Evgeniy Bart et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 9, 2020

13915551 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/915,551 06/11/2013 Evgeniy Bart PARC-20120450-US-NP 4097
35699 7590 03/09/2020
PVF -- PARC
c/o PARK, VAUGHAN, FLEMING & DOWLER LLP
2820 FIFTH STREET
DAVIS, CA 95618-7759
EXAMINER
LAMARDO, VIKER ALEJANDRO
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2126
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/09/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
jenny@parklegal.com
sy_incoming@parklegal.com
tia@parklegal.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte EVGENIY BART, ROBERT R. PRICE, and
DANIEL G. BOBROW
___________

Appeal 2019-000546
Application 13/915,551
Technology Center 2100
_________________

Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12–16, 18, 19, and 21–
25.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “[A]pplicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Palo
Alto Research Center Incorporated. Appeal Br. 5.
2 Claims 5, 8, 11, 17, and 20 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 46–50.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Invention
Appellant’s recited invention relates to “allow[ing] non-experts to
specify constraints for a specialized probabilistic model” that is used “to
predict a future security-related event” based on “security-related data
describing a plurality of heterogeneous events.” Spec. ¶ 1; Appeal Br. 46.3

Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 is exemplary of the claimed subject matter and is
reproduced below with claim element labels added in brackets and
limitations at issue in italics:
1. A computer-executable method for clustering
heterogeneous event data, comprising:
[(a)] receiving, by a computer, security-related data
describing a plurality of heterogeneous events;
[(b)] generating a generalized probabilistic model which
includes assigning a heterogeneous event to a respective cluster
of events in the generalized probabilistic model;
[(c)] displaying, by the computer, a plurality of cluster
assignments and a plurality of probability distributions for
event properties from the generalized probabilistic model;
[(d)] receiving, by the computer subsequent to displaying
the cluster assignments and probability distributions from the
generalized probabilistic model, user input specifying a

3 We refer to: (1) the Specification filed June 11, 2013 (“Spec.”); (2) the
Final Office Action mailed December 27, 2017 (“Final Act.”); (3) the
Appeal Brief filed May 24, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); (4) the Examiner’s Answer
mailed August 31, 2018 (“Ans.”); and (3) the Reply Brief filed October 30,
2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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relationship between event properties associated with the
heterogeneous events;
[(e)] generating a specialized probabilistic model which
involves re-computing at least one of the plurality of cluster
assignments and the plurality of probability distributions for
event properties according to the relationship specified by the
user input; and
[(f)] generating a new event based on the specialized
probabilistic model to predict a future security-related event.
Appeal Br. 45 (Appendix A: Claims Appendix).

REFERENCES
The references4 relied upon by the Examiner are:
Name Reference Date
Liao US 2008/0127146 A1 May 29, 2008
Miltonberger US 2002/0094767 A1 Apr. 15, 2010
Cobb US 2011/0044533 A1 Feb. 24, 2011
Kuecuekyan US 2011/0208681 A1 Aug. 25, 2011
Kawahara Change-Point
Detection in Time-
Series Data by Direct
Density-Ratio
Estimation, Dept. Of
Computer Science,
Tokyo Ins. of Tech.,
pages 389–400
2007
Chib Estimation and
comparison of
multiple change-point
Models, J. of
Econometrics, 86,
pages 221–241
1998

4 All citations to the references use the first-named inventor only.
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Sun Relation Strength-
Aware Clustering of
Heterogeneous Inform
-mation Networks with
Incomplete Attributes,
The 38th International
Conf. on Very Large
Data Bases,
Proceedings of the
VLDB Endowment,
Vol. 5, No. 5,
Aug. 27–31, 2012

REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12–16, 18, 19, and 21–
25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as reciting patent-ineligible subject matter. Final
Act. 2–4.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 7, 13, 19, and 22 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miltonberger and Cobb.
Id. at 4–8.
The Examiner rejects claims 2, 6, 12, 14, 18, and 24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Miltonberger, Cobb, and
Sun. Id. at 9–12.
The Examiner rejects claims 3, 9, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over the combined teachings of Miltonberger, Cobb, and Chib. Id.
at 12–13.
The Examiner rejects claims 4, 10 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over the combined teachings of Miltonberger, Cobb, and Kawahara.
Id. at 13–14.
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The Examiner rejects claims 21 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over the combined teachings of Miltonberger, Cobb, and Liao. Id.
at 14–16.
The Examiner rejects claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
the combined teachings of Miltonberger, Cobb, and Kuecuekyan. Id. at 16–
17.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
I. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the US Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Alice and Mayo.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
217.
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If the claim recites an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the
Alice and Mayo framework, in which “we must examine the elements of the
claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim that
recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the
[claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract
idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The Office published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Guidance”). Recently, the USPTO published an
update to that guidance. October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update,
84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (hereinafter “Guidance Update”).5 Under the Guidance
and the Guidance Update, in determining whether a claim falls within an
excluded category, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) Step 2A — Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts,
certain methods of organizing human activity, such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and

5 The Guidance, as revised by the October 2019 Update, supplements
previous guidance memoranda. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51 (“All USPTO
personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to
follow the guidance.”).
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(2) Step 2A — Prong Two: additional elements that integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP6
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55 (“Revised Step 2A”). Only if a claim (1)
recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a
practical application, do we then look to whether the claim (Step 2B):
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56 (“Step 2B: If the Claim Is Directed to a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept.”).

II. The Examiner’s § 101 Rejection
The Examiner determines that exemplary7 claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception: an abstract idea. Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 21–40. According
to the Examiner, claim 1 recites a mental process “similar to collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis (Electric Power Group8)”. Final Act. 2 (Emphasis added). The
Examiner identifies the claimed “computer” as an additional element and
determines claim 1 does “not include additional elements that are sufficient

6 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) citations herein are
to MPEP, Rev. 08.2017, January 2018.
7 Appellant argues the claims as a group with respect to the § 101 rejection.
Appeal Br. 17. We, thus, select independent claim 1 as exemplary of the
claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
8 Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the
additional elements when considered both individually and as an ordered
combination do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea.” Id.
at 3. We adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as our own and add
the following primarily for emphasis.

III. Appellant’s Arguments
We summarize Appellant’s arguments in favor of eligibility as
follows: (1) like the claims in DDR Holdings9, “the claimed embodiments
are necessarily rooted in computer technology” and thus are not an abstract
idea (Appeal Br. 19); (2) “[a]s in Enfish10, the focus of the claims in the
instant application is on improvements in computer capabilities, which
includes the ability of the computer to customize a model with input from a
user and predict future security-related events with the customized model”
(id. at 20); (3) “[s]imilar to the invention of McRO11, embodiments of the
instant application incorporate ‘rules’ (e.g.: by receiving security-related
data describing heterogeneous events” (id. at 21–22); (4) the claim “solve[s]
a problem of predicting future security-related events, e.g., explosions from
improvised explosive devices and meetings between persons of interest.” (id.
at 21); (5) Appellant’s claim is unlike those in Electric Power Group; (id. at
25); (6) “[a]ssuming arguendo that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea, Appellant submits that the claims as a whole amount to significantly

9 Citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
10 Citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
11 Citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
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more than an abstract idea” (id. at 28); (7) “[s]imilar to BASCOM12, the
instant claims are directed to an inventive concept, namely, of enabling non-
expert users to adapt generalized probabilistic models” and the “inventive
concept can be found in the ordered combination of claim limitations” (id. at
29, 30); (8) “the instant claims are directed to a ‘specific, tangible
application’ which is ‘functional and palpable’” (id. at 32); and (9) “the
instant specification describes how the system is an advancement over the
prior art.” (id. at 33).

