Everlock Fastening Systems

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1992

308 N.L.R.B. 1112 (N.L.R.B. 1992)

1112
308 NLRB No. 161
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 In adopting the judge’s findings and conclusions, we rely on the
reasoning set forth in Everlock Fastening Systems, 308 NLRB 1018
(1992).
In adopting the judge’s findings and conclusions, Member Oviatt
does not rely on Zimmerman Painting & Decorating, 302 NLRB 856
(1991), a case in which he dissented. He finds the facts in this case
to be distinguishable.
1 The Sterling Heights, Michigan place of business is the only fa-
cility involved in this proceeding.
2 See Stipulations (Tr. 7–10).
Everlock Fastening Systems, Inc. and International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Ag-
ricultural Implement Workers of America,
UAW, AFL–CIO, and its Local 174. Case 7–
CA–31675
September 30, 1992
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS DEVANEY, OVIATT, AND
RAUDABAUGH
On April 10, 1992, Administrative Law Judge Karl
H. Buschmann issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the Charging Party filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and con-
clusions1 and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Everlock Detroit Division
of Everlock Fastening Systems, Inc., Troy, Michigan,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Order.
Dennis Boren, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Michael Alaimo, Esq. (Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen
& Freeman), of Detroit, Michigan, for the Respondent.
Laura Campbell, Esq., of Detroit, Michigan, on behalf of the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KARL H. BUSCHMANN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried on June 25, 1991, in Detroit, Michigan. The
charge in Case 7–CA–31675 was filed by International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, UAW, AFL–CIO, and its
Local 174 (the Union) on March 18, 1991, and the complaint
issued on April 22, 1991, charging Everlock Detroit Division
of Everlock Fastening Systems, Inc. (the Respondent) with
violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act), by failing and refusing to provide
hospital/medical insurance to unit employees in accordance
with the collective-bargaining agreement and by failing and
refusing to pay vacation payments to employees in accord-
ance with the provisions of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. The Respondent filed an answer on May 3, 1991, in
which it admitted the jurisdictional elements of the complaint
and averred that its conduct complied with the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Company, Everlock Detroit Division of Everlock Fas-
tening Systems, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its prin-
cipal office at 431 Stephenson Highway, Troy, Michigan,
and, until March 25, 1991, with a place of business at 6567
South Sterling Drive, Sterling Heights, Michigan, where it
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of automobile
parts.1 On October 19, 1990, the Respondent filed a bank-
ruptcy petition pursuant to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., and has been des-
ignated as a debtor in possession by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court of the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division
of Detroit.2 With gross revenues exceeding $1 million during
1990 and with purchases in excess of $50,000 from suppliers
from outside the State of Michigan, the Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
The Charging Party, International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW, AFL–CIO, and its Local 174, is a labor or-
ganization engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. FACTS
The Company and the Union had a successful bargaining
relationship for the employees in the following unit:
All full-time and regular part-time employees of Re-
spondent employed at its Sterling Heights Plant; but ex-
cluding foremen, assistant foremen, watchmen, office
and clerical employees, salaried employees and super-
visors as defined in the Act, time study men and con-
fidential employees.
The latest collective-bargaining agreement, dated August
20, 1988, and effective until August l99l, contains certain
provision relevant to the instant controversy. Article VII
under the heading ‘‘Vacation Plan’’ provides for the accrual
of vacation days based on an employee’s seniority (G.C.
Exh. 2). Another proviso entitled ‘‘Insurance and Drug Pro-
gram’’ and a ‘‘Supplemental Agreement’’ obligate the Com-
pany to provide a current health insurance and drug program
without cost to the employee. (G.C. Exh. 2, art. X.) The
record shows pursuant to a stipulation between the parties
(Tr. 13): Certain employees who had earned vacation pay
prior to October 19, 1990, did not receive their vacation pay
because for the period after February 12, 1991, until March
25, 1991. Persons who sought to have their vacation paid,
1113EVERLOCK FASTENING SYSTEMS
had that vacation prorated to prepetition and postpetition pe-
riods (Tr. 13, G.C. Exh. 3). In a posted notice, dated Feb-
ruary 12, 1991, the Respondent informed the bargaining unit
employees that the Company had filed for Chapter 11 protec-
tion and how the Company would process accrued vacation
payments (G.C. Exh. 3, Tr. 144). The employees were in-
formed, inter alia, that payments for vacation time accrued
after October 19, 1990, the date of filing for Chapter 11 pro-
tection, were postpetition obligations which would be paid to
the employees because the money was considered ‘‘adminis-
trative expenses.’’ However, accrued payments for vacation
time prior to that date were considered prepetition obliga-
tions for which claims could be made to the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court and which, according to the Company, it was not per-
mitted to pay. The Company also sent a memorandum dated
March 22, 1991, to the employees which states as follows
(G.C. Exh. 15):
(2) Vacation Pay. You will receive a check for accrued
but unused vacation pay as of the date of your termi-
nation. Inasmuch as the company is under the jurisdic-
tion of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, the company is per-
mitted presently to pay out only that portion of sever-
ance pay calculable under the company’s plan which is
attributable to the post-bankruptcy period, i.e. since Oc-
tober 19, 1990. Any amount attributable to the pre-
bankruptcy period is subject to the claims procedures of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
As a result, the record shows that a certain number of em-
ployees did not receive their vacation pay which they had
earned prior to October 19, 1990, the date of the filing for
bankruptcy. The Company did not notify the Union of the
failure to pay vacation benefits to these employees until after
the decision was made and the payment plan was imple-
mented. A grievance was filed on March 26, 1991, which
sought to challenge Respondent’s failure to make the vaca-
tion payments (G.C. Exh. 14, Tr. 147). The Respondent de-
nied the grievance on the basis of timeliness and the bank-
ruptcy petition (R. Exh. 11).
The Company offered its employees three medical plans,
the Health Alliance plan, the Wellness plan, and a traditional
medical plan, the CIGNA plan (R. Exh. 2, Tr. 17). The par-
ties stipulated that the Respondent did not pay the insurance
premium for the CIGNA insurance plan from October 15,
1990, to March 25, l991 (Tr. 15). Several unit employees
who were insured by CIGNA thereby lost their coverage for
a certain time. Although the policy provides for an automatic
cancellation if the premium is not paid, it also contains a
‘‘Grace Period’’ provision which extends the policy by 31
days beyond the payment of the premium (R. Exh. 1). By
letter of August 30, 1990, the Respondent had informed
CIGNA that it would reduce its accrued premiums of over
$421,000 by making monthly installments for August, Sep-
tember, October, and November 1990 (G.C. Exh. 5; R. Exh.
7). The record shows that $100,000 was paid in August and
$107,176 on September 15, 1990 (R. Exh. 7). But the Re-
spondent failed to pay the October 1990 installment and any
subsequent payments through March 25, 1991 (Tr. 15, 19,
33, 161). The Respondent attempted to shift the responsibil-
ity for the cancellation of the CIGNA policy on the insurance
carrier. However, the record shows that Respondent’s failure
to pay the monthly installment resulted in the cancellation of
the policy (Tr. 161, 171, R. Exh. 1). During this period, sev-
eral employees were no longer insured under the CIGNA
plan. Several employees who lost their coverage joined the
Health Alliance plan, a health maintenance organization
(HMO), as of November 1, 1990, and others joined the
Health Alliance Preferred Provider Organization. Neverthe-
less, as of the end of the grace period, October 15 to Novem-
ber 1, 1990, several CIGNA insured employees were unin-
sured and other CIGNA-insured employees who opted to join
the Health Alliance Preferred Provider Organization re-
mained uninsured until December 1, 1990. The employees
who joined either of the two insurance plans had less choice
in the selection of their health providers than they would
have had with CIGNA (Tr. 22, 163). Accordingly, Donald
Larkins, director of industrial relations, contacted an insur-
ance broker in January 1991 to explore an insurance cov-
erage similar to that of CIGNA. However, the Respondent
never contracted with an insurance carrier which offered ben-
efits similar to CIGNA. Larkins conceded that the health care
plans in existence after October 15, 1990, were not equal in
coverage to the CIGNA plan provided for in the collective-
bargaining agreement (Tr. 165–168, G.C. Exh. 4).
The record shows that the Company did not notify the
Union and it did not offer to bargain with the Union about
its failure to make the premium payment and to discontinue
the CIGNA insurance until after the implementation of its
decision (Tr. 54, 77). On or about October 23, 1990, the
Company notified the employees during an employee meet-
ing where the employees were informed that the Company
had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and that the insurance
programs were not in effect (Tr. 54–55). During that time,
the Company informed the employees that CIGNA had
stopped paying claims for employees’ medical and dental
bills and that the employees had the option of joining the
Health Alliance (HAP) plan effective November 1, 1990, or
HAP’s Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) plan effective
December 1, 1991, neither of which offered an adequate re-
placement coverage comparable to the CIGNA insurance, as
stated above. (G.C. Exhs. 4, 8, 10.) For example, under
CIGNA, employees could select virtually any health care
provider, they paid a lower ‘‘co-pay’’ or deductible under
CIGNA than with other plans, and they had an option for
chiropractic services (Tr. 167–168).
A grievance challenging the Company’s failure to maintain
the insurance plan was filed on October 10, 1990, by the
union steward (G.C. Exh. 6). By memorandum dated Decem-
ber 21, 1990, the Company informed the grievant that the
grievance was denied (G.C. Exh. 7).
In sum, the Company (a) failed to pay certain unit em-
ployees their accrued vacation pay in accordance with article
VII of the agreement and (b) it failed to pay its premiums
for the CIGNA health insurance plan or for a new carrier
with comparable benefits as required by article X of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement (G.C. Exhs. 2, 3, 4). Respond-
ent’s failure in this regard as well as its failure to notify the
Union and to bargain collectively, violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act, according to the General Counsel. The
Respondent argues that its receivership in a bankruptcy pro-
1114 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3 The Respondent apparently abandoned its affirmative defense
that the issues are barred by Sec. 10(b) of the Act. In any case, the
alleged practices occurred within the 6-month period prior to the fil-
ing of the charge.
ceeding justified its conduct and that the matter should have
been deferred to the grievance procedure in the contract.3
Analysis
The question whether a debtor in possession may reject a
collective-bargaining agreement is now governed by section
1113 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 1113) entitled Re-
organization. This law was enacted by Congress in response
to the decision NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 464 U.S. 513
(1984), where the Court held that a debtor in possession does
not commit an unfair labor practice when it unilaterally alters
the terms of a bargaining agreement. According to section
1113, a debtor in possession or the trustee ‘‘may issue or re-
ject a collective-bargaining agreement only in accordance
with the provisions of this section’’ (11 U.S.C. § 1113 (a)).
The statute outlines in several paragraphs the specific steps
required before a collective-bargaining agreement can be
changed or modified. The effect of the provisions assures
that a debtor in possession may not unilaterally change the
terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. For example, the
Act requires that a debtor in bankruptcy first make a pro-
posal to the union and furnish the union with relevant infor-
mation, it must meet with the union to confer in a good-faith
attempt to reach mutually satisfactory modifications, and the
bankruptcy court must examine and approve any modifica-
tions according to specific guidelines. The Company failed to
comply with any of these requirements. Indeed, the Act spe-
cifically states: ‘‘No provision of this title shall be construed
to permit a trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter any pro-
visions of a collective-bargaining agreement prior to compli-
ance with the provisions of this section’’ (11 U.S.C.
§ 1113(f)).
The court in In Re Unimet Corp., 842 F.2d 879, 884 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 828 (1988), interpreted sec-
tion 1113 and stated that ‘‘[S]ection 1113 unequivocally pro-
hibits [an] employer from unilaterally modifying any provi-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement.’’ Another circuit
court in its analysis of section 1113 stated ‘‘that Congress in-
tended § 1113 to be the sole method by which a debtor could
terminate or modify a collective bargaining agreement and
that application of other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
that allow a debtor to bypass the requirements of § 1113 are
prohibited.’’ In Re Ionosphere Clubs, 922 F.2d 984, 989–990
(2d Cir. 1990).
By stipulation the record shows that the bankruptcy court
did not issue an order allowing the Respondent to reject the
collective-bargaining agreement, and that the Respondent had
not filed a motion pursuant to section 1113 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code (Tr. 14–15).
The record here shows that the Respondent, not only failed
to make the contractual payment to the insurance funds and
failed to pay to certain employees accrued vacation money,
but it also failed to notify the Union prior to the implementa-
tion of its actions and it did not offer to bargain with the
Union. Respondent’s failure to make certain medical insur-
ance payments required by the contract and the failure to pay
certain employees their accrued vacation pay are considered
violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Zimmerman
Painting & Decorating, 302 NLRB 856 (1991). I, accord-
ingly, find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) as alleged in the complaint.
