Ex Parte 5966440 et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesAug 14, 200990007407 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 14, 2009) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte DMT LICENSING, LLC, Appellant and Patent Owner ____________ Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 Technology Center 3900 ____________ Decided: August 14, 2009 ____________ Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, SCOTT A. BOALICK, and KEVIN F. TURNER, Administrative Patent Judges. TURNER, Administrative Patent Judge DECISION ON APPEAL DMT LICENSING, LLC1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 306 from a final rejection of claims 1, 4, 6-8, 10-16, 18-21, 23-36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80-129. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 306. 1 DMT Licensing, LLC is the real party in interest and the current owner of the patent under reexamination. It is noted that DMT Licensing, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of GE Intellectual Property Licensing, Inc., which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Electric Co. (App. Br. 2). Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 2 We heard oral arguments on June 17, 2009, a written transcript of which is included in the record. We AFFIRM-IN-PART. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding arose from a request for ex parte reexamination filed by Napster, Inc. on January 13, 2005, of United States Patent 5,966,440 ( the '440 Patent) issued to Arthur R. Hair on October 12, 1999, based on United States Application 08/471,964 filed June 6, 1995. The Patent was originally assigned to Parsec Sight/Sound, Inc., and subsequently assigned to DMT Licensing, LLC. The instant appeal is related to appeals of two other copending reexaminations: 90/007,402 and 90/007,403. The former reexamination is made with respect to United States Patent 5,191,573 (the '573 Patent, Appeal No. 2009-3609) and the latter with respect to United States Patent 5,675,734 (the '734 Patent, Appeal No. 2009-3457). The relations between the issued patents and their applications are illustrated in the chart below: Appl. No. Filing Date Patent No. Relationship 07/206,497 Jun. 13, 1988 abandoned - 07/586,391 Sep. 18, 1990 5,191,573 Continuation of '497 08/023,398 Feb. 26, 1993 abandoned Continuation of '391 08/471,964 Jun. 6, 1995 5,966,440 Continuation of '398 08/607,648 Feb. 27, 1996 5,675,734 Continuation of '398 Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 3 Patentee’s invention relates to a system and an associated method for electronic sales and distribution of digital audio or video signals (Spec. Col. 1, ll. 16-18). A first party, having authorization to distribute digital audio or video, transfers electronically digital copies of the same to a second party for storage in a local memory after a fee has been charged (id. at col. 6, ll. 16- 48). Claim 1, which we deem to be representative, reads as follows: 1. A method for transferring desired digital video or digital audio signals comprising the steps of: forming a connection through telecommunications lines between a first memory of a first party and a second memory of a second party control unit of a second party, said first memory having said desired digital video or digital audio signals; selling electronically by the first party to the second party through telecommunications lines, the desired digital video or digital audio signals in the first memory, the second party is at a second party location and the step of selling electronically includes the step of charging a fee via telecommunications lines by the first party to the second party at a first party location remote from the second party location, the second party has an account and the step of charging a fee includes the step of charging the account of the second party; and transferring the desired digital video or digital audio signals from the first memory of the first party to the second memory of the second party control unit of the second party through telecommunications lines while the second party control unit with the second memory is in possession and control of the second party; storing the Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 4 desired digital video or digital audio signals in a non- volatile storage portion of the second memory; and playing through speakers of the second party control unit the digital video or digital audio signals stored in the second memory, said speakers of the second party control unit connected with the second memory of the second party control unit; wherein the non-volatile storage portion is not a tape or CD. The prior art references relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims are: Bush 4,789,863 Dec. 6, 1988 Yurt 5,132,992 Jul. 21, 1992 Goldwasser 5,241,428 Aug. 31, 1993 Audio Technologies – History of Recordings, http://www.riaa.com/issues/ audio/history.asp (last visited Sep. 19, 2006). History of the Compact Disc. – OneOff Media, Inc, http://www.oneoffcd. com/info/historycd.cfm (last visited Sep. 19, 2006). History of MPEG, http://www2.sims.berkley.edu/courses/is224/s99/ GroupG/report1.html (last visited Sep. 19, 2006). Ed Grochowski, IBM HDD Evolution chart, http://www.storagereview. com/guideImages/z_ibm_storageevolution.gif (last visited Sep. 19, 2006). The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4, 6-8, 10-16, 18-21, 23-36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80-129 under the following bases (Ans. 4-54): Claims 1, 4, 6-8, 11-16, 19-21, 23, 24, 29-36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80-129 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement; Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 5 Claims 1, 4, 6-8, 11-16, 19-21, 23, 24, 29-36, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80-129 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement; Claims 10, 18, and 25-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite; Claims 1, 11-13, 23, 24, 29-31, 36, 42, 47-49, 58, 80, 87-89, 98, 99, 104-106, 111, 114, 116, 117, and 126 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yurt; Claims 4, 6-8, and 81-84 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yurt and Bush; Claims 14-16, 19-21, 32-35, 39, 40, 45, 50-57, 59, 60, 61, 85, 86, 90- 97, 100-103, 107-110, 112, 113, 115, 118-125, and 127-129 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yurt, Bush and Goldwasser; Claims 1, 4, 6-8, 10-16, 18-21, 23-36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80- 129 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-34 of the '734 Patent; and Claims 1, 4, 6-8, 10-16, 18-21, 23-36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80- 129 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-6 of the '573 Patent; Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 6 ISSUES Appellant contends that the Examiner is acting outside the scope of the Examiner’s authority in the review and resulting reassignment of a priority date for the instant claims (App. Br. 24). Appellant also argues that the Examiner has applied improper and overly strict standards for both written description and enablement (App. Br. 24-25). Appellant argues that any inquiry into the written description and enablement support for the claims should be limited to newly claimed subject matter (App. Br. 25). With respect to the obviousness-type double patenting rejections, Appellant asserts that these do not present new issues related to patentability and are not proper as being made over patents subject to copending reexaminations (App. Br. 25-26). In addition, Appellant argues that prior art rejections are improper because the Examiner has applied references which are not prior art (App. Br. 73-75). The Examiner finds that the application of intervening publications is justified because the claims are not entitled to the benefit of a filing date of an earlier-filed application (Ans. 6-25, 84-86). The Examiner also defends the application of the written description and enablement standards applied (Ans. 6-25, 61-83). The Examiner also made specific findings of support for specific claim elements in the examiner’s “Table I. New Matter Chart†(Ans. 10). Only those arguments actually made by Appellant have been considered in this decision. Arguments which Appellant could have made Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 7 but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Thus, the issues arising from the respective positions of Appellant and the Examiner are: 1) Has Appellant shown reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that the instant claims are not entitled to the benefit of priority of a filing date of an earlier-filed application? 2) Has Appellant shown reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that the instant claims are not supported under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, in accordance with the written description and enablement requirements? 3) Has Appellant shown reversible error in the Examiner’s determination that claims 10, 18, and 25-28 are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph? 4) Has Appellant shown reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of the instant claims over Yurt alone and in combinations with Bush and Goldwasser? 5) Has Appellant shown reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting over claims of the '734 and '573 Patents? Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 8 FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The instant Specification describes a system and an associated method for electronic sales and distribution of digital audio or video signals (Spec. Col. 1, ll. 16-18). 2. A first party, having authorization to distribute digital audio or video, transfers electronically digital copies of the same to a second party for storage in a local memory after a fee has been charged (id. at col. 6, ll. 16-48). 3. The fee is charged via telecommunications lines by the first party using the account of the second party and/or a credit card of the second party (id. at col. 7, ll. 34-56). 4. Desired video signals are sent from a memory by a controller to a receiver at the second party, where the video received is displayed on a video display in possession and control of the second party (id. at col. 8, ll. 6-18). 5. The first party control unit may include a hard disk and a sales random access memory chip, where a first party control integrated circuit controls and executes commands by the first party. Similar hardware may be provided at the second party (id. at col. 7, ll. 15- 33). 6. The following is a reproduction of the Examiner’s “Table I. New Matter Chart†(Ans. 10): Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 9 Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 10 PRINCIPLES OF LAW “Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’†KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). KSR disapproved a rigid approach to obviousness (i.e., an analysis limited to lack of teaching, suggestion, or motivation). KSR, 550 U.S. 398 at 419 (“The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.â€). ANALYSIS Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph We begin by noting that the process of determining whether a claim for the benefit of an earlier filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 120 is proper and supported, is separate from determining whether claims have enablement and written description support of the application in which they are presented. While the former requires an analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, to determine whether there is adequate written description in the cited application to support claims in the subject application, the latter is Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 11 generally divorced from considerations of an earlier filing date. In other words, claims should be analyzed to determine whether they lack support of written description or enablement with respect to the originally filed application in which they are presented. Determining whether such claims can claim the benefit of an earlier filing date is a separate inquiry. See, M.P.E.P. § 201.11. The Examiner’s analysis suggests adequate written description and enablement should rest with all members of the “family†for an individual claim to be supported under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. The Examiner argues that the original claims of instant patent are not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of its parent because the written description of the parent, grandparent and great-grandparent do not support features in the instant claims (Ans. 8). Thus, even if subject matter of the instant claims is supported by the disclosure of the application filed in 1990, i.e., 07/586,391, support for the instant claims would need to be found in the earlier filed application to have adequate support under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. We do not agree. At Oral Hearing, the Examiner responded thusly: JUDGE BOALICK: . . . as I read the Examiner’s answer, it appears that you’re saying that there is no written description or enablement in the great-grandparent application, as opposed to the particular application in which these claims arise. Is that – am I reading you answer correctly? EXAMINER FOSTER: Yes. (Oral Hearing Transcript, p. 12) Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 12 In addition, the Examiner cites M.P.E.P. §§ 2258 and 2163.1 (Ans. 26), but those sections are directed to performing analysis for 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, under different circumstances. We find that any determination of whether the instant claims have support under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, should be made with respect to the instant Specification, i.e. the '440 Patent. From our review of the instant Specification and claims, we find no aspect of the instant claims which are unsupported by the instant Specification, in terms of written description and/or enablement (FF 1-5). Specific to new and amended claims which contain a negative limitation, i.e. “‘a non-volatile storage portion of the second memory . . . wherein the non-volatile storage portion is not a tape or CD’â€, the Examiner argues that such a limitation has no basis in the original disclosure (Ans. 27). The Examiner makes reference to a lack of support in the “Great- Grandparent application†(Id.), which we find to be improper. Similarly, the Examiner’s rejection for lack of enablement also discusses the “Great- Grandparent application,†and talks about requiring undue experimentation to enable the large size filed required for digital video (An. 29-33). Again, we find that rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, should be made with respect to the Specifications which are filed with the subject claims. As such, we find that the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 4, 6-8, 11-16, 19-21, 23, 24, 29-36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80-129 under 35 Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 13 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description and enablement requirements were made in error. Claims of Priority Under 35 U.S.C. § 120 Written description adequate to provide support priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to an earlier application need not be found to exist to the earliest application within the chain. See, In re Edwards, 568 F. 2d 1349, 1351 (CCPA 1978) (where the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the grandparent application complies with the written description requirement, where priority to the parent would determine the propriety of the prior art rejection). Thus, if the disclosure of the 07/586,391 application, filed Sep. 18, 1990, provides written description and/or enablement support for all of the subject matter of a claim, it should be accorded priority of that filing date, even if it is not supported by an earlier filing date through an earlier application. The Examiner’s “Table I. New Matter Chart,†(FF 6) looks at the presence of certain features in the “great-grandparent†application and the “grandparent†application. All of the features listed in the table are supported by the disclosure of at least the Grandparent Application, which was filed September 18, 1990. In addition, all of the aspects of the claims discussed (Ans. 11-13) are supported by subject matter having priority to at least that date. The Examiner also finds that the Grandparent and Parent applications fail to support claims in the Child application, but the Answer Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 14 fails to provide any specific limitations not supported, and merely states “for the same reasons as discussed extensively above†(Ans. 22). The fact that “a very large amount of the new text†was added to the specification is not necessarily dispositive of whether new matter has been added (Ans. 23). Therefore, given the support indicated (FF 6), it would appear that the instant claims are all supported back to at least to that indicated date, i.e. September 18, 1990. The Examiner also argues that descriptions of video download features are not supported by the earliest filed application (Ans. 16-20), specifically that the originally disclosed audio transmission features fail to imply or require any video transmission features. While the Examiner emphasizes that circa 1988, devices capable of decoding and playing back digital video, storage for the same, and distribution channels of adequate bandwidth did not exist, we find more compelling Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner is importing aspects into the claims (Reply Br. 12-16). Appellant argues correctly that the claims do not specify quality, size or bandwidth required for the video signals, and assuming the same to show inadequacy of disclosure is improper (Id.). Appellant also argues that the priority date for claims in the instant patent is not a new issue related to patentability (App. Br. 41). Appellant argues that the original Examiner assigned a priority date of June 13, 1988 to the claims of the '734 Patent and that the Office lacks jurisdiction to review again those issues determined by the original Examiner (App. Br. 41-49). Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 15 The Examiner emphasizes that where the sufficiency of the patent application has not been originally decided, the proper priority date to assign to claims is within the purview of the reexamination process (Ans. 78-79). Central to this issue is whether Patlex Corp. v. Quigg, 680 F. Supp. 33 (DC Cir. 1988), is controlling. In that case, the patent holder sought review of a Board decision affirming the rejection of claims in a reexamination proceeding. A first examiner found a “great-grandparent†application provided an enabling disclosure to a “great-grandchild†application, which issued as the patent. During the reexamination proceedings, a second examiner reconsidered the merits of the first examiner’s decision in order to make a rejection based on intervening prior art. However, the court found that “the reexamination statute does not contemplate a ‘reexamination’ of the sufficiency of a disclosure.†Id. at 37. The court further found that the Examiner and the Board lacked jurisdiction to reexamine the sufficiency of the specification of the “great-grandparent†application. Id. The Examiner finds that Patlex differs from the instant case in several ways (Ans. 78-79). The Examiner finds that in Patlex, the specifications of the “great-grandparent†and “great-grandchild†applications are essentially identical, and that the claims were drawn to the same invention (Ans. 79). The Examiner finds this to be in contradistinction to the instant case where substantial amount of new text was added to both the Specification and the claims. However, as discussed supra, we do not find a substantial amount of added matter to be dispositive of whether there was proper written Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 16 description for that added matter. We continue to find that the recitations to digital video are supported by adequate written description to show that the Appellant had possession of the same at least by the time of filing of the '391 application on September 18, 1990. As such, we do not find the Examiner’s distinctions between Patlex and the instant case to be compelling. The Examiner also cites Ex parte Basell, Appeal No. 2007-0111 (BPAI 2007), aff’d on other grounds, In re Basell Poliolefine Italia S.P.A., 547 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008), as allowing for a rejection based on intervening art because the filing date of the continuation was not entitled to the filing date of the parent (Oral Hearing Transcript p. 14, of related Appeal No. 2009-3457). In the Board’s decision, the original Examiner never considered the substantive issues of patentability of the claims over a specific piece of prior art because the examiner mistakenly accorded the claims an earlier filing date sufficient to antedate the prior art reference. Id., slip op. at 45-46. The Board’s decision distinguishes Patlex by saying that in that case, the specifications were identical and that the original examiner had determined that the original disclosure enabled the subject patent’s claims. Id., slip op. at 54. It is on this latter basis that the panel in Basell distinguishes and we do not. As Appellant has argued and we have discussed above, the original application faced a new matter rejection, which was overcome (Oral Hearing Transcript p. 6). Thus, in similarity to Patlex, and distinguishable from Basell, the original examiner in the application for the instant patent Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 17 considered whether the added texts were new matter and subsequently concluded they were not, such that the patent was allowed to issue. As such, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-302, 37 CFR § 1.552(a), 37 CFR § 1.552(c), and MPEP § 2258, the Examiner cannot be allowed to reexamine the sufficiency of the specification. Indefiniteness of claims 10, 18, and 25-28 under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph We note that Appellant has not acknowledged this indefiniteness rejection in Appellant’s lists of grounds of rejection to be reviewed on appeal (App. Br. 21-23; Reply Br. 4-5). We assume that Appellant was not shunning our review of this rejection, but instead we regard this as a mere omission. As the Examiner has pointed out, claims 10 and 18 lack antecedent basis because those claims depend from cancelled claims 9 and 17, respectively (Ans. 33). As such, we agree with the Examiner and affirm the rejection of claims 10, 18, and 25-28 on this basis. Prior Art Rejections Over Yurt, Bush, and Goldwasser All prior art rejections of the claims rely in part on Yurt. As discussed above, we find the instant claims to have at least the benefit of the application filed September 18, 1990, the 07/586,391 application. As Appellant argues (App. Br. 73-75), Yurt issued from an application filed January 7, 1991, and cannot be considered prior art to the instant claims Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 18 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103. We find, therefore, that all of the prior art rejections are improper and that the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims over the same. Obviousness-type Double Patenting Appellant raises three arguments against the obviousness-type double patenting rejections of the instant claims over claims listed in the '573 and '734 Patents: 1) Appellant argues that the issue of double patenting was previously considered by the original Examiner of the original application for the instant patent and cannot now be considered a substantial new question of patentability (App. Br. 76-78); 2) Appellant argues that under our prior precedent, Ex parte Schmit, an obviousness-type doubling patenting rejection is improper if made over a related patent alone, without citation to prior art or general knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art (App. Br. 78-79); 3) Appellant argues that since the claims of the '573 and '734 Patents are also subject to reexamination, such a double patenting rejection is improper over claims of those patents as they existed prior to the reexamination proceedings (App. Br. 80). With respect to the latter basis we find the rejections to be improper. At Oral Hearing, the instant Examiner appeared to believe that the obviousness-type double patenting rejections were listed as provisional rejections. “EXAMINER FOSTER: The – was it not listed as a provisional rejection?†(Oral Hearing Transcript p. 13.) Given the apparent clear intent, Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 19 we find that the Examiner intended to raise the obviousness-type double patenting rejections provisionally, and that the actual rejections were not made provisional (Ans. 52-54). As such, we find that the obviousness-type double patenting rejections were made in error. CONCLUSIONS Appellant has shown that the Examiner reversibly erred in determining that: 1) claims 1, 4, 6-8, 11-16, 19-21, 23, 24, 29-36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80-129 fail to comply with the written description and enablement requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph; 2) claims 1, 11-13, 23, 24, 29-31, 36, 42, 47-49, 58, 80, 87-89, 98, 99, 104-106, 111, 114, 116, 117, and 126 were obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yurt; 3) claims 4, 6-8, and 81-84 were obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yurt and Bush; 4) claims 14-16, 19-21, 32-35, 39, 40, 45, 50-57, 59, 60, 61, 85, 86, 90-97, 100-103, 107-110, 112, 113, 115, 118-125, and 127-129 were obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yurt, Bush and Goldwasser; and 5) claims 1, 4, 6-8, 10-16, 18-21, 23-36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80-129 should be rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-34 of the '734 Patent or claims 1-6 of the '573 Patent. Appellant has failed to show that the Examiner reversibly erred in rejecting claims 10, 18, and 25-28 as being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph. Appeal 2009-003459 Reexamination Control 90/007,407 Patent 5,966,440 20 DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 4, 6-8, 11-16, 19-21, 23, 24, 29-36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47-61, and 80-129 is REVERSED. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 10, 18, and 25-28 is AFFIRMED. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED-IN-PART rvb cc: PATENT OWNER: DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH ATTN: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP ONE LOGAN SQUARE 18TH AND CHERRY STREETS PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103-6996 THIRD PARTY REQUESTER: ALBERT S. PENILLA MARTINE PENILLA & GENCARELLA, LLP 710 LAKEWAY DRIVE, SUITE 200 SUNNYVALE, CA 94085 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation