Ex Parte 5367627 et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 15, 2011

90010185 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 15, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
90/010,185 06/03/2008 5367627 R62319B 7681
40401 7590 06/15/2011
Hershkovitz & Associates, LLC
2845 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
BROWNE, LYNNE HAMBLETON
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/15/2011 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte Clear With Computers, LLC
Appellant and Patent Owner
____________

Appeal 2011-002548
Reexamination Control 90/010,185
Patent 5,367,627
Technology Center 3900
____________

Before, JAMESON LEE, SCOTT R. BOALICK, and
KEVIN F. TURNER, Administrative Patent Judges.

TURNER, Administrative Patent Judge

DECISION ON APPEAL
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Clear With Computers, LLC1 appeals2 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and
306 from a final rejection of claims 1, 6-8, and 16-40.3, 4
However, as discussed infra, only claim 6 remains pending before us.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 306.
We AFFIRM.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding arose from a request for ex parte reexamination filed
by Ying Chen, on June 3, 2008, of United States Patent 5,367,627
[hereinafter the '627 patent], issued on November 22, 1994, based on United
States Application 08/133,986, filed October 12, 1993, claiming priority
from United States Application 07/959,525, filed October 13, 1992, now
United States Patent 5,283,865, claiming priority to United States
Application 07/435,809.
The '627 patent is subject to a terminal disclaimer, filed December 8,
1993, to obviate a double patenting rejection. The portion of the term of this
patent subsequent to February 1, 2011 has been disclaimed. Thus, the term
of the '627 patent is now expired.

1 At the time the Request for Ex Parte Reexamination was filed, the '627
patent was assigned to Orion IP, LLC. An assignment was executed on
April 17, 2008 to Clear With Computers, LLC.
2 Patent Owner’s Amended Appeal Brief (filed March 31, 2010) [hereinafter
App. Br.].
3 Ex Parte Reexamination Final Office Action (mailed May 4, 2009).
4 Examiner’s Answer (mailed August 12, 2010) [hereinafter Ans.].
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PROSECUTION HISTORY DURING REEXAMINATION
In an Order Granting Ex Parte Reexamination, mailed July 22, 2008,
it was determined that a substantial new question of patentability affecting
claims 1 and 6-8 of the '627 patent existed, based on the request for ex parte
reexamination, filed June 3, 2008. A Non-Final Action, was mailed on
December 3, 2008, rejecting original claims 1 and 6-8.
A response to the Non-Final Action was filed on February 3, 2009. In
the response, Patent Owner responded to the rejection of original claims 1
and 6-8 in the remarks, and added new claims 16-39 in an amendment.
Subsequently, a Notice of Concurrent Litigation was filed on March 19,
2009. In the Notice, Patent Owner identified the following Civil Actions: 5
1. Civil Action No. 6:08-cv-188-LED, U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas, of Clear With Computers, LLC v. Belkin
International, Inc., et al.;
2. Civil Action No. 6:08-cv-243-LED, U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas, of Clear With Computers, LLC v. Apple,
Inc., et al.;
3. Civil Action No. 6:08-cv-302, U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, of Hyundai Motor America v. Clear With
Computers6;

5 See also Appellant’s Related Proceedings Appendix (App. Br. 33-44)
6 The district court’s decision was appealed to Federal Circuit Court of
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4. Civil Action No. 6:09-cv-95, U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas, of Clear With Computers v. Bassett Furniture
Additionally, in a Supplemental Response, filed March 19, 2009,
Patent Owner submitted an amendment adding claim 40. In response to
Patent Owner’s Supplemental Response, a Final Rejection was mailed May
4, 2009, rejecting original claims 1 and 6-8, and new claims 16-40.
Following the May 4, 2009 Final Rejection, a series of four petitions
was filed. The first three petitions were filed on October 5, 2009, and the
last petition was filed on March 26, 2010. Specifically, Appellant filed a
Petition under 37 CFR § 1.181 to withdraw the finality of the Final Office
Action. That petition was dismissed as untimely in a Decision mailed June
29, 2010. Additionally, Appellant filed a Petition under 37 CFR § 1.181 to
enter a Declaration under 37 CFR § 1.132. That petition was dismissed in a
Decision mailed June 29, 2010. Further, Appellant filed a Petition under 37
CFR § 1.182 to enter the Declaration, a Supplemental Declaration, and a
Second After Final Response. That petition was dismissed in a Decision
mailed January 29, 2010. Lastly, on March 26, 2010, Appellant filed a
Petition under 37 CFR § 1.181(a)(3) for Supervisory Review of the Decision
to Continue Ex Parte Reexamination Proceeding. That petition was denied
in a Decision mailed October 2, 2010. Ultimately, all the petitions were
denied, and as a result the pending claims and record remain in the same

Appeals in Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 605 F.3d 967 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
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form as they were under the Final Rejection, mailed May 4, 2009.
Contemporaneous to the filings of the first three petitions, a Notice of
Appeal was submitted on October 5, 2009, with an Appeal Brief
subsequently filed on December 4, 2009. In response to the Appeal Brief, a
Notification of Non-Compliant Appeal Brief was mailed March 2, 2010. In
the Notice, Patent Owner was notified that reference to the non-entered
Supplementary Declaration from Dr. Rhyne must be removed, per the
Petition 2 Decision.
On March 31, 2010, Patent Owner submitted an Amended Appeal
Brief. In response to the Amended Appeal Brief, an Examiner’s Answer
was mailed, August 12, 2010.

DISPOSITION ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit entered a
decision on May 17, 2010. In that Decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas’s Decision7 finding that the '627 patent was not
invalid on anticipation or obviousness grounds, and concluded that claims 1,
7, and 8 of the '627 patent were anticipated as a matter of law. Orion IP,
LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 605 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Following this Decision, on June 16, 2010, Patent Owner submitted a

7 Orion IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 516 F. Supp. 2d 720,
(E.D. Tex., 2007).
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Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. On July
20, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied
the Combined Petition. Based upon the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit’s disposition, we find this Decision to be a final Federal
Court holding of invalidity. Therefore, since Appellant has not informed the
Office of any additional proceedings as required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.565(a), we
acknowledge that claims 1, 7, and 8 have been withdrawn from
consideration. See MPEP § 2286 IV.
Further, as discussed supra, the '627 patent is subject to a terminal
disclaimer, which disclaims the portion of the term of the '627 patent
subsequent to February 1, 2011. Accordingly, the '627 patent is now
expired. As a consequence of its expiration, claims 16-39, added through
the February 3, 2009 amendment, and claim 40, added through the March
19, 2009, will not be considered, as no amendment may be proposed for
entry in an expired patent. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(j). “Although the Office
actions will treat proposed amendments as though they have been entered,
the proposed amendments will not be effective until the reexamination
certificate is issued and published.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(k).
Accordingly, claim 6 is the only remaining claim left pending before
us, and as such, we evaluate the propriety of the rejection of claim 6 as
originally issued with the '627 patent.

PATENTEE’S INVENTION
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Patentee’s invention relates to a computerized method of selling parts
for particular equipment specified by a customer. The method generally
includes steps for receiving information identifying a customer’s parts
requirements, electronically specifying information identifying parts and
specifications for the parts, gathering parts-related information which meets
the customer’s requirements, and compiling the parts-related information
into a proposal meeting the customer’s requirements. (Spec. Col. 1, ll. 49-
50.)
Claim 6 reads as follows:8
6. (Original) The method of claim 1 wherein the step (d)
further comprises the step of including within the proposal
specifications corresponding to the one or more parts which

8 Invalid independent claim 1 reads as follows:
1. (Original) A computerized method of selling parts for particular
equipment specified by a customer, comprising the steps of:
a) receiving information identifying a customer's parts
requirements for the equipment, comprising the step of receiving
equipment application information comprising an identification of the
equipment with which one or more parts are to be used;
b) electronically specifying information identifying a plurality
of parts and specifications for the parts;
c) gathering parts-related information for one or more parts
within the plurality of parts which meets the customer’s requirements,
comprising the step of electronically associating at least one of the
parts within the plurality of parts with the received equipment
application information; and
d) receiving the gathered parts-related information and
compiling the parts-related information into a proposal meeting the
customer's requirements.
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meets the customer’s requirements.

The prior art reference relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the
remaining claim is: 9
Richard H. Baker, dBASE III Plus, Advanced Applications for
Nonprogrammers, 1987 (hereinafter “dBase III”).

The Examiner rejected claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by dBase III.10 (Ans. 4.)
Rather than repeat the arguments of the Appellant or the Examiner,
we make reference to the Brief and the Answer for their respective details.
Only those arguments actually made by Appellant have been considered in
this decision. Arguments that Appellant did not make in the Brief have not
been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

ISSUE
Does dBase III disclose a “proposal” as claimed, and as such,
anticipate the step of “including within the proposal specifications
corresponding to the one or more parts which meets the customer’s
requirements,” as recited by dependent claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)?

9 Additional references and rejections directed towards withdrawn claims 1,
7, 8, and 16-40 have been omitted.
10 Claim 6 was rejected along with claims 1, 7, 8, 16, 22-25, 28-33, and 38-
40 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by dBase III.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Claim Construction
1. Appellant has not directed us to a lexicographic definition for the
term “proposal” in the Specification of the '627 patent.
2. We adopt the definition of “proposal” construed by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to mean “information
intended for conveyance to a potential customer.” Orion IP, LLC v. Staples,
Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 724.

dBase III
D1. dBase III is a manual describing an inventory management
system, which inter alia allows users to manage inventory, handle orders,
record sales, and create catalogs. (dBase III, Pp. 157-167.)
D2. dBase III describes that a customer order can be received through
the mail, in response to a catalog, or over the phone. (dBase III, P. 161.)
D3. dBase III describes that its system allows users to send out
catalogs, which include available parts and their stock numbers and prices.
(dBase III, Pp. 161 and 167.)
D4. In response to a customer’s part request, dBase III describes
building search conditions to search the inventory master record for the part.
(dBase III, Pp. 162-163.)
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D5. In a section of dBase III titled “Recording Sales,” dBase III
discloses “[s]o far, so good. You have the item. You’ve verified that it fits
the customer's car. You can quote the price because it’s right there on the
screen. Did you make the sale? Congratulations. Now record it.” (dBase
III, P. 163.)
D6. Figure 8-5 is reproduced below:

(Figure 8-5 depicts an inventory master record, the result of a search inquiry
in response to a customer’s part inquiry.)
D7. dBase III describes that an inventory master record includes part
information such as the price, the model and year it fits, number in stock,
and a part description. (See Fig. 8-5.)

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Interpretation of Expired Patent Claims
Patent claims in a reexamination proceeding in the USPTO are
ordinarily given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
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patent disclosure. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004). When the patent has not expired, construing claims of an
unexpired patent broadly is not unfair to the patentee because the patentee
has the opportunity to amend the claims to obtain more precise claim
coverage. See id. However, patent claims of an expired patent may not be
amended. 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(j).
The standard of claim construction for the claims of an expired patent
in reexamination was addressed in Ex parte Papst-Motoren, 1 USPQ2d 1655
(BPAI 1986). The Board noted that In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), held that claims in a reexamination proceeding should be given
their broadest reasonable interpretation, consistent with the specification,
because applicants had the right to amend, whereas in a district court,
“claims should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity.”
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571 n.* (citing ACH Hosp. Systems, Inc. v.
Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). The Board held:
[I]n reexamination proceedings in which the PTO is
considering the patentability of claims of an expired patent
which are not subject to amendment, a policy of liberal claim
construction may properly and should be applied. Such a
policy favors a construction of a patent claim that will render it
valid, i.e., a narrow construction, over a broad construction that
would render it invalid.

Papst-Motoren, 1 USPQ2d at 1656; Ex parte Bowles, 23 USPQ2d 1015,
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1017 (BPAI 1991) (both nonprecedential11). The Board also held in both
Papst-Motoren and Bowles that it would be error to read “inferential
limitations” into the claims. Papst-Motoren, 1 USPQ2d at 1657; Bowles,
23 USPQ2d at 1017.
Papst-Motoren’s holding that “claims should be so construed, if
possible, as to sustain their validity” is another way of saying that the
USPTO does not apply the “broadest reasonable interpretation” in
construing the claims of an expired patent in a reexamination proceeding.
The policy reason is that the claims in an expired patent cannot be amended.
However, the maxim that “claims should be so construed, if possible, as to
sustain their validity” is sometimes misunderstood and the Federal Circuit
has clarified the maxim since Papst-Motoren. In accordance with those
cases, it is clear that any claim construction must be in accord with the rules
of claim construction and claims may not be redrafted. See Generation II
Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“[C]laims can only be construed to preserve their validity where the
proposed claim construction is ‘practicable,’ is based on sound claim
construction principles, and does not revise or ignore the explicit language
of the claims.”); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
525 F.3d 1200, 1215-16 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“This court has repeatedly held