IV. Our Review, Guidance, Step 1
We analyze the exemplary claim and the Examiner’s rejection in view
of the Guidance, and we adopt the nomenclature for the steps used in the
Guidance. As an initial matter, the claims must recite at least one of four
recognized statutory categories, namely, machine, process, article of
manufacture, or composition of matter. MPEP § 2106(I); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Appellant’s independent claim 1 recites a method (i.e., a “process”),
independent claim 7 recites a non-transitory computer-readable storage
medium (i.e., a “manufacture”), and independent claim 13 recites a system
(i.e., a “machine”). Thus, the pending claims recite a recognized statutory
category of § 101 and we turn to the two-step Alice/Mayo analysis applied in
accordance with the Guidance.

12 Citing Bascom Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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V. Step 2A, Prong 1 in the Guidance (Alice/Mayo–Step 1)
(Judicial Exceptions)
Next, we determine whether claim 1, being directed to a statutory
class of invention, nonetheless falls within a judicial exception. Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 51.
At a high level, claim 1 recites (a) receiving data (b) generating a
generalized probabilistic model (c) displaying selective data from the
generalized probabilistic model (d) receiving user input specifying a
relationship between certain displayed data (e) generating a specialized
probabilistic model according to the relationship specified by the user input
and (f) “generating a new event based on the specialized probabilistic
model.” Appeal Br. 45. Apart from the additional element discussed
separately below, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1, recites “a
method” for “‘collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain
results of the collection and analysis,’ where the data analysis steps are
recited at a high level of generality such that they could practically be
performed in the human mind.” Guidance Update 7 (citing Elec. Power
Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356). That is, because claim 1 recites receiving
(collecting) data, generating computer-based model that manipulate the data
(analyzing) and generating (displaying) certain results of the collection and
analysis such as the plurality of cluster assignments, we agree with the
Examiner that the claim relates to “organizing or analyzing information in a
way that can be performed mentally or is analogous to human mental work”
in view of Electric Power Group. Final Act. 2.
Appellant argues (5) claim 1 is unlike the claims in Electric Power
Group because “[t]he instant specification clearly discusses the advantages
offered by the technological improvement.” Appeal Br. 25 (citing
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Spec. ¶ 7). Appellant argues the claim “solve[s] a problem of predicting
future security-related events, e.g., explosions from improvised explosive
devices and meetings between persons of interest.” Id. at 21 (citing Spec.
¶¶ 5, 23). The improvement to predicting events argued by Appellant (id.)
is, at best, reflected in the limitations that recite generating a probabilistic
model and generating a new event based on the model. That, however, is
part of the recited abstract idea the Examiner identifies and is an
improvement to the model itself, i.e., the manipulation of data for output or
display, rather than to the claimed computer or any other technology. We,
therefore, conclude claim 1 recites an abstract idea, i.e., a mental process, as
provided for in the Guidance and the Guidance Update.

VI. Step 2A, Prong Two in the Guidance
(Integration into a Practical Application)
Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we now determine whether
the claim is directed to the abstract idea itself or whether it is instead
directed to some technological implementation or application of, or
improvement to, this idea, i.e., integrated into a practical application. See,
e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981)). We determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated
into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there
are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial
exception or exceptions; and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application. Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. This
evaluation requires an additional element or a combination of additional
elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a
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manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See id.
The Examiner finds the additional element recited in claim 1 is “‘a
computer.’” Final Act. 4. The Examiner determines the additional element
does not integrate the exception into a practical application because even
though the claimed “method is computer-implemented . . . this is merely a
generic computer implementation.” Ans. 23. The Examiner, thus,
determines the additional element does not recite an improvement to “the
functioning of ae computer or improve another technology.” Id.
Appellant argues (2) that the focus of claim 1 “is on improvements in
computer capabilities, which includes the ability of the computer to
customize a model with input from a user and predict future security-related
events.” Appeal Br. 20 (citing Enfish). Appellant argues that claim 1
“solves the problem of overly generalized models which do not scale well,”
and cites to paragraphs 8 of the Specification to support this assertion.
Appeal Br. 20. Further, Appellant argues (1) that “that the claimed
embodiments are necessarily rooted in computer technology[,]” similar to
the additional elements in DDR Holdings. Id. at 19.
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s arguments, which rely
upon Enfish and DDR Holdings, and assert the claim is directed to
improving computers or other computer technology. In DDR Holdings, the
claimed invention created a hybrid web page that combined advantageous
elements from two web pages, bypassing the expected manner of sending a
visitor to another party’s web page, in order to solve the internet-centric
problem of retaining website visitors. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257–59.
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The Enfish court found “the plain focus of the claims is on an improvement
to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a
computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336.
Here, we do not find persuasive Appellant’s arguments that the claim
is directed to improving a computer technology or (4) “improv[ing] the
technological process of predicting future security-related events.” Claim 1
is not limited to improving a web or Internet centric technology as in DDR
Holdings. Rather, claim 1 recites a specific way and specific context for
generating a new event. Namely, “displaying, by [a] computer, a plurality of
cluster assignments and a plurality of probability distributions for event
properties from the generalized probabilistic model,” “receiving, by the
computer, user input specifying a relationship between event properties
associated with the heterogeneous events,” and “generating a specialized
probabilistic model.” Appeal Br. 45. While these steps limit the scope of
the abstract concept of collecting, analyzing, and displaying information, the
limitations are not sufficient to transform Appellant’s otherwise patent-
ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. Considering
claim 1 as a whole, Appellant’s claimed invention lacks a technical solution
to a technical problem because the mere presence of a computer in the claim
does not necessarily indicate a technical solution. Thus, unlike the claims in
DDR Holdings, the solution offered by Appellant’s claim 1 is not rooted in
any novel computer technology, as evidenced by the claim’s failure to recite
anything other than a generic computer.
Additionally, we note that the claim does not recite that the method
changes the operation of a computer to improve the function of the
computer, but rather only improves the data provided for “predict[ing] a
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future security-related event” by “generating a specialized probabilistic
model” based on “user input.” Appeal Br. 45. The Specification similarly
describes that a “user may provide guidance . . . for specializing a
probabilistic model” and “[t]he system and/or a human operator may utilize
the inferred probability distributions to generate fictional events to predict
future events.” Spec. ¶¶ 26, 35. Thus, when interpreted in light of the
Specification, claim 1 merely recites use of a computer as a tool to
implement a concept of collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
the results, a mental process (an abstract idea). See, e.g., RecogniCorp, LLC
v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[the claim] does not
claim a software method that improves the functioning of a computer . . .
[but] claims a ‘process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which
computers are invoked merely as a tool.’”) (citation omitted)).
Appellant further argues (3) that claim 1 is similar to the claims at
issue in McRO in that it “incorporate[s] ‘rules’ . . . that improve the
technological process of predicting future security-related events.” Appeal
Br. 21–22 (citing McRO).
We find this argument unpersuasive. In McRO, the court reviewed
claims which use “a combined order of specific rules that renders
information into a specific format that is then used and applied to create
desired results: a sequence of synchronized, animated characters.” McRO,
837 F.3d at 1315. The court found that the claims did not “simply use a
computer as a tool to automate conventional activity,” but instead used the
computer to “perform a distinct process” that is carried out in a different way
than the prior non-computer method to improve the technology of (3-D
animation techniques). See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314–16.
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In contrast with McRO, Appellant does not identify any specific rules
in the claim that are used to solve a technological problem, let alone identify
specific rules that act in the same way as the rules enabling the computer in
McRO to generate computer animated characters. Rather, Appellant’s claim
1 merely recites “generating a new event based on the specialized
probabilistic model.” Appeal Br. 45. Appellant also fails to identify any
specific rules related to the claimed specialized probabilistic model. We,
therefore, find insufficient basis in the record before us to support
Appellant’s argument that claim 1 is similar to the claim in McRO, where
computers were unable to make certain subjective determinations, i.e.,
regarding morph weight and phoneme timings, which could only be made
prior to the McRO invention by human animators. As such, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claim improves a computer
technology or other technology, and we do not consider exemplary claim 1
to recite a practical application of the abstract concept.
Additionally, none of the remaining indicia of integration identified
by the January 2019 Guidance are present in the claim. Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 55; see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). For example, the claims do
not recite a particular machine and, instead, generically recites “one or more
computer processors.” Nor do the claims recite the “[t]ransformation and
reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. 593,
604 (2010); MPEP § 2106.05(c). As noted above, the additional element is
not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, i.e., a generic
computer, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception. We, therefore, determine claim 1 is
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not directed to a specific asserted improvement in computer-related
technology or otherwise integrated into a practical application and thus is
directed to a judicial exception.

