Evelyn J. Watkins Appellant,v.Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 18, 1999
05970824 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 18, 1999)

05970824

03-18-1999

Evelyn J. Watkins Appellant, v. Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.


Evelyn J. Watkins v. Department of the Interior

05970824

March 18, 1999

Evelyn J. Watkins )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Request No. 05970824

) Appeal No. 01951814

Bruce Babbitt, ) Agency No. LMS-92-022

Secretary, ) Hearing No. 270-93-9088X

Department of the Interior, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

On June 11, 1997, Evelyn J. Watkins (hereinafter referred to as appellant)

timely initiated a request to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC or Commission) to reconsider the decision in Evelyn J. Watkins

v. Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal

No. 01951814 (May 6, 1997), received by appellant's attorney on

May 12, 1997. EEOC regulations provide that the Commissioners may,

in their discretion, reconsider any previous Commission decision.

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a). The party requesting reconsideration must submit

written argument or evidence which tends to establish one or more of

the following three criteria: new and material evidence is available

that was not readily available when the previous decision was issued,

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1); the previous decision involved an erroneous

interpretation of law, regulation, or material fact, or a misapplication

of established policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2); and the decision is of

such exceptional nature as to have substantial precedential implications,

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). Appellant's request is denied; however, the

Commission, on its own motion, will reconsider the previous decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether the previous decision provided

appellant with all the relief for which she is entitled.

BACKGROUND

In light of the narrow issue to be decided herein, the Commission will not

repeat the previous decision's narrative. Instead, we note the following

salient facts: pursuant to an administrative hearing, held on August 31,

1992, an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a recommended decision

(RD) finding, among other things, that appellant had been retaliated

against for engaging in prior EEO activity when on July 23, 1992, her

performance appraisal was downgraded from a rating of Outstanding to

Fully Successful (hereinafter allegation 1).<1>

The record indicates that in May 1992, appellant's immediate supervisor,

A-1, prepared her annual performance appraisal for the period covering

April 1, 1991 to March 31, 1992. A-1 rated appellant as being outstanding

on all five elements of the appraisal. Appellant's overall summary

rating for the period was Outstanding. On or about May 29, 1992,

A-1, pursuant to the agency's regulations, forwarded the performance

appraisal to appellant's second-level supervisor, A-2, who had to review

the appraisal and indicate her concurrence or nonconcurrence with the

assigned rating.

A-2 disagreed with the rating that A-1 had provided appellant. In a

June 1992 memorandum to A-1, she took issue with certain comments made

in the narrative section of appellant's performance appraisal. A-1 was

also asked to provide statistics and documentation to support the rating

of Outstanding that she gave appellant. A-1 refused to provide any

additional information. A-1, who was subsequently removed for, among

other reasons, unsatisfactory work performance, violated the agency's

regulations by providing appellant a copy of the performance appraisal

before any action was taken by A-2.

On July 14, 1992, appellant was notified that she would be reporting to

A-2 as her new first line supervisor. On July 22, 1992, A-2 issued a new

performance appraisal to appellant for the subject period. Appellant was

rated Fully Successful on all elements and received an overall rating of

Fully Successful. For each performance element, A-2 wrote that A-1 had

not provided any documentation or information that would have justified

any rating other than Fully Successful. A-3, Chief, Program Services

Office, signed the new performance appraisal as the Reviewing Official.

The AJ found that A-2's justification for disregarding A-1's recommended

rating, and her evaluation of appellant as being Fully Successful,

i.e., A-1's refusal to provide documentation that would have supported

an Outstanding rating, was a pretext for reprisal based discrimination.

According to the AJ, A-2 "[f]ailed to avail herself of an obvious and

available source of documentation -- the complainant." (RD at p.21).

In accordance with the agency's regulations, the AJ found that A-2

should have held a preappraisal meeting with appellant in order to get

information about her performance; reevaluate appellant; remove A-1's

remarks from the appraisal; and return the revised appraisal to A-1 for

her signature before presenting it to appellant. Since these measures

were not taken, the AJ recommended, in pertinent part, that the agency:

Hold a preappraisal meeting with the complainant in connection with

the performance appraisal period April 1, 1991 to March 31, 1992 and

permit the complainant to provide documentation concerning her work

and performance prior to completing a written performance appraisal.

In accordance with agency policy, the agency may remove the comments

which were made by [A-1] relating to staffing and work environment in

the library, after which the agency shall evaluate the complainant,

and award a new summary rating, effective on July 22, 1992.

In its final decision (FAD) dated November 10, 1994, the agency adopted

the findings of the AJ. The FAD also adopted the above corrective action

recommended by the AJ. Appellant filed an appeal with the Commission.

Appellant, in addition to contesting the findings of no discrimination

previously mentioned, argued that the agency and the AJ erred in not

finding that she was entitled to a rating of Outstanding rather than

merely a re-evaluation of her performance. The previous decision,

without addressing appellant's contention that she was entitled to a

rating of Outstanding, affirmed the FAD. Among the remedies ordered by

the previous decision, the agency was directed to:

[h]old a pre-appraisal meeting with appellant in connection with the

performance appraisal period April 1, 1991 to March 31, 1992, and permit

appellant to provide documentation concerning her work and performance

prior to completing a new written performance appraisal. Thereafter,

the agency shall issue appellant a new performance appraisal, effectively

issued on July 22, 1992. Neither the rating nor reviewing official

for appellant's original performance appraisal shall be involved in

the issuance of the new appraisal. The new appraisal shall be issued

to appellant within forty-five (45) days of the date this decision

becomes final.

In appellant's request for reconsideration (RTR), she maintained that

the previous decision erred in not directing the agency to provide her

with a rating of Outstanding. The agency did not respond to appellant's

RTR.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that

appellant's request for reconsideration fails to meet the criteria of 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c). It is therefore the decision of the Commission to

deny her request. On its own motion, however, the Commission offers the

following comments in order to directly address appellant's contention

that the agency and the AJ erred in not finding she was entitled to a

rating of Outstanding rather than a re-evaluation.

Where discrimination is found, the injured party is to be placed, as

near as may be, in the situation they would have occupied if the wrong

had not been committed. Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,

418-19 (1975). We note at the outset that throughout the processing of

her complaint, appellant has incorrectly maintained that the agency's

internal regulations mandate that if a Reviewing Official fails to

take action on an appraisal within fifteen (15) days of its receipt,

the Rater's assessment becomes final. Since A-2 did not act within the

said time period, appellant argued that A-1's original rating must stand.

A review of the pertinent section of the agency's Performance Management

System Timetable, however, indicates that although the Reviewing Official

does have fifteen (15) days to review an appraisal, there is nothing that

indicates the Rater's assessment becomes the official rating if no action

is taken within the period. (Report of Investigation, Exhibit 8, p.230).

Based on a review of the record, the Commission finds that appellant

was not entitled to relief beyond that which was ordered by the previous

decision. We find that placing appellant in the position she would have

occupied had she not been discriminated against does not necessarily

mean that she is entitled to a rating of Outstanding. As the record

indicates, appellant's entitlement to such a rating was never established.

We agree with the AJ that, at this point, the agency's regulations only

entitle appellant to a reevaluation of her performance. Consequently,

we find no discernable reason to overturn the AJ's determination.

CONCLUSION

After a review of appellant's request to reconsider, the previous

decision, and the entire record, the Commission finds that appellant's

request does not meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c). It is

therefore the decision of the Commission to DENY appellant's request.

The Commission, however, has decided to reconsider the previous decision

on our own motion, for the reasons provided. The decision in EEOC

Appeal No. 01951814 (May 6, 1997), as MODIFIED above, remains the

Commission's final decision. The agency is directed to comply with the

previous decision's Order as restated below. There is no further right

of administrative appeal on a decision of the Commission on a Request

to Reconsider.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

(1) The agency shall hold a pre-appraisal meeting with appellant

in connection with the performance appraisal period April 1, 1991

to March 31, 1992, and permit appellant to provide documentation

concerning her work and performance prior to completing a new written

performance appraisal. Thereafter, the agency shall issue appellant a

new performance appraisal, effectively issued on July 22, 1992. Neither

the rating nor reviewing official for appellant's original performance

appraisal shall be involved in the issuance of the new appraisal.

The new appraisal shall be issued to appellant within forty-five (45)

days of the date this decision becomes final.

(2) The agency shall provide appellant with all awards or fringe

benefits accruing from the new appraisal within thirty (30) days of the

date the new appraisal is issued.

(3) The agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation pertaining to

appellant's entitlement to any compensatory damages incurred as result

of the agency's retaliatory actions toward her. The agency shall afford

appellant sixty (60) days to submit additional evidence in support of

her claim for compensatory damages. Within thirty (30) days of its

receipt of appellant's evidence, the agency shall issue a final decision

determining appellant's entitlement to compensatory damages, if any,

together with appropriate appeal rights.

(4) The agency shall post at its facilities in New Orleans, Louisiana

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed

by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by

the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

(5) The agency is encouraged to provide training in the obligations

and duties imposed by the anti-discrimination laws to all the managerial

officials responsible for agency actions in this case.

(6) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due appellant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 18, 1999

_______________ ______________________________

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

1The AJ found no discrimination with regard to two other allegations

raised by appellant. We will not address these allegations in this decision,

because appellant's request for reconsideration only concerns the relief

that she was provided with respect to allegation 1.