Entronic Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 31, 1977

227 N.L.R.B. 1770 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

1770 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
Entronic Corporation and District No. 9, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO. Cases 14-CA-9251, -2, and -3
January 31, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On October 18, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
James L. Rose issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, General Counsel and Re-
spondent filed exceptions and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings,' findings,2 and
conclusions3 of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Entronic Corpo-
ration, Earth City, Missouri, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order, except that the
attached notice is substituted for the Administrative
Law Judge's notice.
' The General Counsel excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's
failure to make any findings as to the allegation in the complaint that
Respondent's supervisor , Amelung, questioned prospective employee Laum-
us about her union sympathies . We find it unnecessary to pass on this
allegation since any additional finding of unlawful interrogation would be
cumulative.
2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibili-
ty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces its
that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A 3, 1951) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
3 The Administrative Law Judge found it unnecessary to decide whether
or not a substantial and representative segment of the Respondent's
employees were employed at the time of the demand and refusal We find
that during the relevant period a substantial and representative segment of
the Respondent 's employees were employed and that the Union represented
a majority of the employees employed as of April I, 1976 General Cable
Corp, 173 NLRB 251 ( 1968) Therefore, we find it unnecessary to pass on his
finding that a bargaining order should issue even if such a complement were
not employed at the time of the Respondent 's refusal to bargain.
227 NLRB No. 257
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing in which all parties participated, the
National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has
ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain collectively through unions of
their own choosing
To act together for collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Dis-
trict No. 9, International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, by dis-
charging or laying off any of our employees or in
any other manner discriminating against them
with regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with said Local
No. 9 as the exclusive representative of employees
in the bargaining unit described below.
WE WILL NOT interrogate prospective employ-
ees concerning their union sympathies.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they cannot
discuss the Union on our company premises.
WE WILL NOT layoff our employees as a reprisal
against them because they have engaged in union
activity or in order to thwart their union activity.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with said Local 9 as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all employees in the bargaining
unit described below with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment and, if an understand-
ing is reached, embody such understanding in
writing and sign the agreement. The bargaining
unit is:
All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed at our Earth City, Missouri, plant, exclud-
ing office clerical employees, professional employ-
ees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
ENTRONIC CORP. 1771
WE WILL offer each employee who was laid off
on April 2, 1976, or discharged thereafter, imme-
diate and full reinstatement to her former position
or, if such position no longer exists, to a substan-
tially equivalent one, without prejudice to seniori-
ty or other rights and privileges enjoyed by each
and make them whole for any loss of pay that they
may have suffered by reason of their discharge or
layoff or both with interest at the rate of 6 percent
per annum.
ENTRONIC CORPORATION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES L. ROSE, Administrative Law Judge: This matter
was heard before me on June 21, 22, and 23, 1976,1 at St.
Louis, Missouri, upon the General Counsel's consolidated
complaint alleging that the Respondent had engaged in
activity violative of Section 8(a)(l), (3), and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. §
151, et seq.).
Upon the record as a whole, including my observation of
the witnesses, briefs, and arguments of counsel, I hereby
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Missouri corporation engaged in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of smoke detectors and
related products. During the calendar year of 1975, the
Respondent sold and distributed from its Missouri facility
to points outside the State of Missouri goods, products, and
materials valued in excess of $50,000. The Respondent
admits being, and I find is, an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
District No. 9, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers , AFL-CIO, is admitted by the
Respondent to be , and I find is , a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Factual Background
The Respondent commenced production operations at its
Earth City facility in January 1976. By March 1976 it had
43 production employees. Initially, and thereafter at all
material times, a substantial amount of production of the
Respondent's smoke detectors was done by another compa-
1 All dates are in 1976 unless otherwise indicated.
2 One card was erroneously rejected as not having been properly
authenticated . That ruling is hereby reversed and G.C. Exh. 4(c) is received
into evidence . The card was passed out at the meeting of April I and
returned to the union business agent at that time . There is no claim that the
ny under contract. This company is located at Harvard,
Missouri.
The organizational activity of the Union began in mid-
March with a business agent for a sister local giving Sharon
Willis approximately 40 authorization cards which she
commenced passing out.
Received into evidence are 33 authorization cards, 19 of
which were signed within a few days of March 18. The other
14 were signed on April 1.2
The first cards were ultimately turned over to Donald
Coker,3 the business representative for the Union, who then
took over the organizational activity in the latter part of
March. On March 29, he sent a letter to the Respondent
advising that the Respondent's employees had designated
the Union to represent them for purposes of "negotiating
labor agreement covering wages, hours, working conditions
and other conditions of employment." The Respondent has
at all times refused to recognize or bargain with the Union.
Coker also contacted the employees and set a meeting for
after work on April 1. At this time, as indicated above,
some 14 employees signed and returned to Coker authori-
zation cards.
At approximately 2 p.m. on Friday, April 2, Lester
Amelung, the plant supervisor, called all of the production
employees together and advised them that, as of a result of
the then nationwide teamsters' strike, which had begun 1
minute after midnight April 1, all of the production
employees were being laid off.
Subsequently, most of the employees who were laid off
were offered and accepted reinstatement; however, a
number of employees have not. The Respondent takes the
position that during the layoff it was determined to
reevaluate each employee's work record and, as a result of
this reevaluation, a number of the employees were termi-
nated.
B. Allegations and Defenses
In the 3-month period predating the organizational
campaign, Amelung is alleged to have engaged in a number
of individual violations of Section 8(a)(1) by interrogating
employees and prospective employees concerning their
union activity.
The layoff of April 2 is alleged to be violative of Section
8(a)(3) as is the failure to recall certain specific employees.
Finally, inasmuch as the Union in fact had been
designated by a majority of the production and mainte-
nance employees, it is alleged by the General Counsel that
the Company's refusal to recognize and bargain with the
Union is, and has been, a violation of Section 8(a)(5).
The Respondent generally denies that Amelung, who is
no longer an employee of the Respondent, engaged in the
alleged 8(a)(1) activity. Respondent also contends that the
layoff of April 2 was not motivated by union animus but
was a result of the teamsters' strike which caused the
Company not to have sufficient parts for continued
production. The Respondent further argues that those
signature is not genuine. Irving Taitel, Ruth Taitel and Jerome Taite!, d/b/a I.
Tortel and Son, a partnership, 119 NLRB 910 (1957), Don the Beachcomber,
163 NLRB 275 (1967).
3 The name appears misplaced in the transcript and is hereby corrected
1772 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees whom it failed to recall, or discharged after
recall, were incompetent.
Finally, the Respondent contends that, even if the Union
has a majority of signed authorization cards, a bargaining
order should not be entered in any event because this was
an expanding unit. At the time of demand for recognition
the Respondent had already determined to put on two more
shifts thus tripling the size of the unit. Since it would have
been inappropriate to direct an election in this unit until the
expansion was complete, it is inappropriate to enter a
bargaining order, the effect of which would be to disenfran-
chise the new employees.
For the reasons set forth below, I conclude in agreement
with the General Counsel that the acts of Amelung were
violative of Section 8(axl), that the layoff on April 2 was
violative of Section 8(aX3) and that as a result of these
serious and substantial unfair labor practices, a fair election
has been made improbable. Since the Union did in fact
represent a majority of employees in an appropriate unit
(notwithstanding that absent the unfair labor practices a
petition for election might have been dismissed or the
eligibility date for an election might have been set in the
future) that Respondent should be ordered to bargain with
the Union as of April 2, 1976.
I also find as independent violations of Section 8(a)(3) the
Respondent's refusal to reinstate certain named employees,
and its discharge of recalled employees Barbara Lawrence
and Linda Keeven.
C. Analysis
1. The 8(a)(l) violations
The week before Christmas 1975 Odette Dupree was
interviewed for a job by Amelung . During that interview,
"He (Amelung) asked me if I knew the parts and things like
that and I said yes, that I had done that before and then he
asked me if I was for a union and I said no , and that is all."
This conversation - that he asked her if she was for a
union - was denied by Amelung.
Similarly , during the first part of January, Amelung
interviewed Margaret Henson for a job. During that
interview,
A. He (Amelung) asked me if I have done this type
of work before and I told him that I did have experience
at building the board's parts, putting them together and
he took apart the smoke detector and showed it to me
and asked me if I knew any of the parts on there. It had
been several years since I have worked with it and I
couldn't remember everything on it. He asked me how I
felt about a union and I said that I really didn't know
that much about a union. I have never been involved
with one and I couldn't know anything about them and
it didn't make much difference.
Q. Did he make any response to you?
A. No, he dust said that this was not a union place.
Amelung denied making any statements concerning a
union during his hiring interview with Henson.
Barbara Handley took a test and was interviewed on
Friday, April 9 (during the layoff), at which time Amelung
said that they were not hiring but he would give her a call
when there was an opening . The next day she was called by
Amelung to ask if she was still interested in a job and he
told her to come in the following Monday . During this
phone conversation, "He (Amelung) asked what my views
were on unions and I told him it didn 't make any difference
one way or the other and that all I was really interested in
was a job."
Ruby Barteau took a test and applied for a job at
Entronic around the end of February. She was interviewed
by Amelung during which "[H]e (Amelung) asked me if I
had any objections to working in a factory that didn't have
a union ." Again Amelung denied that he made any such
statement during the hiring interview.
Sometime in February Linda Keeven, while at work,
casually asked Amelung how many people were working
for the Company at that time . His response was, "Well, that
sounds like union talk to me."
Testifying to the same occurrence, Joyce Launius stated
that in the early part of February she and Keeven were
talking when Keeven asked Amelung how many girls were
working for Entronic , "he (Amelung) gave us a really dirty
look. He said, `That sounds like union talk and we will have
none of this at this time , none of it.' "
Launius testified that sometime later, but apparently the
same day, when she was by herself, Amelung "Came over
and told me that we would have no more union talk
because there would be no unions at that company."
These statements attributed to him by Keeven and
Launius were denied by Amelung, who the Respondent
claims ought to be credited over the employees because for
reasons unstated on the record , as of mid -May 1976 he has
no longer been associated with the Respondent.
I do not find anything in the severance of his employment
for the Respondent to suggest that Amelung ought to be
credited over the other witnesses. On the contrary, his
precise situation is unknown from the record. It may well
be he does , in fact, have an interest in the outcome of this
matter.
In any event , I resolve the credibility issue here in favor
of the employees and against Amelung . I based this in
substantial part on my observation of all the witnesses. I
was generally impressed with the demeanor of the employ-
ees. I thought their testimony was reasonably specific and
straightforward . On the other hand, I was negatively
impressed with Amelung's demeanor and generally felt that
his denials were unpersuasive, not only as to the conversa-
tions outlined above, but on other elements of the case, e.g.,
he testified that he did not know on April 2, when he
announced the layoff, that there had been any union
activity in spite of the fact that employees were wearing
LAM buttons prominently displayed which he must have
seen . Launius testified that Amelung commented on her
button on April 2. Further, William Allen Hayes, the
Company president , testified that on March 31 he discussed
receiving the Union's letter with Amelung.
Fundamentally, I do not believe Amelung's denials of
interrogating prospective employees concerning their inter-
est in unions, or of telling employees that there would be no
union at the Company or union talk on the premises. I find
that Amelung did make the statements attributed to him.
ENTRONIC CORP.
This type of activity by the principal supervisor over
production necessarily tends to interfere with the employ-
ees' Section 7 rights and is therefore violative of Section
8(a)(1).
This is not a situation where the interrogation occurred in
a context free of employer hostility to union organization,
and in connection with a legitimate inquiry, as in the cases
cited by the Respondent. The interrogation took place in
connection with hiring new employees at a new plant. It
was part and parcel of employer hostility. And such
statements were not isolated incidents, as the Respondent
argues . They were real violations of the Act demonstrating
an animus toward unions, which in the context of this
situation must be imputed to the Respondent.
Also alleged violative of Section 8(a)(1) is a statement
testified to by Kathy Frey to the effect that Amelung said
that he did not know why he quit his last job, that he was
making good money, that he had a union and he didn't
have any problems, to which Frey said, "maybe if we had a
union there we wouldn't have any problems." Amelung
said to "shut up." I credit Frey over Amelung that this
conversation took place, however, I do not find in it any
threat, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. Paragraph 5(f) of the complaint will be
dismissed.
There appears to be no evidence of record relating to
paragraph 5(h) of the complaint. Accordingly it will be
dismissed.
2. The layoff
The Respondent admits that on April 2 it laid off all of its
production employees. The Respondent also admits,
through the testimony of its president, that it knew of union
activity at least by that time because the Company had by
then received the Union's letter of March 29. The Respon-
dent however argues that the layoff was not motivated by
union animus or to dissipate the Union's majority; but
rather it was a direct result of the then in effect nationwide
teamsters strike which had commenced the day before.
The Respondent brought forward testimony of its pur-
chasing agent, Donald Wright, to the effect that while the
Respondent had a good inventory of parts needed to
assemble the smoke devices during the first part of March,
the inventory started running low toward the middle of
March. Thus by March 22 the inventory was critically low.
By March 27 the Company was out of a number of
important parts and could no longer produce.
The Respondent's argument that the layoff was a result of
the teamsters strike is, I conclude, pretextual, in spite of the
testimony to the effect that inventories were so slow that
layoff was required.
If in fact the testimony of Wright is believed, that by
March 27 the Company had insufficient parts to do
production work and the implication that no other work
was thereafter available, which is the essence of the
Respondent's argument, then the Respondent reasonably
would have laid off employees on Friday, March 26, rather
than waiting a week. That is, if Wright's testimony and the
implications the Respondent seeks to draw from it are
taken at face value, then it follows that the Respondent had
43 production employees on its payroll for an entire week
1773
without having any work for them to do. Such is so
unreasonable as to force the conclusion that it was not the
case.
It may well be, as the Respondent's records indicate, that
inventories were low in the latter part of March. It is also no
doubt the case that during the 2-1/2 days of the teamsters'
strike, deliveries were stopped. However, it does not
necessarily follow that there was no work available for all of
the production employees.
Indeed, Hayes said that there had been a substantial
problem with test rejection of the detectors. Thus large
numbers of those manufactured did not pass the test and
had to be reworked. Many of these in fact were manufac-
tured by the subcontractor at the Harvard facility. While
Hayes did not testify that the substantial rejection problem
caused the layoff, he did indicate that it was a factor.
However, the converse appears to be more reasonable. That
is, if in fact there were a substantial number of detectors
which needed to be redone, running into thousands, such
would obviously be a source of work for production
employees.
Hayes' testimony and the Company's records show that
literally thousands of detectors need to be reworked. Such
reasonably would have been a source of work for its
employees. The evidence does not persuade me that a
reasonable amount of work did not exist for all production
employees after April 2. Nor would inability to ship the
finished product be a viable reason for the layoff. Hayes
testified that the Company had back orders in the thou-
sands. The Respondent reasonably would have continued
to produce, waiting for the strike to end, so that orders
could be shipped.
In short, I find that the 2-1/2 day teamsters' strike was
not the real reason for the layoff. Of course, under the
National Labor Relations Act an employer can discharge
or lay off employees for any reason or no reason at all -
except for engaging in union or protected concerted
activity. But, if the asserted reason is not reasonable, then
that fact is evidence the true motive lays elsewhere. Further,
"If he [the trier of fact] finds that the stated motive for a
discharge is false, he certainly can infer that there is another
motive." Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation (Iron King
Branch) v. N.L.KB., 362 F.2d 466,470 (C.A. 9, 1966).
In this case , I conclude that the true motive was the fact
that the employees were engaging in an organizational
effort on behalf of the Union, that the Union had
demanded recognition, and that the Company was seeking
to dissipate or otherwise frustrate the employees' organiza-
tional efforts.
The layoff occurred within 2 weeks of the first organiza-
tional activity and the day following the one and only
meeting of all employees with the union business agent. It
also occurred 1 or 2 days after the Company received a
letter from the Union asking for a meeting for the purpose
of negotiating a labor agreement. Given the timing of the
layoff, the fact that union activity was known to the
Respondent's principal supervisors, and the pretextual
nature of the asserted reasons , the conclusion that the
Respondent sought to undermine the employees' union
activity by laying all of them off is inescapable . The layoff,
therefore, was violative of Section 8(a)(3).
1774 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
While most employees were recalled within 2 weeks or so,
a number were either not recalled or, after recall, dis-
charged for alleged incompetence . The Respondent's evi-
dence concerning these employees' alleged inability to meet
the quotas and do competent work is at best questionable.
These employees had worked for months - with apparent
competency and without demonstrated criticism. Since
these particular employees were the principal organizers for
the Union - Sharon Willis, Odette DuPree, Joyce Launius,
Kathy Frey, Ruby Barteau , Linda Keeven, and Barbara
Lawrence - the conclusion is further inescapable that the
Company's specific disciplinary action against these em-
ployees was because of their union activity. In fact the
claimed "reevaluation" of employees by Amelung during
the layoff is simply a second shot. The remedy as to those
not recalled is the same whether the Respondent's failure to
recall them was additionally motivated by their union
activity. In any event, I find that the Respondent, by
specifically failing to recall those employees whom it did
not, engaged in additional violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
Further, as to Keeven and Lawrence, who were recalled
and subsequently discharged, I find their discharges to be
violative of Section 8(a)(3).
3. The refusal to bargain
Received into evidence over the Respondent's objections
were 33 authorization cards signed by employees. Each was
either authenticated by the employee who signed it, or
someone who either saw the employee sign the card or
relieved it from her. These cards are unambiguous and state
a purpose, in part at least, of having the Union represent the
employee for the purposes of collective bargaining. There is
no evidence that any employee was misinformed concern-
ing the purpose of the cards. There is no evidence to
indicate that any employee signed a card under any kind of
duress or that each card did not represent the employee's
specific and freely determined desire to have the Union
represent her for purposes of collective bargaining.
The authenticity of the cards is a matter of evidence
which has been resolved in favor of their admission.
Whether there were misrepresentations in connection with
signing them is an issue which relates to the question of
whether in fact the Union did represent a majority. On this
point, the Respondent has a burden of proof which I
conclude it did not meet. From the totality of the record, I
find that by April 1, 33 of the Respondent's 43 production
employees had freely designated the Union to be their
bargaining representative?
Although the Union's demand letter was sent on March
29, before a majority had signed cards, the Respondent
does not predicate its subsequent refusal on this ground.
The demand was continuing and in any event, by the time
the Respondent rejected the demand and laid off all its
employees, the Union did represent a clear majority - 33
of 43 - in an appropriate bargaining unit.
Laying off all its production employees was such a
substantial unfair labor practice as to make a free election
improbable. Thus the Respondent should be ordered to
bargain with the Union as the majority representative of all
employees in an appropriate unit from and after April 2,
1976. Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB 298 (1975); Gissel
Packing Co., Inc. v. N.LRB., 395 U.S. 575 (1969)
The Respondent's principal defense of the 8(a)(5) allega-
tion is that the unit was expanding. Since it would not have
been appropriate to direct an election on April 2, and until
such time as a substantial complement of employees had in
fact been hired, it would be equally inappropriate to enter a
bargaining order. The Respondent has cited no case
specifically so holding nor has independent research
discovered one.
On the other hand, if, as I conclude, by April 2 the
Respondent through its unfair labor practices made a free
election among employees improbable, then the tainted
atmosphere would exist whether there were 43 employees in
the bargaining unit or 120. The purpose of entering an
order directing the Respondent to bargain with the Union
effective April 2, 1976, is to remedy the Respondent's unfair
labor practices in the only way feasible, recognizing that at
the time that it engaged in these unfair labor practices the
Union in fact represented a majority in an appropriate
bargaining unit.
Whether it would have been inappropriate to have
directed an election absent the unfair labor practices may
well be. However, the policy considerations involved in the
cases cited by the Respondent - that an election should
not be directed in a bargaining unit which does not have a
substantial and representative complement of employees -
must be balanced against the policy of not allowing a
respondent to reap benefits from its unfair labor practices
or to create an atmosphere in which a free election could
not reasonably be conducted, even after the unit has
expanded. I accordingly reject the Respondent's argument
that because it contemplated putting on a second and third
shift a bargaining order should not be entered.
It might be noted in addition, even if this were a
representation case and the issue was whether or not an
election ought to have been directed in April, given the
Company's plan for expansion, it appears that the Board
might reasonably have directed an election. More than one-
third of the employees expected to be hired were in fact on
the payroll and it appears that all of the job classifications
were then in existence. See General Cable Corporation, 173
NLRB 251 (1968). However, this need not be decided
because it is myjudgment that where the employer makes a
free election improbable by engaging in substantial unfair
labor practices, if in fact the union represented a majority in
an appropriate unit, then a bargaining order should be
entered, even though the size of the unit may increase in the
foreseeable future.
IV. THE EFFECT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations set forth
in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
Employee Pam Baker testified that she signed a card which was
apparently lost Since the Union had a clear majority without her it is not
necessary to determine whether to consider her alleged designation
ENTRONIC CORP. 1775
relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1),
(3), and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The
allegations in the complaint not found to be violations of
the Act will be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Entronic Corporation, is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. District No. 9, International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees em-
ployed at the Respondent's Earth City, Missouri, facility,
excluding office clerical employees, professional employees
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute the
unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. The Respondent, acting by and through its plant
supervisor, Lester Amelung, on five separate occasions
interrogated prospective employees concerning their inter-
est in labor organizations generally and on two occasions
advised employees that they could not discuss labor
organizations all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. By April 1, 1976, the Union represented a majority of
employees in the bargaining unit described in paragraph 3,
above.
6. By its letter of March 29, 1976, the Union demanded
the Respondent recognize and bargain with it, which the
Company has and continues to deny.
7. On April 2, 1976, the Respondent laid off all of its
production and maintenance employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
8. The Respondent thereafter recalled most of the laid
off employees, however, it failed and refused to reinstate
the following named employees:
Sharon Willis Kathy Frey
Odette DuPree Ruby Barteau
Joyce Launius
9. The Respondent's failure to reinstate these employ-
ees was additionally a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
10. Having recalled and then discharged Linda Keeven
and Barbara Lawrence the Respondent additionally violat-
ed Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
11. By committing the unfair labor practices found,
including laying off all of its production and maintenance
employees, the Respondent refused to bargain with the
majority representative of its employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act as of April 2, 1976.
12. The Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act in the manner alleged in paragraphs 5(1) or 5(h) of
the complaint.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the entire record in this case, and pursuant to the
provisions of Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDERS
The Respondent, Entronic Corporation, Earth City,
Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act by interrogating prospective employees concerning
their interest in labor organizations and by telling employ-
ees not to discuss unions.
(b) Discriminating against employees by laying them off,
failing to rehire laid-off employees, and discharging em-
ployees in order to discourage union activity or other
protected concerted activity.
(c) Refusing to bargain with District No. 9, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above-
named or any other labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activity for the purposes of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Reinstate all production and maintenance employees
who were laid off on April 2, 1976, who have not already
been offered reinstatement, and Linda Keeven and Barbara
Lawrence to their former positions of employment or, if
those jobs do not exist, to substantially equivalent jobs, and
make them whole for any loss of benefits resulting from the
discrimination against them from and after April 2, 1976,
pursuant to the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
(b) Upon request recognize and bargain with District No.
9, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO, as the designated bargaining represen-
tative for a majority of Respondent's employees in the unit
described above.
(c) Post at its Earth City, Missouri, facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 14, after being duly signed by the Respondent, shall
5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings , waived for all purposes.
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 6 In the event the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
(Continued)
1776 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places , including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.
(e) Preserve and, upon request , make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll and other records necessary to analyze the amount
of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(f) The allegations set forth in paragraphs 5(f) and 5(h) of
the complaint are hereby dismissed.
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board "