In its brief, the Respondent has raised the issue of deferral.
The Respondent’s answer to the allegations in the complaint
did not raise the issue of deferral. The record shows that the
separate grievances filed by the employees concerned the
CIGNA insurance and the vacation pay issues (G.C. Exhs. 6,
10, 14). The General Counsel submits that deferral on either
issue is unwarranted at this stage of the proceeding and, in
any case, inappropriate.
The collective-bargaining agreement provides for a griev-
ance procedure involving five steps, including arbitration.
The grievance procedure presumes the filing of a grievance
by an employee and covers any ‘‘trouble’’ or ‘‘difficulty’’
between the Company and any of its employees as to the
meaning or application of the provisions of the agreement
(G.C. Exh. 2).
The Respondent has taken the position that it is prohibited
from making the required payments to the employees be-
cause of the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. For ex-
ample, in its memorandum, dated February 12, 1991, the
Company informed the employees, inter alia, as follows
(G.C. Exh. 3):
The company is allowed currently to pay post-petition
obligations (including payroll obligations to employees)
as ‘‘administrative expenses,’’ but is not permitted to
pay pre-petition obligations. Instead, claims may be
filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for those pre-peti-
tion obligations. It should be clearly understood by all
employees that the above requirements are dictated by
federal law and are not discretionary.
Again in its memorandum of March 22, 1991, the Com-
pany similarly told the employees (G.C. Exh. 15).
(2) Vacation Pay. You will receive a check for ac-
crued but unused vacation pay as of the date of your
termination. Inasmuch as the company is under the ju-
risdiction of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, the company
is permitted presently to pay you only that portion of
severance pay calculable under the company’s plan
which is attributable to the post-bankruptcy period, i.e.
since October 19, 1990. Any amount attributable to the
pre-bankruptcy period is subject to the claims proce-
dures of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
In short, the Respondent did not really deny its obligation
under the collective-bargaining agreement but it left the issue
for the bankruptcy court and denied the grievance accord-
ingly. (R. Exh. 11.)
The grievance filed with respect to the expiration of the
CIGNA policy was filed on October 24, 1990, and the Re-
spondent denied the charges in the grievance by memoran-
dum of December 21, 1990 (G.C. Exhs. 6, 7). The Respond-
ent’s failure to maintain the insurance coverage was clearly
the result of its inability to pay the premium and its position
in bankruptcy. Respondent’s president, Aran H. Najjarian, in-
formed the Michigan Insurance Bureau by letter of January
21, 1991, inter alia, as follows (G.C. Exh. 9):
1115EVERLOCK FASTENING SYSTEMS
4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
On October 19, 1990, Everlock Fastening Systems,
Inc. filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. That same
afternoon our Director of Industrial Relations, Mr. Don-
ald Larkins, had a telephone conversation with Mr. Ken
White, CIGNA’s Account Manager.
Mr. Larkins informed Mr. White of the bankruptcy
petition, our inability to meet the scheduled October 15,
1990, premium payment, and specifically asked if
CIGNA was going to cancel the insurance policy.
The Respondent’s ability to pay the premium for the
CIGNA policy and its argument that the issues are before the
bankruptcy court, cannot properly be resolved by the provi-
sions of the collective-bargaining agreement.
It is accordingly clear that deferral to the grievance proce-
dure would be of little assistance. Under these circumstances,
it is clear that deferring the issue to arbitration would be in-
appropriate, Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971);
United Technologies Corp., 268 NLRB 557 (1984). Even if
the matter had been taken through the final stage of the
grievance process with a finding that the Respondent violated
the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement, the Re-
spondent’s reaction would probably be the same, that is the
bankruptcy proceeding is a bar to its contractual obligation
and the dispute should be resolved by the bankruptcy court.
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent had failed to assert
its willingness to use arbitration to resolve the dispute and
that the dispute is not well suited to a resolution by the
grievance process.
