Ex Parte 6839759 et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 14, 201795001746 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2017) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 95/001,746 09/07/2011 6839759 43614.98 5175 22852 7590 11/14/2017 FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER LLP 901 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20001-4413 EXAMINER POKRZYWA, JOSEPH R ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3992 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/14/2017 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Requester v. Patent of VIRNETX INC. Patent Owner ____________________ Appeal 2017-010852 Reexamination Control 95/001,746 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Technology Center 3900 __________________ Before JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, DENISE M. POTHIER, and JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges. POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(f) I. STATEMENT OF CASE In an earlier Decision (“Dec.”) mailed February 11, 2016, we affirmed the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 8–10, 12–14, 16, 18, 20, 23–25, and 27–29 but reversed the Examiner’s confirmation of claims 3, 6, 7, 11, 15, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 30 of U.S. Patent No. 6,839,759 B2 (the ’759 patent). Dec. 57–58. We presented various rejections against claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 30, designating these rejections as new Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 2 grounds. Id. at 58. Patent Owner elected to reopen prosecution before the Examiner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(b)(1) (“PO Response”), submitting a Declaration of Fabian Monrose, Ph.D., dated March 11, 2016 (the “Monrose Declaration” or “Monrose Decl.”) and multiple exhibits (i.e., Exhibits A-2, A-35, A-42, A-48, A-86,1 and A-88–A-91). Requester filed comments under 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(c) (“3PR Comments.”) We granted Patent Owner’s request to reopen prosecution for consideration of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 30 and remanded the proceedings to the Examiner. Order 4. On remand, the Examiner maintained the new grounds of rejection of claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 30 in the “Determination Under 37 C.F.R. 41.77(d)” (Ex. Deter.) mailed March 7, 2017. Ex. Deter. 26, 28–31, 33, 36. Patent Owner submitted comments (“PO Comments”) as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(e) on April 7, 2017. Requester submitted a reply (“3PR Reply”) to the Patent Owner’s comments as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(e) on May 5, 2017. This proceeding has been returned to the Board under 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(f). 1 As indicated in the paper captioned “Order Remanding Inter Partes Reexamination Under 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(d) to the Examiner” (“Order”) dated June 17, 2016, Exhibit A-87 listed in the Appendix of the Patent Owner’s Request to Reopen Prosecution could not be located in the record. Order 3. Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 3 Claim Status Claims 1–30 are pending. Claims 1, 3–16, and 18–30 are subject to reexamination. See PO App. Br. iii; see also 3PR App. Br. 2.2 As noted above, claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 30 were subject to the remand order. Upon return, we address claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 30. Our new Decision is deemed to incorporate the earlier Decision, except for those portions specifically withdrawn. 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(f). Illustrative, original claim 1 reads as follows: 1. A method for establishing a secure communication link between a first computer and a second computer over a computer network, the method comprising steps of: enabling a secure communication mode of communication at the first computer without a user entering any cryptographic information for establishing the secure communication mode of communication; and establishing the secure communication link between the first computer and a second computer over a computer network based on the enabled secure communication mode of communication, the secure communication link being a virtual private network communication link over the computer network. Prior Art The following as evidence of unpatentability is relevant to the new grounds of rejection presented in the February 11, 2016 Opinion: Aziz (“Aziz”) US 5,548,646 Aug. 20, 1996 Aziz (“Aziz II”) US 6,119,234 Sept. 12, 2000 2 Patent Owner’s Appeal Brief (“PO App. Br.”) was filed February 2, 2015, and Requester’s Appeal Brief (“3PR App. Br.”) was filed January 30, 2015. Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 4 Information Sciences Institute, RFC: 793, Transmission Control Protocol, DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification 1–85 (1981) (“RFC 793”). Takahiro Kiuchi & Shigekoto Kaihara, C-HTTP -- Development of a Secure, Closed HTTP-based Network on the Internet, 1996 Proc. of SNDSS 64–75 (1996) (“Kiuchi”). Germano Caronni et al., SKIP— Securing the Internet, 1996 Proc. of WET ICE 62–67 (1996) (“Caronni”). Daniel R. Masys & Dixie B. Baker, Protecting Clinical Data on Web Client Computers: the PCASSO Approach, 1998 Proc. AMIA '98 Annual Symposium 366–370 (1998) (“Masys”). Stephen Kent & Randall Atkinson, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, Network Working Group, Internet Draft (Obsoletes RFC 1825) 1– 65 (February 1998) (“Kent”). Stephen Kent & Randall Atkinson, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), Network Working Group, Internet Draft 1–21 (February 1998) (“Kent II”). With the exception of Exhibit A-87,3 we agree with the Examiner’s summary of the declarations and exhibits presented for consideration on remand in this proceeding. Ex. Deter. 5–6. Maintained Rejections In the Examiner’s Determination, the Examiner maintains the following new grounds of rejections: 3 As indicated previously in footnote 1, Exhibit A-87 could not be located in the record of this proceeding. Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 5 Reference(s) Basis Claims Presented/Maintained Kent § 102(b) 1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 21, 22, and 30 Dec. 39–44, 43–44; Ex. Deter. 18–26 Kent/Caronni § 103(a) 1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 21, 22, and 30 Dec. 39–44; Ex. Deter. 26–28 Kent/Kent II § 103(a) 3 and 19 Dec. 44–47; Ex. Deter. 28–30 Kent/Caronni/Kent II § 103(a) 3 and 19 Dec. 44–47; Ex. Deter. 28–30 Aziz § 102(b) 1 and 16 Dec. 47–50; Ex. Deter. 30–31 Aziz and Kent II § 103(a) 3 and 19 Dec. 50–51; Ex. Deter. 28–30 Aziz and RFC 793 § 103(a) 6, 7, 21, and 22 Dec. 51; Ex. Deter. 30–31 Kiuchi § 102(b) 15 and 30 Dec. 51–54; Ex. Deter. 32–33 Kiuchi/Masys § 103(a) 11 and 26 Dec. 54–57; Ex. Deter. 33–36 II. ISSUES We review the new grounds of rejections based upon the issues identified by Patent Owner in its request to reopen and comments on the Examiner’s Determination, and in light of the new evidence and arguments related thereto. Cf. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 6 The main issue is whether Patent Owner has provided sufficient arguments and evidence to overcome the new grounds of rejection for claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 30 presented in the February 11, 2016 Decision. III. ANALYSIS A. Claim Construction 1. “[W]ithout a [U]ser [E]ntering [A]ny [C]ryptographic [I]nformation” In the earlier Decision, we construed the above phrase to mean “without a user entering a code or a key used to convert data so that only the specific recipients will be able to read the sent information.” Dec. 11. For support, we consulted a technical dictionary to obtain an ordinary understanding of the phrase, “cryptographic information,” because the ’759 patent does not define or explain this phrase. Id. Based on the ordinary definition of “cryptography” to a skilled artisan, we determined “cryptographic information” includes “codes used to convert data so that only a specific recipient will be able to read it using a key.” Id. (citing Microsoft® Computer Dictionary 135 (5th ed. 2002)). We further noted that the ’759 patent discusses the recited “enabling a secure communication mode . . . without a user entering any cryptographic information” can involve a user clicking on an icon or entering information, such as a command/keystroke. Id. at 10–11 (citing the ’759 patent 6:44–49, 51:39–41); see also id. at 9 (citing the ’759 patent 6:37–41, 45–51, 50:24–29, and 51:5–9, 34–41). Patent Owner contends that our construction of the phrase “without a user entering any cryptographic information” in the earlier Decision “is Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 7 unreasonably broad.” PO Response 5. Although admitting the phrase cryptographic information has not been defined in the disclosure (id.), Patent Owner urges the broadest reasonable construction of the above phrase is “‘without a user entering any information that is used to encrypt data or information that is used to decrypt data.’” Id. To support this position, Patent Owner cites to exhibits and the Monrose Declaration. Id. at 6 (citing Monrose Decl. ¶¶ 14–15, Ex. A-86, p. 280, and Ex. A-87 at 27:7–20). Patent Owner further states the ’759 patent includes examples where the user enters a single click or “a corresponding minimal input from another input device,” such as a keystroke or click and states this “is not information that is used to encrypt data or information that is used to decrypt data.” Id. at 5–6 (citing the ’759 patent 50:23–27 and Monrose Decl. ¶¶ 14–15). The Examiner responds to this argument in the Determination. Ex. Deter. 