Eric B. Fort, Complainant,v.Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 21, 2009
0120091555 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 21, 2009)

0120091555

08-21-2009

Eric B. Fort, Complainant, v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.


Eric B. Fort,

Complainant,

v.

Michael J. Astrue,

Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120091555

Agency No. DAL-07-0140

Hearing No. 450-2008-00189X

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's February 11, 2009 final order concerning

his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

Complainant, a former Management Support Specialist, GS-12,1 alleged

that the agency discriminated against him on the bases of race

(African-American), sex (male), and in reprisal for prior EEO activity

when:

1. on October 24, 2006, he was singled out when his performance

appraisal was conducted by an evaluation panel that consisted of the

office management staff and his colleagues. During the appraisal, the

District Manager (DM) allegedly behaved in an unprofessional manner by

making disparaging remarks about him;

2. he was subjected to harassment and a hostile work environment

due to management's attitude and unprofessional behavior toward him.

He alleged he was ridiculed in front of the office staff and in public

work settings; his requests for medical leave were met with opposition;

and he was overlooked for promotions. He also alleged he was subjected

to work performance meetings after talking with the EEO Counselor; and

3. he was the only member of the Area V team who had been restricted to

full time receptionist duties which did not allow him to perform the full

range of duties in his job description. On May 2, 2007, the DM allegedly

inequitably distributed the mail duties so that complainant was made

solely responsible for the morning outgoing mail Monday through Friday.

His expressed dissatisfaction to the DM and the Assistant DM regarding

his work assignments remained unresolved.2

Following the investigation into his complaint, complainant requested a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). On January 12, 2009,

the AJ issued a decision dismissing the instant complaint pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1) for failure to state a claim, finding that

complainant failed to describe an adverse action taken against him that

affected a term, condition or privilege of his employment.

Regarding claim 1, the AJ determined that the complainant's assertions

that the agency conducted an illegal performance evaluation did not occur.

The AJ noted that the record reflects that complainant secretly recorded

the October 24, 2006 meeting in which he complained and those recordings

undermined his entire representations about what occurred in the meeting

and support his position. Specifically, the AJ stated that he sent an

email to complainant advising him that if the agency officials referred

to and identified particular portions of the recordings then he was to

respond with specificity. The AJ further stated that complainant "did

refer to the recordings by when on the tape the reference was to have

occurred; and, Complainant totally failed to dispute the evidence provided

in his own secretly recorded 'evidence.' (There would have been some

dispute as to whether or not the recordings would have been admitted if a

hearing had been held, nonetheless, the recorded evidence was considered

for the purpose of Respondent's motion and this order.)." The AJ noted

that a review of the agency's response showed that complainant was not

abused in that meeting and that his performance evaluation was not given

before a "panel" as complainant alleged.

Regarding claim 2, the AJ determined that complainant failed to support

his claims of such public admonishments with so much as a reference

to any other person before whom such occurrences were supposed to have

occurred.

Regarding claim 3, the AJ noted that since complainant came to work early

and then left before he could assist with mail duties in the afternoon,

he was assigned to handle those mail duties which occurred early in

the day. The AJ determined that complainant again failed to show that

he was made the full-time receptionist or the duties he was assigned to

were not appropriate to his position. The AJ determined that during the

relevant time, complainant was in a management support position and had

no supervisory responsibilities.

The agency issued a final order dated February 11, 2009, implementing

the AJ's dismissal decision. The instant appeal followed.

In the instant case, we disagree with the AJ's determination to

procedurally dismiss complainant's complaint, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a)(1), for failure to state a claim. A fair reading of the

record reveals that complainant has alleged that he was subjected to an

ongoing discriminatory and retaliatory hostile work environment when

his performance appraisal was conducted by an evaluation panel that

consisted of the office management staff and his colleagues; DM made

disparaging remarks about him; he was ridiculed in front of the office

staff and in public work settings; his requests for medical leave were

met with opposition; he was overlooked for promotions; he was subjected

to work performance meetings after talking with the EEO Counselor; and

he was the only member of the Area V team who was restricted to full

time receptionist duties which did not allow him to perform the full

range of duties in his job description.

We note that the AJ based his conclusions about whether or not complainant

stated a justiciable claim under Title VII. by weighing the evidence

produced during the agency's investigation of the complaint and by

addressing the merits of the case brought forward by complainant.

This type of determination is more appropriate for a decision following a

hearing or a decision issued by summary judgment pursuant to the standards

prescribed by 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g), rather than a procedural dismissal

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1). The agency represents, in its

response to this appeal, that complainant indicated he did not object

to the agency's motion to the AJ for a decision by summary judgment.

However, the AJ did not decide the case by summary judgment, but rather

dismissed it on a procedural basis.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision on the merits

of a claim without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine

issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is

patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held

that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given

the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case,

there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather

to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249.

The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary

judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the

non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if

the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of

the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988).

A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome

of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting

evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. In the context of an

administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider summary judgment

only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed

for summary disposition. However, in the instant case, because the AJ did

not make a decision by summary judgment, but rather issued a procedural

dismissal, he did not apply any of these standards and we cannot view

his decision as a summary judgment on the merits of complainant's claim.

When examining the AJ's decision purely as a procedural dismissal pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1), we find that complainant has clearly

alleged that he was subjected to ongoing harassment which resulted in a

hostile work environment on the bases of race, sex and prior protected

activity. We note that the events identified occurred over a lengthy

period and were all allegedly committed by the same management officials.

Thus, where, as in the instant case, a complaint does not challenge

an agency action or inaction regarding a specific term, condition or

privilege of employment, a claim of harassment it is still actionable if,

allegedly, the harassment to which the complainant has been subjected

was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

complainant's employment. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure

to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the complainant

cannot prove a set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle

the complainant to relief. The trier of fact must consider all of the

alleged harassing incidents and remarks, and considering them together

in the light most favorable to the complainant, determine whether they

are sufficient to state a claim. Cobb v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997). In applying this standard,

we conclude that complainant has stated a viable claim of hostile work

environment based on discrimination.

Finally, the Commission notes that complainant has alleged reprisal as one

of the basis of the alleged hostile work environment. The Commission's

federal sector case precedent has long defined an "aggrieved employee"

as one who suffers a present harm or loss with respect to a term,

condition, or privilege of employment for which there is a remedy.

Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April

21, 1994). However, under the Commission's broad view of reprisal,

any adverse treatment that is based upon a retaliatory motive and is

reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging

in protected activity, states a claim. See Lindsey v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05980410 (November. 4, 1999) (citing

EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 915.003 (May 20, 1998)). Therefore, we

conclude that this legal standard should have been applied to this

case and complainant should not have been required to demonstrate that

he is "aggrieved" under the Diaz standard, but only to allege that he

suffered adverse treatment that is based upon a retaliatory motive and

is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging

in protected activity. Complainant has met this requirement.

Upon a review of the record, we find that complainant has stated a

cognizable claim under EEOC regulations. Thus, we find that the AJ's

dismissal of the incidents identified above for failure to state a claim

was improper. Accordingly, the agency final order implementing the AJ's

decision to dismiss complainant's complaint for failure to state a claim

is REVERSED. As such, the complaint is REMANDED for further processing

in accordance with the ORDER below.

ORDER

The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the EEOC's Dallas

District Office the request for a hearing, as well as the complaint file,

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final.

The agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at

the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted

to the Hearings Unit of the Dallas District Office. Thereafter, the

Administrative Judge shall issue a decision on the complaint in accordance

with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109, and the agency shall issue a final action in

accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.

If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0408)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29

U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the

sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the

Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the

request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as

stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 21, 2009

__________________

Date

1 The record reflects that in September 2007, complainant was terminated

from agency employment.

2 The record reflects that claim 3 was later amended to the instant

complaint.

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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