11 Although Papst-Motoren is not designated as precedential, it was decided
by an expanded panel of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences,
including the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Chairman of the
Board, and an Examiner-in-Chief.
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that courts may not redraft claims to cure a drafting error made by the
patentee, whether to make them operable or to sustain their validity . . . . To
do so ‘would unduly interfere with the function of claims in putting
competitors on notice of the scope of the claimed invention.’”) (citations and
footnote omitted). The maxim is limited “to cases in which ‘the court
concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim construction, that
the claim is still ambiguous.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Importantly, it is “error . . . to use the
possible invalidity of those claims, if broadly construed, as a basis for
construing them narrowly.” The Saunders Group, Inc. v. ComforTrac, Inc.,
492 F.3d 1326, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface
Architectural Resources, Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“Fairness and the public notice function of the patent law require courts to
afford patentees the full breadth of clear claim language, and bind them to it
as well. Consequently, where such claim language clearly reads on prior art,
the patent is invalid.”); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1327 (“[W]e have certainly not
endorsed a regime in which validity analysis is a regular component of claim
construction.”); Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“[I]f the only claim construction that is consistent with the claim’s language
and the written description renders the claim invalid, then the axiom does
not apply and the claim is simply invalid.”).
The maxim does not mean that claims should be construed more
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narrowly than is required by the rules of claim construction, as is sometimes
misunderstood from cases such as In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 n.30
(CCPA 1969) (“By construing a claim as covering only patentable subject
matter, courts are able, in appropriate cases, to hold claims valid in order to
protect the inventive concept or the inventor’s contribution to the art. The
patentee at that time usually may not amend the claims to obtain protection
commensurate with his actual contribution to the art.”) and Yamamoto,
740 F.2d at 1572 (“District courts may find it necessary to interpret claims to
protect only that which constitutes patentable subject matter to do justice
between the parties.”).
Papst-Motoren does not describe what sources of claim construction
can be used. We assume for this appeal that a patentee is entitled to rely on
any of the various intrinsic and extrinsic sources of claim meaning discussed
in Phillips. It is patentee’s burden to show how an argued claim
construction is supported by the evidence.
Papst-Motoren also does not state what methodology of claim
construction should be used, e.g., whether the USPTO should consider all
sources of evidence considered by district courts. Nevertheless, the USPTO
always considers the specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[I]t would be unreasonable for the PTO to ignore any
interpretive guidance afforded by the applicant’s written description . . . .”).
For purposes of this appeal, we assume that any type of evidence of claim
meaning identified by Phillips, including prosecution history of the original
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patent, can be considered since patentee may not amend.

Anticipation
Anticipation is established when a single prior art reference discloses,
expressly or under the principles of inherency, each and every limitation of
the claimed invention. Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

ANALYSIS
Dependent claim 6
Appellant makes several arguments directed to independent claim 1,
which as discussed supra, was declared invalid by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, but does not separately argue claim 6, which
depends from independent claim 1. Accordingly, for this reason we sustain
the rejection of claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by dBase III.
However, to the extent that we find some of Appellant’s arguments
with respect to independent claim 1 are applicable to arguments which
Appellant could have made for dependent 6, we consider them below.
Appellant argues that dBase III fails to disclose the step of “receiving
the gathered parts-related information and compiling the parts-related
information into a proposal meeting the customer's requirements,” as recited
by independent claim 1. (Br. 10.) Specifically, Appellant contends that
figure 8-5 of dBase III fails to disclose the “proposal” recited by claims 1
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and 6, and illustrated by at least figure 37 because figure 8-5 of dBase III is a
“stock report” which includes a “unit cost” and “list price.” (Br. 10-12.)
To support this contention, Appellant asserts that “proposal” should
be interpreted to mean “[a]n offer by one person to another . . . the
acceptance whereof will make a contract between them . . . .” (Br. 10.) To
further support this contention, Appellant asserts that figure 37 of the '627
patent clearly depicts the term “proposal,” on the top of the figure and a
“signature line” for accepting the proposal, on the bottom of the figure,
neither of which are disclosed by the dBase III reference. (Br. 11.)
Additionally, Appellant argues that because dBase III “requires a human to
verbally or otherwise make a proposal based, in part, on a stock search
report,” dBase III fails to disclose “any computerized system compiling the
part-related information into a proposal.” (Br. 12.)
In response to Appellant’s arguments, the Examiner finds that
dBase III receives the gathered parts-related information using the inventory
managements system’s “build a search condition” feature (FF D4) and
compiles this information into a proposal or quote based on the customer’s
inquiry which is intended to be offered to the customer for sale. (FF D2, D3,
D5; See also Ans. 4-5.) The Examiner finds that this transaction is an offer
to sell the “idler arm assembly” of figure 8-5, and as such “information
intended for conveyance to a potential customer.” (FF 2, D6; See Ans. 27.)
We find the Examiner’s position to be compelling.
In making this determination, we agree with the Examiner that the
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transaction disclosed in dBase III is a “proposal” equivalent to “information
intended for conveyance to a potential customer” as the term was construed
by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. (FF 2.)
While Appellant argues that the “stock report” relied on by the Examiner is
not a “proposal,” we disagree and find that the Examiner is not relying
solely on the “stock report.”
Instead, we find that the Examiner is relying on the offer to sell the
part requested by the customer based on the “stock report.” (FF D4, D5,
D6.) Specifically, the Examiner finds that the “[y]es, we have that in stock,”
disclosed at the bottom of figure 8-5, which is spoken by a shopkeeper, as
the result of an inventory search in response to a customer’s inquiry, and the
subsequent steps described in the section of dBase III titled “Recording
Sales,” together, discloses a “proposal.” (Ans. 28.)
Contrary to Appellant’s assertion that dBase III fails to disclose a
“proposal” because figure 8-5 does not include the headings “proposal” and
“signature line” depicted in figure 37 of the '627 patent, we find that this
assertion is not commensurate with the scope of either claims 1 or 6. While
the claims of an expired patent in reexamination are not examined under the
broadest reasonable interpretation, Ex parte Papst-Motoren, 1 USPQ2d
1655, we will not read embodiments appearing in the written description
into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment when
doing so would ignore the explicit language of the claims. See Superguide
Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004); See also
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Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d at 1215-16. Therefore, since
claims 1 and 6 do not recite limitations requiring a printed “proposal
heading” or “signature line,” we will not read these limitations into the
claims.
Lastly, with respect to Appellant’s argument that dBase III fails to
disclose “any computerized system compiling the part-related information
into a proposal” because dBase III “requires a human to verbally or
otherwise make a proposal based, in part, on a stock search report,” we
cannot agree. While we do agree with Appellant that a proposal is made
based on an inventory report, we cannot agree with the Appellant that the
inventory report is not parts-related information compiled from an inventory
search meeting a customer’s requirements and then offered to a customer as
a “proposal.” (FF D4, D5, D6.) This interpretation is commensurate with
the scope of claims 1 and 6 since the claims do not limit how the proposal is
presented or otherwise offered to a customer.
Consequently, since dBase III is a software program, a computer
would necessarily be compiling the search results into “information intended
for conveyance to a potential customer.” (FF D2.) Therefore, when
information about an “idler arm assembly” is conveyed to the customer, we
interpret this to be “[a]n offer by one person to another . . . the acceptance
whereof will make a contract between them” (FF D5, D6; see Br. 10), and
thus commensurate with both Appellant’s interpretation of the term
“proposal” and that of the district court.
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Accordingly, we are not persuaded by the arguments presented by
Appellant with respect to invalid independent claim 1, as they may be
applicable to dependent claim 6. Therefore, for these reasons, and the
reasons discussed supra, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent 6
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by dBase III.

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CONCLUSION
We conclude that dBase III discloses a “proposal” as claimed, and as
such, anticipates the step of “including within the proposal specifications
corresponding to the one or more parts which meets the customer’s
requirements,” as recited by dependent claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claim 6 is AFFIRMED.
Requests for extensions of time in this ex parte reexamination
proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(c). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED

ack

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PATENT OWNER:

HERSHKOVITZ & ASSOCIATES, LLC
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ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314

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