Ex Parte 7029349 et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Apr 30, 2009

90008501 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 30, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________________

Ex parte PACIFIC LINK HOLDINGS, CORP.1
____________________

Appeal 2009-2602
Reexamination Control 90/008,501
Patent 7,029,349 B22
Technology Center 3900
____________________

Decided:3 May 1, 2009
____________________

Before CAROL A. SPIEGEL, DANIEL S. SONG and KEN B. BARRETT,
Administrative Patent Judges.

SONG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Pacific Link Holdings, Corp. is the real party in interest (App. Br. 1).
2 Issued April 18, 2006 to Lin.
3 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 CFR § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date
shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the
Mail Date.

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Patent 7,029,349 B2

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 306 (2002)
from a Final Rejection of claims 1-8. The Appellant requests review of the
Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-6 and 8 (App. Br. 6). However, the
Appeal Brief also explicitly states that “Applicant is not requesting review of
the rejections of claim 7” (App. Br. 6). Therefore, we consider claim 7 to be
withdrawn for cancellation. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b)
and 306 (2002).
This appeal is related to a co-pending appeal for Reexamination
Control 90/008,500 (for US 7,160,164 to Lin issued from a continuation
application of Ser. No. 10/606,433 which issued as the ‘349 patent).
The Patentee claims a body board (a.k.a. “bodyboard”) used for
recreational activities on snow or water having the various layers claimed.
Representative independent claim 1 reads as follows (Claims App'x.;
reference numerals as shown in figs. 1 and 2 added):
1. A body board, comprising:
a foam core portion [18] having a top and bottom
surface;
a first binding layer [14] laminated on the outside of said
top surface;
a first graphics layer [12] laminated on the outside of said
first binding layer [14];
a first clear protection layer [10] laminated on the outside
of said first graphics layer [12];
a second binding layer [24] laminated on the outside of
said bottom surface;
a second graphics layer [22] laminated on the outside of
said second binding layer [24]; and
a second clear protection layer [20] laminated on the
outside of said second graphics layer [22].
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Independent claim 8 recites the same limitations as claim 1 but the
preamble and the transitional term recites “[a] body board, consisting of:”
(Claims App'x.).
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims is:
Szabad, Jr. 4,850,913 Jul. 25, 1989
Schneider 5,211,593 May 18, 1993
Chang 5,503,921 Apr. 2, 1996
Bambara 5,882,776 Mar. 16, 1999
Deibel 6,358,599 B1 Mar. 19, 2002
Bai Taiwanese Patent 309741 Jul. 1, 1997
(citation to the translation of record)

Kin Japanese Application 2000-117868 Apr. 25, 2000
(citation to the translation of record)

The Examiner rejected claims 1-6 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
unpatentable over Schneider in view of Kin.
The Examiner rejected claims 1-4 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
unpatentable over Bai in view of Kin.
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2 and 8 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
unpatentable over Chang in view of Deibel.
The Examiner rejected claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
unpatentable over Schneider in view of Kin, and further in view of Szabad,
Jr.
The Examiner rejected claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
unpatentable over Schneider in view of Kin, and further in view of Bambara.
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
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ISSUES
The following issues have been raised in the present appeal.
1. Has the Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
the combination of Schneider and Kin results in the recited binding layer?
2. Has the Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
the combination of Bai and Kin results in a body board?
3. Has the Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in concluding
that it would have been obvious to use an adhesive layer as taught in Deibel
in the body board of Chang?

FINDINGS OF FACT
The record supports the following findings of fact (FF) by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1. Schneider describes a bodyboard 10 including a foam plank 30
and a graphics-imprinted bottom skin 40 which covers a bottom planed
surface 14 of the bodyboard 10 (col. 3, ll. 17-20, 35-37; figs. 1-4).
2. Schneider describes that the bottom skin 40 includes a plurality
of film layers 42, 44 bonded adhesively together, graphics being imprinted
on the first surface 46 of the outer layer 44 (col. 3, ll. 40-43, 50-52, 59-62;
figs. 3 and 4).
3. Schneider describes that the film layers 42 and 44 are plastic
polyethylene film sheets (col. 3, ll. 41-43, 50-52).
4. Schneider also teaches that the graphic-imprinted skin can be
applied to the top riding surface of the bodyboard (col. 5, ll. 5-8).
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5. Kin describes a decorative foam sheet for an interior building
wall or a head lining which includes a foam layer 3 and a printing plastic
film 6 formed on the foam layer 3, the printing plastic film 6 consisting of a
plastic film 5 and a printing pattern 4 (Translation, ¶¶ [0001], [0002],
[0009], fig. 1).
6. Kin also describes that the plastic film 5 is used because surface
reinforcement (abrasion resistance, scratching reinforcement), resistance to
contamination, and chemical resistance of the foam layer 3 are weak
(Translation, ¶ [0017]).
7. Bai describes a foam structure having an ethylene-vinyl acetate
(EVA) foam sheet 10, a hot melt glue 11 layer, a hot melt glue 23 layer, an
ink pattern 22, a clear hot melt glue 21 layer, and a transparent thermoplastic
film 20 (Translation, pgs. 5 and 6, 4th figure).
8. Chang describes a bodyboard 50 including a core 52, a top skin
56 secured to the top of the core 52, and a bottom skin 58 secured to the
bottom of the core 52 (col. 4, ll. 41-54; fig 4).
9. The Specification of Chang states:
In producing a skin characterizing this invention,
matrix layer 12 of heat-expandable foam-producing
polyolefin has deposited over its top surface, and prior to
the application of any heat, a non-foamable polyolefin or
polyethylene film . . .

. . .The polyolefin film includes an upper film layer 20a,
and a lower film layer 20b. . . .

As earlier discussed, skins are producible
following the invention which have graphic images
clearly and attractively displayed on the skins. In
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preparing a skin, the imaging material which results in
these images is distributed in the interface between film
layers 20a and 20b.
(Col. 3, ll. 11-30).
10. The Specification of Chang also states:
On leaving the oven, a product is formed which is
illustrated at 40 in the drawing, and referred to herein as
an expanded composite. The matrix layer in the product
has foamed to produce a foam layer 41 having the porous
internal appearance illustrated in FIG. 3. The film
originally lying on the top of the matrix layer, under the
oven temperature conditions, melts or softens with the
residue of the film (42 in FIG. 3) migrating over the
surface of the foam to become fully integrated with the
foam product which is formed.
(Col. 4, ll. 17-27).
11. Thus, Chang describes a composite 40 made of the foam layer
41 (i.e., expanded matrix layer 12) with a lower film layer 20b, the graphic
imaging material layer 24 and the upper film layer 20a melted thereon.
12. The Specification of Chang also states:
As contemplated by the invention, composite 40 is used
to produce a skin in an article such as a bodyboard. . . .

Bodyboard 50 includes a core 52 of stiff material. . . .

Extending over the top surface of core 52 is a top skin
shown at 56. This is suitably secured to the core, in a
conventional manner, throughout the top face of the core.

. . . The composite produced by the invention is utilized
at least in the production of top skin 56. The composite
is secured to core 52 with the top surface of the
composite facing outwardly and bottom surface 41b of
the composite facing the core and secured thereto.
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(Col. 4, ll. 35-60).
13. Thus, the top skin 56 of Chang is made from the composite 40
and is secured to the core 52 of the bodyboard 50 with the bottom surface
41b of the composite 40 being secured to the core 52.
14. Chang does not describe the specific manner in which the top
skin 56 is secured to the core 52 of the bodyboard 50, but merely states that
the skin can be secured “in a conventional manner” (col. 4, ll. 48-49).
15. Deibel describes a foam laminate board 10 including a foam
core 14 with a first facer 16 adhered or bonded to one primary surface of
foam core 14 and a second facer 18 bonded to a second primary surface of
foam core 14 (col. 4, ll. 4-7; fig. 2).
16. Deibel also teaches that the facer “may be laminated to the
foam board by any conventional method known in the art” including using a
heat activated adhesive layer, or an adhesive layer co-extruded with the facer
(col. 6, ll. 20-29).

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art,
(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3)
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the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary
considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). In
KSR, the Supreme Court emphasized “the need for caution in granting a
patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art,” and
reaffirmed principles based on its precedent that “[t]he combination of
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when
it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 415, 416.
The Court stated that “[o]ften, it will be necessary for a court to look
to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known
to the design community or present in the marketplace; and the background
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order
to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known
elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418. The
Court noted that “[t]o facilitate review, this analysis should be made
explicit.” Id. (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness”)). However, “the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id.

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CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
The preambles of independent claims 1 and 8 both recite “[a] body
board”. In claim construction, “[w]hether to treat a preamble as a limitation
is a determination ‘resolved only on review of the entire[ ] ... patent to gain
an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to
encompass by the claim.’” Catalina Marketing Int’l., Inc. v.
Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “In general, a
preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it
is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim. Id.
“Conversely, a preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a
structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only
to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Id.
Based on the review of the entire patent on appeal, we conclude that
the recitation “body board” in the preamble of independent claims 1 and 8
gives life, meaning, and vitality to the claim, and thus, should be given
patentable weight. In so doing, we observe that the preamble does not
merely recite a laminated structure that is intended for use as a body board,
but rather, limits the claimed invention to body board devices.
In independent claim 1, the transitional term “comprising” is used
which does not exclude additional, unrecited elements. See AFG Industries,
Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, Inc., 239 F.3d 1239, 1244-45 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
However, in independent claim 8, the transitional term “consisting of” is
used which excludes any elements not set forth in the claim. Id. at 1245.
In setting forth the various layers, claims 1 and 8 recite a specific
layer “laminated on the outside of” a previously recited surface or layer
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(e.g., “a first binding layer laminated on the outside of said top surface”).
During prosecution, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable
construction in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Thus, applying the broadest reasonable construction, the apparatus
claims 1 and 8 are construed so that recitation “laminated” merely requires
that the body board have the plurality of layers stacked together to result in a
laminate structure. However, by reciting that specific layers are “outside of”
a previously recited surface or layer, the claims require outward positioning
of the recited layers relative to one another in the specific order recited in the
claims. Moreover, with respect to claim 1 which uses the transitional term
“comprising”, intervening layers between the recited layers are not
precluded, although the specific order of the recited layers must be
maintained. In contrast, with respect to claim 8, intervening layers are
excluded by the virtue of the transitional term “consisting of” which
excludes elements not set forth in the claim.

ANALYSIS
Prior to addressing the Examiner’s substantive prior art rejections of
claims 1-6 and 8, we observe that dependent claim 7 stands rejected, but that
the Appellant has specifically requested that we do not review the
Examiner’s rejections of claim 7 (App. Br. 6). Therefore, we consider claim
7 to be withdrawn for cancellation. See ExParte Ghuman, 88 USPQ2d
1478, 1480 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (“If upon filing an appeal brief, the
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applicant limits the claims to be considered on appeal, then it is the practice
of the Patent and Trademark Office to treat the claims not pursued in the
appeal brief as having been withdrawn from the appeal.”).

Rejection of claims 1-6 and 8 over Schneider and Kin
The Examiner rejected claims 1-6 and 8 as unpatentable over
Schneider in view of Kin. The Examiner asserts that Schneider describes
each and every limitation of the rejected independent claims except for the
recited first clear protection layer and the recited second clear protection
layer (Ans. 4) (see also FF 1-4). The Examiner contends that Kin cures this
deficiency (Ans. 8 and 9), and reasons that “[i]t would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art to provide a graphics layer with a clear
polyethylene coating as taught by Kin et al. on the board of Schneider et al.
in order to provide a durable surface that prevents degradation of the
graphics” (Ans. 5).
The Appellant contends that because Kin is directed to a decorative
foam sheet for use as a building material, Kin cannot be combined with
Schneider which is directed to body boards (App. Br. 9). While Kin is not in
the field of the Appellant’s endeavor, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 9)
that Kin is reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the Appellant was
concerned, namely, providing laminated foam structures with graphics
thereon. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986-87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (a reference
may be relied upon as a basis for rejecting a claim when the reference is in
the field of the applicant's endeavor or is reasonably pertinent to the problem
with which the inventor was concerned).
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The Appellant also contends that the combination of Schneider and
Kin still fails to yield all the limitations of independent claims 1 and 8 (App.
Br. 8). In this regard, the Appellant argues that, in Kin, the graphics pattern
4 is printed on the film 5, whereas claims 1 and 8 recite that the protection
layer is laminated to the outside of the graphics layer (App. Br. 8).
However, this argument is misdirected as the Examiner is merely relying on
Kin for teaching the use of a clear layer over a graphics layer (Ans. 8).
The Appellant further disputes the Examiner’s assertion that the thin-
film plastic sheet 44 in Schneider is a binding layer (App. Br. 8). The
Appellant contends that sheet 44 is described as a polyethylene film sheet
which cannot function as the binding layer and that Schneider does not
describe a graphics layer laminated to a separate binding layer (App. Br. 8;
FF 2). We agree. The plain language of the limitation requires the recited
layer to be capable of performing a binding function. The Examiner is
correct in noting that Schneider describes the sheet 44 being bonded to the
outer sheet 42 (Ans. 8, citing Schneider, col. 4, ll. 5-19). However, such
bonding is attained by an adhesive or glue, and not by the sheet 44.
Schneider also does not appear to describe the use of an adhesive between
the sheet 44 and the foam plank 30, but instead, melts the surface of the
foam plank 30 in order to adhere the sheets 42, 44 thereon.
Hence, in view of the Examiner’s application of Schneider and Kin,
the resultant combination cannot be said to include the binding layer recited
in independent claims 1 and 8. Therefore, the Appellant has shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 8 as unpatentable over
Schneider. Claims 2-6 ultimately depend from independent claim 1, and
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thus, we conclude that the Examiner erred in rejecting these dependent
claims as well.

Rejection of claims 1-4 and 8 over Bai and Kin
The Examiner rejected claims 1-4 and 8 as unpatentable over Bai in
view of Kin discussed supra. The Examiner contends that Bai describes the
limitations of the rejected independent claims except for the “second binding
layer, the graphics layers, and the clear protective layers” (Ans. 5). The
Examiner relies on Kin to cure these deficiencies stating that Kin describes
“a graphics layer 4 topped by a clear layer 5 made of polyethylene film” and
that it would have been obvious to “provide a graphics layer with a clear
polyethylene coating as taught by Kin et al. on the foam of Bai in order to
provide a durable surface that prevents degradation of the graphics” (Ans. 5
and 6).
The Appellant argues that neither Bai nor Kin is directed to body
boards and contends that the Examiner is engaging in impermissible
hindsight (App. Br. 11). We agree with the Appellant. As construed supra,
the preamble of independent claims 1 and 8 reciting a “body board” gives
life, meaning, and vitality to the claim and should be given patentable
weight. Catalina Marketing, 289 F.3d at 808. Thus, we disagree with the
Examiner’s contention that combination of Bai and Kin “yields all of the
claimed features” (Ans. 10) because the combination does not describe a
body board.

Rejection of claims 1, 2 and 8 over Chang and Deibel
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The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2 and 8 as unpatentable over Chang
in view of Deibel. The Examiner contends that Chang describes all of the
limitations of independent claims except for the binding layers (Ans. 6).
The Examiner relies on Deibel to cure this deficiency and contends that it
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide the
binding layers of Deibel on the body board of Chang “to provide a strong
and durable hold between the various layers to prevent the board from
coming apart” (Ans. 6).
The Appellant contends that “Chang does not disclose laminating a
graphics layer on the outside of a binding layer, and then laminating a
protection layer on the outside of the graphics layer” (App. Br. 12). The
Appellant appears to be arguing that laminating is a method step. However,
as construed supra, independent claims 1 and 8 (which are apparatus claims)
can be satisfied by a laminate structure having the recited layers positioned
relative to one another in the manner recited by the limitations of the
independent claims.
The Appellants also argue that “there is no discrete ‘protection’ layer
in Chang because the layers 20a, 20b are melted and integrated with the
surface of the foam core” (App. Br. 12). However, this argument is not
persuasive because the claims do not recite a “discrete” clear protection
layer. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982). In addition, while
Chang does describe that the layers 20a and 20b are melted on the surface of
the foam layer 41 so as to migrate over, and become integrated with, the
irregular top surface of the foam (col. 4, ll. 22-32), such melted material film
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layers can still be said to be layers, and are separated by the graphic imaging
material 24 layer therebetween.
The Appellant further argues that Chang does not have a binding
layer, and does not need a binding layer because the top skin 56 is made by a
heating the films onto the surface of the foam layer 41 (App. Br. 13).
However, the Appellant appears to misconstrue the disclosure of Chang in
that the top skin 56 includes the foam layer 41, the foam layer 41 of the top
skin 56 being adhered to the core 52 of the bodyboard 50. More
specifically, the top skin 56 of Chang is made of a composite 40 (FF 12-13).
The composite 40 includes the foam layer 41, as well as the film layers 20a,
20b and graphical imaging material 24 melted thereon (FF 9-11). Chang
further describes that the top skin 56 extends over the surface of a core 52
and secured thereto “in a conventional manner, throughout the top face of
the core” so that the bottom surface 41b of the composite faces the core and
is secured thereto (FF 12). Hence, Chang specifically teaches a need to
secure the top skin 56 to the core 52. However, Chang does not specifically
describe how this is securement is attained (FF 14), much less describe
heating it onto the core.
The Examiner relies on Deibel for teaching that conventional methods
for laminating layers include using an adhesive layer (Ans. 11) (see also FF
15-16). Moreover, the Examiner articulated a reason for using the teachings
of Deibel to adhere the top skin to the core of Chang, namely, “in order to
provide a strong and durable hold between the various layers to prevent the
board from coming apart” (Ans. 6). We find the Examiner’s articulated
reason is rational and sufficient to support the conclusion that it would have
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been obvious to provide an adhesive layer described in Deibel in order to
secure the top skin 56 and the core 52 of Chang together.
The Appellant’s argument that Deibel should not be relied upon
because it is directed to home boards (App. Br. 12) is not persuasive in that
Deibel is reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the Appellant was
concerned, namely, adhering laminated foam structures together. In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986-87.
The Appellant further alleges that various problems arise if the
adhesives described in Deibel are used with Chang’s layers, including
potential damage to the film 20 and/or complication of Chang’s process
(App. Br. 13). However, as noted by the Examiner, such arguments are
speculative (Ans. 11), and also appear to be premised on the Appellant’s
misunderstanding of Chang.
We further note that the combination of Chang and Deibel as
suggested by the Examiner results in intervening foam layer 41 and the
lower film 20b between the graphic imaging material 24 and the core 52.
However, as discussed supra, claim 1 uses the transitional term
“comprising” and does not preclude such additional intervening layers. All
that is required is that the relative order of the recited layers be maintained
which is satisfied by the combination of Chang and Deibel.
In contrast, as pointed out by the Appellant (App. Br. 14),
independent claim 8 uses the transitional term “consisting of” which
precludes additional layers. Thus, while the Examiner is correct in stating
that “consisting of” language does not rule out obviousness rejections, we do
not agree with the Examiner’s assertion that “the base references applied do
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not have any additional structures that [sic, than] those claimed in the instant
invention” (Ans. 12). Clearly, the combination of Chang and Deibel as
suggested by the Examiner results in the additional intervening foam layer
41 and the lower film 20b between the graphic imaging material 24 and the
core 52.
Therefore, in view of the above, the Appellant has not shown that the
Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 as unpatentable over Chang
and Deibel. The Appellant also does not present any persuasive arguments
directed to claim 2 which depends from claim 1. Thus, claim 2 falls with
claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). However, the Appellant has
shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 8 as
unpatentable over Chang and Deibel.

Dependent Claims
The Appellant states “[c]laims 2-7 depend from claim 1 and are
submitted to be allowable for the same reasons.” (App. Br. 13). However,
we consider claim 7 to be withdrawn for cancellation as discussed supra.
Thus, the only rejection of any dependent claim remaining is the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 2 based on the combination of Chang and Deibel. The
Appellant does not present any additional arguments directed to the
limitations of dependent claim 2, but merely relies on its dependency on
claim 1 for patentability. Therefore, because the Appellant has not shown
that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as unpatentable over Chang and
Deibel as discussed supra, the Appellant has also failed to show that the
Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claim 2 over Chang and Deibel.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. The Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in finding
that the combination of Schneider and Kin results in the recited claimed
binding layer.
2. The Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in finding
that the combination of Bai and Kin results in a body board.
3. The Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in
concluding that it would have been obvious to use an adhesive layer as
taught in Deibel in the body board of Chang.

ORDER
1. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-6 and 8 over Schneider
and Kin is REVERSED.
2. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-4 and 8 over Bai and Kin
is REVERSED.
3. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 2 over Chang and
Deibel is AFFIRMED.
4. The Examiner’s rejection of claim 8 over Chang and Deibel is
REVERSED.
Requests for extensions of time in this ex parte reexamination
proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(c). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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ack

cc:
Raymond Sun, Esq.
Law Offices of Raymond Sun
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Third Party Requester:
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