VII. Step 2B in the Guidance (Alice/Mayo, Step 2) (Inventive Concept)
Next, we determine whether the claim includes additional elements
that provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception, thereby
providing an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72–73). To determine whether the claim provides an inventive
concept, the additional elements are considered—individually and in
combination—to determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field or (2) simply append well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
The Examiner identifies the claimed “computer” as an additional
element. Final Act. 6. The Examiner finds claim 1 does “recite that the
method is computer-implemented. However, this is merely a generic
computer implementation that does not amount to significantly more” than
the abstract idea. Ans. 23.
Appellant does not identify any specific limitation of claim 1 beyond
the judicial exception that is not “‘well-understood, routine, conventional’ in
the field” as per MPEP § 2106.05(d). Instead, Appellant argues (7)
“[s]imilar to BASCOM, the instant claims are directed to an inventive
concept, namely, of enabling non-expert users to adapt generalized
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probabilistic models” and the “inventive concept can be found in the ordered
combination of claim limitations.” Appeal Br. 29, 30.
We do not agree. Contrary to Appellant’s arguments, there is no
evidence from the Specification to support any assertion that Appellant’s
combination of claim limitations is non-conventional. Mere attorney
arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual
evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). Claim 1’s method uses a computer for storing and manipulating
data and implementing the abstract idea. According to Appellant’s
Specification, the claimed computer may be a general-purpose computer.
Spec. ¶¶ 60–63; Fig. 4. Thus, the claim simply uses a general-purpose
computer to execute the abstract idea. We, therefore, agree with the
Examiner’s finding that “this is merely a generic computer implementation
that does not amount to significantly more.” Ans. 25. For these reasons, the
recited computer adds nothing more than well-understood, routine,
conventional activities, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract
mental process. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)(ii).
Likewise, Appellant’s claim 1 is not analogous to the claims in
BASCOM. For example, BASCOM (U.S. Patent No. 5,987,606 (“BASCOM
’606 patent”)) describes a particular arrangement of filtering software at a
specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering
features specific to each end user. The filtering software enables
individually customizable filtering at the remote ISP server by taking
advantage of the technical ability of the ISP server to identify individual
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accounts and associate a request for Internet content with a specific
individual account. BASCOM ’606 patent, 4:35–38.
The Federal Circuit recognized that BASCOM’s installation of an
Internet content filter at a particular network location is “a technical
improvement over prior art ways of filtering such content” because such an
arrangement advantageously allows the Internet content filter to have “both
the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the
ISP server” and “give[s] users the ability to customize filtering for their
individual network accounts.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350, 1352.
According to the Federal Circuit, BASCOM’s claims “do not preempt the use
of the abstract idea of filtering content on the Internet or on generic
computer components performing conventional activities.” Id. at 1352.
Instead, BASCOM’s claims “carve out a specific location for the filtering
system (a remote ISP server) and require the filtering system to give users
the ability to customize filtering for their individual network accounts.” Id.
As such, “an inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and
non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” Id. at 1350.
In contrast to BASCOM, Appellant’s claims and Specification
describe an abstract idea implemented by a generic computer. There is no
evidence in the record to support the argument that Appellant’s claimed
system is provided with any non-conventional and non-generic arrangement
of known, conventional components similar to BASCOM. Likewise, there is
no element or combination of elements recited in Appellant’s claim 1 that
contain any “inventive concept” or add anything “significantly more” to
transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573
U.S. 208 at 221.
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Appellant argues (8) “the instant claims are directed to a ‘specific,
tangible application’ which is ‘functional and palpable’” and (9) “the instant
specification describes how the system is an advancement over the prior
art.” Appeal Br. at 32–33.
We are unpersuaded. Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo
analysis includes a search for an inventive concept, the analysis is not an
evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea
is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89 (rejecting the
suggestion that Sections 102, 103, and 112 might perform the appropriate
screening function and noting that in Mayo such an approach “would make
the ‘law of nature’ exception . . . a dead letter”). Further, “under the
Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature
(or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that
discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility.” Genetic
Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Considering the additional element both individually, and in
combination with the claimed abstract idea, we agree with the Examiner that
the claimed computer simply append well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception. Final Act. 6; Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
56.
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We, therefore, conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive
concept because the generic computer recited in claim 1 does not provide
significantly more than the recited mental process. For the reasons
discussed, claim 1 does not recite patent-eligible subject matter. Because
claim 1 is argued as exemplary of the other claims (Appeal Br. 17), we also
conclude that claims 2–4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12–16, 18, 19, and 21–25, do not recite
patent-eligible subject matter and we sustain the rejection of claims 16–24
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103
In rejecting claim 1 as obvious over Miltonberger and Cobb, the
Examiner finds the combination teaches generating a generalized
probabilistic model “which includes assigning a heterogeneous event to a
respective cluster of events in the generalized probabilistic model” as recited
in claim 1. Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues that Miltonberger does not teach heterogeneous
events because “none of ‘individual online customer behavior,’ ‘the data of
user events,’ and ‘the next subsequent set of event data (of a session) of the
user’ is the same as ‘the heterogeneous events’ disclosed in the instant
application.” Appeal Br. 37.
The Examiner responds that Miltonberger’s “events are heterogeneous
events because the statistical models of the Risk Engine are based on
probabilities that dynamically adjust to individual user behavior, recognizing
that every user behaves differently and what might be unusual for one user
may be normal for another.” Ans. 41 (citing ¶¶ 35, 49–52).

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We find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive. We agree with the
rejection and adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action and
the Answer as our own. Miltonberger discusses Risk engine 102 “uses
predictive models of each individual online user’s behavior. . . . based on
probabilities that dynamically adjust to individual user behavior.”
Miltonberger ¶ 35. According to Miltonberger, “[p]redicting the expected
behavior of the user includes generating expected event parameters of the
next [user] event” based on past events.” Id. at ¶ 50; see also ¶¶ 49, 69
(“The models . . . are used to predict the actual observed event parameters
for the next event given the model of the user’s behavior during past
events.”). The Examiner’s interprets the claimed “heterogeneous event,” to
encompass Miltonberger’s “events.
Appellant, however, fails to establish the Examiner’s interpretation of
“a heterogeneous event,” as recited in claim 1, is not the broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with Appellant’s Specification. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellant’s
Specification states that “[h]eterogeneous events are events that may vary by
different factors, including event type, descriptors, location, and time.”
Spec. ¶ 2 (emphasis added). Thus, the Specification does not define
expressly “a heterogeneous event” but merely provides non-limiting
examples of what makes events heterogeneous such as the events varying in
time or location. Appellant, in turn, fails to set forth a description of the
term in the Specification that is inconsistent with the Examiner’s
interpretation. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Appellant, therefore, fails to persuasively demonstrate that the Examiner’s
broad interpretation of “a heterogeneous event,” as recited in claim 1, to
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encompass Miltonberger’s predicting of user behavior based on past user
events that occur at various times, is inconsistent with Appellant’s
Specification or is otherwise unreasonable. In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d
1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
The Examiner relies on Cobb to teach or suggest “receiving, by the
computer subsequent to displaying the cluster assignments and probability
distributions from the generalized probabilistic model, user input specifying
a relationship between event properties associated with the heterogeneous
events,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 6–7 (citing Cobb ¶¶ 51, 52, Fig. 5).
The Examiner adds that Miltonberger, rather than Cobb, is “relied upon for
the probability distributions from the generalized probabilistic model.” Id.
at 6.
Appellant argues “Cobb merely discloses that ‘the user 506 modifies
the displayed event map via the client 504’: ‘For example, the user 506 may
modify a property of a cluster in the displayed event map.’” Appeal Br. 40.
Appellant further “notes that ‘modifying a property of a cluster’ is not the
same as ‘receiving, by the computer subsequent to displaying the cluster
assignments,’ as claimed. Appeal Br. 40.
The Examiner responds,
Fig. 5 teaches receiving user from an input modifying an event
map. Cited ¶ [0051] teaches “The client 504 may allow the user
506 to select one or more clusters of the event map. The client
504 may also display properties associated with selected clusters.
The properties may include an identifier for the cluster, a label
of the cluster, a location of the cluster in the scene, a size of the
cluster, identifiers for ancestors of the cluster, alert preferences
for the cluster, etc.”, and “The client 504 may also allow the user
506 to modify one or more properties for a cluster”. As shown
by ¶ [0051] the client receives a user input selecting one or more
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clusters of the event map, and the client also receives a user input
modifying the cluster properties. The user selection of the cluster
and modification of the cluster properties is specifying a
relationship between the event properties associated with the
heterogeneous events. Cited ¶ [0052] teaches “the user 506
modifies the displayed event map via the client 504. For
example, the user 506 may modify a property of a cluster in the
displayed event map”. As shown in ¶ [0052] the user modifies
the properties of a cluster in a displayed event map.
Ans. 443.
Appellant’s arguments fall short of identifying an error in the
Examiner’s rejection as required on appeal. Arguments must address the
Examiner’s findings. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“The arguments shall
explain why the examiner erred as to each ground of rejection contested by
appellant.”). Here, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because Appellant
fails to specifically respond to the Examiner’s additional findings provided
in the Answer. Reply Br. 14–16. That is, Appellant’s Reply Brief repeats in
substance the arguments from the Appeal Brief but does not address the
Examiner’s additional findings set forth above from the Answer.
Next, Appellant argues the proposed modification or combination
would change the principle of operation of Miltonberger. Specifically,
Appellant argues that because Miltonberger’s “steps all pertain to a
homogeneous user event” the “Miltonberger system cannot be modified to
"receiv[e], by the computer subsequent to displaying the cluster assignments
and probability distributions from the generalized probabilistic model, user
input specifying a relationship between event properties associated with the
heterogeneous events.’” Appeal Br. 42. Thus, Appellant’s argument
depends on Appellant’s previous argument, discussed above, that
Miltonberger does not teach a heterogeneous event. See Appeal Br. 38
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(“these steps all pertain to a homogeneous user event” (bolding omitted)).
Because we find unpersuasive Appellant’s argument that Miltonberger fails
to teach a heterogeneous event, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s
argument that the proposed modification or combination would change the
principle of operation of Miltonberger because Miltonberger’s “steps all
pertain to a homogeneous user event.” Id. at 42.
We, therefore, sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of independent
claims 1, 7, and 13. We also sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of
dependent claims 2–4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14–16, 18, 19, and 21–25, which are not
argued separately. Appeal Br. 40.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s patent eligibility rejection of claims 1–4, 6,
7, 9, 10, 12–16, 18, 19, and 21–25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 1–4, 6, 7,
9, 10, 12–16, 18, 19, and 21–25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 6, 7, 9,
10, 12–16,
18, 19, 21–
25
101 Eligibility 1–4, 6, 7,
9, 10, 12–
16, 18, 19,
21–25

1–4, 6, 7, 9,
10, 12–16,
18, 19, 21–
25
103 Various 1–4, 6, 7,
9, 10, 12–
16, 18, 19,
21–25

Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6, 7,
9, 10, 12–
16, 18, 19,
21–25

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED