Essaquena Harris, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 17, 2009
0120071623 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 17, 2009)

0120071623

06-17-2009

Essaquena Harris, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Essaquena Harris,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120071623

Hearing No. 440-2006-00016X

Agency No. 1J607007205

DECISION

On January 26, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

December 22, 2006 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42

U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons,

the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Rehabilitation Mail Processing Clerk, at the agency's Chicago

Processing and Distribution Center.

On September 20, 2005, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging

that she was discriminated against on the bases of disability (back and

shoulder) and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:

1. on May 17, 2005, her supervisor addressed her in a hostile voice

while requesting a doctor's statement and threatened to have her removed

from the premises;

2. on June 27, 2005, she was not properly paid for forty (40)

hours of leave requested;

3. she was informed she could not work overtime in the Manual Unit;

4. she was informed that her rehabilitative job offer was to

be modified because it forced her to work outside of her medical

restrictions; and

5. she was informed that medical clearance from her doctor was needed

in order to allow her to work overtime.

By letter dated August 15, 2005, the agency dismissed complainant's

claims that on April 26, 2005, her Supervisor told her that the sound of

her voice makes her feel like jumping on her; and on April 28, 2005, her

Supervisor violated her privacy by writing her full social security number

on the back of an EERS Report and leaving it on the post for three tours.

The agency dismissed these claims as untimely filed. Further, the agency

dismissed the claims that on May 19, June 15 and 16, 2005, her Supervisor

constantly checked on her and paged her while assigned to the Manual

Unit; and on June 15, 2005, she was told that she could not take mail

These claims were dismissed by the agency for failure to state a claim.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing. On February 28, 2006, complainant raised the

dismissed issues with the AJ. However, on March 2, 2006, the AJ found

complainant's objection about the dismissed issues was not timely raised.

On April 17, 2006, the agency filed its Motion for Summary Judgment,

and complainant responded on May 8, 2006. On August 26, 2006, the AJ

found there were issues of material fact in dispute, and denied the

agency's motion.

On October 5, 2006, the case was set for a hearing. However, after

complainant rested her case in chief, the agency "reinstated" its Motion

for Summary Judgment,1 which the AJ granted. On December 13, 2006,

the AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination.

It his decision, the AJ found complainant was not an individual with

a disability because her impairments do not substantially limit any

major life activity. With respect to her remaining claims, the AJ

found that the supervisor's use of a loud voice did not rise to the

level of harassment. The AJ further found that, although complainant

was improperly paid, her leave was adjusted and complainant was timely

reimbursed for the error. The AJ found complainant was not denied

overtime on the day in question; rather, her supervisor offered it to her,

but complainant declined and went home. As for complainant's claim that

she was told her rehabilitation job was going to be modified because it

required her to work outside of her medical restrictions, the AJ found

this was done out of a concern for her safety, and was not done with

any discriminatory intent. Finally, the AJ found that the agency did

not act improperly when it denied complainant overtime because the work

was not within her medical restrictions.

The agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding

that complainant failed to prove that she was subjected to discrimination

as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant contends there are material facts in dispute,

and argues that the AJ erred when he failed to entertain her objection to

the dismissal of certain issues. In response, the agency maintains that

the AJ's decision was correct, and asks that we affirm its final order.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As an initial matter, we will address the agency's decision to dismiss

certain issues. Specifically, the agency dismissed the following claims

as untimely:

A. on April 26, 2005, her Supervisor told her that the sound of her

voice makes her feel like jumping on her; and

B. on April 28, 2005, her Supervisor violated her privacy by writing

her full social security number on the back of an EERS Report and leaving

it on the post for three tours.

The agency dismissed the following claims for failure to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted;

C. on May 19, June 15 and 16, 2005, her Supervisor constantly checked

on her and paged her while assigned to the Manual Unit; and

D. on June 15, 2005, she was told that she could not take mail to the

station.

Complainant raised an objection with the agency regarding the dismissal

on August 17, 2005. When the case was assigned for a hearing, the

AJ advised complainant that if she desired to object to the dismissed

issues, she needed to do so within 30 days from the date of the AJ's

Acknowledgement Order. Complainant then raised her objection with the AJ,

but the AJ determined this was not timely done, and found her objection

to these issues was waived.

While we disagree with the AJ's decision not to entertain complainant's

objection to the dismissed issues, we nonetheless find that the agency's

decision to dismiss was correct because none of the four issues state a

claim under the EEOC regulations. Complainant failed to show that she

suffered harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of

employment for which there is a remedy. See Diaz v. Department of the

Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994). Moreover, to the

extent complainant is claiming a discriminatory hostile work environment,

we find that the events described, even if proven to be true, would not

rise to the level of being sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of his employment. See Cobb v. Department of the Treasury,

Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997). Accordingly, the agency's decision

to dismiss these issues is affirmed.

Regarding the AJ's decision on the remaining issues, pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be

upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial

evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera

Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's

credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the

tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other

objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks

in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See

EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).

In this case, AJ essentially issued a directed verdict at the conclusion

of complainant's case in chief. The Commission notes that there is no

mechanism for a "directed verdict" in the EEOC hearing process. However,

under 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e), the AJ has the power to regulate the

conduct of the hearing, limit the number of witnesses where the testimony

would be repetitious, and exclude irrelevant evidence. Upon review,

we find nothing improper in the AJ's actions during the hearing or in

his issuance of a decision in favor of the agency after complainant

presented her case, without hearing the testimony of any witnesses on

behalf of the agency.2

After a review of the record, we find there is substantial evidence

to support the AJ's finding of no discrimination. Assuming, without

deciding, that complainant is an individual with a disability, we

find she failed to present evidence that she was treated differently

than similarly-situated individuals outside of her protected class,

and failed to dispute the agency's reasons for its actions. The record

reveals that all employees in complainant's unit were asked to provide

updated medical documentation, and when complainant failed to do so,

she was asked to leave the building. Further, there is no dispute that

complainant's time and attendance was corrected, and complainant admits

that she was, in fact, offered overtime on the day in question.

Finally, to the extent that complainant was asked to provide medical

documentation, we note that an employer may request medical documentation

from an employee or require a medical examination of an employee only if

the request or examination is job-related and consistent with business

necessity. See Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and

Medical Examinations of Employees under the Americans with Disabilities

Act (July 27, 2000) (web version) (Guidance), at 5. This requirement

is met when the employer has a reasonable belief, based on objective

evidence, that (1) an employee's ability to perform the essential job

functions is impaired by a medical condition; or (2) that an employee

poses a direct threat due to a medical condition. See Guidance at 14.

We find the agency's request under the circumstances to be reasonable.

Complainant failed to provide sufficient evidence that would suggest

the agency's reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination

or retaliation.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the agency's

final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 17, 2009

Date

1 Although the AJ and the agency characterized this turn of events as

reinstatement of the agency's motion for summary judgment, the agency's

motion at this point is more properly characterized as a motion for a

directed verdict.

2 The AJ's decision indicates that the AJ considered the agency's motion

for a directed verdict to be the equivalent of a motion for summary

judgment. However, we find that the AJ's decision is more appropriately

considered as a decision after a hearing.

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0120071623

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

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0120071623