Ex Parte 8600807 et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 31, 2017

96000132 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
96/000,132 11/02/2015 8600807 700-148RPP-SE 3058
24002 7590 04/03/2017
BARKUME & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
20 GATEWAY LANE
MANORVILLE, NY 11949
EXAMINER
WASSUM, LUKE S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/03/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SIGNATURE SYSTEMS LLC,
Patent Owner and Appellant
Appeal 2017-005539
Reexamination Control 96/000,132
Patent 8,600,807 B1
Technology Center 3900
Before MARC S. HOFF, STEPHEN C. SIU, and DENISE M. POTHIER,
Administrative Patent Judges.
SIU, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This proceeding arose out of a request for Supplemental Examination
ofU.S. Patent No. 8,600,807 B1 (“the ’807 patent”) to Richard Postrel,
entitled Method and system for Electronic Exchange of Reward
Points, issued December 3, 2013.
Patent Owner appeals under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 306 from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—3, 6—9, and 12. App. Br. I.1 Claims
4, 5, 11, and 12 have been canceled. Id. at 29, 32. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 Appeal Brief, filed October 11, 2016 (“App. Br.”).
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The disclosed invention relates generally to processing award points
in award programs. See Spec. 3:47—49.
Claim 1 reads as follows:
1. A computer-implemented method of exchanging
rewards comprising:
communicating, by a reward exchange computer, over a
computer network with a reward server computer that stores a
plurality of reward accounts, each of said reward accounts
associated with a different user and comprising a plurality of first
sets of reward points of a first type earned by a user from a first
reward issuing entity as a result of a plurality of first transactions
using a credit card linked to a credit card reward program of the
first reward issuing entity;
storing, by the reward exchange computer, in a reward
exchange account a second set of reward points of a second type
earned by the user as a result of a second transaction executed
between the user and a second reward issuing entity which is
different from the first reward issuing entity; and
accepting communication, by the reward exchange
computer, over the computer network from the reward server
computer for exchanging a quantity of reward points of the first
type, the quantity designated by the user operating a user
computer, from the reward account on the reward server
computer into reward points of the second type for adding to the
reward exchange account on the reward exchange computer by:
converting a quantity of reward points of the first type that
have been designated by the user to be decreased from the reward
account on the reward server computer into a corresponding
amount of reward points of the second type at a predetermined
reward server conversion rate,
adding the corresponding amount of reward points of the
second type to the reward exchange account,
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combining the corresponding amount of reward points of
the second type added to the reward exchange account with the
second set of reward points of the second type previously stored
in the reward exchange account, and
receiving consideration from the reward server computer,
the consideration having a value equivalent to the quantity of
reward points of the first type decreased from the reward account
on the reward server computer.
Appellant appeals the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—3, 6—9, and 12
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
App. Br. 8.
ISSUE
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1—3, 6—9, and 12?
ANALYSIS
Claim 1 recites a method comprising “communication” between a
computer and a server over a network in which the computer stores two
“types” of “reward points” earned by a user and, based on a request from the
user, “exchang[es] a quantity of’ the first type of “reward points” for a
corresponding quantity of “the second type” of “reward points.” Hence,
claim 1 recites manipulation of “reward points,” including “converting,”
“adding,” and “combining” values of reward points (i.e., a “quantity” of
reward points). The Examiner finds that claims 1—3, 6—9, and 12 are
unpatentable as being directed to non-statutory subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101. Final Act. 25—30; see also Final Act. 13—25 and Ans. 4—22.
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We agree with the Examiner for at least the reasons set forth by the
Examiner.
At the outset, we note that claim 1 is directed to a process. Thus, we
further consider whether the claim is directed to a judicially recognized
exception, such as an abstract idea, and if so, whether the claim recites
additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. For example, following the “framework for distinguishing
patents that claim . . . abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts” as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), we first
“determine whether the claims at issue are directed to [a] patent-ineligible
concept[]” and, “[i]f so, we then ask, ‘[wjhat else is there in the claims
before us?’” in order “to determine whether the additional elements
‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2355 (internal citation omitted).
In Alice, claims were directed to a “computer-implemented scheme
for mitigating ‘settlement risk’ ... by using ... a third-party intermediary”
including creating “records (i.e., account ledgers),” “updating] the . . .
records,” “allowing ‘only those transactions for which . . . updated . . .
records indicate sufficient resources . . . [’],” and “instruct[ing] the relevant
financial institutions to carry out the ‘permitted’ transactions in accordance
with the updated . . . records.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2351—2353 (internal
citation omitted). The Court held that such claims “are drawn to [an]
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abstract idea” based on similarities between the claimed “intermediated
settlement” and claims in other matters previously held to be unpatentable as
“abstract ideas.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355—2356 (concluding that “[i]t
follows from our prior cases, and Bilski in particular, that the claims at issue
here are directed to an abstract idea”).2 In particular, the Court noted
sufficient similarity of the “intermediated settlement” claims in Alice to
claim features previously determined to be “abstract ideas” of “an algorithm
for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form” {Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, 71—72)), a method for
“adjusting] alarm limits for certain operating conditions” {Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2358 (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 585—86), or a “method for hedging against
the financial risk of price fluctuations” including “initiating” transactions,
“identifying market participants” and “initiating a series of [other]
transactions ... to balance the risk.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355—2356 (citing
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 599).
Based on this guidance, claims directed to any of converting,
adjusting, creating, or updating data (and any similar such actions on data)
constitute an “abstract idea” and, therefore, are to be held to be non-statutory
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 1 in the present matter recites
communicating, storing, accepting and exchanging data. The claimed
2 With respect to this issue, the Court cited Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); and Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593 (2010).
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“exchanging” data further includes converting, adding, combining, and
receiving data. We agree with the Examiner that each of these claimed
actions performed on data are sufficiently similar to at least one of
mitigating, creating, updating (Alice), converting (Benson), adjusting
(Flook), hedging, initiating, and/or identifying data (Bilski), each of which
the Court informs us constitutes an “abstract idea” that is unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in Alice, the Federal
Circuit further instructs that claims reciting various other claim terms
pertaining to the manipulation of data constitute “abstract ideas” and are to
be considered unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. These include claims
directed to “collecting, displaying, and manipulating data,” “recognizing
certain data within [a] set,” “storing . . . data in a memory,” “extracting data
. . . , entering the data into . . . fields,” “customizing information,”
“presenting [data] to users,” as well as claims that “recit[e] similar data
manipulation steps,” even if the claims in question “limit[] the invention to a
technological environment”;3 claims drawn to “collecting], classify[ing], or
otherwise filtering] data,” and the “creation of [data] used to search and
retrieve information” even if the claims in question recite specific types of
data;4 claims drawn to generating and transmitting data, even if such data
3 Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., No. 2016-
1077, 2017 WL 900031, at *5 (Fed. Cir. March 7, 2017).
4 Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., Nos. 2016-1128, 2016-
1132, 2017 WL 900018, at *7 (Fed. Cir. March 7, 2017).
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includes categories and items or if the data is stored on a data storage device,
or claims drawn to other actions deemed to be “commonly known”;5 claims
drawn to “receiving [data], characterizing [the data] based on [other data],. .
. communicating the [data]” or “filtering” data, or any other action deemed
to “not ‘improve the functioning of the computer itself” or constitute
“generic computers to perform generic computer functions”;6 claims drawn
to “classifying [data] and storing the [data] based on its classification,” or
any actions that do not contribute to the “improvement [of] the functioning
of a computer” and “simply add[] conventional computer components to
well-known business practices”;7 claims drawn to “retaining information” or
any claim that “contains no restriction on how the result is accomplished”;8
claims drawn to “collecting,” “recognizing,” or “storing” data even if the
claims also “limit[] the abstract idea ... to a particular technological
environment”;9 claims drawn to “receiving,” selecting,” “offering,”
“restricting access,” “facilitating display,” or “updating” data, as well as
5 Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240—1242 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
6 Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313, 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).
1 In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
8 The court also considered “retaining information” to constitute “well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known.” Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
9 Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l
Assoc., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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“using [data] as an exchange or currency”;10 claims drawn to “receiving”
and/or “processing” data and “creating” a “contractual relationship”;* 11 and
claims drawn to “generating” data and/or “combining” data is to be deemed
“so abstract and sweeping” as to be “not patent eligible under section 101,”12
In summary, the Federal Circuit instructs us that claims are to be
deemed unpatentable as directed to “abstract ideas” under 35 U.S.C. § 101 if
the claims recite no more than manipulating data that may include any of
classifying, collecting, combining, communicating, creating, customizing,
displaying, extracting, facilitating display of, filtering, generating,
manipulating, offering, presenting, processing, receiving, recognizing,
restricting access to, retaining, retrieving, searching, selecting, storing,
transmitting, updating, or using as an exchange or currency (or any other
similar action taken with respect to data).
In the present matter, claim 1 is directed to a method comprising
storing “reward accounts” (i.e., data) on a computer, exchanging a quantity
of “reward points” (i.e., data) between “reward accounts” by “converting” a
quantity of reward points (i.e., data) from one type into another type, adding
an amount of “reward points” (i.e., data), combining amounts of “reward
points” (i.e., data), and receiving “consideration” from a computer (i.e.,
10 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714-716 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
11 buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1354—55 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
12 Digitech Image Tech, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d
1344, 1351 (2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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data). Hence, claim 1 recites manipulating data that includes storing,
exchanging, converting, adding, combining, accepting, and receiving data.
We agree with the Examiner that the recitations of “storing,”
“combining,” and “receiving” data, according to our reviewing court(s), is to
be considered to be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In addition, we
agree with the Examiner that any of the other claimed actions to be
performed on data (e.g., “exchanging,” “converting,” “adding,” “accepting,”
“communicating”) is sufficiently similar to at least one of the actions
performed on data explicitly held to constitute an “abstract idea” for
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 101 by our reviewing courts. See previous
discussion, supra. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner, in accordance
with guidance from our reviewing courts, that the claims in the present
matter recite an “abstract idea” without significantly more in the context of
35 U.S.C. § 101 and are, therefore, unpatentable as being directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
The Supreme Court in Alice Corp. further cautions that we must
“tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all
of patent law” because “[a]t some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply . . . abstract ideas.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354
(citing Mayo Collaborative Svcs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1293—1294). In order to prevent “swallowing] all of patent law,” we must
“distinguish between patents that claim the ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ of human
ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more
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. . . thereby ‘transforming] them into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2354 (internal citation omitted).
In this regard, the Supreme Court in Alice informs us that a claimed
invention that is deemed to constitute an “abstract idea” may be determined
to be patent eligible if that “abstract idea” is “used ... in a process designed
to solve a technological problem in ‘conventional industry practice’” and
“improve[s] an existing technological process.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358
(citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). The Supreme Court further
informs us that “the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform
a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 134
S. Ct. at 2358.
In the present matter, as previously discussed, the claims are directed
to a method that is performed by a computer, the method comprising storing
data (i.e., “reward accounts”) on a computer, exchanging data (i.e., a
quantity of “reward points”), converting data (i.e., a quantity of “reward
points”), adding data (i.e., an amount of “reward points”), combining data
(i.e., amounts of “reward points”), and receiving data (i.e., “consideration”)
from a computer. In other words, the claims merely recite a generic
computer for performing the “abstract idea.” See also Final Act. 26.
Because the Supreme Court, as noted above, has held that recitation of a
generic computer is insufficient to transform a claimed invention deemed to
be an “abstract idea” into a patent-eligible invention, we must conclude that
the claimed invention in the present matter is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
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§ 101 as an “abstract idea” and execution of the “abstract idea” using a
generic computer is insufficient to transform the “abstract idea” into a
patent-eligible invention under 35U.S.C. § 101.
Appellant argues that, in accordance with guidance from the Federal
Circuit in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016) and Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2016), the claims in the present matter do not constitute “abstract ideas”
in the context of 35 U.S.C. § 101. In particular, Appellant argues that
“Patent Owner has not simply claimed a general process of conversion of
[data] of one type to [data] of a second type as alleged by the Examiner” but,
instead, “has set forth in the claims a specific, limited, and detailed invention
that is so much more [than] the fundamental currency exchange as alleged
by the Examiner.” App. Br. 13—14. Appellant proceeds to reproduce
portions of claim 1 and summarize other portions of claim 1. App. Br. 14—
15. Appellants’ summarization and restatement of claim 1 is unavailing.
While Appellant broadly asserts that claim 1 recites “so much more [than]”
manipulation of data, Appellant’s recapitulation of claim 1 fails to
demonstrate persuasively any specific detail recited in claim 1 that would
indicate that claim 1 recites something “more than” an abstract idea for
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 101, in accordance with recent guidance from our
reviewing courts, much less that the alleged additional recited feature(s) are
sufficient either to remove the claimed “abstract idea” from the realm of
non-statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (i.e., “abstract ideas”) in
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accordance to guidance from our reviewing courts or to transform the
“abstract idea” into patent-eligible subject matter.
Appellant also argues that even if claim 1, for example, recites no
more than an “abstract idea” in the context of 35 U.S.C. § 101, “the claims
pass part two of the Alice test and are thus patent-eligible.” App. Br. 15. In
particular, Appellant argues that the present claims “are similar in nature and
context to those found eligible in the Federal Circuit case of DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com. 773 F.3d 1245, 113 USPQ2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed Cir.
2014)” because “the claims in DDR Holdings were directed to solving the
Internet-centric problem of retaining website visitors” and “addressed a
challenge ‘particular to the Internet,’ which was retaining control over the
attention of the customer in the context of the Internet.” App. Br. 18. We
are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument.
Appellant only broadly asserts that claims directed to solving a
“problem of retaining website visitors” and “retaining control over the
attention of the customer” in DDR Holdings are somehow “similar in nature
and context” to claims in the present matter that are directed to storing
“rewards” data on a computer and “converting” a quantity of the “rewards”
data from one type to another type and “adding” and “combining” the
resultant data. Id. Yet, Appellant does not point out any specific similarity,
relevant to the question of patentability under 35 U.S.C. 101, between
storing, converting, adding, and combining data (as presently claimed) and
“retaining website visitors” or “retaining control of the attention of the
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customer” as claimed in DDR Holdings. Indeed, we do not observe any
meaningful similarity between the two seemingly unrelated, claimed
inventions, much less sufficient similarity to conclude that the presently
claimed invention is sufficient to “transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea
into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358.
Appellant also argues that the presently claimed invention is a patent-
eligible invention under 35U.S.C. § 101, in accordance with guidance from
our reviewing courts as set forth in DDR Holdings, because, according to
Appellant, the claims “address business challenges that are particular to the
Internet,” “are rooted in computer technology since it addresses the near
simultaneous decrease of points on one account, conversion and
increase/combination of points in second account,” and recite “a series of
detailed, specific steps that must be carried out in order ... to provide the
near simultaneous decrease of points on one account, conversion and
increase/combination of points in second account - and thus the instant
reconciliation and synchronization of reward point accounts.” App. Br. 19—
21.
We disagree with Appellant’s implied assertions, based on the holding
in DDR Holdings, that all claims that “address business challenges that are
particular to the Internet,” “are rooted” in computer technology, or “recite []
a series of detailed, specific steps that must be carried out in order”
(including claims that recite “abstract ideas,” as that term is interpreted by
our reviewing courts) must be deemed to be patentable under 35 U.S.C.
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§ 101. Indeed, we do not identity, nor does Appellant point out, that DDR
Holdings provides such guidance at all. We further refer to the Examiner’s
finding concerning DDR Holdings and the claims at issue. Final Act. 20—23.
Rather, in DDR Holdings, claims that “address[ed] the problem of
retaining website visitors that, if adhering to the routine, conventional
functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be instantly transported
away from a host’s website after ‘clicking’ on an advertisement and
activating a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. In that case, the
court held that the claims pass muster under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claims recited that “the visitor is no longer transported to [a] website [as
expected, but] . . . [ijnstead . . . call for . . . directing] the visitor to an
automatically-generated hybrid web page that combines visual ‘look and
feel’ elements from the host website and product information from the third-
party merchant’s website related to the clicked advertisement.” Id.
In the present case and as previously discussed, the claims are directed
to storing data pertaining to reward points and exchanging a quantity of
reward points of a first type for a second type responsive to a request from a
user. The claims do not recite “transporting” a visitor anywhere, much less
to a “hybrid web page that combines visual Took and feel’ elements.” See
id. Hence, the claims in the present matter are directed to unrelated subject
matter. We disagree with Appellant that our reviewing court’s analysis of
claims to subject matter that is unrelated to that of the present claims is
somehow applicable in the present matter.
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Viewing DDR Holdings more broadly as potentially standing for the
proposition that claims that recite an “abstract idea” are, nevertheless,
considered to be patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 if the claims in question
recite performing an action on the Internet that provides a result that differs
from what would be expected by those of skill in the art based on known
prior performance of the same claimed action (i.e., in the claims of DDR
Holdings, upon selection of a hyperlink, a user is transported to a website
that is different from the website to which a user would expect to be
transported), we note that claim 1 does not recite the “Internet.” Even
assuming that claim 1 recites the “Internet,” Appellant does not point out
what specific feature recited in claim 1 would constitute a result that would
have been unexpected by one of skill in the art. For example, as previously
discussed, claim 1 merely recites the expected and predictable result of
exchanging types of reward points between accounts based on a request
from a user to do so. One of skill in the art requesting to exchange reward
points between accounts would have expected the system to exchange the
reward points as requested. In contrast, with the possible interpretation of
the claims in DDR Holdings, as arguably described by the Federal Circuit,
the claims in the present matter recite actions that provide expected results
and not unexpected results.
Appellant does not suggest an alternative perspective of the holding in
DDR Holdings that would demonstrate persuasively that the claims in the
present case are patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in accordance with
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guidance from our reviewing courts. Hence, we cannot agree with
Appellant’s assertion.
Appellant argues that the present claims are patentable under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because, based on the holding of the Federal Circuit in Bascom
Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016), “claims [that] did not pre-empt all use of the claimed
abstract idea . . . passed the second part of the Alice test.” App. Br. 24.
We disagree with Appellant’s contention that either Bascom or McRO
stands for the proposition that all claims directed to “abstract ideas,” as that
term has been interpreted by our reviewing courts, are, nevertheless,
considered to be patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 if the claims do not “pre­
empt all use of the claimed abstract idea.” Id.
In McRO LLC, the court held that claims that recite “a specific
asserted improvement in computer animation” are patentable under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because the court determined that such claims “go[] beyond
merely ‘organizing . . . information into anew form’” {McROInc., 837 F.3d
at 1314—15) (internal citation omitted) and not because the claims do not
pre-empt all use of the claimed abstract idea. Indeed, the court explicitly
stated that “we have recognized that ‘the absence of complete preemption
does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” McRO Inc., 837 F.3d at 1315
(citing Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2015)).
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In Bascom, the court held that claims that recite a “filtering system”
that executes an “associated filtering scheme” (Bascom Global Internet
Services, Inc., 827 F.3d at 1345) to be an “abstract idea” (id. at 1348) that
is, nevertheless, patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because, according to the
Federal Circuit, the claims in that case recite an “ordered combination of the
limitations” including “the installation of a filtering tool at a specific
location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features
specific to each end user.” Id at 1348—1349. We do not identity a
discussion by the Federal Circuit in Bascom that would support Appellant’s
contention that the claims in Bascom were considered by our reviewing
court to be patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claims in question
supposedly do not “pre-empt all use of the claimed abstract idea.” App. Br.
24.
Appellant also argues that the present claims are patentable under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because, in contrast to the holding of the Federal Circuit in
Planet Bingo LLC v. VKGSLLC, 576 F. App’x 1005 (Fed Cir. 2014), the
claims in the present matter, according to Appellant, are “not a simple
application of a few mental steps that can be performed in the human mind.”
App. Br. 25. We note that in Planet Bingo, our reviewing court held that the
claims were z/wpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although the Federal
Circuit agreed with the District Court that the claims in Planet Bingo
“consists solely of mental steps which can be carried out by a human using
pen and paper” (Planet Bingo LLC, 576 F. App’x at 1007), Appellant does
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not indicate that the Federal Circuit also held that the converse is also true,
i.e., that all claims that recite subject matter that is “not a simple application
of a few mental steps that can be performed in the human mind” are
patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
SUMMARY
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1—3, 6—9, and 12 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
AFFIRMED
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