Ex Parte 7810729 et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 28, 201495001618 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 95/001,618 05/10/2011 7810729 85729-9 1281 120728 7590 03/31/2014 The Law Office of Kirk D. Williams 3196 Dayton St Denver, CO 80238 EXAMINER RUBIN, MARGARET R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3992 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/31/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEALS BOARD ____________________ SQUARE, INCORPORATED, Requester and Respondent v. REM HOLDINGS 3, LLC, Patent Owner and Appellant ____________________ Appeal 2013-009801 Reexamination Control Nos. 95/001,618 United States Patent No. 7,810,729 B2 Technology Center 3900 ____________________ Before JEFFERY B. ROBERTSON, DENISE M. POTHIER, and ANDREW J. DILLON, Administrative Patent Judges. POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL I. STATEMENT OF CASE Requester, Square Incorporated (“Requester”) made a third party request for inter partes reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 7,810,729 B2 (“the 729 patent”) to Robert E. Morley, Jr., entitled Card Reader Device for a Cell Phone and Method of Use issued October 12, 2010 and assigned to Rem Holdings 3, LLC. Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 2 Patent Owner, Rem Holdings 3, LLC (“Owner”) appeals under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 315 (2002) from the decision in the Examiner’s Right of Appeal Notice (RAN) rejecting claims 1-22 of the 729 patent. Owner App. Br. 6. Requester filed a Respondent Brief disputing contentions by Owner and supporting the Examiner’s decision. Requester Resp. Br. 8-22. Requester also cross-appeals from the Examiner’s decision in the RAN not to adopt specific rejections of claims 1-22 or to withdraw specific rejections. Requester App. Br. 11-30. Owner filed a Respondent Brief repeating arguments made in the Appeal Brief, opposing the cross-appeal, and supporting the Examiner’s decision not to adopt certain proposed rejections. Owner Resp. Br. 8-35. Owner filed a Rebuttal Brief. Owner Reb. Br. The Examiner’s Answer relies solely on the RAN mailed July 17, 2012, incorporating it by reference. Ans. 1. An oral hearing was conducted on January 8, 2014. The transcript of the oral hearing will be made of record in due course. Requester identifies a related reexamination, Reexamination Control No. 95/001,619 of U.S. Patent No. 7,918,394 B2, which is couched as a continuation application of the application issuing as the 729 patent and resulted in a Reexamination Certificate canceling all claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,918,394. Requester App. Br. 2. Owner identifies a related reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 7,896,248 B2, Reexamination Control No. 95/001,620, which is also on appeal and has been assigned Appeal No. 2013-010534. Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 3 We are informed that the 729 Patent is involved in pending litigation, Square, Inc. and James McKelvey v. Rem Holdings 3, LLC, Civil Action No. 4:10- cv-2243 SNLJ, which is before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and has been stayed pending the outcome of this reexamination proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 315. We AFFIRM. Claim 1 on appeal reads as follows: 1. A card reader device for reading a card having data stored on a magnetic stripe incorporated into the card the device comprising: a read head for passing a magnetic stripe of a card by to read data stored on a magnetic stripe and for producing a signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe; a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe; and an output jack adapted to be inserted into a microphone input associated with a cell phone for providing the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe to a cell phone. Owner App. Br., Claims App’x 63. A. Prior Art Relied Upon The Examiner relies on the following as evidence of unpatentability: Von Mueller (“Von Mueller I”) US 2005/0247787 Nov. 10, 2005 Antonio US 2006/0223580 Oct. 5, 2006 Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 4 Luis Padilla Visdómine, Magnetic Stripe Reader Circuit 1-7 1 (2003), available at http://classic- Pdweb.archive.org/web/20030218183546/http://www.gae.ucm.es/~padilla/extrawo rk/magamp.html (“Padilla II”). Luis Padilla Visdómine, Turning Your Mobile Into a Magnetic Stripe Reader 1-4 2 (2007), available at http://classic- web.archive.org/web/20041027001715/http://www.gae.ucm.es/~padilla/extrawork/ mobilesoundtrack.html (“Padilla I”). Siemens Blog, Siemens MC60 cell phone 1-2 3 (September 2, 2008), available at http://siemphones.blogspot.com/2008/09/siemens-mc60-review.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (“siemphones”). Philip Berne, Full LG Rumor2 Review 1-3 4 (May 16, 2009), on file (“Rumor 2”). B. The Adopted Rejections The Examiner maintains the following proposed rejections: Reference(s) Basis Claims Presented Von Mueller I and Antonio § 103(a) 1-3 and 6-22 RAN 4-7 Von Mueller I, Antonio, and Rumor 2 § 103(a) 4 RAN 8 Padilla I, Padilla II, and siemphones § 103(a) 1-3, 5-7, 11- 13, and 15-18 RAN 8 1 Three printed pages of this reference were provided, and these page numbers correspond sequentially to the pages provided. 2 Four printed pages of this reference were provided, and these page numbers correspond sequentially to the pages provided. 3 Two printed pages of this reference were provided, and these page numbers correspond sequentially to the pages provided. 4 Three pages of this reference were provided, and these page numbers correspond sequentially to the pages provided. Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 5 Padilla I, Padilla II, siemphones, and Rumor 2 § 103(a) 4 and 10 RAN 9 Von Mueller I, Padilla I, and siemphones § 103(a) 1-3, 6-9, and 11-22 RAN 9-12 Von Mueller I, Padilla I, siemphones, and Rumor 2 § 103(a) 4 and 10 RAN 12-13 C. The Proposed Rejections Not Adopted or Withdrawn The Examiner has not adopted or has withdrawn the following rejections: Reference(s) Basis Claims Last Presented Lekernel § 103(a) 1-22 Request 7- 12, App. A Lekernel/Tyner § 103(a) 6-9, 13-15, 20, and 22 Request 12- 18, App. B Lekernel/Gullickson § 103(a) 4 and 10 Request 19- 20, App. C Padilla I and II § 103(a) 8, 9, 14, and 19-22 Request 20- 23, App. D Wallner, Padilla I, siemphones § 103(a) 1-3, 5-8, and 11-22 Non-Final Rej. 18-19 Wallner, Padilla I, siemphones, Rumor 2 § 103(a) 4 and 10 Non-Final Rej. 19 Von Mueller and Antonio § 103(a) 5 December 13, 2011 Action Closing Prosecution 8-9 Von Mueller, Padilla I, siemphones § 103(a) 5 December 13, 2011 Action Closing Prosecution 11-12 Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 6 II. ISSUES ON APPEAL Owner and Requester raise the following issues of whether the Examiner erred in finding that: (1) von Mueller I teaches “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe” found in independent claims 1 and 19? (2) Padilla I teaches “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe” found in independent claims 1 and 19? (3) One of ordinary skill in the art would have combined teachings of von Mueller I and Antonio? (4) One of ordinary skill in the art would have combined teachings of Padilla I, Padilla II, and siemphones? (5) the secondary considerations fail to weigh against obviousness? III. ANALYSIS A. Preliminary Matters On January 6, 2014, Owner filed a petition to expunge certain information from the record. The Office granted the petition on February 25, 2014. We will confine our opinion to the contentions presented in the briefs. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.67. B. Claim Construction As Requester notes (see Requester Resp. Br. 11), Owner argues for the first time in the Appeal Brief that the recitation, “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe” found in Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 7 claims 1 and 19, invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Owner App. Br. 12-18. Owner specifically asserts that the Examiner erred in failing to construe this recitation as a means-plus-function limitation. Id. Notably, claims 11-18, 21, and 22 fail to recite the limitation, “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal . . .,” and Owner’s arguments in this regard are inapplicable to these claims. The failure to use the word “means” creates a strong rebuttable presumption that the drafter did not intend a claim to be governed by § 112, sixth paragraph. See Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In particular, 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph has been determined not to be invoked when the drafter fails to signal an intent to apply the provision. See id. at 1374. Until the filing of the Appeal Brief, Owner did not signal any intent to apply 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph to the phrase, “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal . . . .” Even so, generic terms, such as “device for . . ,” may invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph when the phrase is considered a non-structural term that is not modified by sufficient structure. See Welker Bearing Co., v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A limitation lacking the term, “means,” may overcome a presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph is not invoked by showing that “the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for permitting that function.” See Flo Healthcare, 597 F.3d at 1374. Owner makes this precise contention. Owner App. Br. 12; Owner Resp. Br. 13-14; Owner Reb. Br. 11-12. Owner argues the phrase, “signal setting device” has no meaning in the electrical arts and that the phrase, “a signal setting device for setting amplitude of Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 8 the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe,” describes insufficient structure for performing the recited function. Owner App. Br. 12; Owner Resp. Br. 13-14. Accordingly, Owner asserts the structure corresponding to the purported means-plus-function limitation is “a resistance coupled to the output jack” (Owner App. Br. 16) that passively attenuates the signal without using power. Owner App. Br. 15. Given this understanding, Owner contends that the recited “signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal . . .” excludes an amplifier. Owner App. Br. 16; Owner Reb. Br. 5-8. Requester disagrees, asserting the limitation does not invoke § 112, sixth paragraph, and recites sufficient structure that includes an amplifier. Requester Resp. Br. 10-12. Assuming 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph has been invoked for the recited “signal setting device for setting an amplitude,” we find both a resistor and an amplifier are corresponding structures to this recitation when considering the 729 patent’s disclosure as interpreted by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). Notably, the precise function in claims 1 and 11 is “setting an amplitude of the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe.” There is no restriction in claims 1 or 19 that the signal’s amplitude is set by attenuating the signal passively or without using power. See Requester Resp. Br. 12-13. When considering the structure in the 729 patent’s disclosure that performs the function of “setting an amplitude of the signal,” the 729 patent discusses “a signal setting device for setting amplitude of the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe” in several places. The 729 patent describes “a signal amplitude setting device 26[,] such as resistor which is connected to jack 16,” “resistor 26 with the resistor setting the amplitude of the waveform,” “[t]he resistor 26 sets the Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 9 amplitude of this signal and this signal is provided to the cell phone 20,” and “[t]he waveform then has its amplitude set by the resistor 26 in step 106.” The 729 patent 4:24-25, 42-43, 4:67-5:1, 5:64-65; Fig. 2. The 729 patent therefore includes a resistor as an example of the structure that performs the function of “setting an amplitude of the signal[.]” The 729 patent describes another embodiment shown in Figure 3 devoid of any resistors. The 729 patent 3:54-56, 5:22-57; Fig. 3. Owner states this embodiment uses an amplifier “in place of the ‘signal setting device for setting . . .’ of FIG. 2.” Owner App. Br. 17. In this embodiment, card reader device 80 has coil 86 to read the data stored on the magnetic stripe and to produce a waveform indicative of the signal (i.e., the “read head . . . for producing a signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe[.]”) The 729 patent 5:23-24, 32-35; Fig. 3. The signal is then amplified using amplifier 88 and transmitted to a cell phone or other device through jack 90. 5 The 729 patent 5:35-37; Fig. 3. Amplifier 88 thus adjusts or sets the signal’s amplitude prior to transmitting the signal to a cell phone or other device (e.g., a host device). See Requester Resp. Br. 12. The phrase, “signal setting” is not used in the 729 patent when describing the Figure 3 embodiment and the symbols for resistor and amplifier are different. Owner App. Br. 17. Yet, amplifier 88 still performs the function of “setting an amplitude” as recited in independent claims 1 and 19. That is, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized that a resistor generally sets amplitude through attenuation, and an amplifier generally sets amplitude through amplification. See Requester Resp. Reply Br. 12-13. Although these devices set amplitude differently, they both perform the recited function of “setting an amplitude of the 5 We presume the reference to “jack 88” in line 37 is a typographical error. Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 10 signal . . .” as broadly as recited and as one skilled in the art would interpret in light of the disclosure. We therefore find that the 729 patent describes a second structure (i.e., an amplifier) that one skilled in the art would have understood in light of the disclosure as corresponding to the recited “signal setting device for setting an amplitude . . .” in claims 1 and 19. Owner contends that one skilled in the art would interpret the phrase, “signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal . . .” in the 729 patent to be restricted to a resistance that can only passively attenuate. Owner App. Br. 14-15; Owner Reb. Br. 6-7. For example, Owner presents a supplemental declaration of the inventor of the 729 Patent, Robert E. Morley, Jr., Ph.D., 6 to support that one skilled in the art would understand that a “signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal” is only a resistance that passively attenuates a signal. See Owner App. Br. 14-15 (citing Evidence App’x, Ex. 18, ¶ 26). Requester presents a competing declaration by David A. Thompson, Ph.D. dated September 29, 2011 (“the Thompson declaration”) supporting the position that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal” to include more than a device that attenuates (e.g., a resistor) and includes both resistors and amplifiers. Requester Resp. Br. 12, 14 (citing Evidence App’x, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 20-24 and 29). 6 Owner presents two declarations by Robert E. Morley, Jr. In Owner’s Appeal Brief and Respondent Brief, the two declarations are submitted as Exhibit 1 dated September 1, 2011 (“the Morley declaration”) and Exhibit 18 dated January 17, 2012 (“the supplemental Morley declaration”). When citing to these declarations, we will refer to them by their respective exhibits number (i.e., Exs. 1 and 18) listed in the Evidence Appendix of Owner’s Appeal Brief. Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 11 We are not persuaded by the supplemental Morley declaration. As noted above, the recited function in claim 1 is that of “setting an amplitude of the signal” – not setting an amplitude of a signal by passively attenuating. The supplemental Morley declaration accounts only for devices that set amplitude using passive attenuation, which is not claimed. Also, the quoted statements from Stephen R. Wood 7 similarly focus only on devices that set an amplitude through passive attenuation. On the other hand, we find the Thompson declaration has some persuasive value, because the declaration does not unduly limit claim 1 to devices that set an amplitude only through passive attenuation and also addresses what an ordinarily skilled in the art would understand a “signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal” to be in light of the 729 patent’s disclosure. See Requester Resp. Br., Evidence App’x, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 9, 20-21. Owner asserts that the Thompson declaration is not probative, because it fails to consider what an ordinarily skilled artisan would have known at the time of the invention but rather considers a “2009 time frame,” which encompasses time after the invention. Owner Resp. Br. 17-18; Owner Reb. Br. 14-15. We are not persuaded. The “2009 time frame” reasonably includes dates in 2009 prior to the June 10, 2009 filing date of the 729 patent. Also, as indicated by Requester, the recitation of “the signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal . . .” in claim 1 is broader in scope than that recited claim 3, which specifically recites the signal setting device comprise a 7 Owner refers to a declaration of Stephen R. Wood presented in another reexamination, Control No. 95/001,620. Owner Reb. Br. 8. Given that this declaration is not evidence submitted with the briefs of this appeal, we will not consider its contents, other than the quoted portions found in the Rebuttal Brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.67(c)(1)(ix). Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 12 resistor. Requester Resp. Br. 13-14. Owner retorts that the “signal setting device” in claim 1 simply includes “any resistance” and in claim 3 distinctly recites “a resistor.” See Owner Resp. Br. 16; Owner Reb. Br. 11. We are more persuaded by Requester’s position. Using the doctrine of claim differentiation, which creates a presumption that each claim in a patent has a different scope, we agree that the “signal setting device” in claim 1 includes more structure than a resistor or resistance and, based on the disclosure as discussed above, includes amplifiers. See Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Alternatively, assuming 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph has not been invoked, we find that one skilled in the art would have understood that the structures in the 729 patent’s disclosure corresponding to the “signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal . . .” recited in independent claims 1 and 19 include resistors and amplifiers under the broadest reasonable construction standard set forth in In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004. We refer to the above discussion for support. With this understanding, we turn to the art rejections. C. Art Rejections The “obviousness inquiry centers on whether ‘the claimed invention as a whole’ would have been obvious . . . . ” Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257- 58 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 13 considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). See also KSR, 550 U.S. at 406-07. Additionally, “[t]he obviousness assessment depends on what the prior art teaches and on what the non-prior-art evidence of ‘secondary considerations’ (or objective indicia) may indicate about whether the invention would have been obvious at the relevant time.” Institut Pasteur and Universite Pierre et Marie Curie v. Focarino and Precision Biosciences, Inc., 738 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 406-07). The evidentiary standard for findings in proceedings before the United States Patent Office is preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 1. von Mueller I and Antonio under § 103 a. Claims 1-3 and 6-22 Claims 2, 3, and 6-22 are not separately argued and accordingly are grouped with representative independent claim 1. Concerning claim 1, the Examiner concludes that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of von Mueller I and Antonio. RAN 4-7 (incorporating to Request, App. J). Owner asserts that the amplifier disclosed in von Mueller I is not a “signal setting device” as recited in claim 1. Owner App. Br. 19-22. Requester argues that Owner’s interpretation of the claims is too narrow. Requester Resp. Br. 12-14. We agree with Requester for the same reasons discussed above in the section entitled “Claim Construction.” Specifically, given the above claim construction of the phrase, “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal,” the von Mueller I teaching of magnetic head amplifier schematic diagram 90 is a card reader device having signal setting device for setting an amplitude. RAN 4 (referring to Request 43-47, Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 14 App. J 243-244). Additionally, von Mueller I teaches magnetic head amplifier schematic diagram 90, which reads magnetic stripe information on a credit card, includes resistors. See RAN 4 (referring to Request, App. J 243-44 (citing von Mueller I ¶¶ 31, 38, Figs. 1, 8)). Thus, von Mueller I has “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal” that includes both amplifiers and resistors. We stress that claims 11-18, 21, and 22 fail to recite “a signal setting device” and instead claim “an amplifier.” Appellant does not argue that von Mueller I is missing an amplifier. Thus, the above-discussed argument concerning von Mueller I failing to teach “a signal setting device for setting am amplitude of the signal,” is not applicable to claims 11-18, 21, and 22. Additionally, Owner contends there is no motivation to modify von Mueller I as proposed, because von Mueller I is designed such that no data communication can take place between the card reader and the personal data assistant (PDA) when data is being transferred between the PDA and a personal computer (PC) (i.e., when “hot syncing.”) Owner App. Br. 22-29; Owner Reb. Br. 17-18. Owner particularly emphasizes von Mueller I’s discussion that data cannot be transferred between a card reader and a PDA during hot syncing and asserts the proposed combination does not solve how to transfer data to the PDA from the card reader during hot syncing. Owner App. Br. 23-25 (citing von Mueller I ¶ 37). We are not persuaded that these statements in von Mueller I would dissuade one of ordinary skill in the art form combining Antonio’s teachings with von Mueller I. As Requester and the Examiner indicate, the restriction in von Mueller I of not providing data transfer between the card reader and the PDA during hot syncing provides a precise reason with some rational underpinning to combine Antonio with von Mueller I. See RAN 6-7; Requester Resp. Br. 14-16. That is, Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 15 Antonio’s teaching provides the von Mueller I/Antonio system the ability to transfer data during hot syncing between the card reader and the PDA through another, additional input (e.g., a microphone input) widely used with portable device. RAN 6-7. Also, we agree with the Examiner’s reasoning that “the ubiquitous presence of mobile devices makes them ideal input devices as pointed out by Antonio and using the earphone/microphone inputs provided [in these mobile devices] allows convenience and flexibility in collecting and processing data.” RAN 5. Owner argues that von Mueller I already solves this problem by storing data for later retrieval. Owner App. Br. 25. Owner asserts that there is no need for simultaneously communication, because one can use the card reader when the device is not hot syncing. See id. and Owner Reb. Br. 17. We disagree. The proposed modification would have improved on von Mueller I’s techniques and provides a reason for obviousness. See KSR Int’l Co v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Also, von Muller I does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage a solution of permitting simultaneous communication between the PDA and PC as well as between a PDA and card reader. Owner further asserts that the proposed combination would have rendered von Mueller I inoperable, would have changed the device’s principle of operation from one that does not transfer data during hot syncing to one that does, and would have required significant changes. Owner App. Br. 24-25. First, we note that bodily incorporation of the features of Antonio into von Mueller I is not required. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Second, contrary to Appellant’s assertions (Owner Reb. Br. 16), the Examiner has not proposed a substitution of one element for another. See RAN 5. Third, we disagree that von Mueller I’s Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 16 principle of operation is to stop data from transferring between the PDA and the card reader during hot syncing. Rather, von Mueller I’s principle of operation is data communication between the PDA and other devices. We further agree with Requester that the combination of teachings results in a device with components having the same functions and yields a predictable result. See Respondent Resp. Br. 14-15. That is, von Mueller I’s connection (i.e., the serial port) will still permit normal serial communications between PC and PDA and prevent other data for being sent through this connection during hot syncing (von Mueller I ¶ 37). The additional, second connection, as suggested by Antonio and as explained above, provides for improved data communication techniques by permit contemporaneous data communication between the card reader and the PDA during hot syncing. See Requester Resp. Br. 15. Thus, the Examiner’s reasoning is sufficiently supported by the references. As a result, we disagree with Owner that the Examiner is using impermissible hindsight in formulating the obviousness rejection. Owner App. Br. 27-29. b. Claim 4 Claim 4 is rejected based on von Mueller I, Antonio, and Rumor 2 under § 103. RAN 8. Owner refers to the arguments made for claim 1, namely those presented in Subsection vii.1. Owner App. Br. 29. We are not persuaded for the reasons previously set forth when addressing von Mueller I and Antonio. 2. Padilla I, Padilla II, and siemphones a. Claims 1-3, 5-7, 11-13, and 15-18 Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 17 We select independent claim 1 as representative and group claims 2, 3, 6, 7, 11-13, and 15-18, not separately argued, with claim 1. The Examiner finds that Padilla I, Padilla II, and siemphones teach the limitations found in claim 1. RAN 8 (incorporating to Request 20-23, App. D). Like von Mueller I above, Owner argues that the amplifier disclosed in Padilla II is not a “signal setting device” as recited in claim 1. Owner App. Br. 35- 36; Owner Reb. Br. 19-21. Requester argues that Owner’s interpretation of the claims is too narrow. Requester Resp. Br. 16. We agree with Requester for the same reasons discussed in the above section entitled “Claim Construction.” Specifically, given the above claim construction to the phrase, “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal,” Padilla II teaches an amplifier, which is a card reader device having signal setting device for setting an amplitude. RAN 8 (referring to Request 20-23, App. D 98-99). Additionally, Padilla II teaches adjusting the amplifier circuit by changing R2 (i.e., a resistor) to get an optimal signal (e.g., maximum amplitude and minimum noise). Padilla II 2. Thus, even assuming that the “signal setting device” was restricted to resistors, Padilla II has “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal” that includes both amplifiers and resistors. Owner notes that claims 11-13 and 15-18 recite an amplifier and not “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude[.]” Owner App. Br. 37. Thus, the above-discussed argument concerning Padilla II failing to teach “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude of the signal, “ is not applicable to claims 11-13 and 15-18. We further stress that Owner does not dispute that Padilla II is missing an amplifier. Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 18 Owner also asserts that Padilla I fails to teach including a “signal setting device” within a card reader and Padilla II does not suggest including such a feature within Padilla I. Owner App. Br. 30-34. Owner describes how Padilla’s invention evolved between Padilla I, Padilla II, and Padilla III 8 and argues this chronology suggests to an ordinarily skilled artisan that there is no need to add any intervening circuitry (i.e., the recited signal setting device) between a read head and an output jack as the Examiner proposes. Owner App. Br. 31-32; Owner Reb. Br. 19-20. Specifically, Owner asserts that Padilla III describes sound cards being common used and renders including an amplifier within Padilla I’s circuit unnecessary. Id. We are not persuaded. First, although Owner provides some evidence that amplifier may not be required between a device having soundcards and a magnetic card reader (Owner App. Br. 31-32 (citing Evidence App’x, Ex. 31)), Padilla III does not discourage including such a structure. See Requester Resp. Br. 17, Evidence App’x, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 29, 32-33. Second, as Requester contends, Padilla I does not indicate that all output signals from the read head of the card reader will have an acceptable amplitude for a cell phone. Id. Third, Padilla III states that the “impedances of both devices are usually similar” (emphasis added), suggesting to an ordinarily skilled artisan that there are occasions where an amplifier would assist in adjusting the signal and to turn to the teachings of Padilla II for a known technique to adjust weak signals. Owner App. Br., Evidence App’x, Ex. 31, p. 1; see also Requester Resp. Br. 17, Evidence App’x, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 27, 29, 31. 8 Padilla III, entitled “The simplest magnetic stripe reader,” has not been relied upon by the Examiner in the rejection but has been provided by Owner as evidence. Owner App. Br., Evidence App’x, Ex. 31. Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 19 Additionally, Owner further contends that the Examiner’s motivation is facially insufficient and that the Examiner is engaging in impermissible hindsight to make the combination. Owner App. Br. 33-34; Owner Reb. Br. 20. Although a “motivation” is not needed to support an obviousness rejection, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational basis underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (internal quotes and citations omitted). As indicated by the Requester, Padilla II provides a suggestion to one skilled in the art that including an amplifier circuit within a device (e.g., Padilla I’s card reader) would assist in setting the amplitude to an acceptable level. See Requester Resp. Br. 17. Owner contends that this is a rejection with a new motivation that was not presented in the RAN. Owner Reb. Br. 21. Yet, the Examiner incorporates the Request 20-23 and Appendix D for this rejection. See RAN 8. Appendix D states Padilla II teaches including an amplifier circuit, which is adjusted by changing the value of resistors within the circuit to obtain a maximum amplitude and minimum noise. Request, App. D 98-99. As such, the Request, which is incorporated by reference into the RAN, provides at least one reason with a rational underpinning to include an amplifier circuit (e.g., “a signal setting device for setting an amplitude”) within Padilla I, so that a maximum amplitude and minimum noise is obtained. Padilla II 2. As such, we conclude that the Examiner has provided a sufficient reason for combining Padilla II with Padilla I and that the Examiner is not relying on impermissible hindsight. For the first time in the Rebuttal Brief, Owner argues one skilled in the art would not turn to Padilla II because Padilla II is used for a joystick input and differs from a cell phone in Padilla I. Owner Reb. Br. 21. This argument is Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 20 untimely and has been waived. See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (informative). To the extent claim 11 is separately argued (Owner App. Br. 37), we refer to the above discussion. Concerning claim 5, Owner contends that Padilla I and II fail to teach the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe is an analog signal as recited. Owner App. Br. 8; Owner Reb. Br. 22-23. Focusing on Padilla II, Owner argues that the Padilla II outputs a digitized signal out of the amplifier circuit. Owner App. Br. 38 (discussing Dr. Morley’s simulation). However, bodily incorporation of Padilla II within Padilla I is not required. “Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. As Requester notes, there is no dispute that Padilla I’s output jack produces an analog signal that is indicative of data stored on a magnetic stripe to a cell phone. See Requester Resp. Br. 18. Thus, when combining Padilla II’s teaching of using an amplifier to optimize amplitude and minimize noise with Padilla I analog system, one skilled in the art would have recognized making the signal indicative of data stored on a magnetic strip analog. Moreover, although described in the context of von Mueller I and Antonio (see Requester Resp. Br. 18, Evidence App’x, Ex. 1, ¶ 23), we agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized using analog or digital signals as an input signal into a cell phone’s microphone input, such as Padilla I’s, when accounting for the creative steps and inferences of an ordinarily skilled artisan would have employed. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 21 b. Claims 4 and 10 Claims 4 and 10 are rejected based on Padilla I, Padilla II, siemphones, and Rumor 2 under § 103. RAN 9. Owner relies on the arguments made for claim 1, specifically Subsection vii.3. Owner App. Br. 38. We are not persuaded for the reasons previously set forth when addressing Padilla I and II. 3. von Mueller I, Padilla I, and siemphones a. Claims 1-3, 6-9, and 11-22 Claims 1-3, 6-9, and 11-22 are rejected as being unpatentable over von Mueller I, Padilla I, and siemphones. RAN 9-12 (incorporating Request 23-32, App. E). For this rejection, Owner refers to the arguments made in Subsections vii.1.1-1.2, that address the § 103 rejection of von Mueller I and Antonio. Owner App. Br. 39-40. We are not persuaded for the previously-stated reasons. b. Claims 4 and 10 Claims 4 and 10 are rejected based on von Mueller I, Padilla II, siemphones, and Rumor 2 under § 103. RAN 12-13. Owner relies on the arguments made for claim 1, especially Subsection vii.5. Owner App. Br. 41. We are not persuaded for the previously-stated reasons. 4. Consideration of Secondary Evidence in Determining Obviousness Having considered the evidence supporting a conclusion of obviousness, we now turn to the arguments concerning objective evidence of nonobviousness. Owner asserts that uncontroverted objective evidence, including evidence of copying and commercial success, has been provided to weigh against the Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 22 obviousness of the claims in the 729 patent. Owner App. Br. 42-61. Requester takes the opposing position, asserting Requester did not copy the invention and that the evidence fails to provide a sufficient nexus between the claimed invention and the Requester’s commercial success. Requester Resp. Br. 19-22. Requester asserts the success of the product is due to “many factors that have nothing to do with a card reader[,]” including its transaction platform that includes software components, services provided beyond the card reader, and the fact that the card reader is free. Requester Resp. Br. 20-22. We disagree with Owner that the Examiner has not considered the submitted evidence within the record in arriving at the conclusion that claims 1-22 are obvious. See Owner App. Br. 45. The ACP specifically discusses the evidence over several pages. See ACP 19-25. The Examiner stresses, in particular, that the presented evidence of secondary considerations is not sufficient to overcome the obviousness rejections because “the present circumstances are believed to demonstrate strong obviousness rejections where the evidence for maintaining the rejections that are in place is stronger than the presented evidence regarding secondary considerations.” ACP 20; see Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768-69 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We agree with the Examiner. All the evidence of secondary considerations is directed toward claims 1-10, 19, and 20. See Owner App. Br. 42 and 54-59. As such, for claims 11-18, 21, and 22, there is no evidence of secondary considerations on the record to outweigh the obviousness rejections of these claims. For the remaining claims, the evidence presented by Owner falls into three general categories: (1) alleged copying by Requester of the claimed invention (Owner App. Br. 46-52); (2) commercial Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 23 success of Requester’s reader (Owner App. Br. 52-60); and (3) other considerations (Owner App. Br. 60-61). A. Alleged Copying by Requester Owner discusses the Morley declaration and the supplemental Morley declaration, asserting that these declarations demonstrate that the Requester’s reader has the claimed features recited in claims 1 through 10, 19 and 20 and that Requester copied Owner’s reader. Owner App. Br. 44 (citing Evidence App’x, Exs. 1 and 18), 46 (citing Evidence App’x, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 9-16 and Ex. 18, ¶¶ 6-8); Owner Resp. Br. 31-34; Owner Reb. Br. 27-30. Requester provides a different story contending that Mssrs. Morley and McKelvey collaborated and are co- inventors of the claimed invention. See Requester Resp. Br. 19. Specifically, Owner contends Mr. James McKelvey, a founder at Square, approach Dr. Morley in February 2009 with an idea of processing credit cards using an iPhone as a host device by taking a picture of the card. Between February and the fall of 2009, Dr. Morley further asserts that he designed a card reader that uses a headset jack’s microphone input to send a signal indicative of the card’s data and includes the features in claims 1 through 6 of the 729 patent. Owner App. Br., Evidence App’x, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 9-12. In the supplemental Morley declaration, Dr. Morley also maps Requester’s card reader to the limitations in claim 1. Owner App. Br. 46-48, Evidence App’x, Ex. 18, ¶¶ 6-8. Notably, Owner does not assert or provide evidence that dependent claims 7-9 or 20 were copied. See id; see also Owner App. Br., Evidence App’x, Ex. 1. Contrary to Owner’s contentions (Owner App. Br. 42, 45; Owner Reb. Br. 25), the Examiner considered the evidence that Requester copied Owner’s Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 24 reader. See ACP 22 (discussing Ex. 1 9 ¶ 9, and Ex. 21 10 in Owner’s Appeal Brief, Evidence App’x). Specifically, the Examiner finds evidence that Requester’s reader has some of the features of the claimed invention. See ACP 24. The Examiner also finds some evidence that there were discussions between Dr. Morley and Mr. McKelvey and that the base patent disclosure was provided to someone in advance of June 10, 2009. ACP 22 (discussing Ex. 21 in Owner’s Appeal Brief, Evidence App’x). Additionally, the Examiner further discusses the conflicting versions of what occurred between Mssrs. Morley and McKelvey. ACP 22 (discussing to Ex. 1 ¶ 9 and Ex. 21 in Owner’s Appeal Brief, Evidence App’x). Namely, the Examiner notes the complaint provided by Requester asserting that Mssrs. Morley and McKelvey are co-inventors of the 729 patent. ACP 22 (citing Ex. 24 in Owner’s Appeal Brief, Evidence App’x). Thus, Requester provides some evidence to contradict Owner’s evidence of copying. Citing to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2137.01, Owner further asserts that the 729 patent issued to Dr. Morley creates a presumption that the he is the sole inventor. See Owner App. Br. 51; Owner Reb. Br. 29-30. Yet, other evidence counters this purported presumption. First, Mr. 9 At times in the record, both the Examiner and Owner refer to the same exhibits using letters or numbers. For example, the Examiner refers to “exhibit Q” and “Exhibit V[.]” See ACP 22. As another example, Owner refers to Exhibits 2-17 as Exhibits A-P respectively and Exhibits 19-30 as Exhibits Q-AB respectively. See, e.g., Owner App. Br. 44. For purposes of this opinion and for consistency, we will only refer to the exhibits using the numbers listed in the Evidence Appendix of Owner’s Appeal Brief. 10 Owner points out reference to “exhibit Q” in the ACP seems to refer to another exhibit, Exhibit W. See Owner App. Br. 49. Because of the reference to “June 10, 2009” in the ACP, we disagree and presume the Examiner intended to refer to Exhibit 21 which was sent “06/10/2009.” Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 25 McKelvey sent an email to Dr. Morley on April 23, 2009, stating that “[Dr. Morley] figured out a way to both simplify the circuit AND amplify the signal.” Owner App. Br., Evidence App’x, Ex. 25. We note that the email does not provide sufficient detail to ascertain whether “simplify[ing] the circuit” includes the recited “signal setting device.” This email and the June 10, 2009 email also provide further support that Mssrs. Morley and McKelvey were collaborating on the claimed invention that became part of a card reader patent application. Owner App. Br., Evidence App’x, Exs. 21 and 25. Moreover, we note that the evidence fails to show that the features could have been included within the Requester’s reader by some other attributable factors, such as a general lack of concern for patent property, which weighs neither for nor against the nonobviousness of a specific patent. See Cable Elec. Prods. Inc. v. Genmark Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1985) overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1358-61 (Fed. Cir. 1999)(en banc). In view of the above, we agree with the Examiner, that the provided evidence of copying is insufficient to outweigh the obviousness rejection. See ACP 22. B. Commercial Success of Requester and Other Card Readers Owner argues the overwhelming objective evidence establishes a nexus between the claimed invention of claims 1-10, 19, and 20 and the commercial success of Requester’s reader. Owner App. Br. 52-60; Owner Resp. Br. 34-35; Owner Reb. Br. 31-34. The Examiner, on the other hand, states Owner has not presented a convincing nexus between the secondary considerations and the Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 26 claimed invention. See ACP 23-25. Requester also contends that the evidence does not provide the requisite nexus. Requester Resp. Br. 20-22. Owner refers to various exhibits to support its position. See Owner App. Br. 44, Evidence App’x, Exs. 1-30. Owner asserts that the commercial success evidence includes 800,000 card readers embodying the invention in claims 1 through 9, 19, and 20 were sold by Requester in a twelve-month period and were offered for sale at 10,000 retail outlets. Owner App. Br. 56-57 (referring to Evidence App., Exs. 19 and 27). Owner states that over one million merchants were using Requester’s card reader embodying the invention in claims 1 through 9, 19, and 20 to accept credit card payments, and payments over two billion dollars and, two months later, four billion dollars annually were being processed using the readers embodying the invention in claims 1 through 9, 19, and 20. Owner App. Br. 54, 56-57 (referring to Evidence App., Exs. 19, 23, and 27). These arguments do not address claim 10. Contrary to Owner’s contentions, the Examiner considered this evidence and concluded it did not outweigh the obviousness rejection. See ACP 23-25. Notably, “evidence related solely to the number of units sold provides a very weak showing of commercial success, if any[,]” because such evidence provides no indication of whether these sales are substantial with respect to the market. In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). The above exhibits mainly relate to the number of units, and Owner fails to show whether these sales were substantial with respect to the market. See ACP 23 (requesting a comparison between Square and other companies who sold readers). Specifically, we do not agree with Owner’s statement that the evidence shows the market share went from zero to 12.5 percent. Owner App. Br. 57, Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 27 Evidence App’x, Exs. 19 and 23. Rather, the evidence states there are only eight million merchants currently accepting credit cards in the United States, and Square has added one million. This evidence demonstrates that Square has added to or grown the market within the United States. Owner App. Br. 57, Evidence App’x, Ex. 23. On the other hand, Square has described its customer base as about ten percent, but this number is limited to Visa and MasterCard customers, excluding American Express, Discover and others in the market. Owner App. Br. 57, Evidence App’x, Ex. 19. On the whole, this evidence fails to demonstrate adequately commercial success of Requester’s card readers. Accordingly, evidence of units sold and sales in Exhibits 19, 23, and 27 (Owner App. Br. 54, 56- 57) are insufficient to indicate whether these sales are substantial in the market, providing at best a weak showing of commercial success. The provided evidence further indicates that Requester’s card reader success is tied to reasons other than the claimed invention. For example, the evidence attributes Requester’s product popularity in part to the position that many businesses found the overhead of traditional merchant accounts were too burdensome. See Owner App. Br., Evidence App., Ex. 19. As another example, the card readers were given away for free. See Owner App. Br. 56-58, Evidence App’x., Exs. 19 and 27 (stating “Branson ‘took an interest in Requester’s rapid growth and novel technology, in particular its free hardware . . . .”) This illustrates that the free reader – not the merits of the claimed invention itself –contributed to Requester’s commercial success. See Requester Resp. Br. 19-21. Owner also discusses that the Requester reader has “garner[ed] significant attention for its bite- size credit card reader.” Owner App. Br. 58 (citing Evidence App., Ex. 5). This article indicates the reader’s size, which finds no corresponding limitation in Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 28 independent claims 1 and 19, is why the card readers are popular. Requester further states other factors (e.g., its transaction platform, software) attributed to its card reader’s success. See Requester Resp. Br. 20-21. To demonstrate commercial success, Owner also relies on the Morley declaration and the Morley supplemental declaration. Owner App. Br. 55-57, Evidence App’x., Exs. 1 and 18. Specifically, Owner cites to paragraphs 42 through 52 of the Morley declaration and specifically discusses Intuit’s card readers. Owner App. Br. 57, Evidence App’x, Ex. 1. However, just as stated above when discussing Requester’s card reader, any of Intuit’s or other companies’ alleged commercial success is arguably related to the card reader being offered for free. Owner App. Br. 57-58, Evidence App., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 44-45 and Ex. 10. Additionally, the Morley declaration has no supporting information that the Intuit reader (i.e., “the Mophie reader”), when it cost $79.95, was “not successful in the marketplace.” Owner App. Br., Ex. 1, ¶ 44. Also, other than the mere allegation that the supplemental Morley declaration (Owner App. Br., Evidence App’x, Ex. 18) demonstrates commercial success, it has not been discussed further. See Owner App. Br. 55-60. Moreover, Owner argues that demonstrating these card readers embody the claimed features (see Owner App. Br., Evidence App., Exs. 1 and 18) is sufficient to presume a nexus between commercial success and the claimed features See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1129 (Fed. Circ. 2000) and Oral H’g 20. We find that other evidence has rebutted this presumed nexus as explained in the above discussion. Lastly, the Examiner discusses a claimed feature that distinguishes over the prior art – the output jack – and asserts that this “critical” feature is not shown to Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 29 have a nexus to the commercial success of Requester’s reader. ACP 24-25. Owner argues this statement demonstrates that the Examiner applied the incorrect standard. Owner App. Br. 52-53. We agree that this statement taken alone does not apply the current test set forth in Rambus, which states “the obviousness inquiry centers on whether ‘the claimed invention as a whole’ would have been obvious” and that evidence that touts the patented design as a whole must be considered. Rambus, 731 F.3d at 1257-58. Yet, the Examiner’s statements are not without any legal basis. For example, “[e]ven assuming that [Owner] has sufficiently demonstrated commercial success, that success is relevant in the obviousness context only if there is proof that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention – as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to the quality of the patented subject matter.” See Huang, 100 F.3d at 140. Also, In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011) supports the notion that “[w]here the offered secondary considerations actually results from something other than what is both claimed and novel in the claim, there is no nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.” Id. at 1068. As discussed above, we find evidence that the sales were the results of other commercial factors and not a direct result of the characteristics of the claimed invention. C. Other Evidence Owner also contends the provided evidence illustrates the failure of others, disruptive technology, and recognition by others. Owner App. Br. 42, 60-61. Regarding the evidence of disruptive technology, we are unaware of and Owner provides us with no case law to support the notion that a disruptive technology Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 30 provides evidence to outweigh an obviousness rejection. See Owner App. Br. 44- 45, 60-61; see Owner App. Br., Evidence App’x, Ex. 1 ¶ 29. Similarly, the Examiner states that she is unclear what point Owner is making concerning disrupting the market by giving away free card readers. ACP 23. To the extent Owner is attempting to show that disruption demonstrates substantial sales in the market, we find that the relied-upon evidence for this premise states, “if this is disruptive technology” (emphasis added), and not that the technology is disruptive. See Owner App. Br., Evidence App’x, Ex. 6, p. 2. Thus, any connection between disruption in the market and substantial sales with this evidence of record is tenuous. Also, Owner has asserted that there is a causal relationship between the claimed invention and commercial success due to the reader’s size and the need for other companies to give the card reader away for free in order to enter the mobile credit card field (see Owner App. Br. 56-58, Evidence App’x, Ex. 1 ¶¶ 34-36). We, like the Examiner, are not persuaded that this evidence demonstrates a sufficient nexus between commercial success and the claimed invention. For example, Owner asserts that the statements made by Mimi Hart, CEO of Magtek Inc., demonstrate appreciation of customers and evidence whether the invention would have been obvious. Owner App. Br. 60-61 (citing Evidence App., Ex. 6). Ms. Hart indicates that “capturing the analog waveform” and decoding “further down the pipe” permits for a low-cost product. The feature of capturing an analog waveform is not found independent claims 1 and 19, and thus does not establish a nexus between the claimed invention of these claims and the commercial success. Moreover, this exhibit further states that the Requester has “great press” and Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 31 “hype,” suggesting that the marketing of the reader has attributed to the card reader’s success. Owner App. Br., Evidence App., Ex. 6. Concerning demonstrating long felt need and failure of others, Owner fails to point specifically to evidence that supports these positions. See Owner App. Br. 42-61. To the extent that what is discussed in the briefs demonstrates a long-felt need, failure of others, or recognition by other, we disagree and further refer to our above discussion. In conclusion, the Board is given broad deference in its weighing of the evidence of secondary considerations. See In re Inland Steel Co., 265 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Even when some evidence of commercial success is provided, such evidence may not outweigh a strong case of obviousness. See id. at 1366. As illustrated discussed above, the claimed invention as whole has been considered, such that the overall conclusion by the Examiner that the presented evidence of secondary considerations is not sufficient to overcome the obviousness rejections is sound. See ACP 20. Based on the above discussion, we are not persuaded that the presented secondary evidence outweighs the case of obviousness for claims 1-22. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting: (1) claims 1-3 and 6-22 as being obvious over von Mueller I and Antonio, (2) claims 1-3, 5-7, 11-13, and 15-18 as being obvious over Padilla I, Padilla II, and siemphones, (3) claims 1-3, 6-9, and 11-12 as being obvious over von Mueller I, Padilla I, and siemphones, (4) claim 4 as being obvious over von Mueller I, Antonio, and Rumor 2, and (5) claims 4 and 10 as being obvious over (a) Padilla I, Padilla II, siemphones, and Rumor 2 or (b) von Mueller I, Padilla I, siemphones, and Rumor 2. Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 32 5. Non-Adopted Rejections – Cross Appeal by Requester Requester argues that the Examiner erred in refusing to adopt various proposed rejections of claims 1-22 based on (1) Lekernel alone and in combination with other references, (2) Padilla I and II, (3) Wallner, Padilla I, and siemphones alone and in combination with Rumor 2, and (4) von Mueller I and Antonio, and (5) von Mueller I, Padilla I, and siemphones. Requester App. Br. 13-30. Our conclusion that the Examiner did not err in adopting the rejections of claims 1-22 as discussed above renders it unnecessary to reach the propriety of the Examiner’s decision to not adopt or withdraw certain rejections of those claims on different bases. Cf. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009). As such, we need not reach the propriety of the Examiner’s non-adoption or withdrawal of the rejections discussed in the Requester’s Appeal Brief. See Tempo Lighting v. Tivoli, LLC, No. 2013-1140, 2014 WL 503128, at *4-5 (Fed. Cir. February 10, 2014). IV. CONCLUSIONS Owner did not demonstrate that the Examiner erred in adopting the above-identified rejections of claims 1-22. We do not reach the issue of the propriety of the Examiner’s non-adoption or withdrawal of specific proposed rejections. V. DECISION The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-22 is affirmed. In the event neither party files a request for rehearing within the time provided in 37 C.F.R. § 41.79, and this decision becomes final and appealable under 37 C.F.R. § 41.81, a party seeking judicial review must timely serve notice Appeal 2013-009801 Control No. 95/001,618 Patent 7,810,729 B2 33 on the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 90.1 and 1.983. Requests for extensions of time in this inter partes reexamination proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.956. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.79. AFFIRMED FOR OWNER: Robert Greene Sterne Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox 1100 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 FOR THIRD-PARTY REQUESTER: Scott A. McKeown Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier & Neustadt, LLP 1940 Duke Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation