Eugenia A. Williams, Complainant,v.Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 10, 2000
01971511 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 10, 2000)

01971511

08-10-2000

Eugenia A. Williams, Complainant, v. Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Eugenia A. Williams v. Department of Agriculture

01971511

August 10, 2000

Eugenia A. Williams, )

Complainant, )

)

v. )

) Appeal No. 01971511

Daniel R. Glickman, ) Agency Nos. 93-1012

Secretary, ) 93-1129

Department of Agriculture, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On December 10, 1996, complainant, by facsimile, filed an appeal from

the agency's final decision concerning the amount of compensatory

damages to which she was entitled.<1> The appeal is deemed timely (see

29 C.F.R. � 1614.401(e) and 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,660 (1999) (to be

codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614. 504(a) and

(b))), and is accepted in accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659

(1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

The issue presented is whether the agency's November 8, 1996 decision

to award complainant $2,000.00 in compensatory damages constitutes full,

"make whole" relief.

The complainant filed two complaints against the agency on October 12,

1993 (Case No. 93-1012) and on November 29, 1993 (Case No. 93-1129).

The cases were consolidated and the following issues were accepted

for investigation: whether complainant was discriminated against,

on the bases of race (Black), physical disability (none provided), and

reprisal (previous EEO activity), with respect to: (1) Element No. 4

on her performance appraisal for FY 1992, received on June 9, 1993;

(2) a 14-day suspension, which was effective August 8, 1993; and (3)

her claim that she was harassed with respect to her working conditions

from June 1, 1993, regarding time and attendance matters, i.e., leave

requests, the pay period 17 leave charges, her compensatory time request

for October 8, 1993, and the comments which were on placed on her time

and attendance records.

On April 15, 1994, the parties entered into a resolution agreement

(agreement). The agreement stated that it constituted the �full,

complete, and final settlement� of complainant's cases. The agency,

without admitting �[d]iscrimination, wrongdoing, misconduct, or

liability,� agreed to:

1) change 10 hours of annual leave taken in pay period #17 to sick

leave and advance to the complainant any necessary hours to cover the

10 hours of sick leave;

2) grant the complainant 1 hour of compensatory time for hours worked

on October 8, 1993;

3) cancel the 14-day suspension of August 8 - 21, 1993, and restore

back pay and benefits during the aforementioned suspension period;

4) expunge the complainant's official personnel folder of any material

relating to the suspension mentioned in item #3, above;

5) change performance element #4 (assembles and processes branch time

and attendance) to exceeds for the FY-92 rating period.

6) reassign the complainant outside of the Agency effective April 17,

1994, and reimburse the hiring Agency for salary and benefits through

COB FY-94;

7) remove additional remarks on official records copy from the

Complainant's time and attendance file for 1993 pay periods 12 through

19; and

8) pay proven compensatory damages.

On July 26, 1994, the complainant submitted written material to support

her claim for compensatory damages. She claimed past pecuniary losses and

nonpecuniary losses. With respect to past pecuniary losses, she sought:

(a) $11,532.00 for 1,098 hours of annual leave used between 1990 and

1994; (b) $1,502.00 for transportation to medical providers between 1990

and 1995; (c) $3,425.00 for loans and upkeep of her daughter in 1993 and

1994; and (d) $1,380.00 for hair damage in 1993 and 1994. With respect

to nonpecuniary damages, the complainant sought $4,510,000.00.

Although, at one time, there was a dispute as to whether the agency had

complied with the terms of the agreement, the only matter before the

Commission is the amount of compensatory relief to which the complainant

is entitled. According to the agency, it denied liability for the

damages requested by the complainant on November 22, 1994. The agency

did not, however, explain why it then took almost two additional years,

November 11, 1996, to issue its final determination of the amount that

the complainant was entitled to in compensatory relief. As noted above,

the agency, in November 1996, concluded that she was only entitled to

$2,000.00. We will address the specifics of the complainant's claims

and the agency's response below.

Compensatory Damages

a. Legal Standards for an Award of Compensatory Damages

Section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071,

Pub. L. No. 102-166, codified as 42 U.S.C. � 1981a, authorizes an award

of compensatory damages as part of the "make whole" relief for intentional

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, and � 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended.

Section 1981a(b)(3) limits the total amount of compensatory damages

that may be awarded to each complaining party for future pecuniary

losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss

of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses, according to the

number of persons employed by the respondent employer. The limit for an

employer with more than 500 employees, such as the agency, is $300,000.00.

42 U.S.C. � 1981a (b)(3)(D).

Compensatory damages may be awarded for the past pecuniary losses,

future pecuniary losses, and non-pecuniary losses which are directly or

proximately caused by the agency's discriminatory conduct. Compensatory

and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil Rights

Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. N-915.002 (July 14, 1992), at 8. Pecuniary

losses are out-of-pocket expenses that are incurred as a result of the

employer's unlawful action, including job-hunting expenses, moving

expenses, and other quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses. Id. Past

pecuniary losses are the pecuniary losses that are incurred prior

to the resolution of a complaint via a finding of discrimination, an

offer of full relief, or a voluntary settlement. Id. at 8-9. Future

pecuniary losses are losses that are likely to occur after resolution

of a complaint. Id. at 9. Non-pecuniary losses are emotional pain,

suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,

injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation,

injury to credit standing, and loss of health. Id.

A compensatory damages award should fully compensate a complainant for

the harm caused by the agency's discriminatory action even if the harm

is intangible. Id. at 13. There are no precise formulae for determining

the amount of damages payable for non-pecuniary losses. Damage awards for

non-pecuniary losses that have been assessed by juries and courts have

varied substantially from one another. Id. at 13. However, an award of

compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses, including emotional harm,

should reflect the extent to which the respondent's discriminatory action

directly or proximately caused the harm and the extent to which other

factors also caused the harm. Id. at 11-12. An award of compensatory

damages for non-pecuniary losses should also reflect the nature and

severity of the harm and the duration or expected duration of the harm.

Id. at 14.

Finally, pursuant to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the compensatory

damages provision of the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1991 may not

be retroactively applied to conduct that occurred before November

21, 1991, the effective date of the Act. Thus, complainant cannot

receive compensatory damages with respect to matters that arose before

November 21, 1991. A complainant is entitled to reimbursement for all

pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses incurred as a result of the post-CRA

discrimination.

B. Complainant's Evidence of Injury and Causation

According to the complainant, she began being harassed in June 1990, when

her work hours were changed and she was penalized for things that she

had not done. After June 1991, the complainant stated that management's

harassment of her increased. She attributed this to her having contacted

an EEO counselor. During the period of June 1990 through November 21,

1991, complainant indicated that she incurred several stress related

problems, i.e., losing a child due to a premature delivery, problems

with her GI system, stomach pains, upset stomach, diarrhea, nervousness,

being tense, excitability, and disorientation.

On January 13, 1992, she was told to contact an agency official at 8:00

a.m., regarding her whereabouts, arrival, and departure time, unless she

was unconscious. According to the complainant, this comment caused her

to shake, her stomach began to move, her heart began to beat faster,

and she �felt as though [she] was being suffocated.� In April 1992,

she again prematurely delivered a child that, complainant maintained,

did not survive due to her �stressful work environment.� The complainant

soon became pregnant a third time. She stated, however, that she was

unable to take the medication that was prescribed to her in order to deal

with the effects of the harassment that she was allegedly subjected to

between May and September 1992. Subsequently, she was accused of being

AWOL, abusing leave, and falsifying official records with respect to

time and attendance. She was also informed by management that, in the

future, one of her supervisors had to watch her fill out her time and

attendance records. Complainant stated that this procedure was degrading

and made her feel uncomfortable.

In October 1992, complainant indicated that she was placed on strict

bed-rest and was only allowed to go to the bathroom and eat meals.

Despite being on bed-rest, complainant maintained that agency officials

continued to harass her by sending her disturbing letters and making phone

calls that she found both threatening and intimidating. According to

complainant, she began to hemorrhage and �on December 25, 1992, once again

my membranes ruptured prematurely causing me to be hospitalized.� The

complainant's niece had to watch her daughter during the holiday period.

On December 31, an emergency cesarean section was performed on the

complainant. Although she delivered a son, he did not survive.

Between January and February 1993, she was hospitalized for severe chest

pains, shortness of breath, and back pains after she discovered that

her job had been promised to a co-worker. Between March and May 1993,

complainant maintained that her working conditions caused her to suffer

stomach, back, and chest pains. Between June and August 1993, as a result

of receiving a proposed suspension, she stated that she suffered chest

pains, irregular breathing, and hair breakage due to stress. She also

stated that her niece had to take care of her daughter throughout the

Summer of 1993.

Between September and December 1993, she stated that she consulted with a

psychiatrist for treatment of stress. During a meeting with an agency

official on December 15, 1993, complainant stated she was told that

the agency was justified in suspending her and that if she continued

making accusations, she would be subjected to disciplinary actions.

In addition, she was told that she would not be detailed out of the

agency. Complainant maintained that she felt �completely helpless.� She

went to the nurse's office to lie down. While there, she became nervous

and began having severe chest pains along with shortness of breath.

On December 16 and 17, 1993, she had to go to the emergency room.

In January 1994, complainant was detailed to another agency; however,

she maintains that she was still harassed by her former management chain

with respect to leave usage and time and attendance matters. On May 3,

1994, she underwent gall bladder surgery, which she also attributed

to management's constant harassment. On or around June 22, 1994, she

received a letter concerning proving compensatory damages. According to

the complainant, she had to �re-live the past 4 years of unpleasantness.�

On July 5, 1994, complainant was institutionalized for depression.

Complainant's niece, C-1, provided a statement indicating, among other

things, that she noticed a change in the complainant's behavior around

January 1991, when she was told, by complainant, about her problems

at work. According to C-1, complainant began �regressing when she

inform[ed] me that her supervisor was constantly harassing her about leave

and other issues.� In September 1993, C-1 indicated that complainant

borrowed $700.00 from her, after she was suspended from work without pay.

C-1 indicated that complainant told her that people had become �extremely

rude to her which upset her condition, causing her to take a lot [sic]

of medication just to make it through the day.� Complainant, she stated,

also took medication at night to help her sleep because of nightmares.

According to C-1:

[i]t takes her a long time to make decisions. I think this is due to

the medication that she is taking to help her deal with the stressful

work environment that she was in. And now, [complainant] is petrified

that she will lose her present job because she was hospitalized in May

1994 and just found out that she needs to be hospitalized again but this

time on a psychiatric ward. After her session with her psychiatrist on

June 24, 1994, [complainant] became very ill. She was unable to keep

anything on her stomach for several days. She had diarrhea, stomach

pains, nausea, trembling spells, anxious, just a nervous wreck.

C-1 concludes by stating that �I have been helping her take care of

daughter, [C-2], for over a year now.�

C-3, the complainant's sister, indicated that she noticed a �dramatic�

change in complainant's behavior since June 1992.� C-3 maintained

that �it is as though she hated to go to work because it was [a] very

unpleasant place to spend most of her day. She always seemed like she

[was] preoccupied and tense.� C-3 also indicated that the complainant

was, at times, withdrawn from her family and acted as though something

was troubling her. Finally, C-3 indicated that complainant's daughter

�[h]as been staying with our niece, C-1, since June 1993, because

[complainant] has been taking a lot [sic] of medication for her condition

which interferes with her emotional and physical state.�

Complainant's hair stylist indicated, among other things, that in late

July 1993, she noticed that complainant's hair was beginning to �break

off.� According to her, the complainant told her that she was taking

daily medication and was under a tremendous amount of stress from

her job. The complainant, she stated, came in for weekly treatments

for her condition. The record contains numerous copies of receipts

pertaining to complainant's hair treatments.

Complainant's daughter stated that �[d]uring the school year of 1993, I

was kept up at night while my mother would be in the living room crying

over the things that happened to her at work that day or the days or

weeks before.� Complainant's daughter further indicated that �I had to

stay with either my aunt or my cousin because I was unable to live with

my mother. Every morning when she would go to work, I was scared for

her safety.�

On February 28, 1995, Doctor J, a psychiatrist, wrote that �[complainant]

has been undergoing weekly psychotherapy since August 1994, after being

hospitalized for major depression.� He also indicated that she has

displayed, at various times, symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder,

major depression, and paranoia. He listed concerns such as recurring

nightmares regarding threats and harassment on her previous job, insomnia,

flashbacks of being threatened and intimidated on her previous job,

nervousness, impaired concentration, periods of sadness, feelings of

emptiness, and anxiety with a sensation of being unfairly persecuted.

According to Doctor J, �complainant will require continuing psychotherapy

for an indefinite period of time to address the above symptoms and other

areas of concern. As she was previously psychiatrically healthy, her

symptoms appear to emanate solely from work-related concerns.�

1. Past Pecuniary Losses

(a). With respect to complainant's claim for $11,632.00 for leave

that she used between 1990 and 1994, we find that this is a claim for

equitable relief not for compensatory damages, and is therefore beyond

the scope of the agreement. Hogeland v. Department of Agriculture,

EEOC Appeal No. 01976440 (June 14, 1999); McGowan-Butler v. Department

of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940636 (September 9, 1994).

(b). With respect to complainant's claim for $1,502.00 for transportation

to medical providers, the agency denied this claim because the complainant

did not submit documentation relating to these expenses. We agree.

Complainant has the burden of establishing her entitlement, if any,

to the amounts she requested.

(c). With respect to the complainant's claim that she borrowed

$3,425.00 in loans and upkeep of a her daughter in 1993 and 1994,

the agency denied this claim because the complainant did not submit

documentation to support her claim. We find that, with the exception of

the $700.00 that she borrowed from her niece, C-1, the complainant did

not submit documentation relating to the expenses she incurred in order

to care for her daughter. Complainant, after she was suspended from work

without pay, provided sufficient documentation that she borrowed $700.00

from her niece. Her 14-day suspension was one of the matters that was

raised in her formal complaints and which was resolved by the agreement.

Therefore, we find that this is a matter for which the complainant should

be reimbursed.<2>

(d). With respect to complainant's claim for $1,380.00 for damage to her

hair from July 24, 1993 through July 15, 1994, the agency found that,

notwithstanding the receipts and opinion letter from the complainant's

hair stylist, the complainant presented no proof of causation.

According to the agency, �[c]omplainant presented no credible proof

that the conditions at work were the direct and proximate cause of her

hair damage. A beautician is not a physician. A beautician's opinion

regarding the cause of the complainant's hair damage is pure speculation

based entirely upon her conversations with the complainant.� We agree

with the denial of complainant's claim. There is insufficient evidence

to establish a causal relationship between complainant's hair loss and the

agency's actions. We find no persuasive evidence to support the assertion

that the complainant's medication caused the damage to her hair.

2. Future Pecuniary Losses

Like the agency, we find that complainant is not entitled to future

pecuniary damages. Although complainant presented evidence that she

would �[r]equire continuing psychotherapy for an indefinite period of

time,� the agency correctly noted that she did not provide specific

detailed documentation of the nature, extent and likely duration of

these visits.

3. Non-pecuniary Losses

As previously noted, the complainant sought $4,510,000.00 for

non-pecuniary damages; however, the agency awarded her $2,000.00. We find

that the record supports the complainant's claim for non-pecuniary damages

resulting from her claim that she underwent harassment from management

officials concerning time and attendance matters. We note, however, that

the agency's period of liability for compensatory damages is limited to

June 1, 1993 until April 15, 1994. We note in this regard that the issues

accepted by the agency and subsequently settled by the parties encompass

this time period. It is a Commission goal to make damage awards for

emotional harm consistent with awards in similar cases. In Carpenter,

EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995), the Commission awarded $75,000

for non-pecuniary damages in order to compensate the complainant for the

deterioration of her medical and emotional condition. According to the

complainant, in Carpenter, the agency's actions resulted in her seeking

disability retirement, because of an aggravation of her asthma, panic

attacks, insomnia, digestive problems, loss of spirit, social withdrawal,

feelings of hostility, irritability, and a loss of libido.

In Finlay v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01942985

(April 29, 1997), the Commission awarded $100,000 in non-pecuniary

damages in order to compensate the complainant for severe psychological

injuries over four years. The complainant's condition, which was

expected to continue for an indeterminate period of time, included

ongoing depression, frequent crying, concern for physical safety, loss

of charm, lethargy, social withdrawal, concern for physical safety,

recurring nightmares and memories of harassment, a damaged marriage,

stomach distress, and headaches.

In Santiago v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01955684 (October

14, 1998), the Commission awarded $125,000 in non-pecuniary damages

for emotional distress, i.e., depression, anxiety, paranoia, confusion,

moodiness, insomnia, social withdrawal, tearfulness, fatigue, loss of

libido, loss of self-esteem, chest and stomach pains, digestive problems,

and incidents of shortness of breath. The complainant repeatedly

sought medical treatment for her problems, including an invasive

diagnostic procedure, after she was removed in 1993. The duration of

the complainant's emotional and psychological distress and physical

illness was found to be from November 21, 1991 to the date complainant

was removed, on February 12, 1993.

In Chow v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01981308 (August 5,

1999), the Commission awarded $100,000.00 to a female employee who had

been subjected to sexual harassment from her supervisor. According to the

record, in March 1993, he began making comments of a sexual nature to her.

After she rejected his advances, his demeanor toward her became hostile.

In Chow, the complainant became upset, nervous and began experiencing

abdominal pains, chest pains and headaches. She also experienced

difficulty breathing and sleeping due to nightmares, and gained weight and

began losing her hair. She testified that she became so depressed that

she did not want to socialize with others, stopped jogging, walking her

dog, and eventually ended her relationship with her boyfriend. In August

1993, she began seeing a psychologist two to three times a month and

was subsequently placed on anti-anxiety medication and anti-depressant

medication. She saw the psychologist approximately 3 to 3 � years.

Having carefully considered the facts of this case, the Commission finds

that, in light of the fact that the agency's period of liability is

limited to June 1, 1993 until April 15, 1994, complainant is entitled to

non-pecuniary damages in a total amount of $50,000.00. The Commission

finds that the amount of this award is motivated by neither passion

nor prejudice; is not "monstrously excessive" standing alone; and is

not inconsistent with amounts awarded in similar cases. See Cygnar

v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989); and EEOC v. AIC

Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F.Supp. 573, 574 (N.D.Ill. 1993).

Complainant, therefore, is entitled to an additional $48,000.00 in

non-pecuniary damages.

In reaching the above amount, the Commission has considered many factors.

For example, we considered the severity of the hostile environment that

complainant was subjected to during the eleven months at issue. We also

considered the nature, severity, and duration of complainant's emotional

distress and related symptoms. During the period at issue, complainant,

on several occasions, suffered chest pains, irregular breathing, and

was unable to care for her daughter throughout the Summer of 1993.

She also had to consult with a psychiatrist for treatment of stress

and, on December 16 and 17, 1993, she had to go to the emergency room.

Her family members also outlined the distress that she underwent during

the period. As noted above, complainant's psychiatrist found that she

suffered from post traumatic stress disorder, major depression, and

paranoia, which he found was related to the harassment she was subjected

to.

Unlike the agency, we also find that the plain meaning of the agreement,

that the agency would

pay �proven compensatory damages,� allows for the payment of future

non-pecuniary damages, i.e., those that arose after the agreement was

signed but which are shown to be related to the matters addressed in

the complaints.<3> Thus, our total award of $50,000.00 reflects Doctor

J's statement that complainant would, for an indefinite period of time,

have recurring nightmares, insomnia, flashbacks, nervousness, impaired

concentration, periods of sadness, feelings of emptiness, anxiety,

and a sensation of being unfairly persecuted.

Accordingly, the agency's FAD is Modified.

ORDER

The agency is ordered to take the following remedial actions:

1. Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency, if it has already paid complainant the $2000.00

referenced in the FAD, shall issue her a check for $48,700.00 for proven

compensatory damages. If the agency has not already paid complainant

the $2000.00 referenced in the FAD, then it shall issue her a check for

$50,700.00.

2. The issue of attorney's fees and costs are REMANDED to the agency.

Complainant, through counsel, shall submit a request for attorney's

fees and costs in accordance with the Attorney's Fees paragraph set

forth below. No later than sixty (60) days after the agency's receipt of

the attorney's fees statement and supporting affidavit, the agency shall

issue a final agency decision addressing the issues of attorney's fees,

and costs. The agency shall submit a copy of the final decision to the

Compliance Officer at the address set forth below.

3. The agency shall submit copies of checks for compensatory damages

and attorney's fees, and the agency's determination on attorney's fees,

to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action.

The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,

the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a

civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior

to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a

civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407

and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the

underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �

2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to

an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the

complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall

be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of

fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0400)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN

THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

__08-10-00_______ __________________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_____________________ _________________________________

DATE

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2The agency denied the complainant's request to be reimbursed for the

$700.00 she borrowed from C-1 because C-1 did not state that the loan

was related to the upkeep of complainant's daughter. We find, however,

that even if the complainant did not establish that the $700.00 loan

was related to the upkeep of her daughter, the record is clear that

complainant incurred this expense as a result of her unpaid 14-day

suspension. Therefore, we find it is appropriate to reimburse her.

3In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms

of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the

plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal Service, EEOC

Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the

writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning

must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without any

resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator

v. Building Engineering Services, 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).