Eric K. Niheu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 15, 2019

14099244 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 15, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/099,244 12/06/2013 Eric K. Niheu 12587-0084003 2908
26212 7590 08/15/2019
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. (ACCENTURE)
P.O. BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
KAZIMI, HANI M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/15/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ERIC K. NIHEU, ROBERT V. BLAKEY, SHERWIN S. CHIU,
and ROGER HAYNIE
____________

Appeal 2017-011531
Application 14/099,244
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, AMEE A. SHAH, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
The Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 2–4, 6–14, and 16–21, which are all of the pending
claims.3 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 Throughout this Decision, we refer to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.,” filed June 1, 2015), Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Sept. 15,
2017), and Specification (“Spec.,” filed Dec. 6, 2013), and to the Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Aug. 17, 2017) and Final Office Action (“Final
Act.,” mailed Jan. 16, 2015).
2 According to the Appellants, the real party in interest is Accenture Global
Services Limited. Appeal Br. 1.
3 The Appellants requested an oral hearing, but waived appearance at the
hearing that was scheduled for July 23, 2019. See Waiver (filed June 4,
2019).
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THE REJECTION
Claims 2–4, 6–14, and 16–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants’ invention “relates to enterprise application
integration.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claims 2 and 12 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 12
(Appeal Br. 24–25(Claims App’x.)) is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal and is reproduced below:
12. A computer-implemented method comprising:
combining, using at least one processor executing
instructions of a composite application, services from multiple
tools on a network that each provide a software service to a user;
and
providing, using at least one processor executing
instructions of the composite application, collaborative
functionality between the multiple tools on the network by:
communicating, using the composite application,
with all of the multiple tools on the network;
enabling a subset of the multiple tools to
communicate with one another to provide collaborative
functionality, including converting between a first
language service used by a first tool of the multiple tools
and a second, different language service used by a second,
different tool of the multiple tools to enable
communication between the first tool and the second tool
that otherwise would not be possible by:
receiving a message from the first tool;
turning the received message into a
reformatted message that is formatted appropriately
for the second tool;
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providing the reformatted message to the
second tool;
receiving, from the second tool, a result of the
reformatted message;
repackaging the result of the reformatted
message for return to the first tool; and
returning, to the first tool, the repackaged
result of the reformatted message; and
presenting results of the collaborative functionality
in an integrated interface that combines information from
the multiple tools and reflects a result of communications
exchanged between the first tool and the second tool.

ANALYSIS
Framework Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
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(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
Earlier this year, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”).
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance.
Claims 2–4 and 12–14
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework the Examiner
determines that “the claims [are] directed towards conducting a computer
system comprising a composite application that is configured to combine
services from multiple application resources on a network is a fundamental
economic practice and thus, the claims include an abstract idea.” Final
Act. 2. The Examiner further determines that the claims are “directed to the
abstract idea of a fundamental economic practice of combining services
from multiple application resources on a network” (id. at 5) and “to the
abstract idea of integrating enterprise application” (Ans. 6). When viewed
through the lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Examiner’s
determination depicts the claimed subject matter as an ineligible “[c]ertain
methods of organizing human activity” that include “fundamental economic
principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk)” under
Prong One of Revised Step 2A. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The Appellants disagree and contend that the claim is more accurately
described as “a novel ‘composite application that is configured to combine
services from multiple tools on a network that each provide a software
service to a user’ that ‘provid[es] collaborative functionality between the
multiple tools on the network.’” Appeal Br. 10 (alterations in original).
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Under step one of the Alice framework, we “look at the ‘focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a
whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1230 (2017)).
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon
. . . . Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on
whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded
subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In
other words, the first step of the Alice framework “asks whether the focus of
the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in [the relevant
technology] or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1335–36; see also
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention
is directed. Here, the Specification is titled “SYSTEM AND METHOD OF
INTEGRATING ENTERPRISE APPLICATIONS” and provides for an
invention that “relates to enterprise application integration.” Spec. ¶ 2. The
Specification provides that “[m]odern companies often rely on multiple
enterprise applications (computer programs and systems designed to provide
specific functionality) to help manage and run their businesses” and often
have “multiple independently established computer systems designed to
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address specific business processes or objectives” that come from different
vendors and that are not readily integrated with each other. Id. ¶ 3. A more
recent approach to integrating applications in an enterprise is “service-
oriented architecture (SOA) in which resources on a network are made
available as independent services that can be accessed without knowledge of
their underlying platform,” which does not need to be tied to a specific
technology, and which “may be implemented using a wide range of
interoperability standards.” Id. ¶ 4. The purported invention can “present[]
sales targeted information by combining services from multiple application
resources on a network.” Id. ¶ 25; Appeal Br. 2.
An examination of the claims shows that claim 2 recites a computer
system comprising a processor and medium coupled to the processor having
stored thereon an application “configured to combine services from multiple
tools on a network that each provide a software service to a user” that when
executed, causes the processor to perform the operation of “providing
collaborative functionality between the multiple tools on the network by”
(a) communicating with all of to multiple tools, (b) enabling a subset of the
tools to communicate with one another by converting between a first
language used by a first tool and a second, different language used by a
second tool by: (1) receiving a message, (2) “turning the received message
into a reformatted message,” (3) “providing the reformatted message to the
second tool,” (4) receiving a result of the reformatted message,
(5) repackaging the result for return, and (6) returning the repackaged result,
and (c) presenting the results in an interface that combines the information.
Appeal Br. 21–22. Claim 12 similarly recites a method comprising the steps
as recited in claim 2, performed by a processor, of combining, providing
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functionality, communicating, enabling, and presenting. Id. at 24–25. The
claimed processor is part of conventional computer system 100. See Appeal
Br. 2; Spec. ¶¶ 25, 26, 79–87. The Specification provides that “all of the
functional operations described in this specification can be implemented in
digital electronic circuitry, or in computer software, firmware, or hardware”
(id. ¶ 79) and that “[p]rocessors suitable for the execution of a computer
program include, by way of example, both general and special purpose
microprocessors, and any one or more processors of any kind of digital
computer” (id. ¶ 82). The term “tool” is not defined in the claim. The
Specification provides that the term “tool” is used interchangeably with the
term “application resource” “to refer to a combination of software and
hardware” and “can thus include a software application sold by a first
vendor and an underlying computer platform (hardware plus operating
system) sold by one or more different vendors.” Spec. ¶ 26.
When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claimed limitations, we determine that the limitations
recite a method, performed by a conventional computing device, to combine
services and provide collaborative functionality by reformatting and
repackaging data. The limitation of combining services is functionally
recited without any detail how, technologically or by what algorithm, the
result of combining is achieved. Combining data or service can be done
mentally. The limitation of providing collaborative functionality is
performed by receiving, reformatting, providing, repackaging, returning, and
presenting data. Receiving data is an extra-solution activity. See In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (characterizing data gathering steps as
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insignificant extra-solution activity). Providing and presenting data is
merely insignificant post-solution activity. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11
(“Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting
abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant
postsolution activity.”’) (quoting Diehr, at 191–92).
Thus, we are left with the limitations regarding reformatting and
repackaging the messages, with no meaningful steps outside that scope. The
claims do not recite how, technologically or by what algorithm, the
messages are reformatted or repackaged. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (hereafter
“Capital One”) (“Although the claims purport to modify the underlying
XML document in response to modifications made in the dynamic
document, this merely reiterates the patent’s stated goal itself.”).
Reformatting and repackaging the messages are simply the reorganization of
information that can be done mentally. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Fin. Corp., 127 F. Supp. 3d 506, 516 (D. Md. 2015), aff'd, 850
F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“military officers have long received
intelligence reports, extracted key information, reorganized that information
into intelligence summaries, and sent the summaries back to the field
officers.”).
Combining services and providing collaborative functionality by
reformatting and repackaging data is similar to the concepts of “changing
one description of a level sensitive latch (i.e., a functional description) into
another description of the level sensitive latch (i.e., a hardware component
description) by way of a third description of that very same level sensitive
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latch (i.e., assignment conditions)” in Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics
Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom., 138 S.
Ct. 71 (2017), “collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” in Capital
One, 850 F.3d at 1340, and translating by generating a payload, defining
parameters, and converting the payload into a different form in Novo
Transforma Techs., LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 2015 WL 5156526, at *2-3
(D. Del. Sept. 2, 2015), aff’d, 669 Fed. App’x. 555 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, we conclude the claims recite mental processes including
observing and organizing data (see 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52), and thus an abstract idea.4 Thus, we disagree with the Appellants’
argument that the Examiner’s rejection is in error because the Examiner
“ignores concrete limitations in the claims.” Appeal Br. 10; see also Reply
Br. 1.
Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we look to
whether the claims “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner
that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception,” i.e., “integrates a judicial exception into a practical application.”
84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Here, the Appellants contend that the claims provide
functionality that “is only possible as a consequence of the concrete
computer environment in which communication between the first tool and
the second tool would not otherwise be possible” and, thus, the claims recite

4 We note that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different
levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240
(Fed. Cir. 2016). The Board’s “slight revision of its abstract idea analysis
does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241.
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“features [that] are necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome a
problem -inability of the first tool and the second tool to communicate -
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks . . . similar to the
claims in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.” Appeal Br. 10; see also
id. at 11–13; Reply Br. 13–16. When viewed through the lens of the 2019
Revised Guidance, the Appellants contend that the elements of the claims
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application by “reflect[ing] an
improvement in the functioning of a computer.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing
DDR Holdings, LLC. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258–59 (Fed. Cir.
2014). We disagree.
In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims
addressed the problem of retaining website visitors who, if adhering to the
routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be
transported instantly away from a host’s website after clicking on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
The Federal Circuit, thus, held that the claims were directed to statutory
subject matter because they claim a solution “necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks.” Id. The court cautioned that “not all claims
purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id.
at 1258. And the court contrasted the claims to those at issue in
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), in that, in
DDR Holdings, the computer network was not operating in its “normal,
expected manner” and the claims did not “recite an invention that is []
merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet.” Id. at 1258–59.
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Here, the Appellants contend that the claims address the problem of
“inability of the first tool and the second tool to communicate.” Appeal
Br. 10. The Specification does not discuss addressing this problem; rather,
as discussed above, the Specification discusses generally that vendors’
different systems may not readily integrate with each other. Spec. ¶ 3.
Regardless, although the tools are computer-centric, i.e., software or
computer platforms, the inability for disparate entities or beings to
communicate or integrate is not a problem rooted in technology arising out
of computer networks, but rather a problem that existed prior to the Internet
and computers, such as the inability to communicate between people
speaking different languages. See Novo Transforma, 2015 WL 5156526,
at *3 (“Incompatible communication types have existed since before the
emergence of computers and the Internet.”).
Also, unlike DDR Holdings, here, the purported solution comprises
the use of a conventional computing device operating in its ordinary capacity
(see supra) to combine, communicate (including converting, information by
receiving, reformatting, providing, repackaging, and returning information),
and present the results. The Appellants do not direct attention to, and we do
not see, where the Specification describes computer components, such as a
processor and interface, acting in an unconventional manner to further the
desired solution of providing collaborative functionality and presenting data.
And the claims do not recite a specific technological way of presenting data
(see Appeal Br. 12) in a way that is not routine or conventional.
The Appellants also contend that “the claimed subject matter
addresses a specific problem in the art; namely, the integration of multiple
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computer software tools.” Id. at 15.5 However, as the Appellants state, any
improvement is in providing the possibilities of developing new capabilities,
combining data from multiple resources, and customizing features to give
sales agents “rapid access to relevant content needed to support customer
care and sales efforts” (Appeal Br. 15 (citing Spec. ¶¶16, 17), not to the
processor itself. These are not technological improvements or
improvements to a technological area. The alleged improvement lies in the
abstract idea itself, not to any technological improvement. See BSG Tech
LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir. 2018). See
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336 (focusing on whether the claim is “an improvement
to [the] computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for
which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity”).
We also disagree with the Appellants’ contention that the claims are
similar to those of Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1252
(Fed. Cir. 2017) because the claimed “composite application improves
efficiency, process quality, and data integrity.” Reply Br. 2–3 (citing Spec.
¶¶ 15, 32). In Visual Memory, the court held that the claims were “directed
to an improved computer memory system, not to the abstract idea of
categorical data storage.” 867 F.3d at 1259. The court discussed that the
Specification explained performance problems with prior art memory
systems. Id. Thus, the claims were “directed to a technological
improvement: an enhanced computer memory system.” Id. In contrast,

5 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly
evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of Office guidance). Solely for
purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate
them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of Office guidance). See 2019 Revised
Guidance at 55.
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here, paragraph 15 of the Specification provides that “[u]ser efficiency can
be increased and training time decreased. Sales cycle time can be reduced,
process quality and data integrity can be improved, and more consistent
customer experiences can be fostered.” Thus, any improvement is to user’s
time and training and to sales cycles, not to a technological improvement in
the processor. Here, the claims merely recite “generalized[, mental steps] to
be performed on a computer using conventional computer activity.” Id.
at 1260.
We further disagree that the claims are similar to those of Trading
Techs. Int’l., Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“Trading Techs.”) because the claims “allow a user to ‘get a full picture of
[an] account and also the industry context for the account’ which allows the
user to ‘efficiently evaluate prospective partners or competitors, and [] craft
more personalized campaigns and messages.’” Reply Br. 3 (quoting Spec.
¶ 32). In Trading Techs., under Step 1, the district court held that the claims
were “directed to improvements in existing graphical user interface devices
that have no ‘pre-electronic trading analog,’ and recite more than ‘setting,
displaying, and selecting’ data or information that is visible on the [graphical
user interface] device.” Trading Techs. 675 F. App’x at 1004 (internal
quotations omitted). The district court determined that the claims “solve
problems of prior graphical user interface devices . . . in the context of
computerized trading[ ] relating to speed, accuracy and usability” and did
not “simply claim displaying information on a graphical user interface.” Id.
The claims required “a specific, structured graphical user interface paired
with a prescribed functionality directly related to the graphical user
interface’s structure that is addressed to and resolves a specifically identified
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problem in the prior state of the art.” Id. Further, under Step 2, the district
court held that “the specific structure and concordant functionality of the
graphical user interface are removed from abstract ideas, as compared to
conventional computer implementations of known procedures.” Id. The
Federal Circuit agreed, holding that “the claimed subject matter is ‘directed
to a specific improvement to the way computers operate,’ . . . for the claimed
graphical user interface method imparts a specific functionality to a trading
system ‘directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in
the software arts.’” Id. at 1006 (citations omitted).
Here, the claims simply require, in relevant part, presenting the results
in an integrated interface that combines information and reflects a results of
exchanged communications without any specific functionality directly
related to the interface’s structure that is addressed to and resolves a problem
in technology. Rather, the claims are similar to those in Trading Techs.
Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Trading
Techs II”) and Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Trading Techs III”) where the claims directed to
displaying particular information in a particular way did not focus on an
improvement to computer technology.
We are not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument that the claims’
elements of reformatting and repackaging “actually ‘[e]ffect[] a
transformation or reduction of a particular article [computer data] to a
different state or thing’” because “the received message is transformed into a
reformatted message which is a different state (for the message) and a
different thing (a reformatted message).” Reply Br. 11. The message with
data remains a message with data; it is not transformed into a different state;
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the message and data are simply reorganized. See Capital One, 850 F.3d at
1342 (modifying XML documents to solve incompatibility issues did not
transform was not transformative).
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
that claims 2 and 12 are directed to an abstract idea.
Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework
Under the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework, and Step 2B of
the 2019 Revised Guidance, we find supported the Examiner’s
determination that “[t]claims do not include limitations that are ‘significantly
more’ than the abstract idea” in that “the limitations are merely instructions
to implement the abstract idea on a computer and require no more than a
generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the
industry.” Final Act. 2–3.
Taking the claims’ elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. The claimed
mobile device is a conventional, general purpose computer. See supra. It is
clear, from the Specification, including the claim language, that the
“limitations require no improved computer resources [the Appellants]
claim[] to have invented, just already available computers, with their already
available basic functions, to use as tools in executing the claimed process”
performed by the claimed system. SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1169–70 (Fed. Cir. 2018). We agree with the Examiner that
the processor and interface operate in their ordinary and conventional
capacity to perform the well-understood, routine, and conventional functions
of combining data, communicating, converting data by receiving,
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reformatting, providing, repackaging, and returning data, and presenting the
results thereof. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355 (gathering, sending,
monitoring, analyzing, selecting, and presenting information does not
transform the abstract process into a patent-eligible invention); Trading
Techs. II, 921 F.3d at 1093 (data gathering and displaying are well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities); Capital One, 850 F.3d at
1341 (determining that there was “no ‘inventive concept’ that transform[ed]
the abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and manipulating XML data into a
patent-eligible application of that abstract idea)”.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
the Appellants’ claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of combining data, data
communication (communicating, receiving, returning), data organization
(reformatting and repackaging), and displaying the results is equally generic
and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Capital One, 850
F.3d at 1341 (holding that the sequence of collecting, organizing,
identifying, mapping, organizing, defining, and detecting was abstract);
Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354–56 (holding that the sequence of gathering,
analyzing, and displaying in real-time was abstract); Inventor Holdings, LLC
v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding
that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display,
and transmission was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore,
ordinary and conventional.
We disagree with the Appellants’ contention that “the Examiner does
not ‘identify the [additional claim] elements in the rejection and explain why
they do not add significantly more to the exception.’” Appeal Br. 14
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(alteration in original); see also Reply Br. 9–10. The Examiner adequately
explains the reasons why the elements, individually and as a whole, do not
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. See Final Act. 3–7;
Ans. 7–9. The Examiner has thus notified the Appellants of the reasons for
the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet
the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
The Appellants’ other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance (see, e.g., Appeal Br. 9–15; Reply Br. 4–12)
and have been considered but are not persuasive of error. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to
the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not
be relied upon.”)).
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
that the limitations of claims 2 and 12 do not transform the claims into
significantly more than the abstract idea.
We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
of independent claims 2 and 12 and dependent claims 3, 4, 13, and 14 for
which no separate arguments were presented. Appeal Br. 15.
Claims 6–11 and 16–21
We do not agree with the Appellants’ contention that the Examiner’s
rejection of dependent claims 6–11 and 16–21 is in error because “[t]he
Final Office Action does not address the features recited in [ dependent
claims] but rather groups all of the claims together.” Appeal Br. 15–19;
Reply Br. 17. There is no specific requirement that each claim be examined
individually by the Examiner in determining that the claims are directed to
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an abstract idea. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355–57 (addressing the claims
together). The Examiner includes the dependent claims in the heading of the
rejection (Final Act. 2) and the analysis (id. at 3; Ans. 8). There is no
indication that the Appellants were not put on notice of the Examiner’s
rejection regarding the dependent claims.
We are not persuaded of error by the Appellants’ argument that the
limitation claims 6 and 16, of having the application be “readily expandable
by adding a handler to convert a language service,” allows new capabilities
and thus is “necessarily rooted in computer technology and cannot be
performed manually, i.e., without the use of a computer.” Appeal Br. 15–16.
The “problems” of having an application or system be expandable and
converting/translating languages existed prior to the Internet. The
Appellants do not provide further evidence or reasoning how the “solution”
of expandability results in the processor performing in a manner that is not
routine or conventional. Moreover, the invocation of the Internet or
computers in narrowing the field of the invention to a computer-networked
environment is not sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention. See Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716 (limiting the use of the
abstract idea “to a particular technological environment” does not make the
abstract idea patent-eligible).
We are similarly not persuaded of error by the Appellants’ argument
that the limitations of claims 7 and 17 claim a “solution [that] is necessarily
rooted in computer technology, similar to the invention from DDR Holdings,
because ‘finding, at runtime, dynamic libraries for particular tools,’ and
‘dropping, into the framework, new code from the dynamic libraries’ are
steps necessarily performed by computers.” Appeal Br. 16. The Appellants
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do not explain what “problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks problem” the purported solution “necessarily rooted in computer
technology” overcomes in a manner that is technologically unconventional.
The mere invocation of computers is not enough. See SAP Am., 898 F.3d
at 1170.
The Appellants’ argument that claims 10 and 20 “recite a specific
solution to a specific problem” because the limitation of supporting on-
demand indexing “would not otherwise have been available without the
claimed composite application” (Appeal Br. 19) in unpersuasive of error for
similar reasons as for claims 6, 7, 16, and 17. Namely, the Appellants do not
present argument or reasoning what problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks problem the purported solution overcomes in a
manner that is technologically unconventional and requires more than a
general purpose computer operating in its ordinary capacity.
Regarding the Appellants’ arguments with respect to claims 8–11 and
18–21 that the claims “recite ‘meaningful limitations’ that ‘clearly [do] not
seek to tie up any judicial exception such that others cannot practice it,’”
(Appeal Br. 18–19), although the Supreme Court has described “the concern
that drives this exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas
from patent eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption,” see Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2354, characterizing pre-emption as a driving concern for patent
eligibility is not the same as characterizing pre-emption as the sole test for
patent eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of
preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or
this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the
§ 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
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1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354). Although
“preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. The
aforementioned concept is not sufficiently limiting so as to fall clearly on the
side of patent-eligibility.
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s determination
that dependent claims 6–11 and 16–21 are directed to a judicial exception
without significantly more, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of these dependent claims.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–4, 6–14, and 16–21 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED