Everett Auto Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 3, 1954

107 N.L.R.B. 1449 (N.L.R.B. 1954)

EVERETT AUTO COMPANY 1449
Thomaston , Georgia , branch distribution plant : While opposed
to the inclusion of any driver - salesmen, the Employer con-
tends that if the driver - salesmen at Columbus are included in
the unit , the driver - salesmen who work out of the Thomaston
branch distribution plant should also be included . As we have
determined to exclude the driver - salesmen at Columbus, and
as the Petitioner does not seek any employees at Thomaston,
there would now seem to be no request before the Board by
either party that any of the Thomaston employees be included.
In view of this fact , as well as the distance between the two
plants and the lack of interchange of personnel , we find that
the Columbus plant constitutes a separate appropriate unit.
We find that the following employees constitute aunit appro-
priate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9 (b) of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees at the Employer's
Columbus , Georgia , plant , including shipping and delivery
employees , laboratory employees , and the truckdriver, but
excluding office clerical , technical and professional employees,
retail store employees , driver - salesmen and their helpers,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
Members Rodgers and Beeson took no part in the consider-
ation of the above Decision and Direction of Election.
EVERETT AUTO COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE NO. 69, AFL,
Petitioner . Case No. 19 - RC-1382. March 3, 1954
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 ( c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Rachel Storer,
hearing officer . The hearing officer's rulings made at the
hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby af-
firmed.
Upon the entire record in this case , the Board finds:
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act.'
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent
certain employees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the
representation of employees of the Employer within the mean-
ing of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the Act.
i Howell Chevrolet Co. v. N. L. R. B., 346 U. S. 482. Member Rodgers joins in this decision
but is not to be deemed thereby as agreeing with the Board's present jurisdictional standards
107 NLRB No. 299.
1450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Employer contends that a current bargaining agreement
between the Petitioner and the Snohomish County Automobile
Dealers Association,2 of which the Employer was formerly
a member , is a bar to this proceeding . The Petitioner contends
that the agreement is not a bar inasmuch as the Employer
resigned from the Association before the effective date of the
current agreement , which is a renewal of a preceding contract.
The record reveals that the original contract between the
Petitioner and the Association was executed during July 1952,
at a time when the Employer was an association member, and
was made effective retroactively for a period of 1 year
from May 1, 1952, to May 1, 1953. The contract contained a
clause providing for automatic renewal for an additional 1-year
period unless either party, at least 60 days prior to May 1,
1953, gave written notice of desire to modify or terminate.
On December 31, 1952, the Employer sent a letter of resig-
nation to the Association . 3 Thereafter , as neither party gave
the requisite notice at least 60 days prior to May 1, 1953,
the Association ' s contract with the Petitioner was automat-
ically renewed . On September 24, 1953, after the contract
was renewed , the petition herein was filed.
The Employer does not deny that it resigned from the
Association but argues , in support of its contract -bar contention,
that because its resignation from the Association did not
terminate the Employer ' s obligations under the original
contract , the renewal of that contract automatically extended
the Employer ' s obligations for the renewed term.
We find the Employer' s contention to be without merit. While
we agree with the Employer that it could not alter the course
of its bargaining from joint to individual action during the term
of the original agreement between the Petitioner and the
Association ,4 there was no restriction on the Employer's
freedom to abandon participation in group bargaining at a
proper time .5 Where, as here, the contract contains an auto-
matic-renewal clause, the proper time for withdrawal from
participation in group bargaining would be before the renewal
takes effect. Any other view would render it virtually impossible
for an employer who participates in group bargaining to
disassociate itself therefrom , even though such an employer
individually desires to terminate or modify a contract which
the group sees fit to retain for an additional term. Therefore,
by withdrawing from the Association prior to the Mill B date
2 Herein called the Association.
3 Aside from its formal parts the letter read;'Please accept my [the Employer ' s) resignation
from your Association . After due consideration , I believe because of personal factors
this action is desirable at this time."
4Engineering Metal Products Company, 92 NLRB 823
5 Economy Shade Company, 91 NLRB 1552.
MAURICE EMBROIDERY WORKS, INC. 1451
of the contract, the Employer prevented the renewed contract
from becoming a bar as to him. 6
4. The following employees of the Employer constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act:
All employees engaged in the repair, maintenance, and
servicing of automotive equipment at the Employer's Everett,
Washington , plant, excluding new- and used - automobile sales-
men, office clerical employees, guards, professional em-
ployees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.'
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
Chairman Farmer and Member Beeson took no part in the
consideration of the above Decision and Direction of Election.
6Nor do we find merit in the Employer 's contention that the resignation was not effective
with regard to withdrawal from group participation in collective bargaining because the
resignation did not specifically mention collective bargaining . We find that a resignation
of the type herein involved constitutes an effective withdrawal for all purposes unless an
intention to continue in some phase of group activity is expressed therein. Moreover, the
Association ' s president testified without contradiction that the Association had never bargained
on behalf of nonmembers.
7 The unit is substantially as agreed upon by the parties,
MAURICE EMBROIDERY WORKS, INC. and UNION GENERAL
DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA DE LA AGUJA
INDEPENDIENTE. Case No. 24-CA-390. March 4, 1954
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 13, 1953, Trial Examiner Thomas N. Kessel
issued, his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled pro-
ceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending
that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report attached
hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent
had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices
and recommended a dismissal of those allegations. There-
after, the Respondent filed exceptions.
The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudici4l error was com-
mitted. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has
considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions, and the
entire record in the case and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. I
I In the absence of an exception thereto, we adopt, without passing thereon, the Trial Exam-
iner's conclusion that the Respondent did not engage in surveillance, and his subordinate
finding that, as a matter of law, the agency of Balines had not been established by competent
proof.
107 NLRB No. 296.