.L.
Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
"Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction
based upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only
knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the
claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only
from applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper." In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1313-14 (CCPA 1971). Here, the Examiner
expressly relies on specific disclosures of Takahashi and Matsumoto to
support the proposed combination, and has provided "some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007).
For example, in the Final Action, the Examiner explained:
[I]t would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in
the art at the time the invention was made to modify Takahashi
to determine whether or not the power-feeding objective unit is
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in an activated state as taught by Matsumoto for the benefit of
restarting charge (supplying power) when the objective unit is
subjected to increased current demands as stated by Matsumoto
thereby ensuring the battery remains in a fully charged state.
Final Act. 4 ( emphasis added). In the Answer, the Examiner further
explained: "The combination of the references results with the benefit of
ensuring the electronic device stays fully charged even during an activated
state in which the power consumption is increased and depletes the battery."
Ans. 3 ( emphasis added). We agree with the Examiner's reasoning, and also
find Takahashi's open-ended teaching of automatically restarting charging in
"cases where the voltage of the battery cell 160 decreases" for the benefit of
"enhancing usability" gives even more reason for the skilled artisan to
consider and incorporate Matsumoto's teaching of such cases including
when a cell phone receives a call or when a backlight is illuminated (i.e.,
activates states). See Takahashi ,r 135 (emphasis added). For the foregoing
reasons, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error in combining Takahashi and
Matsumoto.
To the extent that Appellants argue nonobviousness of claim 1 by
attacking Takahashi and Matsumoto individually (see, e.g., App. Br. 4--7;
Reply Br. 4 ( e.g., last paragraph)), this is improper. One cannot show
nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are
based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426
(CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
For the reasons discussed supra, we sustain the Examiner's rejection
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 1, 3-6, and 8-17, which
Appellants argued as a group as noted above.
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Application 14/357,840
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's obviousness rejections of claims 1, 3---6,
and 8-17.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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