Ex Parte Aggarwal et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 19, 2013

11016210 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 19, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/016,210 12/17/2004 Vijay Kumar Aggarwal AUS920040590US1 7502
7590 04/22/2013
Robert H. Frantz
P.O. Box 23324
Oklahoma City, OK 73123
EXAMINER
SISON, JUNE Y
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2443
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/22/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte VIJAY KUMAR AGGARWAL, CRAIG LAWTON,
CHRISTOPHER ANDREW PETERS, P.G. RAMACHANDRAN,
LORIN EVAN ULLMANN, and JOHN PATRICK WHITFIELD
____________

Appeal 2010-007725
Application 11/016,210
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, JEFFREY S. SMITH,
and JOHN A. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judges.

SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2010-007725
Application 11/016,210

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1 and 14-25, which are all the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

Representative Claim
1. A method for designing work flows for autonomic provisioning
management system comprising:
evaluating, by a portion of a computing platform, autonomic
provisioning workflows stored in computer memory used to provision a
group of targeted computing platforms to determine a common denominator
of workflow steps among said group of targeted computing platforms;
responsive to said evaluating, producing, by a portion of a computing
platform, a pseudo-clone autonomic provisioning workflow in computer
memory including said common denominator set of workflow steps which is
executable by a provisioning management system to yield a pseudo-clone
system; and
responsive to said producing of psuedo-clone autonomic provisioning
workflows, producing in computer memory, by a portion of a computing
platform, a plurality of completion autonomic provisioning workflows
corresponding to a specific targeted computing system, and which is
executable by a provisioning management system on a pseudo-clone to yield
a replacement computing system for a targeted computing system.

Prior Art
Du US 5,826,239 Oct. 20, 1998
Lehtinen US 6,064,950 May 16, 2000
Richter US 2002/0194251 A1 Dec. 19, 2002
Yang US 6,542,854 B2 Apr. 1, 2003
Miller US 2003/0172141 A1 Sep. 11, 2003
Yamasaki US 2005/0131982 A1 June 16, 2005
Kodialam US 2005/0174934 A1 Aug. 11, 2005
Clemm US 7,293,080 B1 Nov. 6, 2007
Appeal 2010-007725
Application 11/016,210

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Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1 and 14-25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Du, Yang, Richter, Lehtinen, Miller, Clemm, Yamasaki,
and Kodialam.

ANALYSIS
Appellants contend that Du teaches provisioning communications
network workflows, not provisioning computer platform workflows.
Appellants argue that the background section of Appellants’ Specification
states that provisioning computer platform workflows typically includes
selecting processor speed and installing operating systems. According to
Appellants, setting up a communications path as taught by Du is not the
same as selecting processor speed or installing operating systems. App. Br.
8-14; Reply Br. 5-10. However, the portion of the Specification cited by
Appellants discloses what provisioning typically includes. Appellants have
not provided a definition of “provisioning workflows . . . to provision a
group of targeted computing platforms” that excludes provisioning
workflows of the computer network of Du.
Appellants contend that the patentable distinction between claim 1
and the prior art is the evaluation of the automatic computer platform
provisioning workflows to determine the greatest common denominator
component list for a pseudo-clone computer platform, and to determine a
variety of finish out workflows to complete such a pseudo-clone into an
exact clone of one of several targeted computer platforms. App. Br. 14.
However, claim 1 recites “evaluating . . . to determine a common
Appeal 2010-007725
Application 11/016,210

4
denominator of workflow steps among said group of targeted computing
platforms.” Appellants’ contention is not commensurate with the scope of
the claim.
The Examiner finds that the computing activity elements of Yang
teach the common denominator of workflow steps. Ans. 14. Appellants
contend that the combination of Du and Yang does not teach “a common
denominator of workflow steps.” In particular, Appellants contend that the
claimed common denominator of workflow steps is tied to targeted
computing platforms, which are specific hardware platforms. According to
Appellants, Yang’s common denominator is tied to generic hardware. Reply
Br. 4-5. We find that the term “targeted computing platforms” recited in
claim 1 encompasses the different hardware platforms taught by Yang (col.
5, l. 58 to col. 6, l. 36).
Appellants contend that the Examiner has not set forth the grounds of
rejection clearly so as to afford Appellants an opportunity to respond. App.
Br. 14-17; Reply Br. 1-3. We find that the Examiner has established a prima
facie case of unpatentability.
There has never been a requirement for an examiner to make an
on-the-record claim construction of every term in every rejected
claim and to explain every possible difference between the prior
art and the claimed invention in order to make out a prima facie
rejection.... [A]ll that is required of the [Patent] [O]ffice to
meet its prima facie burden of production is to set forth the
statutory basis of the rejection and the reference or references
relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner
as to meet the notice requirement of [35 U.S.C.] § 132.
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We find that the
Examiner has met this burden. See Ans. 13-22. Appellants have not
explained how the limitations of claim 1 distinguish over the portions of the
Appeal 2010-007725
Application 11/016,210

5
prior art cited by the Examiner. Nor have Appellants provided persuasive
evidence or argument to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case. See Jung,
637 F.3d at 1365-66 (citing Ex Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential)).
We sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appellants
do not present arguments for separate patentability of claims 14-23, which
fall with claim 1. Appellants present arguments for the patentability of
claims 24 and 25 similar to those presented for claim 1 which we find
unpersuasive.

DECISION
The rejection of claims 1 and 14-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Du, Yang, Richter, Lehtinen, Miller, Clemm, Yamasaki,
and Kodialam is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. §
41.50(f).

AFFIRMED

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