7–9. The Examiner determines our construction “still conforms to the plain and ordinary definition of the term[, ‘cryptographic information,’] provided by the Patent Owner.” Id. at 8 (citing to the ’759 patent 1:49–56, which discusses encrypting and decrypting using keys). The Examiner points out the recited “cryptographic information” “does not necessarily require ‘cryptographic values, specific cryptographic algorithms and key lengths” discussed in the newly provided evidence. Id. (referring to Ex. A-87). Requester states Patent Owner (1) does not explain how the Specification “limit[s] the type of information that a user should or should not enter,” (2) “points to no evidence that would necessitate a specific, narrow claim construction,” and (3) provides no evidence “that the Board’s Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 8 construction is broader than the embodiments by the specification.” 3PR Comments 2. We agree with the Examiner and Requester. Ex. Deter. 7–9; 3PR Comments 2–3. As the Examiner notes (Ex. Deter. 8), our construction of the phrase, “without a user entering any cryptographic information,” conforms to a plain and ordinary understanding of the phrase. Thus, even though there exists other definitions for the term “cryptography” (Ex. A-86, p. 280, cited in Ex. Deter. 7–8), our construction of the disputed phrase is still consistent with how one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood such a phrase. Additionally, as noted by Patent Owner (PO Response 6 (citing the ’759 patent 50:23–27)), by Dr. Monrose (Monrose Decl. ¶¶ 14–15, cited in PO Response 6), and in our decision (Dec. 9 (citing the ’759 patent 6:37–41, 45–51, 51:5–9, 34–41)), the disputed phrase does not exclude a user from entering some types of information, including a command or keystroke(s). On the other hand, Patent Owner does not explain persuasively or provide persuasive evidence that our construction of “cryptographic information” is erroneous when considering the disclosure and how one skilled in the art would have understood this phrase. See 3PR Comments 2. Patent Owner discusses what an expert of Apple, Inc., who is not a party to this proceeding, argues the phrase means. PO Response 6 (citing Ex. A-87). Notably, Exhibit A-87 has not been located in the record for review, and this argument therefore amounts to an assertion made by a non-party to this proceeding with no supporting, objective evidence. Also, as explained above, the broadly recited phrase “cryptographic information” has not been Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 9 defined in the disclosure or otherwise demonstrated to have the construction presented in this exhibit. We additionally agree with the Examiner (Ex. Deter. 6) that the statements in the Monrose declaration echo those in Patent Owner’s Response. Compare Monrose Decl. ¶¶ 14–15 with PO Response 5. We further agree with the Requester (3PR Reply 2) that the Examiner has considered the Monrose Declaration and has given the declaration the same consideration as Patent Owner’s arguments in the Response. See Ex. Deter. 6 (indicating “the Monrose Declaration . . . appears to be identical to the arguments submitted by the Patent Owner in the March 2016 Remarks, which are discussed below”). As such and in contrast with Patent Owner’s assertion (PO Comments 4), the Examiner has weighed the Monrose Declaration when concluding that “the Patent Owner’s arguments in the March 2016 Remarks [are] unpersuasive.” Ex. Deter. 8–9. 2. “[V]irtual [P]rivate [N]etwork [C]ommunication [L]ink” In the Decision, we construe the above phrase to mean “a communication path within a network, including over the Internet, that appears to have the security of a private network and that restricts access to information on it path, such as by using encryption or other obfuscation techniques.” Dec. 16. Patent Owner responds to the Decision, arguing among other things, that the recited “virtual private network communication link” must be a direct communication path between devices and requires encryption. PO Response 7–11 (citing the ’759 patent, Monrose Decl., and Exs. A-2, A-35, A-42, A-48, and A-89–A-91). Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 10 The Examiner responds to Patent Owner’s arguments, finding them unpersuasive. Ex. Deter. 9–17. Similarly, Requester is not persuaded. 3PR Comments 3–5. We agree with the Examiner and Requester. See id.; see also Ex. Deter. 9–17. We further maintain that our construction of “virtual private network communication link” is reasonable. We emphasize that the ’759 patent disclosure does not limit a virtual private network to be based only on encryption techniques. See the ’759 patent 7:1–12 (discussing a VPN based on an address hopping regime), cited in Dec. 14; see also the ’759 patent 52:14–32 (discussing further non- encryption techniques), quoted in part in Ex. Deter. 12 and quoted in 3PR Comments 4. Moreover, the ’759 patent does not define or limit the understanding of a VPN communication link. See generally ’759 patent. Also, the ’759 patent’s Figures demonstrate VPN communication links can include components between the recited “first computer” and “second computer.” See the ’759 patent, Figs. 1–2, 24, 28, 29, 33, cited in Ex. Deter. 13–14; see also PO Response 9–10 (stating “the ’759 patent specification discloses . . . the link traverses a network (or networks) through which it is . . . routed via various network devices”), quoted in 3PR Comments 4. As such, contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions (PO Response 8 (citing to Ex. A-42, p. 3); PO Comment 5 (citing Ex. A-42)), the ’759 patent provides many techniques other than encryption for establishing a VPN, including its communication link. Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 11 Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Exhibits A-48, page 84 and Exhibit A- 42, page 24 do not demonstrate persuasively that the recited VPN “communication link” requires encryption as argued when construed in light of the ’759 patent’s disclosure as an one of ordinarily skill in the art would have understood. PO Response 11. We further stress that the Office is not bound by arguments put forth by unrelated parties to this proceedings. PO Response 7–8 (citing Ex. A-35, p. 6). Notably, Exhibit A-35 is a petition submitted to the Office by Apple, Inc., urging for a particular claim construction of “a virtual private network communication link.” PO Response, Ex. A-35, p. 6. Moreover, in the related Decision to Institute and in the Final Written Decision, a different Board panel construed the recited VPN communication link similar to the construction in the instant proceeding. That is, the panel found “a VPN communication link is a transmission path between two devices that restricts access to data, addresses, or other information on the path, generally using obfuscation methods to hide information on the path, including, but not limited to, one or more of authentication, encryption, or address hopping.” Apple Inc., v. VirnetX Inc., Appeal No. IPR2014-00481, Paper No. 11, slip op. at 7 (PTAB September 3, 2014); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., Appeal No. IPR 2014-00481, Paper No. 35, slip op. at 11 (PTAB August 24, 2015). Also, as the Examiner indicates, the courts and the Office do not construe claims in the same manner. See Ex. Deter. 15–16 (quoting the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2111); see also In re 4 The reproduction of Computer Desktop Encyclopedia (9th ed.), is blurry and somewhat illegible. Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 12 Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054–55 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Nor are we required in this reexamination proceeding to follow a court’s claim construction where the Office was not a party to the court proceeding. See In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007). As such, Exhibit A-88 (PO Response 8 (citing Ex. A-88, p. 25–26)), which is a court’s Opinion concerning Microsoft’s proposed claim construction of a VPN communication link in a different patent, was considered by the Examiner and was determined to have insufficient probative value in this proceeding concerning the ’759 patent. See Ex. Deter. 15–16. Regarding Patent Owner’s argument that it has disclaimed a broader understanding of “a virtual private network communication link” for a narrow construction in this proceeding, requiring a direct communication between the source and target computers (PO Response 10), we are not persuaded. Id., Exs. A-2, p. 5, A-89, pp. 6–9, A-90, p. 7, and A-91, pp. 6–8,. Interestingly, Patent Owner provides an exhibit where it urged a district court the opposite—that it had not disclaimed the scope of the recitation “virtual private network communication link” such that the link requires direct communication. See PO Response, Ex. A-91, page 6. As such, Exhibit 91 fails to provide an express disclaimer that a VPN communication link must be a direct communication between a source and target computer. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating “[a]bsent claim language carrying a narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the claim based on the specification or prosecution history when those sources expressly disclaim the broader definition”). Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 13 This record, also, contains no such alleged clear disavowals related to the recited VPN “communication link” made during the prosecution of the application (i.e., U.S. Application No. 10/702,522) that issued into the ’759 patent. See PO Response, Ex. A-91, page 6; see also id. , Ex. A-89, p. 6 (providing statements made during the prosecution of U.S. Application No. 11/839,987, which issued into U.S. Patent No. 7,987,274 B2) and Ex. A-90, p. 7 (providing statements made during the reexamination proceeding of U.S. Patent No. 6,502,135 B1, assigned Control No. 95/001,269). To extent Patent Owner asserts these applications, patent, or proceedings are “related” to the ’759 patent, Patent Owner has not demonstrated sufficiently that their relationship requires us to accept any alleged prosecution history disclaimer made in these “related” proceedings. See PO Comments 4. Furthermore, regardless of whether the Examiner properly characterizes Exhibit A-2 as a claim construction presented in a brief (PO Comments 4), due consideration was given to the merits of the related argument. See Ex. Deter. 15–16; see also 3PR Reply 2–3. Additionally, the evidence provided demonstrates Microsoft—an unrelated party to this proceeding—characterizes in a brief VirnetX’s position that computers communicate directly with each other in a VPN as a “clear mandate.” PO Response, Ex. A-2, page 5. Yet, this is no more than a characterization made by a defendant in a brief, for which we are under no obligation to accept. Also, Requester indicates and we agree this “mandate” concerns statement made in another application that issued into another patent. 3PR Comments 4–5. Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 14 In Patent Owner’s Comments on the Examiner’s Determination, Patent Owner asserts the Examiner failed to consider or did not properly consider a number of exhibits, including Exhibits A-2, A-35, A-42, A-48, and A-88–A-90. PO Comments 4–5. We are not persuaded. The Examiner refers to and addresses these exhibits within his determination. See Ex. Deter. 9–10, 14–17 (addressing A-2, A-35, A-42, A-48, A-88–A-91). We further refer to our above discussion and consideration of these exhibits. Lastly, we agree with the Examiner (see Ex. Deter. 6) that the statements in the declaration echo those in Patent Owner’s Response. Compare Monrose Decl. ¶¶ 16–24 with PO Response 7–9. We further agree with the Requester (3PR Reply 2) that the Examiner has considered the Monrose Declaration and has given the declaration the same consideration as Patent Owner’s arguments in the Response. See Ex. Deter. 6 (indicating “the Monrose Declaration . . . appears to be identical to the arguments submitted by the Patent Owner in the March 2016 Remarks, which are discussed below”). Additionally, the Examiner specifically addresses paragraph 22 of the Monrose Declaration when addressing the argument that the VPN communication link must be direct. Ex. Deter. 13–14 (citing Monrose Decl. ¶ 22). As such and in contrast with Patent Owner’s assertion (PO Comments 4), the Examiner has weighed the Monrose Declaration when concluding that “the Patent Owner’s arguments in the March 2016 Remarks [are] unpersuasive.” Ex. Deter. 13, 17. Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 15 B. The Rejections 1. Kent The Examiner maintains the rejection of claims 1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 21, 22, and 30 based on Kent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as presented in the February 11, 2016 Board Opinion. Ex. Deter. 18–26; see also Dec. 39–44. Patent Owner asserts that Kent discloses every IPsec implementation must have an administrative interface that allows an administrator or user to “create security policies by entering cryptographic information” (PO Response 13) and that we improperly rely on an inherency position in determining that the application’s involvement in managing and controlling security policies does not involve a user entering cryptographic information. Id. at 12–13 (citing Kent 14–15). In response to these assertions, we agree with the Examiner and Requester. Ex. Deter. 18–26; 3PR Comments 5–6; see also Ex. Deter. 19 (stating Kent distinguishes between a user and a system administrator such that the user does not enter cryptographic information). We emphasize that in our previous decision we found that Kent discloses an embodiment where an application—as opposed to a user—can establish security services. Dec. 40. Despite Patent Owner’s statements and Dr. Monrose’s determination to the contrary (PO Response 12–14 (citing Kent 6, 7, 14, 15 and Monrose Decl. ¶¶ 27–34)), the record does not demonstrate persuasively that the phrase “cryptographic information” must include the discussed information in Kent that a user can enter (e.g., a user can control how IPsec is applied or traffic (Kent 14, cited in PO Response 12)). As such, Kent does not teach a user entering the recited “cryptographic information” when enabling a Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 16 secure communication, which is contrary to claim 1’s prohibition (i.e., “without a user entering cryptographic information”). Patent Owner’s Comments include an assertion that the Examiner failed to address arguments related to Kent. PO Comments 5–6. We are not persuaded and thus agree with Requester in this regard. 3PR Reply Br. 4–6. Also, Patent Owner further requests an opportunity to respond to the purported “new interpretations of Kent” that allegedly constitute a new ground of rejection. PO Comments 6. However, we disagree that the Examiner’s interpretation of Kent in the Examiner’s Determination changes the rejection’s thrust. The rejection still remains as presented in the earlier Decision and the Examiner’s Determination indicates that the rejection is being maintained despite the newly presented evidence and arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(d). In particular, this decision reviews the grounds of rejection based on Kent as presented in our previous decision (see Dec. 40) in light of the arguments presented and the newly presented evidence. The discussion in the Examiner’s Determination regarding a user as well as an administrator can set constraints only further illustrates how Kent teaches and suggests the limitations of claim 1. Lastly, we agree with the Examiner that the statements in the declaration echo those in Patent Owner’s Response. Compare Monrose Decl. ¶¶ 31–34 with PO Response 13–14. We further agree with the Requester (3PR Reply 2) that the Examiner has considered the Monrose Declaration and has given the declaration the same consideration as Patent Owner’s arguments in the Response. See Ex. Deter.6 (indicating “the Monrose Declaration . . . appears to be identical to the arguments submitted Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 17 by the Patent Owner in the March 2016 Remarks, which are discussed below”). As such and in contrast with Patent Owner’s assertion (PO Comments 4), the Examiner has weighed the Monrose Declaration when concluding that “the Patent Owner’s arguments in the March 2016 Remarks [are] unpersuasive.” Ex. Deter. 21, 24. 2. Remaining Rejections Patent Owner does not comment on the Examiner’s remarks related to the remaining rejections of (1) claims 1, 6, 7, 15, 16, 21, 22, and 30 based on Kent and Caronni (Dec. 39–44; Ex. Deter. 26–28), (2) claims 3 and 19 based on (i) Kent and Kent II (Dec. 44–47; Ex. Deter. 28–30), (ii) Kent, Caronni, and Kent II (Dec. 44–47; Ex. Deter. 28–30), and (iii) Aziz and Kent II (Dec. 50–51; Ex. Deter. 28–30), (3) claims 1 and 16 based on Aziz (Dec. 47–50; Ex. Deter. 30–31), (4) claims 6, 7, 21, and 22 based on Aziz and RFC 793 (Dec. 51; Deter. 30–31), (5) claims 15 and 30 based on Kiuchi (Dec. 51–54; Ex. Deter. 32–33), and (6) claims 11 and 26 based on Kiuchi and Masys (Dec. 54–57; Ex. Deter. 33–36). As for the arguments presented by Patent Owner in its request to reopen prosecution (PO Response 15–24), we agree with the Examiner, including that the arguments presented by Patent Owner are not persuasive (Ex. Deter. 28–31, 33, 36). We further agree with Requester’s comments concerning Patent Owner’s arguments related to these new grounds or rejection. 3PR Comments 5–12. 3. Remaining Contentions Finally, generic assertions that the Examiner’s positions are not clearly developed and that the Determination should be vacated (PO Comments 3, 6) are unpersuasive. These general arguments are unavailing Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 18 because they fail point out with adequate specificity what positions were not clearly developed by the Examiner or are erroneous. Also, Patent Owner implies that other arguments exist related to “the propriety of other aspects of the Determination,” and attempts to reserve the right to present arguments later. PO Comments 3 n.2. Yet, Patent Owner does not identify an error concerning these “other aspects of the Determination.” Id. IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS For the above reasons, Patent Owner has not provided sufficient arguments and evidence to overcome the new grounds of rejection for claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 11, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, and 30 based on the various references presented in the February 11, 2016 Decision. Requests for extensions of time in this inter partes reexamination proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.304, 1.956, and 41.79(e). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.79. In the event neither party files a request for rehearing within the time provided in 37 C.F.R. § 41.79, and this decision becomes final and appealable under 37 C.F.R. § 41.81, a party seeking judicial review must timely serve notice on the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 90.1 and 1.983. 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(f) Appeal 2017-010852 Patent 6,839,759 B2 Reexamination 95/001,746 19 FOR PATENT OWNER: FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP 901 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20001-4413 FOR THIRD-PARTY REQUESTER: DAVID J. MCCOMBS HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP IP SECTION 2323 VICTORY AVENUE, SUITE 700 DALLAS, TX 75219 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation