Ex Parte 7686587 et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 31, 201695002008 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 95/002,008 06/01/2012 7686587 144074.00751 9436 26710 7590 04/01/2016 QUARLES & BRADY LLP Attn: IP Docket 411 E. WISCONSIN AVENUE SUITE 2350 MILWAUKEE, WI 53202-4426 EXAMINER DOERRLER, WILLIAM CHARLES ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3993 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/01/2016 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ HAYWARD INDUSTRIES, INC. Requester/Cross-Appellant v. PENTAIR LTD. Patent Owner/Appellant ____________________ Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B21 Technology Center 3900 ____________________ Before JOHN C. KERINS, DANIEL S. SONG, and BRETT C. MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judges. MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 Issued to Koehl March 30, 2010 (the ’587 patent). Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Patent Owner appeals under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 315(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–15. The Requester also cross-appeals under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(c) and 315(b) from the Examiner’s non-adoption of certain rejections of claims 1–15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 315. We are informed that the ’587 patent is subject to litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina (Case No. 5:11-CV-459, Pentair Water Pool and Spa, Inc. et al. v. Hayward Industries, Inc. et al.). PO App. Br. 1. The ’587 Patent also is a divisional application of United States Patent Application No. 10/730,747, now U.S. Patent No. 8,540,493, which is related to (A) U.S. Patent Nos. 8,641,385; 8,444,394; 7,990,091; 7,983,877; 7,976,284; 7,857,600; 7,821,215; 7,815,420; 7,751,159; 7,704,051; 7,612,510; and 7,572,108, (B) U.S. Application Nos. 11/980,096; 12/973,778; 14/322,744; 14/338,939; 14/444,782; 14/446,018; and 14/444,812, and (C) Reexamination Control Nos. 95/002,005 and 95/002,007,2 and (D) Case IPR2013-00287. Id. We AFFIRM-IN-PART in that we REVERSE with respect to the Patent Owner's appeal, but AFFIRM with respect to the Requester's cross- appeal. THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The Patent Owner’s claims are directed generally to “pumps and pumping methods, and more particularly to pump motor controllers and 2 This panel issued a decision in this appeal on March 31, 2015. Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 3 control methods.” Spec., col. 1, ll. 12–14. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of detecting a fault condition in a motor of a pump, the method comprising: measuring a bus current being provided to the motor; generating a fault condition code if the bus current is greater than a bus current upper limit setting; shutting down a drive to the motor for a predetermined time period in order to stop the pump when the bus current is greater than the bus current upper limit setting; and restarting the drive to the motor after the predetermined time period has elapsed in order to restart the pump. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Genheimer Profio Gerlowski Krohn Anastos Webber Ligman Wang US 4,286,303 US 4,647,825 US 4,913,625 US 5,076,761 US 5,076,763 US 5,672,050 US 5,828,200 US 2003/0063900 A1 Aug. 25, 1981 Mar. 3, 1987 Apr. 3, 1990 Dec. 31, 1991 Dec. 31, 1991 Sept. 30, 1997 Oct. 27, 1998 Apr. 3, 2003 Baldor Motors and Drives, Series 10 Inverter Control Installation and Operating Instructions (Feb. 2000) (hereinafter “Baldor”). Control Techniques, Commander SE Advanced User Guide (Nov. 2002) (hereinafter “the Commander Guide”). Control Techniques, Dinverter 2B User Guide (Nov. 1998) (hereinafter “Dinverter”). Yu and Figoli, AC Induction Motor Control Using Constant V/Hz Principle and Space Vector PWM Technique with TMS 320C240, Digital Signal Processing Solutions (April 1998) (hereinafter “Yu”). Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 4 Carrow, Electrician’s Technical Reference: Variable-Frequency Drives, Delmar (2001) (hereinafter “Carrow”). THE REJECTIONS ON APPEAL The Examiner made the following rejections, which we have renumbered sequentially for ease of reference: 1. Claims 1and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Genheimer. RAN 10. 2. Claims 2 and 3 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Genheimer. Id. 3. Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Genheimer and Krohn. Id. 4. Claims 1–4, 10, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Baldor. RAN 11. 5. Claims 2, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Baldor. Id. 6. Claims 1–4, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gerlowski and Baldor. RAN 12. 7. Claims 5–7 and 9–14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Genheimer and Carrow. Id. 8. Claims 5–7 and 9–14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Baldor and Carrow. RAN 13. 9. Claims 8 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to provide an adequate written description. RAN 14. 10. Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Genheimer and Yu. Id. Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 5 11. Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Baldor and Yu. Id. 12. Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Gerlowski, Baldor, and Yu. Id. 13. Claims 1, 5–7, and 9–11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Carrow. RAN 15. The Requester also appealed the non-adoption of certain rejections, a listing of which may be found in the Requester’s Appeal Brief. Req. App. Br. 3–5. ANALYSIS THE ADOPTED REJECTIONS Rejections involving Genheimer One dispositive issue permeates all of the pending rejections that rely upon Genheimer as the main reference, which is whether Genheimer’s starter is a drive as claimed or a switch as asserted by the Patent Owner. See, e.g., App. Br. 7. As explained by the Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Collins, “[a] power supply used to supply variable frequency power to AC motors is often called a ‘variable speed drive (VSD)’. . .‘variable frequency drive,’ [‘]adjustable speed drive,’ or…[t]he generic name ‘motor drive’ is also used.” Collins Dec. ¶ 28. While neither side proffers an actual definition of the term “drive” or explains its common understanding in this art beyond Dr. Collins’ discussion of the term, the Patent Owner does Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 6 explain how the system of Genheimer is for operation of single-speed motors and not variable motors. PO App. Br. 7–8. The Requester counters that “the words ‘variable speed’ are not mentioned anywhere in Claims 1 and 4” such that it would disqualify the teachings of Genheimer as disclosing a drive as claimed. Req. Resp. Br. 3. The closest thing to a definition is provided by the Examiner, who construes the term such that “drive is seen to be a term of art for the electronics that produce the proper electrical signal to power the electric motor.” ACP 27. The Examiner further elaborates that Genheimer meets this definition because it “provides the proper magnitude, phase[,] and frequency for the motor (although not necessarily a variable frequency).” RAN 30. The Patent Owner disagrees with this assertion and argues that “[t]he starter 36 of Genheimer is nothing more than an on/off switch that does not produce (or even reasonably ‘provide’. . .) the proper electrical signal, but acts as a mere conduit for electricity (of whatever magnitude, phase, frequency, etc.) from the power supply.” PO App. Br. 8. While we agree that the claims do not specifically claim a variable speed motor or drive, what does seem apparent based upon the evidence presented to us is that the ’587 patent, as a whole, contextually discloses a variable speed motor and associated drive. See PO App. Br. 7. It seems that both sides agree that a switch is not a drive, but disagree whether Genheimer’s starter is a switch or a drive. Accordingly, our decision on this point hinges upon whether Genheimer merely teaches a switch or not. Even using the Examiner’s broad construction regarding producing or providing power, we cannot see how Genheimer’s starter is anything other than a Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 7 switch. While it may have circuitry that stands between the power lines and the motor, that circuitry does nothing more than allow the power to pass through to the motor. This does nothing to “produce the proper electrical signal to power the electric motor” as stated by the Examiner and referenced supra. As the Patent Owner states, “Gehnheimer fails to disclose or suggest that the starter 36 in any way modifies, conditions, or alters the power supplied by the conventional three-phase power supply.” PO App. Br. 7 (citing Supp. Collins Dec. ¶ 18). It merely passes along whatever power it receives without regard to whether that power is proper for the motor on the other side of the circuitry. Furthermore, because neither side has specifically argued what the term “drive” actually means other than to say whether something is or is not as generally construed by the Examiner, we accept Dr. Collins’ statement that the term “motor drive” applies to a variable speed motor drive. See Collins Dec. ¶ 28. Accordingly, while the claims do not specifically recite a variable speed motor, or a variable speed motor drive, we construe “drive” in view of the Specification of the ’587 patent to have a meaning as explained by Dr. Collins such that “drive” in these claims refers to a variable speed drive. This is consistent with the Examiner’s requirement that the drive “produce the proper electrical signal,” which implies the capability to do more than just pass on the power provided by the source. As such, Genheimer does not teach a drive as claimed, but merely teaches a switch that does nothing to condition the power as would be required in a variable speed drive. None of the references used in combination with Genheimer Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 8 cures this deficiency. Accordingly, we reverse rejections 1–3, 7, and 10 listed above. Rejections Involving Baldor and Gerlowski Baldor Regarding Baldor, the Patent Owner argues that “the Baldor overcurrent faults rely on output frequency measurements rather than bus current measurements, as specified by Claim 1.” PO App. Br. 14. Although Baldor teaches overcurrent fault codes, Baldor specifically states that these faults are triggered by measurements taken of output frequency, not of current itself as required by the claims. See Baldor 3–15.3 Requester's declarant, Dr. Emadi, states that in Baldor, the “drive can be programmed to detect whether an overcurrent condition [occurs].” Supp. Emadi Dec. ¶ 25. Detection of an overcurrent condition, however, is not the same as “measuring bus current” and subsequently “generating a fault condition code if the bus current is greater than a bus current upper limit setting,” as recited in the claimed method. Additionally, we agree with the Patent Owner that the Requester’s evidence does not teach an affirmative disclosure, but relies on the absence 3 Requester emphatically states that “nowhere does Baldor state that the overcurrent faults (F16, F17, and F18) require frequency measurements.” Req. Resp. Br. 7. We find such a statement troubling considering that Baldor very clearly states “[i]f the motor loading is large enough to drive the inverter below this output frequency, the inverter will trip an overcurrent fault (F16, F17, or F18).” Baldor 3-15 (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is not the actual measurement of overcurrent that produces the fault, but the proxy measurement of frequency. Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 9 of a teaching to allegedly inferentially disclose the claimed feature. PO App. Br. 15. Specifically, Dr. Emadi states, “the controller still monitors current being supplied to the motor (bus current), and determines whether the current exceeds a pre-defined threshold, since the Baldor manual does not disclose that current monitoring is not overrided when the device is in torque limit mode.” Supp. Emadi Dec. ¶ 27. Not disclosing that current monitoring is not overridden is not the same as disclosing that current monitoring is taking place. Even granting that point however, it is still clear that the fault code arises from a frequency measurement, not based upon the monitoring of current, the latter being required by the claims. Furthermore, regarding the Requester’s assertion of fault code 20 in Baldor, we agree with the Patent Owner that this fault code references a timed overload fault condition rather than an overcurrent condition as claimed. See PO App. Br. 15. As the Patent Owner argues, this overload condition “specifically allows the drive to operate after an upper limit has been exceeded as it relies on an ‘overload’ measurement that requires, at a minimum, current over a time period.” PO App. Br. 15 (citing Supp. Collins Dec. ¶ 42); see also Baldor 3-11. Accordingly, we do not agree that Baldor operates in a manner where an overcurrent is measured and then the motor is shut down in accordance with the claimed method. As none of the references used in combination with Baldor cures this deficiency, we reverse rejections 4, 5, 8, and 11. Gerlowski As with Genheimer, we agree with the Patent Owner that Gerlowski also fails to teach the claimed “drive,” but instead merely teaches “sending a Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 10 signal to trip a switch through which power to a pump is flowing.” PO App. Br. 21. Similar to the prior discussion, whether Gerlowski discloses a drive depends on the proper understanding of what a “drive” is. As discussed above, the Examiner’s definition of drive does not take into account the context of the ’587 patent, which requires a narrower definition equating to a variable speed drive. In this drive/switch dichotomy, Gerlowski also teaches something more akin to a switch than a variable speed drive. As to the Examiner’s proposed combination of Baldor’s restart feature with Gerlowski, we agree with the Patent Owner that such a restart would not be desirable in Gerlowski. See PO App. Br. 23. The Examiner points to the fact that, in Gerlowski, “the control flowchart of figure 3 returns to the initial step 60 after protective measures have been taken in step 75.” ACP 32. As the Patent Owner points out, however, this actually “highlights the incompatibility of incorporating an automatic restart with Gerlowski….[because] Gerlowski specifically requires that protective measures are taken before returning to step 60.” PO App. Br. 23–24. In other words, Gerlowski requires some intervention, i.e., protective measures, to occur before the restart. Gerlowski’s shutdown appears to involve a pump failure, not simply a temporary condition that could be cured with a temporary shutdown. As specifically stated, Gerlowski relies on protective measures to be undertaken, which, as the Patent Owner argues, would appear to teach away from using an automatic restart. Yu fails to cure the deficiencies of this combination. Accordingly, we find this combination to be deficient and reverse rejections 6 and 12. Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 11 Anticipation by Carrow The Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that Carrow fails to teach the claimed “predetermined time period” during which the drive is shut down, after which the motor is restarted. As the Patent Owner points out, “Carrow discloses that a ‘drive can be programmed to automatically attempt a restart up to ten times at two-minute intervals.’” PO App. Br. 25 (citing Carrow 62). We agree that this is a time period between attempted, unsuccessful restarts rather than the claimed predetermined time period during which the drive is shut down. We are unpersuaded that this time period represents the time after shutdown for the first restart to occur as alleged by the Requester. Req. Resp. Br. 12. Carrow states that restarts may occur “when conditions permit” (Carrow 62), but is silent as to how much time may be necessary for “conditions [to] permit” as stated. Carrow does not specifically tie the two- minute wait time between restart attempts to this basis for allowing a restart in the first place. We see no disclosure that teaches a predetermined time period as claimed. Additionally, we agree with the Patent Owner that whatever restart occurs, it happens due to an under-voltage condition, not an overcurrent fault as claimed. See PO App. Br. 26. The mere mention in Carrow that other reasons besides under-voltage may cause the motor to trip does not amount to an express disclosure that an overcurrent condition would also cause a trip and automatic restart, as would be required in an anticipation rejection. Accordingly, we reverse rejection 13. Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 12 Written Description Rejections The Examiner rejects claims 8 and 15, finding that the Specification of the ’587 patent fails to “disclose providing direct current to the bus when the drive is shut down for a period of time.” RAN 14. The Patent Owner, however, persuasively explains in detail how the ’587 patent disclosure supports these claims. PO App. Br. 27–30. Although the totality of the explanation persuades us that the limitation is sufficiently described, we find particularly persuasive the fact that the ’587 patent discloses that “the status indicator LEDs can be lit continuously or can flash at various rates…to indicate the status of the drive 46 of the motor 16. In one embodiment, LED A…can be lit continuously when power is being applied, but the controller 24 is not driving the motor 16.” Spec., col. 12, ll. 10–15. We agree with the Patent Owner that this supports the conclusion that the ’587 patent “discloses that the drives 46, which are powered by the DC bus, can be powered while not driving the motor 16.” PO App. Br. 29. In other words, if LED A is lit, it signifies power is supplied to the drive 46, but as stated, controller 24, of which drive 46 is a part, is not driving the motor, so the lit LED A indicator indicates that the motor is powered even when the drive is not driving the motor, i.e., the drive is shut down. Accordingly, we do not agree with the Requester that this fails to teach the claim language at issue. See Req. Resp. Br. 15. As such we reverse this rejection. CROSS-APPEAL Both the Examiner and the Patent Owner adequately rebut the Requester’s positions regarding the non-adopted rejections. See generally, Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 13 RAN 24–30 and PO Resp. Br. 3–15. We highlight certain representative arguments below regarding these rejections to further explain why the Examiner was correct in the decision not to adopt the rejections appealed by the Requester. Commander Guide The Requester argues that the Examiner erred in refusing to adopt the proposed rejections based on the Commander Guide because the Commander Guide discloses restarting the drive as claimed. See Req. App. Br. 5–9. As the Patent Owner points out, however, the Commander Guide teaches a reset, not a restart, whereby a reset “means updating parameters and drive states.” PO Resp. Br. 4. Additionally, as the Patent Owner points out, a reset “can occur while the drive is still running.” Id. Accordingly, the reset described in the Commander Guide cannot be the same as a restart, which requires first shutting down the motor. As none of the references used in combination with the Commander Guide cure this deficiency, we affirm the Examiner’s decision not to adopt the rejections involving the Commander Guide. Ligman The issue with Ligman is that it allegedly does not teach the predetermined time period before restarting. The Requester argues that a predetermined time period exists because the restart is implemented on a microcontroller and microcontrollers “operate in synchronization with the clock signal such that instructions in the software programs are fetched and executed in response to the clock signals.” Req. App. Br. 9. As the Examiner states, however, under this rationale, “all systems that rely on Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 14 microprocessors use only predetermined times.” RAN 37. Such an all- encompassing interpretation of a predetermined time period would not allow for non-predetermined time periods when a microcontroller is used and, as such, is an unreasonably broad interpretation that cannot be a proper basis for assertion of a predetermined time period. Also, the mere use of clock signal does not mean that the restart is done after a predetermined time period. Depending on what else is happening within the microcontroller, it may take more or less time to perform the instructions such that calling for a restart may take different amounts of time. Accordingly, there is no disclosure of a predetermined time period as claimed. Because none of the references proposed to be combined with Ligman cures this deficiency, we affirm the Examiner’s decision not to adopt the rejections involving Ligman. Profio The Requester argues that Profio was not properly considered because the Examiner erred in determining that it does not teach an automatic restart. See Req. App. Br. 12–13. We agree with the Examiner, however, that Profio teaches that “the motor cannot be manually started during the predetermined time period and the reference never discusses automatically restarting the motor.” RAN 20. The Examiner continues by explaining that the “motor is blocked from starting during the time period” and does not disclose “that the motor is restarted after the predetermined time has elapsed.” Id. Further, we agree with the Patent Owner that, as with the Commander Guide, the Requester improperly equates a reset with a restart. PO Resp. Br. 7–8. Profio makes clear that in the context of the predetermined time, “the memory of recent operation or overload [prevents] a restart until the motor Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 15 has had a predetermined time to cool.” Profio, col. 6, ll. 2–4 (emphasis added). There is, however, no express disclosure of an automatic restart after that predetermined cooling time. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s decision not to adopt the rejection involving Profio and Krohn, which does not cure the deficiency in Profio. Anastos The Patent Owner points out that, unlike with Genheimer, the Examiner properly concluded that Anastos teaches a switch, not a drive as claimed. PO Resp. Br. 8. Both parties assert that Genheimer and Anastos are similar and should be treated similarly. While we agree that they are both similar, we side with the Patent Owner and the Examiner that Anastos merely teaches a switch and not a drive. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s decision not to adopt rejections involving Anastos. Wang The Requester argues mainly that the Examiner erred in asserting that Wang teaches away from a combination with the Commander Guide. Req. App. Br. 16–18. As the Patent Owner argues, however, Wang deals with a fan in an HVAC system and the shutdown alleged by the Requester is merely a one second interrupt of the input signal to the fan motor that does not stop the fan. PO Resp. Br. 11. The system of Wang then continues to operate in this mode of repeated one second shutdowns until the error corrects itself or an operator arrives to shut the system down entirely and diagnose the problem. Supp. Collins Dec. ¶ 32. As the Examiner further correctly notes, “Wang is directed to an HVAC fan, which would not stop if the power were interrupted for one second” contrary to the language of Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 16 claim 1 requiring a shutdown of the drive to stop the pump. RAN 38. Accordingly, we agree that the Examiner properly determined that Wang is insufficient to support an obviousness rejection. Webber The Requester asserts that the Examiner incorrectly refused to adopt the proposed rejection involving Webber. Req. App. Br. 19–20. As the Patent Owner correctly states, however, Webber teaches only shutting down and does not teach restarting without repair by an operator. PO Resp. Br. 12. After conceding the Patent Owner’s general point, the Requester counters that Webber “further provides for simple removal of power from the pump when the pump draws excessive current without requiring the pump to be repaired or replaced.” Req. App. Br. 19 (citing Webber’s disclosure that “[p]ower is also removed from the pump 20 by the pump motor fault detect portion if the pump 20 draws excessive current for more than two seconds.” Col. 12, ll. 21-24.) We see nothing in this disclosure that discusses a restart. The only thing disclosed in this passage is that power is removed. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s decision not to adopt the rejection involving Webber. Remaining Rejections The remainder of the Requester’s arguments deal with art used in rejections already addressed in relation to the Patent Owner’s appeal or already addressed supra in connection with the Requester’s cross-appeal. As such, the deficiencies noted apply and the rejections were properly not adopted for the reasons already discussed. Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 17 DECISION For the above reasons, we REVERSE the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15 and we AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision not to adopt the additional rejections proposed by the Requester, thus denying the Requester’s cross-appeal. Accordingly, no pending claim remains under an affirmed rejection. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). In the event neither party files a request for rehearing within the time provided in 37 C.F.R. § 41.79, and this decision becomes final and appealable under 37 C.F.R. § 41.81, a party seeking judicial review must timely serve notice on the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 90.1 and 1.983. REVERSED; CROSS-APPEAL DENIED msc Appeal 2015-007909 Reexamination Control 95/002,008 Patent US 7,686,587 B2 18 PATENT OWNER: QUARLES & BRADY LLP ATTN: IP DOCKET 411 E. Wisconsin Avenue Suite 2350 Milwaukee, WI 53202-4426 THIRD PARTY REQUESTER: McCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP NEWARK Four Gateway Center 100 Mulberry Street Newark, NJ 07102 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation