Ex parte AHAMED et al.

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Oct 21, 1998

07666162 (B.P.A.I. Oct. 21, 1998)

Application for patent filed March 7, 1991.1
1
Paper No. 24
THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today
(1) was not written for publication in a law journal and
(2) is not binding precedent of the Board.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
_______________
Ex parte SYED V. AHAMED
and VICTOR B. LAWRENCE
______________
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,1621
_______________
ON BRIEF
_______________
Before URYNOWICZ, THOMAS and JERRY SMITH, Administrative
Patent Judges.
JERRY SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134
from the examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11,
13, 14 and 17-36. Claims 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15 and 16 have been
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
2
indicated as containing allowable subject matter.
The disclosed invention pertains to a multiprocessor
system which combines advantages of synchronous and
asynchronous operation. Tasks are divided into subtasks and
are assigned to
a plurality of processors in sizes which are related to the
operating rates of the individual processors.
Representative claim 1 is reproduced as follows:
1. A multiprocessor system comprising:
a plurality of processors operating in parallel and all
operating synchronously with each other, at least some of the
processors each operating to process a task at a different
rate so that each processor of the at least some of the
processors processes the task in a different amount of time
than the other processors;
first means connected to the plurality of processors, for
receiving a task comprising a sequence of a plurality of
subtasks and distributing portions of the received task to
individual ones of the processors for processing, each portion
comprising at least one subtask and the subtasks of each
portion being sequential in said sequence, the portions being
directly proportional in size to the operating rates of the
individual processors so that each individual processor
processes the portion of the task that is distributed to the
individual processor in a same amount of time as the other
processors process the portions distributed to them, the first
means distributing sequential said portions to the plurality
of processors in inverse order of the operating rates of the
processors such that the processor having a lowest operating
rate receives a first sequential one of the portions and the
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
3
processor having a highest operating rate receives a last
sequential one of the portions; and
second means connected to the plurality of processors,
for outputting results of the processing.
The examiner relies on the following references:
Liu et al. (Liu) 5,031,089 July 09, 1991
(filed Dec. 30,
1988)
Natarajan 5,146,540 Sep. 08, 1992
(effectively filed Feb. 22,
1990)
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 17-36 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103. As evidence of obviousness
the examiner offers Liu in view of Natarajan.
Rather than repeat the arguments of appellants or the
examiner, we make reference to the briefs and the answer for
the respective details thereof.
OPINION
We have carefully considered the subject matter on
appeal, the rejection advanced by the examiner and the
evidence of obviousness relied upon by the examiner as support
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
4
for the rejection. We have, likewise, reviewed and taken into
consideration, in reaching our decision, the appellants’
arguments set forth in the briefs along with the examiner’s
rationale in support of the rejection and arguments in
rebuttal set forth in the examiner’s answer.
It is our view, after consideration of the record
before us, that the evidence relied upon and the level of
skill in the particular art would not have suggested to one of
ordinary skill in the art the obviousness of the invention as
set forth in claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 17-36.
Accordingly, we reverse.
Appellants have indicated that for purposes of this
appeal the claims will stand or fall together in the following
two groups: Group I has claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14,
17-22, 25, 28, 31 and 34, and Group II has claims 23, 24, 26,
27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35 and 36. Consistent with this
indication appellants have made no separate arguments with
respect to any of the claims within each group. Accordingly,
all the claims within each group will stand or fall together.
Note In re King,
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
5
801 F.2d 1324, 1325, 231 USPQ 136, 137 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re
Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 991, 217 USPQ 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Therefore, we will only consider the rejection against claims
1 and 23 as representative of all the claims on appeal.
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is
incumbent upon the examiner to establish a factual basis to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Fine,
837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In
so doing, the examiner is expected to make the factual deter-
minations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (CCPA 1966), and to provide a reason why
one having ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have been
led to modify the prior art or to combine prior art references
to arrive at the claimed invention. Such reason must stem
from some teaching, suggestion or implication in the prior art
as a whole or knowledge generally available to one having
ordinary skill in the art. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley
Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta
Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293, 227 USPQ 657,
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
6
664 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); ACS
Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221
USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). These showings by the
examiner are an essential part of complying with the burden of
presenting a prima facie case of obviousness. Note In re
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
With respect to representative, independent claim 1,
the examiner basically asserts that Liu teaches the invention
of claim 1 except for the recitation that each processor
processes the portion of the task distributed to it in the
same amount of time as the other processors process their
distributed portions, and the recitation that the subtasks are
allocated in inverse order such that the processor having the
lowest processing rate receives the first task portion and the
processor having the highest processing rate receives the last
task portion [answer, pages 3-6]. Natarajan is cited by the
examiner as teaching an allocation system in which tasks are
allocated among a plurality of processors such that all
processors finish at substantially the same time. The
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
7
examiner asserts that it would have been obvious to allocate
tasks in Liu using the distribution approach of Natarajan to
increase the speed of Liu’s system. The examiner also
observes that the order of task distribution has no effect on
the operation of the system so that it would have been an
obvious design choice to distribute tasks in the reverse order
as claimed. Appellants make several arguments in support of
alleged errors made by the examiner in consideration of the
applied references.
At the outset, we are of the view that the task
allocation techniques of Liu and Natarajan are so opposed to
each other that the rationale for combining their teachings
could only come from an improper hindsight reconstruction of
the invention by the examiner. Liu is specifically directed
to a decentralized system whereas Natarajan and the claimed
invention are directed to a centralized system in which a
first means assigns tasks to the plurality of processors.
Tasks in Liu are assigned at the request of processors which
are being underutilized. Tasks are then reassigned based on
interprocessor communication of respective workloads. Thus,
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
8
Liu allocates tasks using a completely different methodology
from Natarajan or the claimed invention. Natarajan is similar
to the claimed invention in that it uses a centralized system
to assign tasks based on equalizing the time to perform tasks
by processors operating in parallel. The strategies of
Natarajan and Liu could not be combined into a single system
without destroying the main benefit set forth in
each of the respective disclosures. Therefore, we find no
basis in the applied prior art to combine their teachings in
the manner proposed by the examiner.
Appellants’ argument that the order of assigning tasks
to the processors is not a mere design choice is also well-
taken. The output frames of the disclosed invention can only
become available at substantially the same time if they are
distributed in the manner recited in claim 1. Any other order
would delay the time at which the output frames are available
for use by subsequent processing. This is a question of
obviousness which has not been addressed by the examiner. The
examiner’s finding
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
9
of the distribution order being a design choice is not
supported by the record.
The arguments by appellants and the examiner as to
whether Liu and Natarajan are synchronous or asynchronous
systems also fail to properly address the requirements for a
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Neither the examiner nor
appellants address the question of whether the synchronous
operation of the plurality of processors recited in claim 1
would have been obvious over the teachings of Liu and/or
Natarajan. There are only two modes of operation, synchronous
and asynchronous. Simply establishing that a reference is one
or the other does not address the obviousness of the
recitation of synchronous operation. Notwithstanding the
failure of the examiner and appellants to properly consider
issues of obviousness, the examiner’s assertions regarding the
synchronous operation of Liu and Natarajan are unsupported by
the references.
For all the reasons just discussed, the examiner’s
rejection of representative claim 1 is not supported by the
applied prior art. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
10
of claim 1 and the other claims which are grouped therewith.
Since all of the claims of Group II are dependent claims which
depend
from at least one claim from Group I, we also do not sustain
the rejection of any of the claims of Group II.
In summary, the decision of the examiner rejecting
claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 17-36 is reversed.
REVERSED
STANLEY M. URYNOWICZ, JR. )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
JAMES D. THOMAS ) BOARD OF
PATENT
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
JERRY SMITH )
Administrative Patent Judge )
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
11
JS/cam
Appeal No. 96-1492
Application 07/666,162
12
S. H. Dworetsky
AT & T Bell Laboratories
600 Mountain Avenue Room 3C-512
P. O. Box 636
Murray Hill, NJ 07974-3647