Ex Parte Adams

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 13, 2018

13854061 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 13, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/854,061 03/30/2013
147005 7590 04/17/2018
Change Healthcare LLC and Alston & Bird LLP
c/o Alston & Bird LLP
Bank of America Plaza
101 South Tryon Street, Suite 4000
Charlotte, NC 28280-4000
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Brian Adams
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
065910/430203 1379
EXAMINER
BARR, MARY EV ANGELINE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/17/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
usptomail@alston.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRIAN ADAMS
Appeal2017-001016
Application 13/854,061
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal2017-001016
Application 13/854,061
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
The claims are directed to a method and apparatus for mapping
message data. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
receiving a first healthcare message in a first format, the
first healthcare message comprising a first set of healthcare data
comprising at least one healthcare data value, wherein the
healthcare data value is derived from one or more predetermined
data values entered into a medical records application;
determining a content of the first healthcare message;
determining, using a processor, a first portion of a
structure of the first healthcare message that corresponds to the
one or more of the predetermined data values based on the
content of the first healthcare message; and
storing mapping data indicating that the first portion of the
structure of the first healthcare message corresponds to the one
or more of the predetermined data values.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Adams et al.
Neben
Gunn
US 2011/0010401 Al
US 2011/0173346 Al
US 2011/0119088 Al
2
Jan. 13, 2011
July 14, 2011
May 19, 2011
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Application 13/854,061
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Claims 1, 8, and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (pre-AIA), first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement. 1
Claim[s] 1[-11] stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (pre-AIA), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to
particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the
inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. 2
Claims 1--4, 6, 12-15, and 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102( a)( 1) as being anticipated by Adams.
Claims 7-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Adams in view ofNeben.
Claims 5 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Adams in view of Gunn.
1 We note that a rejection of independent claim 1 based upon written
description implies that all the dependent claims depending therefrom are
also included. Consequently, claims 1-11 have been rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 112(a).
2 See n.1. Same rationale applies for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b).
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ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, ...
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, "[w]hat else is
there in the claims before us?" To answer that question, ...
consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as an
ordered combination" to determine whether the additional
elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an "'inventive concept'"-i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Int'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73
(2012)).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.
Although the Court in Alice made a direct finding as to what the
claims were directed to, here we find that the claims themselves and the
Specification provide enough information to inform one as to what they are
directed to.
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The steps in claim 1 result in: storing mapping data indicating that the
first portion of the structure of the first healthcare message corresponds to
the one or more of the predetermined data values. The Specification
describes the background of the prior art manual mapping:
Experts may manually generate mapping programs that
format input data in a first vendor's format to output data suitable
for another vendor's format. Development of these mapping
programs requires careful analysis of the form and structure of
the structure of both the sending and receiving structure, such
that generation of mapping programs is a laborious and time
consuming task. As new messaging structures are implemented
in response to standards revisions and product updates, new
mapping programs must be generated to allow the new
messaging structures to function with systems that implement
alternative messaging structures.
(Spec. i-f 4). The Specification further describes "present invention in order
to provide for mapping of the structure healthcare messages using known
healthcare data." (Spec. i-f 5). The Specification further describes:
For the purposes of this application, the term "healthcare
message" should be understood to refer to at least any message
or medical record provided in a format suitable for
communication within a healthcare records system, such as a
healthcare exchange. As such, the term "healthcare message"
may include, but is not limited to, messages for transmission,
modification, creation, or deletion of medical records (e.g., HL 7
admit-discharge-transfer (ADT) messages), or any file or data
format for storing of medical records or medical record data.
(Spec. i-f 18). Finally, Appellant describes the apparatus as "[t]he apparatus
102 may be any computing device capable of functioning in a health
information infrastructure, including desktop or laptop computers, mobile
devices, tablet computers, servers, or the like." (Spec. i-f 20).
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Thus, the intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 is directed to
determining a set of mapping data for a healthcare message. It follows from
prior Supreme Court cases, and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) in
particular, that the claims at issue here are directed to an abstract idea. We
determine the claims to be directed to: abstractly determining a mapping of
one data to another data structure to be like a method of organizing human
activities (managing a human asset) and to be like a fundamental economic
practice (customer/vendor relationship) -which are at the patent-ineligible
end of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 spectrum. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356. That is,
we find the claimed steps of receiving, determining, determining, and
storing, constitute acts that could be performed by a human and/ or
"analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes
within the abstract-idea category." Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed to certain arrangements
involving contractual relations are directed to abstract ideas). Thus, the
determining and storing mapping data for a healthcare message is directed to
an "abstract idea" beyond the scope of§ 101.
As in Alice, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the
"abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is
no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction between the concept of
an intermediated settlement in Alice and the concept of determining and
storing mapping data for a healthcare message, at issue here. Both are
squarely within the realm of "abstract ideas" as the Court has used that term.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be limited
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to asset management, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP Techs.,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
The introduction of a computer/processor into the claims does not
alter the analysis at Mayo step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it'" is not
enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea "'to a particular technological environment."'
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a
computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to "implement[t ]" an abstract idea
"on . . . a computer," that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern
that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of
computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not
generally the sort of "additional feature[ e ]" that provides any
"practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself."
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
"[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea ... on a
generic computer." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer/processor at each step of the process is purely conventional.
Using a computer to take in data, compute -a result, and return the result to a
user amounts to electronic data query and retrieval-some of the most basic
functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer
to perform generic computer functions.
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Considered as an ordered combination, the processor of Appellant's
method add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered
separately. Viewed as a whole, Appellant's claims simply recite the concept
of determining and storing mapping data for a healthcare message. The
claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the
computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology
or technical field. Instead, the claims at issue amount to nothing
significantly more than instructions for determining and storing mapping
data for a healthcare message. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2360.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims m substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer
components configured to implement the same idea. This Court
has long "warn[ ed] ... against" interpreting § 101 "in ways that
make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art.'
Alice, 134 S. Ct._at 2360 (alterations in original).
We have reviewed all the arguments (App. Br. 19-22) Appellant has
submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us which
stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our analysis above
substantially covers the substance of all the arguments that have been made.
But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various arguments in
order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues, that the Examiner has failed to establish a prima
facie argument for in eligibility. (App. Br. 19-20). Specifically, Appellant
contends "the Final Office Action fails to provide any discussion of specific
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claim features of Appellant's claims, nor does the Final Office Action
provide any reasoning for why these claim features fail to recite
'significantly more' than the abstract idea." (App. Br. 20). Appellant
further argues that the claims are not abstract. (App. Br. 20-21 ). Appellant
contends that independent claim 1 is similar to the Example 1 "Abstract Idea
Examples," published on January 27, 2015. (App. Br. 21). We disagree
with Appellant and find that "Example 1" is directed to removing malicious
code from email messages, but the present claims do not modify the
message, but merely provide mapping data which does not change the
message in the generic "method." Appellant's argument is not
commensurate in scope with the language of representative independent
claim 1. Finally, Appellant argues that the claims recite significantly more
than the alleged of abstract idea. (App. Br. 21-22). Appellant specifically
argues:
The claims also provide an improvement in the functioning of a
computer by allowing dynamic definition of message structures
through the use of predetermined input data. The claims also
address the problem of enabling communication between devices
with incompatible message structures, a problem that is unique
to the realm of computer networking in the same manner as the
patentable claims described in DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com.
(App. Br. 22).
We disagree with Appellant because in DDR, the claims at issue
involved, inter alia, "web page displays [with] at least one active link
associated with a commerce object associated with a buying opportunity of a
selected one of a plurality of merchants" (claim 1 of US 7 ,818,399 B 1, Oct.
19, 2010). There is no such claim element with this degree of detail here
before us.
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We find Appellant's arguments are not commensurate in scope with
the language of independent claim 1, which does not claim the the method in
the detail argued. Appellant's arguments are not persuasive because such
arguments are not commensurate in scope with the language of independent
claims 1, 12, and 18. See In re Self, 671F.2d1344, 1348(CCPA1982)
(limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be relied upon for
patentability ).
Moreover, we disagree with Appellant, because the Examiner finds, as
do we above, that the limitations in the independent claims 1, 12, and 18 set
forth or describe the abstract idea are: "receiving," "determining,"
"determining," and "storing" steps for improving the abstract idea itself of
comparing and mapping data to convert and transmit information. There is
no improvement shown in the actual technical field of network computing in
terms of improvement in the computers themselves or in the logic or
processing of a network. (Ans. 5).
As discussed above, the Specification identifies the use of "desktop or
laptop computers" (Spec. i-f 20) to "provide for mapping of message
structures to facilitate the transfer of healthcare data" (Spec. i-f 17), but that
does not claim the modification of the received data. This is an effect and
not a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology. The
question is whether the claims as a whole "focus on a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology" or are "directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In this case, claim 1, as a whole, is focused on the
idea of determining mapping data and storing the data.
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Appellant does not file a Reply Brief to respond to the Examiner's
further clarifications of the rejection. As a result, Appellant has not shown
error in the Examiner's conclusion of a lack of patent eligible subject matter
in representative independent claim 1. As a result, we sustain the rejection
of representative independent claim 1 and independent claims 12 and 18 not
separately argued and the respective dependent claims 2-11, 13- 17, 19, and
20.
35U.S.C.§l12(a) REJECTION
With respect to independent claim 1 (and dependent claims 2-11 ), the
Examiner rejects the claims based upon a lack of written description support
for the claim phrase "the healthcare data value is derived from one or more
predetermined data values entered into a medical records application," and
the Specification does not provide support for the concept of predetermined
data or for the concept of deriving a healthcare data value from the
predetermined data values. (Final Act. 7-8). The Examiner further finds
that paragraph 34 states that "predetermined values from a record
management system are from fictitious records, but deriving healthcare data
values is not disclosed." (Final Act. 8).
We disagree with the Examiner and find Appellant identified
paragraphs "[0017], [0034], [0035], [0040], [0047], [0049]" of the
Specification and provides a discussion of the input of known data into the
healthcare message. (App. Br. 9). We note that the Examiner merely
repeats the same argument from the Final Action in the Examiner's Answer.
(Ans. 6). Furthermore, we find the Specification in paragraphs 33-37
discloses the input of known data into a healthcare message at a client that
will allow the record management system to receive the healthcare message
and dynamically determine the mapping therefrom. As a result, we find that
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Appellant had possession of the claimed invention recited in independent
claim 1 and its respective dependent claims 2-11.
With respect to dependent claims 8 and 9, the Examiner additionally
finds a lack of written description support for the term "confidence value" in
the Specification. (Final Act. 8).
Appellant identifies paragraphs 50 and 51 that discuss the likelihood
and confidence. (App. Br. 12-13).
The Examiner maintains:
Although the specification describes marking a set of values as
highly likely to correspond to data, this is not a confidence value.
Determining something is highly likely is a confidence level and
not a confidence value. A confidence value indicates a
calculation of a specific value. There is no formula described
for how to calculate a confidence value. Paragraph 50 of the
specification does discuss that weights are applied to factors to
come up with a likelihood, but this does not describe how one of
ordinary skill in the art would know how or when to apply
weights to a factors and which factors would be weighted or even
applied to the likelihood.
(Ans. 6).
We find the Examiner's rejection to be directed to an issue of
enablement, but the Examiner has set forth the rejection based upon a lack of
written description requirement. (Final Act. 7-8).
We find paragraphs 50 and 51 of the Specification describe a
determination of a likelihood of a match and "mapping of particular bit
values to particular data fields may be confirmed if the likelihood of a match
rises above a particular threshold value" (Spec. i-f 50) and "the method may
determine whether a mapping with a reasonably high level of confidence has
been determined for each possible type of data to be included in various
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healthcare messages" (Spec. i-f 51 ). As a result, we find Appellant has shown
possession of the subject matter recited in the language of dependent claims
8 and 9, and we cannot sustain the rejection thereof.
35 U.S.C. § l l 2(b) REJECTION
In the Final Rejection, the Examiner withdrew the separate
indefiniteness rejection of dependent claim 10 that was presented in the
Non-Final Rejection. (Final Act. 3).
With respect to independent claim 1, the Examiner finds the use of
"predetermined data values" to be indefinite. (Final Act. 9). We understand
the Examiner to also reject claims 2-11 under this rationale based on their
dependency. (Final Act. 9). The Examiner maintains that
the specification does not clearly disclose what data values
would be considered predetermined. Examiner construes this to
be the data value from the medical record currently in the system,
where determining a first portion of a healthcare message that
corresponds to the predetermined data values based on the
content of the message is the process of comparing the value
from the medical record to the value in the healthcare message.
(Final Act. 9).
Appellant identifies paragraphs 34, 3 6, and 40 in the Specification to
interpret the terms "known" or "predetermined." (App. Br. 13). Appellant
further contends that in "addressing the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, Appellant's specification includes lengthy recitations of the use
of input data that is known to a record management system at the time it is
entered into a client record system (see, e.g., Figure 3, element 304)." (App.
Br. 13). Appellant further argues that
in contrast to the manner in which the structure of the generated
message is "unknown" to the record management system at the
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time the "known" data values are encoded into the message by
the client record system. (See, e.g., Specification [0039], [0052]).
Appellant submits that a person of ordinary skill would
understand that the term "predetermined" is intended to
characterize the set of input data provided to the client record
system as being known or predetermined by the records
management system, as clearly recited in Appellant's
Specification at [0032]. Accordingly, Appellant submits that a
person of ordinary skill would clearly understand the use of the
term "predetermined data values" to refer to data values that are
provided by, visible to, or of which a system performing the
process is otherwise aware (e.g., a records management
application) outside the context of the message generated by the
client.
(App. Br. 13-14).
The Examiner further maintains:
Claim 1 recites the term "predetermined data values" which is
considered to be indefinite. The specification describes the
known or predetermined data to be that which a user is instructed
to input into the application in Paragraph 34. However, there is
no indication of where this data value is coming from. There is
no description of how the system is determining the
predetermined data value is "John Doe" or "October 6, 1982"
and as described in Paragraph 32 of the specification, the format
of the fields may not always be the same, thus how would one
determine which predetermined data value is to be used as it
would be based on the format of the particular record system.
(Ans. 6-7).
We agree with Appellant that the claim terminology is not indefinite, but
rather is broad. As a result, we cannot sustain the Examiner's indefiniteness
rejection of claims 1-11.
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35 U.S.C. § 102 REJECTION
With respect to claims 1--4, 6, 12-15, and 17-20, Appellant does not
set forth separate arguments for the claims. As a result, we select
independent claim 1 as the representative claim for the group and address
Appellant's arguments thereto. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Examiner finds that the Adams reference discloses all of the
claimed limitations in independent claim 1. The Examiner further maintains
that the limitation
wherein the healthcare data value is derived from one or
more predetermined data values entered into a medical records
application (Examiner notes that this limitation does not bear
patentable weight as how the data value is derived does not
impact the receiving of the message which is made up of a
healthcare data value).
(Final Act. 10).
Appellant contends that "Final Office Action disregards the
features of Appellant's claims that relate to the manner in which the data is
received (i.e., that it is predetermined), and that the particular predetermined
data is identified within the message in order to perform the determination of
the message structure." (App. Br. 15). Appellant further contends that:
As in Di[S]tefano, the instant use of "predetermined" data
describes the data not by its content (e.g., whether the data recites
"John Doe"), but instead as a functional characteristic of the data
itself (e.g., the fact that it is predetermined prior to being entered
into the medical records application).
(App. Br. 16). Appellant further contends that
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even if the "predetermined data values" were considered printed
matter, the second phase of the test, "having a functional or
structural relationship with the substrate" still indicates that this
information should be accorded patentable weight. In particular,
the particular predetermined data values are in a direct functional
relationship with the records management system that functions
to identify the structure of the message, as the predetermined data
values represent the particular portions of the message used to
determine the structure of the message.
(App. Br. 17).
The Examiner maintains that there is no patentable weight given to
the "predetermined data" because "how the data value is derived does not
impact the receiving of the message." (Final Act. 10).
We agree with the Examiner and find that the Examiner has set forth a
finding of the four functional steps in generic "method" recited in the
language of representative independent claim 1. Moreover, the Examiner
cites to paragraphs 23, 24, 26, 29, 33, and 37-39 of the Adams reference to
disclose the recited limitations. (Final Act. 10-11 ).
The Examiner maintains that paragraphs 24 and 29 disclose the step
of receiving healthcare message. We agree with the Examiner. The
Examiner additionally finds
wherein the healthcare data value is derived from one or
more predetermined data values entered into a medical records
application (Examiner notes that this limitation does not bear
patentable weight as how the data value is derived does not
impact the receiving of the message which is made up of a
healthcare data value);
(Final Act. 10). We agree with the Examiner and further note that the
language of independent claim 1 does not set forth a separate step with
respect to any difference in how the data is received differently than would
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be disclosed by the system of Adams. Therefore, Appellant has not shown
error in the Examiner's finding of anticipation of representative independent
claim 1 and independent claims 12 and 18 and the dependent claims 2--4, 6,
13-15, 17, 19, and 20, not separately argued with specificity.
35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION
With respect to dependent claims 5, 7-11, and 16, Appellant relies
upon the arguments advanced with respect to the anticipation rejection and
does not set forth separate arguments for patentability of the dependent
claims. As a result, we group these claims as falling with representative
independent claim 1.
CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-20 based upon a lack
of patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101; the Examiner erred
in rejecting claims 1-11 based upon a lack of written description support
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-11 based
upon indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b); the Examiner did not err in
rejecting claims 1--4, 6, 12-15, and 17-20 based upon anticipation under 35
U.S.C. § 102; and the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims based upon 5,
7-11, and 16 based upon obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner's written description
and indefiniteness rejections, but we sustain the Examiner's patent
ineligibility, anticipation, and obviousness rejections.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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