Ex Parte Acharya et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 22, 2012

11399872 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 22, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/399,872 04/07/2006 Swarup Acharya 28-12-15 3492
7590 10/22/2012
Ryan, Mason & Lewis, LLP
90 Forest Avenue
Locust Valley, NY 11560
EXAMINER
WANG-HURST, KATHY W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2646
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/22/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte SWARUP ACHARYA, BHAWNA GUPTA,
and ANURAG SRIVASTAVA
____________________

Appeal 2010-006445
1

Application 11/399,872
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, BRYAN F. MOORE, and
TREVOR JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1
The real party in interest is Alcatel-Lucent. (App. Br. 1.)

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Application 11/399,872

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1-20. (App. Br. 2.) We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appellants’ Invention
Appellants invented a method and system for allowing a TV service
provider (106) to deliver a requested subscription service to a roaming
subscriber (104R) via a single communication channel between the provider
(106) and the set top box (112R) at the remote location of the subscriber
(104R). (Spec. 3, ll. 5-12.) In particular, upon receiving a request for
content of a first authorized channel from the roaming subscriber at a remote
location, a head-end equipment (202) assigns the requested content to one of
a plurality of program streams (211) through which the content is delivered
to the subscriber. Upon receiving another request from the subscriber for
content of a second authorized channel, the head-end device replaces the
content of the first channel with that of the second channel in the selected
program stream through which the newly requested content is delivered to
the subscriber at the remote location. (Spec. 10, l. 28- spec. 13, l. 21.)

Illustrative Claim
Independent claim 1 further illustrates the invention as follows:
1. A method of providing access to a subscription service in a
signal distribution system to a system user at a location remote
from a home location of the user, the subscription service
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comprising a plurality of selectable channels available to the
user at the home location, the
remote location being serviced by head end equipment of the
system, the method comprising the steps of:
assigning to the user one of a plurality of program
streams utilizable for delivery of content from the head end
equipment to an interface device at the remote location;
obtaining in the head end equipment content for a first
channel of the subscription service available to the user at the
home location; and
inserting the content for the first channel into the
assigned program stream to thereby make said content
accessible to the user at the remote location via the interface
device;
wherein user selection via the interface device of a
different channel of said subscription service available to the
user at the home location causes the content for the different
channel to be obtained by the head end equipment and inserted
into the assigned program stream in place of the content for the
first channel;
wherein the program streams from which the assigned
program stream is selected are part of a single communication
channel between the head end equipment and the interface
device at the remote location; and
wherein absent assignment of the assigned program
stream the program streams that are part of the single
communication channel are otherwise utilized to provide
subscription service access to another system user having the
remote location as its home location.

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4
Prior Art Relied Upon
The Examiner relies on the following prior art as evidence of
unpatentability:
Karaoguz US 2004/0117813 A1 Jun. 17, 2004
Kahn US 2005/0188410 A1 Aug. 25, 2005
Jerding US 2005/0240961 A1 Oct. 27, 2005
Casey US 2007/0124779 A1 May 31, 2007

Rejections on Appeal
The Examiner rejects the claims on appeal as follows:
1. Claims 1-10, 15, 16, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Karaoguz and
Casey.
2. Claims 11-14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Karaoguz, Casey, and Kahn.
3. Claims 17 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Karaoguz, Casey, and Jerding.
ANALYSIS
We consider Appellants’ arguments seriatim as they are presented in
the principal Brief, pages 6-15.
Dispositive Issue: Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in
finding that the combination of Karaoguz and Casey teaches or suggests
upon receiving a request for authorized content from a roaming subscriber, a
provider assigns the requested content to a selected program stream through
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which the requested content is delivered to the set-top box of the
subscriber’s remote location thereby the selected program stream forming a
single communication channel between head-end equipment and the set-top
box, as recited claim 1?
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that combination
of Karaoguz and Casey teaches or suggests the disputed limitations
emphasized above. In particular, Appellants argue that while Karaoguz
generally discloses an office computer that interfaces with a head-end
equipment via an Internet infrastructure, Karaoguz does not disclose a given
program stream being assigned to carry content for two different channels
requested by a roaming subscriber at the office computer. (App. Br. 7-8.)
Further, Appellants argue that Karaoguz does not teach that the assigned
program stream is coupled to the head-end to thereby form a single
communication channel, which can deliver content to a local subscriber at
the remote location when the channel is not assigned to the remote
subscriber. (Id. at 8-9.)
In response, the Examiner broadly construes a “program stream” as a
physical communication channel or a conduit for carrying requested channel
content. (Ans. 15.) Consequently, the Examiner finds that Karaoguz’s
disclosure of delivering to an office computer all kinds of user-requested
media content through an established communications channel teaches the
disputed limitations. (Id. at 15-16.)
On the record before us, we agree with the Examiner’s findings, and
ultimate conclusion of obviousness. We note at the outset that Appellants
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have not addressed the specific findings made by the Examiner in the
Answer. As set forth in the Answer, the Examiner relies extensively, inter
alia, upon paragraph [0046] of Karaoguz to infer that a single
communication channel is established between the office computer and the
provider thereby enabling a remote subscriber at the office computer to
receive different kinds of requested data content through the established
channel, and also to enable the local user at the office computer to receive
regularly scheduled data content when the channel is not assigned. (Ans.
15-17.) Appellants have failed to address, let alone rebut this finding, which
is the thrust of the Examiner’s rejection. While generally alluding to some
of the paragraphs of Karaoguz relied upon by the Examiner, Appellants do
not explain how the cited portions of the reference fall short of teaching the
disputed limitations. In other words, Appellants’ arguments fail to analyze
the portions of the prior art upon which the Examiner relied to contrast them
with the disputed limitations.
In our view, Appellants’ general statements regarding Karaoguz’s
disclosure is not responsive to the Examiner’s specific findings made in the
Answer. Further, Appellants are reminded that merely reciting what the
claims recite, and making a general allegation of patentability does not
constitute a persuasive argument. See Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693,
slip op. at 7-8 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative.) Therefore, we find that
such arguments do not squarely address the Examiner’s findings.
We find that Appellants have been given full and fair notice of the
teachings of the Karaoguz reference, as further clarified by the Examiner in
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the “Response to Argument” section of the Answer (Ans. 15-17.)
Consequently, we find unavailing Appellants’ argument that Casey does not
cure the deficiencies of the Karaoguz reference. (App Br. 8.) Appellants are
responsible for all that is disclosed by the collective teachings of the cited
references. See In re Zenitz, 333 F.2d 924, 926 (CCPA 1964). “They are
part of the literature of the art, relevant for all they contain.” In re Heck, 699
F.2d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting In re Lemelson, 397 F.2d 1006,
1009 (CCPA 1968)).
We have previously held that "[i]f an appellant fails to present
arguments on a particular issue … the Board will not, as a general matter,
unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the rejection." Ex parte
Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (citations
omitted). Consequently, because Appellants’ arguments are ineffective in
demonstrating error in the Examiner’s prima facie case to establish the
patentability of the claims on appeal, we find Appellants have failed to rebut
the Examiner’s rejection of the claim 1 with any persuasive analysis. See Ex
parte Belinne, at 7-8. For at least the aforementioned reasons, we find
Appellants have not sustained the requisite burden on appeal of providing
arguments or evidence persuasive of error in the Examiner’s rejection of
representative claim 1.
Regarding claims 2-20, we note that Appellants’ arguments also suffer
from the aforementioned deficiencies outlined in our discussion of claim 1.
Further, the Examiner has rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence each
argument separately raised by Appellants in the Brief regarding the cited
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claims. (Ans. 17-22). We consequently adopt the Examiner’s findings,
which are incorporated herein by reference. Because Appellants have not
persuasively rebutted these findings, Appellants have not shown error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 2-20.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2-20 as set forth above.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

ELD