Finally, the Respondent’s argument that there ‘‘is nothing
in the record to suggest that the lapse in medical insurance
coverage was caused by Respondent’’ and that, in any case,
the Union waived its rights to bargain over this issue is
plainly contradicted by the record. Don Larkin, Respondent’s
director of industrial relations, testified that CIGNA’s can-
cellation was caused by Respondent’s failure to pay the Oc-
tober 15 premium (Tr. 30). Furthermore, the payment sched-
ule for four monthly installments was an accommodation by
the insurance carrier because prior to that time the Respond-
ent’s fixed premium payments were already behind schedule
(Tr. 32). The cancellation of the policy as a result of Re-
spondent’s failure ‘‘to catch up as past due accrued pre-
miums’’ should not have been a surprise and was in accord
with the automatic cancellation provision in the insurance
contract. Moreover, the Union did not waive its bargaining
rights, particularly where, as here, the Respondent blamed
CIGNA and the bankruptcy posture.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Everlock Detroit Division of Everlock
Fastening Systems, Inc., is a debtor in possession and an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party, International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW, AFL–CIO, and its Local 174, is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following is an appropriate unit for purposes of col-
lective bargaining:
All full-time and regular part-time employees of Re-
spondent employed at its Sterling Heights Plant; but ex-
cluding foremen, assistant foremen, watchmen, office
and clerical employees, salaried employees and super-
visors as defined in the Act, time study men and con-
fidential employees.
4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act by unilaterally, without notice to the Union and without
offering to bargain with it, changing the terms of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, by (1) failing to pay certain unit
employees their accrued vacation pay earned prior to October
19, 1990, and (2) failing to pay its health insurance pre-
miums for the CIGNA medical insurance from October 15,
1990, to March 25, 1991, as required by the contractual pro-
visions of the collective-bargaining agreement, dated August
20, 1988.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act, I recommend that it be ordered to cease and de-
sist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by failing (1) to pay certain employees
accrued vacation pay and (2) to pay insurance premiums, as
required in the collective-bargaining agreement, I the Re-
spondent must be ordered to make the payments on behalf
of the unit employees subject to the approval of the bank-
ruptcy court with any interest or other sums applicable to the
payments to be computed in accordance with the Board’s de-
cision in Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213 (1979).
The Respondent must make the unit employees whole for
any losses they may have suffered as a result of its failure
to make the contractually required payments. Kraft Plumbing
& Heating, 252 NLRB 891 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940
(9th Cir. 1981), to be computed in the manner set forth in
Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enf. 444
F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), and with interest to be computed
in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987). The Respondent would also be or-
dered to bargain with the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of the unit employees.
On these findings of fact and conclusons of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended4
ORDER
The Respondent, Everlock Detroit Division of Everlock
Fastening Systems, Inc., Troy, Michigan, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to bargain collectively with the Union and uni-
laterally and without notice to the Union changing the terms
of the collective-bargaining agreement, by failing to pay em-
1116 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
ployees the accrued vacation pay or failing to make insur-
ance premium payments.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make all payments to employees for their accrued va-
cation pay and all insurance premium payments which have
been unlawfully withheld, with interest pursuant to the col-
lective-bargaining agreement and make whole the employees
in the unit for any losses directly attributable to the withhold-
ing of those payments with interest, as set forth in the rem-
edy section of this decision.
(b) Bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees in the aforemen-
tioned unit.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its facility in Troy and Sterling Heights, Michi-
gan, copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’5
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 7, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, UAW, AFL–CIO, and its
Local 174 and unilaterally and, with notice to the Union,
change the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement by
failing to make insurance premium payments or payments to
employees for accrued vacation pay.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make the payments to certain employees for
their accrued vacation pay and all insurance payments which
we have unlawfully withheld, with interest, pursuant to the
collective-bargaining agreement between ourselves and the
Union.
WE WILL make whole our employees in the unit for any
losses directly attributable to our withholding of the pay-
ments or contributions, with interest. WE WILL bargain col-
lectively with the Union on behalf of our employees in the
following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time employees of Re-
spondent employed at its Sterling Heights Plant; but ex-
cluding foremen, assistant foremen, watchmen, office
and clerical employees, salaried employees and super-
visors as defined in the Act, time study men and con-
fidential employees.
EVERLOCK DETROIT DIVISION OF EVERLOCK
FASTENING SYSTEMS, INC., EMPLOYER AND
DEBTOR IN POSSESSION IN BANKRUPTCY