Ex Parte 7,577,316 B2 et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 15, 2016

95000683 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 15, 2016)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
95/000,683 08/17/2012 7,577,316 B2 13557-105153.R2 1052
23363 7590 08/15/2016
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP
PO BOX 29001
Glendale, CA 91209-9001
EXAMINER
FOSTER, ROLAND G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/15/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

GOOGLE INC.
Requester,

v.

Patent of VEDERI, LLC,
Patent Owner.
____________

Appeal 2016-002084
Reexamination Control 95/000,683
Patent 7,577,316 B2
Technology Center 3900
____________

Before DENISE M. POTHIER, ERIC B. CHEN, and IRVIN E. BRANCH,
Administrative Patent Judges.

POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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I. STATEMENT OF CASE
Google Inc. (Requester) made a third party request for inter partes
reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 7,577,316 B2 (“the ’316 patent”) to Enrico Di
Bernardo and Luis F. Goncalves, entitled System and Method for Creating, Storing
and Utilizing Images of a Geographic Location, issued August 18, 2009, and
assigned to Vederi, LLC. Claims 1, 6, 8–10, 13, and 16–24 were the subject of the
original reexamination. Claims 36–43 were added. PO App. Br. 3; 3PR App. Br.
1–2.1 Claims 1, 6–10, 16, 17, 26, and 29 have been canceled. Id.
The Examiner’s Answer incorporates the RAN by reference (Ans. 1), which
rejects claims 13, 18–24, 36, 37, 39–41, and 43 and determines claims 38 and 42 are
patentable (RAN 1).
Patent Owner appeals the decision in the RAN rejecting claims 13, 18–24, 36,
37, 39–41, and 43 of the ’316 patent. PO App. Br. 3. Requester responded, and
Patent Owner rebutted. See generally 3PR Resp. Br. and PO Reb. Br.
Requester cross appeals the decision in the RAN determining claim 42 of the
’316 patent is patentable. 3PR App. Br. 2. Patent Owner responded, and Requester
rebutted. See generally PO Resp. Br. and 3PR Reb. Br.
Claim 38 has been indicated as patentable and is not argued by Requester.

1 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to: (1) the Action Closing Prosecution
(“ACP”) mailed September 24, 2013, (2) the Right of Appeal Notice (“RAN”)
mailed June 4, 2014, (3) the Patent Owner’s Appeal Brief (“PO App. Br.”) filed
September 3, 2014, (4) the Requester’s Respondent Brief (“3PR Resp. Br.”) filed
October 2, 2014, (5) the Patent Owner’s Rebuttal Brief (“PO Reb. Br.”) filed May
22, 2015, (6) the Requester’s Appeal Brief (“3PR App. Br.”) filed September 8,
2014, (7) the Patent Owner’s Respondent Brief (“PO Resp. Br.”) filed October 9,
2014, (8) the Requester’s Rebuttal Brief (“3PR Reb. Br.”) filed May 21, 2015, and
(9) the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed April 21, 2015.
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RAN 1, 4; see 3PR App. Br. 2.
An oral hearing was conducted on April 27, 2016. The transcript of the oral
hearing has been made of record.
We have been informed that the ’316 patent is the subject of litigation,
Vederi, LLC v. Google Inc., Case No. 2:10-CV-07747 (C.D. Cal.) and Vederi, LLC
v. Google Inc., Case Nos. 13-1057 and 13-1296.2 PO App. Br. 2; 3PR App. Br. 1,
22, Related Proceedings App’x.
Additionally, we have been informed that this appeal is related to:
(1) U.S. Patent No. 7,805,025 B2, which is the subject of inter partes
reexamination having been assigned Control No. 95/000,681,3 (2) U.S. Patent No.
7,239,760 B2, which is the subject of inter partes reexamination having been
assigned Control No. 95/000,682,4 and (3) U.S. Patent No. 7,813,596 B2, which is
the subject of inter partes reexamination having been assigned Control No.

2 Cases Nos. 13-1057 and 13-1296 were decided on March 14, 2014 and concerned
U.S. Patent Nos. 7,239,760 B2, 7,577,316 B2, 7,805,025 B2, and 7,813,596 B2.
Vederi, LLC v. Google Inc., 744 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rh’g en banc and cert
denied. The Federal Circuit reversed the claim construction of the district court,
vacated the judgement, and remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 1385; see
also PO App. Br. 2. Notably, the disputed claim language addressed by the
Federal Circuit differs from the instant appeal.
3 The Board rendered an opinion in this inter partes reexamination, affirming the
Examiner’s decision to reject certain claims. Google Inc. v. Vederi, LLC, Appeal
No. 2015-001495, 2015 WL 4038967 at *17 (PTAB June 26, 2015). On request
for rehearing from both Google and Vederi, we maintained our position. Google
Inc. v. Vederi, LLC, Appeal No. 2015-001495, 2016 WL 807721 (PTAB February
29, 2016)
4 The Board rendered an opinion in this inter partes reexamination, reversing the
Examiner’s decision to confirm certain claims and entering new grounds of
rejection. See Google Inc. v. Vederi, LLC, Appeal No. 2015-004309, 2016 WL
3958474 at *9–10 (PTAB June 26, 2015).
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95/000,684.5 PO App. Br. 2; 3PR App. Br. 1.
Requester further indicates (1) the ’316 patent is a continuation of U.S.
Patent Nos. 7,239,760 B2 and (2) each of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,805,025 B2 and
7,813,596 B2 is a continuation of the ’316 patent. PO App. Br. 2; 3PR Resp. Br. 1.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 315.
We affirm in part the Examiner’s decision to reject or not to reject claims 13,
18–24, and 36–43.
Canceled claim 1 and dependent claim 13 are reproduced below with
emphasis added:
1. [Canceled] In a system including an image source and a user terminal
having a screen and an input device, a method for enabling visual navigation
of a geographic area from the user terminal, the method comprising:
receiving a first user input specifying a first location in the geographic
area;
retrieving from the image source a first image associated with the first
location, the image source providing a plurality of images depicting views of
objects in the geographic area, the views being substantially elevations of
the objects in the geographic area, wherein the images are associated with
image frames acquired by an image recording device moving along a
trajectory;
displaying an icon associated with an object in the geographic area;
receiving a user selection of the icon; and
identifying a second location based on the user selection.

13. The method of claim 1,
wherein the first image is a composite image created by
processing pixel data of a plurality of the image frames.

The ’316 patent 15:41–57, 16:37–39; PO App. Br. 46, Claims App’x.

5 This reexamination is currently on appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB) and has been assigned Appeal No. 2016-002008.
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A. Prior Art Relied Upon
Either the Examiner or Requester relies on the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Lachinski6 US 5,633,946 May 27, 1997
Murphy US 6,282,362 B1 Aug. 28, 2001

Michael J. Shiffer, Augmenting Geographic Information with Collaborative
Multimedia Technologies, 11 Proc. Auto Carto 367-376 (1993) (“Shiffer.”)

Frank Yee, GPS & Video Data Collection In Los Angeles County: A Status Report,
Position Location And Navigation Symposium, IEEE Position Location and
Navigation Symp. 388–393 (1994) (“Yee”).

J. Dykes, An Approach To Virtual Environments For Visualization Using Linked
Geo-referenced Panoramic Imagery, Computers, Environment and Urban Systems,
24 Computers, Env’t and Urb. Systems 127-152 (2000) (“Dykes”).

Kheir Al-Kodmany, Using Web-Based Technologies and Geographic Information
Systems in Community Planning, 7 J. Urb. Tech. 1–31 (Apr. 2000) (“Al-
Kodmany.”)

Nada Bates-Brkljac & John Counsell, Issues in Participative Use of an Historic
City Millennial Web Site, IEEE Proc. Int’l Conf. Info. Visualization 119–125 (July
2000) (“Bates.”)

6 Requester indicates that Lachinski was cited in its Comments to rebut Patent
Owner’s response and to explain how Yee’s four-view images are created. 3PR
Resp. Br. 21–22; May 22, 2013 Third Party Requester Comments 27–28.
Although not relying on Lachinski in the rejection, the Examiner discusses
Lachinski, indicating the reference was properly cited under 37 C.F.R.
§1.948(a)(2). See RAN 20.
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B. Adopted Rejections
The Examiner maintains the following proposed rejection, for which Patent
Owner appeals:

Reference(s) Basis Claims RAN
Dykes § 102(a) 13 6–8
Al-Kodmany § 102(a) 13 8–10
Bates § 102(a) 13 10–12
Yee and Dykes § 103(a) 13, 18–24, 36, 37, 39–41, 43 12–15
Murphy and Yee § 103(a) 13, 187–24 16–17
Shiffer and Yee § 103(a) 13, 18–24 18–19

PO App. Br. 5.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified
by Owner, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Cf. Ex parte
Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (citing In re Oetiker, 977
F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). “Any arguments or authorities not included in
the brief permitted under this section or [37 C.F.R.] §§ 41.68 and 41.71 will be

7 Both the Examiner and Patent Owner include claims 16 and 17 in this rejection as
well as the § 103 rejection based on Shiffer and Yee. PO App. Br. 5; RAN 16, 18.
Because claims 16 and 17 have been canceled (PO App. Br. 3), we presume these
inclusions are typographical errors and render such errors harmless.
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refused consideration by the Board, unless good cause is shown.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.67(c)(1)(vii).
Based on the disputed errors presented by Patent Owner and Requester, the
main issues on appeal are:
(1) Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 13, 18, 19, 23, 24, 36, 39–41,
and 43 by finding Yee and Dykes teach “a composite image created by processing
pixel data of a plurality of the image frames,” giving this phrase its broadest
reasonable interpretation in light of the disclosure;
(2) Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 20–24 by finding Yee and
Dykes teach or suggest and “the first location specified by the first user input is an
arbitrary address entered via the first user input, the entered arbitrary address
specifying information selected from a group consisting of street name, city, state,
and zip code”?
(3) Did the Examiner err in not adopting the proposed rejection of claim 42
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Yee and Dykes?

III. ANALYSIS
A. Claim Construction
During examination of a patent application, a claim is given its broadest
reasonable construction “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by
one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). There is a
presumption that a claim term generally carries its ordinary and customary
meaning. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
A patentee may rebut this presumption, however, by acting as his own
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lexicographer, providing a definition of the term in the specification with
“reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In the absence of such a definition, limitations are not to be
read from the specification into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
Patent Owner and Requester discuss the limitations of claims 13 and 20 in
their respective appeal briefs. We note that independent claim 1 has been
canceled. RAN 1. However, the claims on appeal depend directly or indirectly
from claim 1. Thus, each appealed claims have the recitations in claim 1.
1. “a composite image created by processing pixel data of a plurality of
the image frames” of claim 13

Claim 13 depends from claim 1 and recites “a composite image created by
processing pixel data of a plurality of the image frames.” PO App. Br. 46, Claims
App’x. Claims 18, 23, and 36 indirectly depend claim 1 and recite similar
limitations to claim 13. Id. at 47, 49, Claims App’x; see also PO App. Br. 17. We
select claim 13 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.67(c)(1)(vii).
Patent Owner disputes the claim construction of the particular phrase,
“composite image,” by the Examiner. PO App. Br. 17–21; PO Reb. 7–10. Patent
Owner argues that
The composite image depicts a single new view of the objects in the
geographical area. The single new view is different from any of the views
depicted in any one of the image frames from which the composite image is
created, e.g., it can be a wider view. Moreover the new view is from a single
location as if the viewer [was] at that location.

PO App. Br. 17; see also PO App. Br. 19 and PO Reb. Br. 7–8. To support this
position, Patent Owner cites to Figure 2 of the ’316 patent and composite
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image 40. PO App. Br. 17–18. Patent Owner further contends that “[n]othing in
the ’316 patent suggests that two or more separate and independent images
depicting separate and distinct views of different objects is a ‘composite image’ as
used in the ’316 patent simply because they are displayed simultaneously on a
screen.” Id. at 21.
The Examiner, on the other hand, finds the phrase, “composite image,”
includes combining four images into a single image. See RAN 29–30
(incorporating the Requester’s November 25, 2013 Comments on pages 17 through
19). In the incorporated comments, Requester states that (1) Yee’s four-view
images are composite images under the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard, (2) Yee does not use “composites” to refer to “side-by-side views,” “4-
view,” or “curbside views,” and (3) the recited “composite image” does not require
a single, new view. See 3PR November 25, 2013 Comments 17–19 (citing Yee
389); 3PR Resp. Br. 8–9.
Upon review, we agree with the Examiner and Requester. When
considering the disclosure, the ’316 patent discusses creating “composite images”
by synthesizing images, image data, or image frames. The ’316 patent, Abstract,
2:20–22, 33–35, 3:46–49, 5:45–47. This disclosure also states image data from
each selected image frame is extracted and combined to form the composite image.
Id. at 5:66–6:1. None of these discussions state that the composite image is a “new
view” or that the view is “different from any of the views depicted in any one of
the image frames” as Patent Owner contends. PO App. Br. 17; see also PO App.
Br. 19 and 3PR November 25, 2013 Comments 19.
Patent Owner further points to other discussions in the ’316 patent,
contending these portions provide context for the term “composite image” as
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something different from those described in the Background of the Invention
section. PO Reb. Br. 7–8 (quoting the ’316 patent 1:48–52, 56–58, 2:35–38). Yet,
claim 13 does not reflect the noted differences (e.g., a single image or an image
having a wider field of view than any acquired image). Additionally, the portion
cited by the Patent Owner to support an understanding that the recited “composite
image” has a wider field of view is described as a preference. The ’316 patent
2:35–38 (stating “[p]referably, the composite image . . .”) (emphasis added).
Also, most of the discussion in the ’316 patent does not address how the
images are synthesized or combined to form the composite image. See the ’316
patent 2:20–22, 33–35, 3:46–49, 5:45–47. Other portions of the ’316 patent state
preferences that the composite image provides a panoramic view or a field of view
that is wider than that of a single image acquired by an image recording device, or
details how image data extracted from each image frame creates a composite
image on a column-by-column basis. Id. at Abstract, 2:35–38, 5:47–51, 6:1–5;
Fig. 2. We stress, however, that the ’316 patent describes these characteristics and
how to combine the information as preferences of a composite image. See id.
Patent Owner even further discusses Provisional Application No. 60/238,490
(“the ’490 provisional application”) to which the ’316 patent claims priority. PO
App. Br. 19. According to Patent Owner, there is a discussion in the ’490
provisional application of a composite image that provides a 360º view. PO App.
Br. 19 (citing U.S. Provisional App. No. 60/238,490, p. 8). Yet, the ’316 patent
does not define a “composite image” to have these characteristics. Moreover,
claim 13 has no language that the “composite image” is an image that provides 360
degrees of view.
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Accordingly, we determine the disclosure of the ’316 patent does not define
the phrase “composite image” with the reasonable precision necessary to require
this phrase to mean a single, new, single, different, or 360º view.
The plain and ordinary meaning of “composite” includes “something that is
made up of different parts.”8 A single image consisting of data from four reduced
image frames is something made from different parts (e.g., a composite). Also, an
ordinary meaning of (1) “synthesize” 9 includes “to make (something) by
combining different things” or “to combine (things) in order to make something
new,” and (2) “combine,”10 includes “to unite into a single number or expression.”
In other words, given its broadest, reasonable construction consistent with the
disclosure, the phrase “composite image” includes an image created by combining
different image data or by uniting image data.
Accordingly, we agree that Patent Owner’s position imports limitations from
disclosed embodiments of the ’316 patent improperly into the recited phrase,
“composite image.”
Patent Owner does not dispute the remainder of claim 13’s language of
“each composite image is created by processing pixel data of a plurality of the

8 Definition of “composite” (noun). Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, 11th
ed., available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/composite (last
visited July 1, 2016).
9 Definition of “synthesize.” Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, 11th ed.,
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/synthesize (last visited
July 1, 2016).
10 Definition of “combine” (def. 1c). Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, 11th
ed., available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/combine (last visited
July 1, 2016).

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image frames.” To be sure, Patent Owner discusses an image having “pixel values
that are computed from pixel values of each of the image frames from which the
composite image is created.” PO App. Br. 18. But, Figure 2 and its description in
the ’316 patent are described as an illustration of a composite image (the ’316
patent 5:52) and a preference— not a requirement —to extract column image data
from each image frame. The ’316 patent 5:52–54, 6:1–5.
Patent Owner further refers to the district court proceeding, Vederi, LLC v.
Google Inc., Case No. 2:10-CV-07747 (C.D. Cal.). PO App. Br. 17 n.1. In that
proceeding, Patent Owner and Requester agreed that a “a composite image created
by processing pixel data of a plurality of the image frames” means “an image
formed by combining two or more image frames at the pixel level.”
Although noted, we are not obligated to follow the same claim construction
as the district court. See In re Trans Texas Hold’gs Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1298
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (noting the PTO was not a party to the district
court litigation and that “[c]laims are given ‘their broadest reasonable
interpretation, consistent with the specification, in reexamination proceedings.’”).
The ’316 patent describes how image data is extracted from each frame and the
composite image is created on a column-by-column basis on a pixel level. The
’316 patent 6:1–15. Yet, this passage discusses a preferred technique of how
image data is combined. See id. Granted, the claims require “processing pixel data
of a plurality of image frames.” But this recitation does not recite how the pixel
data of the images frames are processed, such that the image frames must be
combined at the pixel level or that pixel values of the composite image are
computed from pixel values of two or more image frames. We see no specific
limitation that “processing” involves generating pixel values for the composite
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image, such that pixel data of the composite image must be computed from two or
more image frames. See PO App. Br. 18.
Applying the ordinary meaning of “processing,” claim 13 requires no more
than taking in and using the pixel data from two or more image frames to create a
composite image. We therefore, construe the limitation of “processing pixel data
of a plurality of image frames” requires no more than taking in and using pixel data
from two or more image frames to create the composite image, which includes an
image created by combining different image data or by uniting image data as
previously discussed.
2. “the first location specified by the first user input is an arbitrary address
entered via the first user input, the entered arbitrary address specifying
information selected from a group consisting of street name, city, state, and zip
code” of claim 20

Claim 20 depends from claim 1 and further recites “the first location
specified by the first user input is an arbitrary address entered via the first user
input, the entered arbitrary address specifying information selected from a group
consisting of street name, city, state, and zip code.” PO App. Br. 47, Claims
App’x. Patent Owner argues that the recited “arbitrary address” means “‘any
potential addresses (assigned and unassigned) in the geographic area, not
preselected or constrained by the system.’” PO App. Br. 21. Patent Owner further
argues that the ordinary meaning and the ’316 patent’s disclosure support this
understanding. PO App. Br. 22–23.
The Examiner determines that an “arbitrary address” does not require a
database having images of both assigned and unassigned addresses, but “means
arbitrary to someone’s perspective and that perspective may broadly and
reasonably belong to a user.” RAN 30. Requester further asserts that an “arbitrary
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address” includes “an address selected from a group of addresses.” 3PR Resp.
Br. 9 (citing ACP 24).
Specifically, Patent Owner also asserts that the district court construed the
term “arbitrary to mean “assigned and unassigned addresses” (PO App. Br. 21) and
that an ordinary meaning of this term “refers to any member of a set of potential or
possible ‘somethings’” (PO App. Br. 22). However, Patent Owner provides no
citations to an ordinary meaning for “arbitrary” or a citation to the district court’s
understanding, amounting to mere attorney argument that cannot take the place of
evidence in the record. See Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 595
(Fed. Cir. 1997). As such, this part of the argument is not probative. Moreover, as
previously noted, we are not obligated to follow the same claim construction as the
district court. See Trans Texas, 498 F.3d at 1298.
Patent Owner also cites to various columns for support. PO App. Br. 22–23
(citing the ’316 patent 2:45–49, 6:37–47, 7:15–20, 13:21–14:14). Column 7 of the
’316 patent does not discuss addresses but rather “an arbitrary value” for a time
phase. The ’316 patent 7:15–20, cited at PO App. Br. 22. In fact, when discussing
entering an address, there is no mention that the address is arbitrary or unassigned
by the system as argued. See PO Resp. Br. 6–7. Rather, the ’316 patent discusses
entering “an address of the location”— not some random address —and returning a
map corresponding to the address. The ’316 patent 11:45–46, 12:20–26, 32–35,
13:23–37, 55–61. Cited portions column 2, lines 45 through 49 also do not
describe selecting a potential address without one-to-one correspondence as Patent
Owner contends. PO App. Br. 22.
Similarly, cited portions column 13, line 21 through column 14, line 14 do
not describe a user entering an address “regardless of whether that address actually
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exists.” PO App. Br. 23 (citing the ’316 patent 13:21–14:14). Claim 20 also does
not recite showing an image of the location along a street where the address would
be located “[i]f the selected address does not correspond to an address assigned to
an actual building.” PO App. Br. 22. We thus are not persuaded that the phrase
“arbitrary address” in claim 20 must be any potential address which is not
constrained by the system, including those that are unassigned, in the geographic
area.
Furthermore, using an ordinary understanding of “arbitrary”11 and Patent
Owner’s analogy of a person picking any number between 1 and 100 is an
“arbitrary number” (PO App. Br. 22), an arbitrary address depends on the user’s
discretion. See 3PR Reb. Br. 3. As such, the Examiner’s position that the address
is arbitrary to someone’s perspective is reasonable. RAN 30. Additionally, the
Examiner states an arbitrary address can include “one from a group of tagged
images.” See id. Because the ’316 patent’s disclosure does not limit the
understanding of “arbitrary” and claim 20 does not further define how the address
is “arbitrary,” we agree.
Accordingly, we determine “an arbitrary address’ includes an address
selected from a group of addresses and can include an assigned address.
B. Did the Examiner err in determining that Yee and Dykes teach the
composite image as recited in claim 13?

1. Lachinski

11Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, definitions [3a] of “arbitrary,” available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arbitrary (last visited July 8, 2016)
(defining “arbitrary” as “based on or determined by individual preference or
convenience rather than by necessity or the intrinsic nature of something.”)
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At the outset we address a procedural issue raised by Patent Owner. Patent
Owner argues that the citation to Lachinski by Requester was improper and should
be excluded from consideration. PO App. Br. 30–31; PO Reb. Br. 10–11.
According to the Examiner, Lachinski was cited by the Requester to explain Yee’s
mobile mapping system and various features disclosed. See RAN 20. Requester
contends that its reliance on and discussion of Lachinski is proper under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.948(a)(2). 3PR Resp. Br. 21–22 (citing May 22, 2013 Comments 27).
The propriety of whether a reference was properly submitted under § 1.948
is a petitionable matter. Because this issue is not appealable, the Board will not
decide this issue. See MPEP §§ 1002 and 1201, 9th ed. (Oct. and Nov. 2015
respectively); see also In re Hengehold, 440 F.2d 1395, 1403 (CCPA 1971)
(stating that there are many kinds of decisions made by examiners, “which have
not been and are not now appealable to the board or to this court when they are not
directly connected with the merits of issues involving rejections of claims, but
traditionally have been settled by petition to the Commissioner.”)
2. “Composite Image” of Claim 13
Claims 13, 18–24, 36, 37, 39–41, and 43 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) based on Yee and Dykes. RAN 12–15. Except for claims 20 and 21, the
claims are argued collectively. PO App. Br. 31–37. We select claim 13 as
representative of claims 13, 18, and 19. 37 C.F.R. § 41.67(c)(1)(vii). To repeat,
claim 13 recites “the first image is a composite image.”
In rejecting claim 13, the Examiner relies on Yee and Dykes. RAN 15
(incorporating and adopting Request 98–128 and Claim Chart CC-D). The
Request refers to Yee and the teaching of “composites of them.” Request 113
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(citing Yee 389). Claim Chart CC-D similarly cites Yee to teach the composite
image. Request, Ex. CC-D 12.
Notably, Patent Owner does not dispute that Yee discloses the “Image
Frames Limitation” that recites “wherein the images are associated with image
frames acquired by an image recording device moving along a trajectory.” See PO
App. Br. 31–34; see also 3PR Resp. Br. 2–7 (referring to the “Image Frames
Limitation.”) That is, Yee discloses image frames captured while an image
recording device moves along a trajectory. Yee 390 (discussing taking 30 frames
per second while moving down the road); see also 3PR Resp. Br. 13 (citing Yee
388–89). However, Patent Owner argues that the Examiner has relied upon Yee to
define the term “composites” and change the meaning of the term. PO App. Br.
19–20; PO Reb. Br. 8–9. Specifically, Patent Owner further contends that Yee
uses the term “composite” improperly to include side-by-side views and 4-views.
PO App. Br. 20 n. 2 (citing a “Geospan Brochure”12), 20–21. Patent Owner asserts
that the ’316 patent requires the composite image be a single view and not “two or
more separate and independent images depicting separate and distinct views of
different objects.” PO App. Br. 21.
We find this argument unavailing. As discussed above in the Claim
Construction section, we determine the phrase “composite image” includes a single
image created by combining different image data or by uniting image data but does
not require a single new image with a single new view as urged by Patent Owner.
PO App. Br. 17; 3PR Resp. Br. 14. Moreover, as for the remaining phrase that

12 Patent Owner refers to “the Geospan Brochure” as Exhibit C filed January 2,
2013. However, our records indicate Exhibit C was filed January 8, 2013 and is
entitled “Drive around town on your PC with GEOVISTA – Visual Geographic
Information.”
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“each composite is created by processing pixel data of a plurality of the image
frames,” we determine that the recitation does not recite how the pixel data of the
images frames are processed, such that the acquired image frames must be
combined at the pixel level or that pixel data of the composite image must be
computed from two or more image frames. Rather, claim 13 requires only using
pixel data from two or more image frames to create the composite image.
Based on this understanding, we determine Yee teaches the recited
“composite image” recitation. Yee states “[s]ome of the specific data to be
collected and made available . . . include: curbside view, front and back; street
view, front and back; real estate view left and right; real estate and address zoom,
4-view; and composites of them.” Yee 389 (emphasis added). The Examiner finds
that this portion of Yee explicitly discloses a composite image (i.e., “composite of
them”) (RAN 29), such as “a composite display of (for example) a curbside view
with a front and back view [that] is a new view manipulated at the pixel level and
synthesized from multiple images” (RAN 30). Given how the language
“composite of them” is separate from the other described views, including the 4-
view, we determine the Examiner’s position is reasonable.
Moreover, the view in the described “Geospan Brochure” is just one image
example of GEOVISTA data, which was acquired by GEOSPAN Corporation
discussed in Yee. See, e.g., Yee 392. But, as previously stated, Yee discloses
various examples, including a “composites of them” separate from the “4-view.”
Yee 389. Yee explicitly discloses “composites” (id.; see RAN 29) and “them”
refers back to the other views, including a front and back curbside view, a front
and back street view, a left and right real estate view. Thus, Yee teaches creating
“composites” of these various views.
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As for the “4-view” example in Yee, Yee does not provide any more details
how the view is formed. Yee 389. Even so, Patent Owner presumes the example
in the described “Geospan Brochure” is the only “4-view” that Yee envisions and
argues this is not “a composite image created by processing pixel data of a
plurality of image frames.” PO App. Br. 20–21, 32. Although asserting that
Lachinski should not be considered (PO App. Br. 30–31), Patent Owner relies on
Lachinski’s example in arguing that Yee’s “4-view” is not a composite image as
recited. PO App. Br. 32. We are not persuaded for the above-stated reasons.
Moreover, Lachinski is not part of the rejection.
Nevertheless, some similarities exist between what is shown in Patent
Owner’s example and what Yee and Lachinski disclose. Yee discusses “images
can be displaced as rolling video of four views in a frame . . . .” Yee 392.
Lachinski further states:
The four-view generator 62 has four inputs 82, allowing signals from four of
the video cameras 50 to be input simultaneously. The generator 62 reduces
the image represented by each signal to one-fourth of its original size and
then combines the reduced images to form a single video image by placing
each of the reduced images into one of the four corners of an output image.

Lachinski, 5:25-31 (emphasis added), cited in 3PR Resp. Br. 13; Lachinski, Fig. 3.
This supports that the 4-view discussed in Yee (Yee 389) includes four images,
one in each of four corners that is reduced in size. Lachinski, 5:25-31; Fig. 3.
Lachinski also states the generator produces “a single video image” that includes
four reduced size images. Id.
Moreover, Yee teaches that data from the four images, which includes its
pixel data, are used to create the reduced-sized images. The “four views in a
frame” discussed in Yee (Yee 392) or the “single video image” with four-views,
each one-fourth of its original size that form “reduced images,” is further explained
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in Lachinski (Lachinski 5:25–31). This image is a single image that is made up of
different parts or image frames (e.g., image data from multiple views) and uses or
combines pixel data from each of the different view image frames to create the
single image. Yee therefore teaches “a composite image” as broadly as recited.
Patent Owner contends the Examiner changes the meaning of composite in
determining Yee teaches the recited “composite image.” PO App. Br. 20. We are
not persuaded and find no deviation in Yee from the ordinary meaning of the term
“composite.” As previously stated, Yee explicitly teaches the collected data
includes composites of them, which refers back to the various other described
views (e.g., curbside, front and back, street, real estate view left and right, and
4-views). Yee 389. Importantly, identity of terminology is not required, but Yee
actually uses the term, “composites.” See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir.
1990). Additionally and although not required by the claim, the Examiner finds
and we agree that Yee provides a “composite” that includes, for example, “a
curbside view with a front and back view” as “a new view.” RAN 30.
The argument that Yee’s discussion to include composites “teaches away
from creating composite images with its process” is unavailing. PO App. Br.
32–33. In particular, as already stated, Yee discloses composites (Yee 389) and
the images are acquired as the vehicle moves down the road (Yee 390). Patent
Owner contends that the user would “manually review[] the raw image frames and
select[] the most appropriate image” which is slow and costly. PO App. Br. 33.
However, insufficient support for the assertion that Yee’s review would be
performed manually, would be costly, and would require modification has been
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provided in the record. PO App. Br. 32–34.13 In any event, Lachinski, which
addresses a GeoSpan system at least similar to Yee, discusses the manual process
is not used to generate composites. Lachinski 5:25–40 (discussing using generator
62 to form a single video image), cited in 3PR Resp. Br. 14.
We thus, are unpersuaded that Yee teaches away from creating a composite
image with its process as argued. Even so, the limitation “each composite is
created by processing pixel data of a plurality of the image frames” in claim 13
does not exclude involving inputting some data manually. Moreover, many of the
disputed features (e.g., slow, cost, precision, complexity) (PO App. Br. 32–33) are
not commensurate in scope with claim 13.
Lastly, Patent Owner argues that one skilled in the art would not have
combined Dykes with Yee to arrive at the claimed invention. PO App. Br. 32, 34.
Patent Owner asserts Dykes concerns 360 degree panoramas and thus does not
teach “the desirability of acquiring image frames for creating composite images
‘by an image recording device moving along a trajectory.’” PO App. Br. 32.
Patent Owner contends that Dykes does not cure the deficiencies of Yee and “there
is no rational reason why a person of skill in the art would have combined Yee and
Dykes to arrive at the embodiment of claim[] 13.” PO App. Br. 34.
To the contrary, Yee is not deficient as argued by Patent Owner. Even so
and although not relied upon in the rejection, Dykes teaches another known
technique of creating “composites” by combining images to produce a panorama.

13 Patent Owner footnotes a reference entitled “GEN-2 City Tour BBC & CNBC
1995, January 1, 2004” (PO App. Br. 33 n.2) and states the reference was
submitted January 7, 2013. We are not able to locate this reference. At best, we
have located a reference entitled, “City Tour – User Guide and Tutorial” submitted
January 8, 2013, copyrighted 1996 by GEOSPAN Corporation.
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Dykes 132–34. When substituting one known element for another known in the art
(e.g., Yee’s composite for Dykes’ panoramic technique of forming a composite),
“the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.” KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Also, both the Examiner and Requester
have provided reasons with some rational underpinning to combine Dykes with
Yee. Exemplary reasons include (1) providing symbols in Yee’s map system to
enable a user to navigate locations by visualization, (2) creating an environment in
Yee’s system that is easy to set up due to minimal data and metadata used, and (3)
providing a degree of future proofing in Yee’s map system. RAN 13–15 (citing
Request 98–100 and Dykes 139–40); 3PR Resp. Br. 14–15 (citing Request 98–99,
Yee 391–92, and Dykes 139–40).
Accordingly, we determine that the Examiner has not erred in rejecting
claim 13 and claims 18, and 19 not argued separately.
3. “Arbitrary Address” of Claim 20
Claim 20 depends from claim 1 and is argued separately. PO App. Br.
34–36. Claim 20 recites “wherein the first location specified by the first user input
is an arbitrary address entered via the first user input, the entered arbitrary address
specifying information selected from a group consisting of street name, city, state,
and zip code.” PO App. Br. 47, Claims App’x. Based on the Patent Owner’s
argued claim construction, Patent Owner contends that the recited “arbitrary
address” is “any one of all the potential addresses (assigned and unassigned) in a
geographic area” and that “the image database must have images of both assigned
and unassigned addresses.” PO App. Br. 35; PO Resp. Br. 6–7. For this reason,
Patent Owner argues Yee fails to disclose the recitation of claim 20. Id. We are
not persuaded.
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As explained above, we disagree that the recited “arbitrary address” when
considered in light of the disclosure must include unassigned addresses. Patent
Owner’s assertions amount to mere attorney argument that cannot take the place of
evidence in the record. See Estee Lauder, 129 F.3d at 595. As such, this portion
of the argument is not probative.
Also, as explained above, when considering the ’316 patent’s disclosure, “an
arbitrary address” includes an address selected from a group of addresses and need
not include unassigned addresses. See the ’316 patent 11:45–46, 12:20–26, 32–35,
13:21–24. Moreover, and when discussing entering an address, there is no
discussion that the address is arbitrary or unassigned. PO Resp. Br. 6–8; 3PR Reb.
Br. 2–3. We thus are not persuaded that the phrase “arbitrary address” in claim 20
must be any potential addresses, including those that are unassigned, in the
geographic area. Additionally, there is no recitation concerning a database of an
arbitrary addresses in claim 20 as argued by Patent Owner. PO App. Br. 35. As
such, we determine that Patent Owner’s contentions concerning the Yee system
and related documents discussed do not demonstrate that a user of the Yee system
is unable to enter an “arbitrary address” as broadly as recited.
As for teaching the “arbitrary address” limitation, the Examiner cites to the
Request to teach the disputed recitation. RAN 15 (incorporating and adopting
Request 98–128); Request 122 (citing Yee 391–92). In particular, Yee discusses a
“[s]treet address entry” (Yee 392) and street name recording. See Yee 391–92.
Thus, entering a street address, such as in Yee, is “arbitrary” because the address is
an address selected by the user from a group of addresses. See Yee 392.
Additionally, using an ordinary understanding of “arbitrary” and Patent Owner’s
analogy of a person picking any number between 1 and 100 is an “arbitrary
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number” (PO App. Br. 22), Yee’s entered address is an arbitrary address because
the entered address depends on the user’s discretion to enter such address. Lastly,
Requester points out and we agree that Yee allows the user to select a point of a
street segment or a location on a map (e.g., an arbitrary address of a first location
specified by the first user input and specifies at least a city or state) and to retrieve
information for that location. 3PR Reb. Br. 3 (citing Yee 391–92). We agree.
Patent Owner further argues Lachinski and Dykes do not cure the purported
deficiency. PO App. Br. 35–36. On the other hand, Requester discusses Lachinski
to support its position. 3PR Resp. Br. 15–16; 3PR Reb. Br. 3–4. Dykes was not
relied upon to teach the “arbitrary address” feature. Request 122, Ex. CC-D
19–20. Also, Lachinski was not cited in the proposed rejection. Moreover, to the
extent that Requester is relying on Lachinski to demonstrate an inherent property
of Yee (3PR Resp. Br. 15–16), the Examiner has not relied on these teachings in
rejecting claim 20. Also, although there are many similarities between Lachinski
and Yee (e.g., describing the vehicle that captures images with multiple camera
and GPS data developed by GeoSpan), we also cannot state with certainty that all
the details in Lachinski describe the “same” system as Yee, including how the
addresses are matched to geography.
For the above reasons, we determine that the Examiner has not erred in
rejecting claim 20 and dependent claims 36, 37, 39–41, and 43 that are not
separately argued.
4. Claims 21–24
Patent Owner further argues claim 21, which depends from claim 20. PO
App. Br. 36–37. Claim 21 recites
segmenting the trajectory on which the image recording devices
move, into a plurality of segments;
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correlating the plurality of segments to a plurality of street segments
in a geographic information database;
identifying one of the plurality of street segments based on the
arbitrary address;
retrieving the first image based on the identified one of the plurality of
street segments; and
outputting the first image onto an image display device.

Patent Owner asserts that claim 21 “describes a method whereby the houses and
other structures do[ not] need to be individually tagged to an image.” PO App. Br.
37. Yet, claim 21 does not include a limitation that excludes tagging images. To
extent that this argument concerns the “arbitrary address” limitation of claim 20,
we are not persuaded. As previously discussed, Yee teaches this feature.
By reciting “identifying one of the plurality of street segments based on the
arbitrary address,” Patent Owner contends that the claim 21’s process associates
first and second locations with a street segment and not a specific image. PO App.
Br. 37. Patent Owner contends Yee is deficient, and Lachinski does not disclose
this step. Id. We disagree and refer to the Examiner’s explanation. RAN 15
(incorporating and adopting the rejection in Request 123–25, which cites Yee 388–
89, 391–92); see also 3PR Resp. Br. 16–18 (discussing a user can point to a road
segment (e.g., a location) on a computerized map and display image of the
segment, which is discussed at ACP 24–25, which cites Yee 391–92).
Lastly, Patent Owner argues that Yee, even when supplemented by
Lachinski, does not disclose “the three step retrieval process of claim 21.” PO
App. Br. 37. We find this argument unavailing given that claim 21 recites five
steps and only one “retrieving” step. That is, we are not clear as to what portion of
claim 21 is “the three step retrieval process.” Other than the previously discussed
argument concerning the “identifying” step and Lachinski, Patent Owner does not
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articulate clearly any step in claim 21 that the cited art fails to teach. See PO App.
Br. 36–37. We additionally refer to the Examiner’s finding concerning claim 21
and the adopted Rejection in the Request. ACP 24–25; Request 123–125 (citing
Yee 388–89, 391–92).
Accordingly, we determine that the Examiner has not erred in rejecting
claim 21 and dependent claims 22–24, which are not separately argued.

REQUESTER’S CROSS APPEAL
The Examiner did not adopt the following proposed rejection,14 for which
Requester appeals:

Reference(s) Basis Claims RAN
Yee and Dykes § 103(a) 42 RAN 4

3PR App. Br. 2, 4.
Claim 42 indirectly depends from claim 20 and further recites “[t]he method
of claim 36 wherein the image source comprises images comprising views of
substantially all the static objects in the geographic area.” PO App. Br. 50, Claims
App’x.
Regarding this claim, the Examiner found that this claim is patentable
because “[c]laim 42 limits the image source to ‘images comprising view[s] of
substantially all the static objects in the geographic area.’” RAN 4. Requester

14 This rejection was proposed by Requester in comments after the ACP on
November 25, 2013. 3PR November 25, 2013 Comments 49.
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argues the Examiner erred in concluding this claim is patentable over Yee and
Dykes. 3PR App. Br. 4–18. We agree.
Patent Owner does not rebut the findings concerning Yee for claim 42 or
Requester’s claim construction for claim 42. See generally PO Resp. Br.
Specifically, when addressing claim 42, Patent Owner disputes that Dykes—not
Yee— fails to teach the “substantially all the static objects in a geographic area.”
PO Resp. Br. 11. Patent Owner also repeats arguments concerning claim 13,
which has similar limitations to claim 36, and claim 20. PO Resp. Br. 6–8
(discussing the “arbitrary address” limitation), 8–10 (discussing the “composite
image” limitation). We are not persuaded for the previous-stated reasons. We
additionally refer to the Requester’s mapping of the claim limitations in this
regard. 3PR App. Br. 4–13; 3PR Reb. Br. 2–7.
Turning to the ’316 patent to construe claim 42’s limitations, the disclosure
discusses the static objects at two locations. First, as noted by Requester, the
disclosure repeats what is recited or that the image database (e.g., an image
source) contains substantially all of the static objects in the geographic area to
allow for visually navigation. The ’316 patent 2:45–48, cited in 3PR App. Br. 13
and 3PR Reb. Br. 8. Second, the ’316 patent discusses a database that provides
a visual representation of at least the static objects in the entire area without the
“substantially all” language. The ’316 patent 10:12–15. Unfortunately, neither
portion of the ’316 patent describes what is meant by “substantially all.”
Requester does not provide us with evidence of an ordinary understanding of
the phrase, “substantially all,” but asserts that it means “a sufficient quantity of
images of objects are stored in the image database (or ‘image source’ in claim 42)
to allow the user to visually navigate the area” in the context of the claim. 3PR
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App. Br. 13–14 (bolding omitted). Additionally, Requester states that the
“substantially all” does not require capturing “every conceivable object in a
geographic area.” 3PR Reb. Br. 8. Our understanding is aligned with Requester.
An ordinary meaning for “substantial” includes “considerable in quantity:
significantly great” and “being largely but not wholly that which is specified.”15
As such, claim 42 requires the image source to have a considerable number of
static objects— but not all — in the geographic area to allow a user to visually
navigate the area from the user terminal.
Yee teaches its database includes data concerning
accurate street location and names, selected infrastructure items such as
power poles, street lights, traffic signals, guard rails, highway striping, etc[.];
houses; pavement conditions; individual house addresses; and intelligent
vehicle highway systems data such as speed limits, speed zones, turn
restrictions, oneway street data and street signs can be viewed and further
located if desired.

Yee 389, quoted in 3PR App. Br. 14 and 3PR Reb. Br. 9. As such, Requester
provides adequate evidence that a considerable quantity of static objects are
captured in Yee’s system. See id. Additionally, Yee discusses a visual interface
system allowing a user to navigate geographic areas. Yee 391–92, cited in 3PR
App. Br. 15 and 3PR Reb. Br. 9.
Furthermore, the proposed rejection additionally addresses Dykes in this
regard. 3PR App. Br. 15–17 (citing Dykes 134, 139–40, Fig. 2); 3PR Reb. Br.
7–9. Requester indicates that Dykes teaches creating panoramas that include rocks
or landscape and thus include a considerable number of the static objects. See

15 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, definitions [3b] and [5] of “substantial,”
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantially (last visited
July 11, 2016)
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Dykes 134, Fig. 2 (reproduced at 3PR App. Br. 16 and 3PR Reb. Br. 8). We agree
that this figures illustrates “images comprising views of substantially all the static
objects in the geographic area” as recited. Requester also points to Dykes’s
teachings of providing a panorama that allows the user to navigate across the
virtual space between features further teaches claim 42’s recitations. 3PR App. Br.
15–17 (citing Dykes 139–40).
Regarding claim 42, Patent Owner asserts Dykes’ panoramas are taken at
various locations but does not disclose the “substantially all the static objects”
limitation. PO Resp. Br. 11. Patent Owner argues that Dykes does not
demonstrate that substantially all static objects between locations where the
panoramas are taken were captured. Id. We disagree. Figure 2 demonstrates that
a considerable number of the static objects in the geographic area were captured
and thus includes “substantially all static objects in the geographic area” as recited.
Dykes, Fig. 2, reproduced in 3PR App. Br. 16. Moreover, as noted above, this
argument fails to rebut the findings concerning Yee related to the “substantially all
static objects” limitation.
Accordingly, the Examiner erred in determining Yee and Dykes do not
render claim 42 obvious.

REMAINING REJECTIONS
The above discussions address all the claims on appeal and are dispositive,
rendering it unnecessary to reach the propriety of any remaining contentions. See
Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Vivid
Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

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IV. CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 13, 18–24, 36, 37, 39–41, and 43
based on Yee and Dykes is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision that claim 38 is patentable is affirmed.
We do not sustain the Examiner’s decision determining claim 42 is
patentable.
We present a new ground of rejection for claim 42.

V. TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(a), the above-noted reversal constitutes a new
ground of rejection. Section 41.77(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection
. . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” That section also provides
that Patent Owner, WITHIN ONE MONTH FROM THE DATE OF THE
DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the
new grounds of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal proceeding as to the
rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. The owner may file a response requesting
reopening of prosecution before the examiner. Such a response must
be either an amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence
relating to the claims so rejected, or both.

(2) Request rehearing. The owner may request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.79 by the Board upon the same record. The request
for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with
particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or
overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all
other grounds upon which rehearing is sought.

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In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.79(a)(1), the “[p]arties to the appeal may
file a request for rehearing of the decision within one month of the date of: . . .
[t]he original decision of the Board under § 41.77(a).” A request for rehearing
must be in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.79(b). Comments in opposition to the
request and additional requests for rehearing must be in accordance with 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.79(c)–(d), respectively. Under 37 C.F.R. § 41.79(e), “[t]he times for
requesting rehearing under paragraph (a) of this section, for requesting further
rehearing under paragraph (c) of this section, and for submitting comments under
paragraph (b) of this section may not be extended.”
An appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 141–144 and 315 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.983 for an inter partes
reexamination proceeding “commenced” on or after November 2, 2002 may not be
taken “until all parties’ rights to request rehearing have been exhausted, at which
time the decision of the Board is final and appealable by any party to the appeal to
the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.81; see also MPEP §§ 2682, 2683 (8th ed., Rev. 8, July
2010).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
Requests for extensions of time in this inter partes reexamination
proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.956. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.79.
In the event neither party files a request for rehearing within the time
provided in 37 C.F.R. § 41.79, and this decision becomes final and appealable
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.81, a party seeking judicial review must timely serve notice
on the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 90.1 and 1.983.
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AFFIRMED-IN-PART
37 C.F.R. § 41.77(b)

FOR PATENT OWNER:

LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE LLP
PO Box 29001
Glendale, CA 91209-9001

FOR THIRD-PARTY REQUESTER:

STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
1330 Connecticut Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20036