Ex Parte Akazaki et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 14, 2014

11806447 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 14, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte SHUSUKE AKAZAKI, MITSUO HASHIZUME,
TAKAHIDE MIZUNO, and YUJI YAMAMOTO
____________________

Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447
Technology Center 3700
____________________

Before: EDWARD A. BROWN, THOMAS F. SMEGAL,
and MICHAEL L. WOODS, Administrative Patent Judges.

WOODS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Shusuke Akazaki et al. (“Appellants”) seek our review under 35
U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1, 6, and 11. Appeal Br. 2.
Claims 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, and 15 have been canceled and claims 3, 4, 8, 9, 13,
and 14 have been withdrawn. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The Appellants’ invention is directed to ignition timing control for an
internal combustion engine. See, e.g., Spec. 1. Claim 1 is representative of
the subject matter on appeal, and is reproduced below, with emphasis on the
key disputed claim limitations.
1. An ignition timing control apparatus for an internal
combustion engine, comprising:
ignition timing determining means for determining
ignition timings for a plurality of cylinders of said internal
combustion engine on a cylinder-by-cylinder basis;
knock intensity parameter detecting means for detecting a
knock intensity parameter indicative of the intensity of
knocking on a cylinder-by-cylinder basis;
correction degree parameter calculating means for
calculating a correction degree parameter indicative of a degree
to which the ignition timing should be corrected toward a
retarding side in accordance with the detected knock intensity
parameter on a cylinder-by-cylinder basis;
first correcting means for correcting the ignition timing
toward the retarding side on a cylinder-by-cylinder basis in
accordance with the calculated correction degree parameter,
wherein said correction degree parameter
calculating means calculates the correction degree parameter
only for one cylinder corresponding to one of the knock
intensity parameters when the one knock intensity parameter is
larger than a predetermined first determination value and is
smaller than a predetermined second determination value larger
than the predetermined first determination value, and calculates
the correction degree parameters for all the cylinders when the
one knock intensity parameter is equal to or larger than the
predetermined second determination value, and
wherein said knock intensity parameter detecting
means comprises
cylinder inner pressure parameter detecting
means for detecting a cylinder inner pressure parameter
Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447

3
indicative of a cylinder inner pressure on a cylinder-by-cylinder
basis,
engine rotational speed detecting means for
detecting the rotational speed of said internal combustion
engine as an engine rotational speed, and
knock intensity parameter calculating means
for calculating the knock intensity parameter based on a filtered
value derived by applying predetermined bandpass filtering to
the cylinder inner pressure parameter, and setting a pass band of
the predetermined bandpass filtering in accordance with the
detected engine rotational speed;
maximum pressure angle detecting means for detecting a
crank angle position at which the cylinder inner pressure
presents a maximum value in the combustion cycle as a
maximum pressure angle on a cylinder-by-cylinder basis based
on the cylinder inner pressure parameter;
intake pipe inner pressure detecting means for detecting
an intake pipe inner pressure;
basic target angle calculating means for calculating a
basic target angle in accordance with the engine rotational
speed and the detected intake pipe inner pressure such that the
basic target angle is set at a more retarded value as the engine
rotational speed is higher in a high rotation range;
target angle setting means for setting a target angle to
which the maximum pressure angle is targeted on a cylinder-
by-cylinder basis by correcting the calculated basic target
angle in accordance with the detected maximum pressure
angle; and
second correcting means for correcting the ignition
timing on a cylinder-by-cylinder basis using a sliding mode
control algorithm such that the maximum pressure angle
reaches the target angle,
wherein said correction degree parameter
calculating means calculates the correction degree parameter
for the one cylinder corresponding to the one knock intensity
parameter to be a larger value of the degree to which the
ignition timing is corrected toward the retarding side when the
one knock intensity parameter is larger than the predetermined
first determination value than when the one knock intensity
Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447

4
parameter is equal to or smaller than the predetermined first
determination value, and
said target angle setting means sets the target
angle for the one cylinder to a more retarding side when the
one knock intensity parameter is larger than the predetermined
first determination value than when the one knock intensity
parameter is equal to or smaller than the predetermined first
determination value.

EVIDENCE
The Examiner relied on the following evidence in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Iida
Tanaya
Christensen
Tanaka ’454
Tanaka ’382
Vukovich
US 4,483,295
US 6,789,409 B2
US 7,292,933 B2
US 4,802,454
US 4,718,382
US 5,857,162
Nov. 20, 1984
Sept. 14, 2004
Nov. 6, 2007
Feb. 7, 1989
Jan. 12, 1988
Jan. 5, 1999
Yamaguchi

US 6,609,493

Aug. 26, 2003
THE REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 6, and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Iida in view of Tanaya, Christensen, Tanaka ’454
and/or Tanaka ’382, Vukovich, and Yamaguchi. Answer 5.

ANALYSIS
Claim 1
In contending the rejection of claim 1, the Appellants present several
arguments, which we address separately, below.
Basic Target Angle Calculating Means
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner found that “Vukovich discloses
basic target angle calculating means for calculating a basic target angle
Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447

5
(spark timing) in accordance with the engine rotational speed and the
detected intake pipe inner pressure.” Answer 10 (citing Vukovich, col. 2, ll.
46–50) (italicized emphasis added).
In response, the Appellants contend that Vukovich does not disclose
the claimed “basic target angle calculating means.” See Appeal Br. 19–20.
In particular, the Appellants argue that, instead of disclosing the claimed
“basic target angle,” Vukovich simply discloses spark timing as a function
of engine speed and manifold absolute pressure. Id. The Appellants further
contend that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been
motivated to configure the [electronic spark timing] unit of Vukovich for
calculating ‘a basic target angle in accordance with the engine rotational
speed and the detected intake pipe inner pressure.’” Id. at 20; see also Reply
Br. 6.
During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given
their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.
See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404–05 (CCPA 1969). Furthermore, the
interpretation must be consistent with the one that those skilled in the art
would reach. In re Cortright, 165 F. 3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Here, the Appellants appear to argue that the Examiner’s
interpretation of the claimed term “basic target angle” is incorrect, but do not
otherwise propose a different interpretation. See Appeal Br. 12–22; see also
Reply Br. 3–9; see also Answer 16. In particular, the Appellants have not
provided an alternative definition and have not identified any inconsistency
between the Examiner’s interpretation and the Specification. See Appeal Br.
12–22; see also Reply Br. 3–9. We also note that the Examiner’s
interpretation—where the claimed “basic target angle” is for spark timing—
Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447

6
is consistent with the Specification and consistent with the one that those
skilled in the art would reach. See Answer 16 and 17; see also, e.g., Spec.
41, ll. 13–14; 43, ll. 1–13; and Figs. 6 and 7). For these reasons, we agree
with the Examiner that a broad, but reasonable, construction of the term
“basic target angle” includes Vukovich’s spark timing. See Answer 17.
We also agree with the Examiner’s finding that Vukovich’s
scheduling of spark timing, which is based on engine speed and manifold
absolute pressure, meets the claim limitation of “calculating a basic target
angle in accordance with the engine rotational speed and the detected intake
pipe inner pressure.” Vukovich, col. 2, ll. 42–50; Answer 15. Notably, the
Appellants have not presented persuasive arguments to explain why
Vukovich’s “engine speed” or “manifold absolute pressure” might be
different from the claimed “engine rotational speed” or “intake pipe inner
pressure,” respectively.
Furthermore, if the Appellants’ intention is to argue that the prior art
does not disclose the claimed “calculating a basic target angle . . . such that
the basic target angle is set at a more retarded value as the engine rotational
speed is higher in a high rotation range,” we disagree. As correctly found by
the Examiner, it is well known that spark timing is retarded at higher engine
speeds. Answer 11 (citing Yamaguchi, col. 11, ll. 28–32).
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by the Appellants’
argument that the prior art, including Vukovich, does not disclose the
claimed “basic target angle.”
Target Angle Setting Means
The Examiner also found that Tanaka ’382 discloses an engine control
system comprising a “target angle setting means for setting a target angle to
Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447

7
which the maximum pressure angle is targeted on a cylinder-by-cylinder
basis . . . [that] sets the target angle for the one cylinder to a more retarding
side to suppress knocking.” Answer 9 (citing Tanaka ’382, Abstract).
In response, the Appellants contend that Tanaka ’382 does not
disclose or suggest the claimed “target angle setting means.” Appeal Br.
20–21; Reply Br. 7–8. In support of their argument, the Appellants simply
recite a paragraph in Tanaka ’382 (“Excerpt”) and the claim limitation
relating to “target angle setting means.” See Appeal Br. 20–21 (citing
Tanaka ’382, col. 7, ll. 31–45); see also Reply Br. 7–8.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011) requires more substantive
arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and
a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the
prior art. See also In re Lovin 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Here, we agree with the Examiner that, in the Appellants’ Appeal
Brief, “there is no actual argument . . . [and that the] Appellant[s have] not
presented any argument to counter Examiner’s position other than to allege
that Tanaka [’382] does not disclose a set of features.” Answer 18.
We also struggle to understand how the Appellants’ recitation of the
Tanaka ’382 Excerpt supports their argument. First, the Excerpt cited by the
Appellants is not the same disclosure relied upon by the Examiner in support
of this rejection. See Appeal Br. 20–21 (citing Tanaka ’382, col. 7, ll. 31–
45); see also Answer 9 (citing Tanaka ’382, Abstract). Second, we agree
with the Examiner that the Excerpt instead supports the Examiner’s position.
See Answer 19. In particular, we agree with the Examiner that the Excerpt,
which includes “the target maximum-pressure angle Θpo is altered in the
retarding direction so as to prevent knocking . . . is essentially the full extent
Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447

8
to which the Examiner relied on Tanaka ’382, as set forth in the rejections.”
Id.; see also Appeal Br. 21.
As the Appellants have not apprised us of error in the Examiner’s
reliance on Tanaka ’382, we are not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument
that the prior art, including Tanaka ’382, does not disclose the claimed
“target angle setting means.”
Prima Facie Case for Obviousness
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner combined the teachings of Iida with
Tanaya, Christensen, Tanaka ’454 and/or Tanaka ’382, Vukovich, and
Yamaguchi. Answer 5.
The Appellants argue that “as evidenced by the large number of
references cited in making the obviousness rejection,” the obviousness
rejection is based on impermissible hindsight analysis. Appeal Br. 21–22.
The Appellants also argue that “[i]t is well established in U.S. patent law
that a piecemeal analysis of a number of references . . . is improper absent
some teaching or suggestion in the references.” Id. at 22; see also Reply Br.
4. The Appellants further contend that there exists a “lack of evidence that a
person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had the knowledge or
motivation necessary to yield the claimed invention.” Reply Br. 4.
As reliance on a large number of references in a rejection does not,
without more, weigh against the obviousness of the claimed invention, we
are not convinced that the Examiner used impermissible hindsight simply by
combining multiple prior art references. See In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
Furthermore, the Appellants’ contention that it “is improper absent
some teaching or suggestion in the references,” to combine multiple
Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447

9
references in making an obviousness rejection, is foreclosed by the Supreme
Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
Appeal Br. 22; see also Reply Br. 4. In particular, the Court rejected the
rigid requirement of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known
elements in order to show obviousness. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415.
Furthermore, the test for obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is
expressly suggested in any one or all of the references, but whether the
claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in
the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. See In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Rejections on obviousness
grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements, however, there
must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977,
988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418.
In the present case, the Examiner provided the needed reasoning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See Answer 8–11. Further,
other than the general allegation that the Examiner “has failed to provide a
prima facie case for obviousness,” the Appellants have not specifically
identified error in the Examiner’s reliance on the combination of Iida,
Tanaya, Christensen, Tanaka ’454, Tanaka ’382, Vukovich, or Yamaguchi.
Reply Br. 5; see also Appeal Br. 12–13, 21–22; see also Reply Br. 3–5.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument that the
Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case for obviousness.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not apprised of error and sustain the
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Appeal 2012-009687
Application 11/806,447

10
Iida in view of Tanaya, Christensen, Tanaka ’454 and/or Tanaka ’382,
Vukovich, and Yamaguchi.
Claim 6
In contending the rejection of claim 6, the Appellants present the same
arguments as discussed above in connection with claim 1. Appeal Br. 25;
Reply Br. 3–9. For the same reasons discussed supra, we are not apprised of
error and sustain the rejection of claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Iida in view of Tanaya, Christensen, Tanaka ’454 and/or
Tanaka ’382, Vukovich, and Yamaguchi.
Claim 11
In contending the rejection of claim 11, the Appellants also present
the same arguments as discussed above in connection with claim 1. Appeal
Br. 29; Reply Br. 3–9. For the same reasons discussed supra, we are not
apprised of error and sustain the rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Iida in view of Tanaya, Christensen,
Tanaka ’454 and/or Tanaka ’382, Vukovich, and Yamaguchi.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 6, and 11 as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Iida in view of Tanaya, Christensen, Tanaka
’454 and/or Tanaka ’382, Vukovich, and Yamaguchi is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED
Klh