Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida d/b/a Alamo Rent A Car

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Apr 11, 2012

12-CA-026588 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 11, 2012)

JD(ATL)–8–12
Miami, FL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
ATLANTA OFFICE
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF FLORIDA, LLC
d/b/a ALAMO RENT-A-CAR
Cases 12–CA–26588
12–CA–26637
12–CA–26660
and 12–CA–26706
12–CA–26723
12–CA–26820
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 769, 12–CA–27057
affiliated with INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
Karen M. Thornton, Esq., and Shelly Plass, Esq.
for the General Counsel.
Daniel R. Begian, Esq., and John P. Hasman, Esq.
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL A. MARCIONESE, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case in
Miami, Florida on May 16-20, 2011. Teamsters Local Union No. 769, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, filed and amended the seven charges in this case on
various dates from December 18, 2009 through February 16, 2011.1 On April 8, 2011, the

1 The Charge in Case. No. 12-CA-26588 was filed on December 18, 2009 and amended on
January 13, 2010, February 18, 2010 and October 20, 2010. The charge in Case No. 12-CA- 26637
was filed on February 18, 2010 and amended on October 20, 2010. The charge in Case no. 12-CA-
26660 was filed on March 9, 2010 and amended on October 20, 2010. The charge in Case No. 12-CA-
26706 was filed on April 22, 2010 and amended on October 20, 2010. The charge in Case no. 12-CA-
26723 was filed on May 6, 2010 and amended on July 6, 2010 and October 20, 2010. The charge in
Case No. 12-CA- 26820 was filed on August 5, 2010 and amended on October 20, 2010. The charge
in Case No. 12-CA-27057 was filed on February 16, 2011.
JD(ATL)–8–12
2
General Counsel, based upon these charges and amended charges, issued the amended
consolidated complaint alleging that the Respondent, Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida,
LLC, d/b/a Alamo Rent-a-Car, violated Section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act.2 On April 21,
2011, the Respondent filed an answer to the amended consolidated complaint denying that it
committed any of the alleged unfair labor practices.5
The primary allegation in the complaint is that the Respondent withdrew recognition
from the Union as the representative of a unit of employees at its facility near the Miami
airport on January 19, 2010, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The complaint
alleges that the Respondent engaged in unlawful conduct before it withdrew recognition by: 10
telling employees on various dates in late November and early December 2009 that the
employees would be losing their short-term disability benefits because they were represented
by the Union and eliminating these benefits effective January 1, 2010; interrogating
employees regarding their union membership and support on January 13 and 16, 2010;
encouraging employees to circulate a decertification petition on January 13, 2010; and 15
interfering with the Union’s access to unit employees at the Miami facility on January 4,
2010. The complaint further alleges that the Respondent violated the Act after withdrawing
recognition from the Union by interrogating employees and soliciting them to withdraw their
membership in the union on January 28, 2010; by making unilateral changes in employees’
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment starting in late February 2010 20
and continuing through January 1, 2011; and by refusing to process and arbitrate a grievance
over the discharge of a unit employee since March 3, 2010.3
In its answer, the Respondent admits that it withdrew recognition on January 19, but
denies that it violated the Act by this conduct. The Respondent asserts that its conduct was 25
privileged because it had objective proof that the Union did not have majority support. The
Respondent also admits making the unilateral changes that post-date its withdrawal of
recognition but defends this conduct on the same basis, i.e. that the Union no longer had the
support of a majority of employees in the unit when the Respondent withdrew recognition.
Finally, the Respondent admits that it made changes to the unit employees’ short-term 30
disability benefits but asserts that it was privileged to do so by virtue of waiver and/or
contract coverage. The Respondent denied the commission of any of the other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and 35
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following

2 The General Counsel had previously issued an order consolidating cases, consolidated complaint
and notice of hearing on January 31, 2011.
3 All dates are in 2010 unless otherwise indicated.
JD(ATL)–8–12
3
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a Delaware limited liability company, is engaged in the business of 5
commercial and business car rental throughout the United States, including at the facility
located at 3355 NW 22nd Street in Miami, Florida. The Respondent annually purchases and
receives at its facilities in Miami and throughout the State of Florida goods and services
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Florida. The Respondent
admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 10
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
15
The Respondent operates car rental agencies at the Miami International Airport under
three brands, i.e. Enterprise, National and Alamo. This case involves only the Alamo
operation at Miami airport. The Respondent acquired this business, along with the National
Car Rental business at Miami airport, when it acquired Vanguard Car Rental, USA in August
2007.4 At the time of the acquisition, the Union represented the employees of the Alamo and 20
National Miami operations in separate wall-to-wall units.5 The Respondent’s own Enterprise
employees in Miami were unrepresented.
The Union was certified as the exclusive Section 9(a) representative of the following
unit of Alamo employees on July 22, 2005:25
All full-time and regular part-time Bus Drivers, Cashiers, Custodians, Damage
Clerks, Greeters, Inventory Clerks, Lead Bus Drivers, Lead Service Agents, Lost
& Found Clerks, Parts Clerks, Phone Operators, Rental Agents, Return Agents,
Service Agents, and Technicians A, B and C, employed by the Employer at its 30
facility at 3355 NW 22nd Street, Road, Miami, Florida; excluding: all other
employees, including office clerical employees, confidential employees,
managerial employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as define
din the Act.
35
The Union successfully negotiated a first contract for these employees with the Respondent’s
predecessor, Vanguard, that was effective from November 29, 2005 through January 2, 2010.
The Union initiated negotiations for a new agreement by requesting bargaining in a
letter dated September 22, 2009. The Respondent also requested negotiations in its own letter 40
dated October 26, 2009. Despite the parties’ apparent mutual desire to negotiate a successor

4 The Respondent also acquired other Alamo and National car rental operations across the country
as part of this transaction.
5 On February 19, 2008, the Union was decertified as representative of the National Car Rental
unit after an election conducted by the Board.
JD(ATL)–8–12
4
agreement, no meetings were held before the expiration of the contract. Correspondence in
evidence indicates that the Respondent had a change in labor relations representative which
delayed the start of negotiations. By December 28, the parties had agreed to meet beginning in
late February or early March 2010, which were the first dates offered by the Respondent’s
new representative. Because of the delay in the start of negotiations, the parties also agreed on 5
December 28, 2009 to extend the existing contract until March 31, 2010. No meetings
occurred because the Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union before the agreed-
upon dates for bargaining.
A. The Respondent’s Elimination of Short-Term Disability Benefits10
The parties’ collective bargaining agreement contained the following provision at Article 23:
Section 1: All full-time employees covered by this agreement will be eligible for
participation under the Employer’s Comprehensive Group Insurance Plan. All 15
employees who elect to participate in said plan shall contribute on a pre-tax
weekly contribution basis. The amount of said contribution shall be determined by
the Employer consistent with what is charged to other employees in Miami,
Florida upon each annual enrollment.
20
Section 2: All full-time employees covered by this Agreement will be permitted to
elect to participate in the Employer 401(k) Plan subject to the terms and
conditions of the Plan and shall be permitted elections given other employees
under the terms of the Plan.
25
Section 3: No matter respecting provisions of the above Plans shall be subject to
the grievance, arbitration or negotiation procedure established hereunder.
This contract had been negotiated with the Respondent’s predecessor, Vanguard. At
the time, the unit employees were covered by the “Vanguard Car Rental USA Inc. Health and 30
Welfare Plan”, which included a short-term disability benefit. When the Respondent acquired
the Miami Alamo operation as part of its acquisition of Vanguard, it adopted the collective
bargaining agreement and continued in effect the Vanguard Health and Welfare Plan,
including the short-term disability benefit. The Respondent became the plan sponsor with the
benefits administered by a company called Matrix Absence Management, Inc. On August 1, 35
2009, Matrix stopped administering these benefits. The Respondent, which was self-insured
for these benefits, took over the administration of the plan and continued the benefits until
January 1, 2010 when, it is undisputed, the Respondent eliminated the short-term disability
benefit for unit employees at the Miami Alamo facility.
40
It is undisputed that, historically, the Respondent has held an open enrollment period
in October and November each year during which employees may make various elections
regarding their benefits. It is also undisputed that the Respondent did not conduct any open
enrollment meetings in 2009 for the 2010 plan year, which led to some confusion and
uncertainty among unit employees. One of these employees, Marjorie Wisecup, a rental agent 45
since 1995 and a recent union steward, questioned Lisette Dow, the Respondent’s Human
JD(ATL)–8–12
5
Resources Manager in Miami about the absence of any open enrollment information.
According to Wisecup, who testified as a witness for the General Counsel, she first spoke to
Dow on the subject during the first week of November 2009, which would have been toward
the end of the traditional open enrollment period. Wisecup testified that Dow reviewed with
her the 2010 benefits package without mentioning that the short-term disability plan was 5
going to be eliminated. Wisecup further testified that, around the same time, she heard Dow
tell other employees not to worry if they didn’t have a chance to enroll because the
employees’ benefits in 2010 would be the same as they had in 2009.
Wisecup testified that she had another conversation with Dow regarding benefits in 10
late November or early December, after the enrollment period had closed. Dow called
Wisecup into her office and said she needed to tell her that, effective January 1, “we will no
longer have short-term disability at Alamo.” Wisecup asked Dow why? According to
Wisecup, Dow replied by pulling out a copy of the collective bargaining agreement and
telling Wisecup that the contract did not specify short-term disability. Wisecup responded that 15
short-term disability benefits were included in the comprehensive group insurance plan cited
in Article 23 of the contract. Wisecup asked Dow why, if the employees were union the last
four years and had short-term disability, all of a sudden they (i.e. management) was taking it
away. Dow replied that, because Article 23 did not specify short-term disability, the
employees couldn’t have it. Wisecup responded by pointing out that the employees had 20
medical, dental and other coverage which was not specifically mentioned in the collective
bargaining agreement. Wisecup also talked about the impact the elimination of short-term
disability benefits would have on employees, including herself, who were thinking of having
children.6 In response to these entreaties, Dow simply referred to the omission of specific
reference to the benefit in the contract as the reason the Respondent was eliminating the 25
benefit.
Acknowledging confusion and discontent among the employees over this change,
Dow and Airport Market Manager Bridget Long conducted a series of meetings with small
groups of employees on December 1, 3 and 7, 2009. Dow posted a flyer to announce the 30
meetings. A total of 15 employees attended these meetings, most of whom were rental agents.
Wisecup attended one of these meetings. She recalled that there were about 5 or 6 employees
at the meeting including fellow rental agents Andy Felgentres and Sal Baglio. She
remembered that the meeting lasted about 20-30 minutes. According to Wisecup, Long
opened the meeting by saying that she did not realize that short-term disability meant so much 35
to the employees and she apologized for management failing to tell employees that this
benefit was being eliminated. Wisecup spoke up at the meeting, saying that it was devastating
to find out, after the enrollment period ended, that employees would no longer have short-
term disability benefits. Wisecup then reminded Dow how she had gone to Dow’s office to go
over the benefits for 2010 and that Dow didn’t say anything about short-term disability being 40
eliminated. Dow responded that she knew about the change when Wisecup was in her office
and did not tell her because she did not think it was a big deal. Wisecup testified that, during
this meeting, Felgentres asked Long why the benefit was being eliminated. According to

6 Wisecup had used this benefit twice before when she was pregnant and was contemplating
having another child.
JD(ATL)–8–12
6
Wisecup, Long replied, “because you’re union, you can’t have short-term disability.” When
Felgentres said that was discrimination, Long responded, “don’t worry, Enterprise has very
good lawyers.” Baglio left the meeting at that point. Wisecup testified that she then tried to
explain how the change would affect her personally and Dow told Wisecup that this was not
the place to discuss personal issues, that they would discuss it later. At that point, according to 5
Wisecup, Long left the room and she and Dow discussed, again, the meeting at which Dow
reviewed the benefits for 2010 without mentioning this change. Dow was upset that Wisecup
raised this in front of Long. Wisecup told her it was not personal, it was about the insurance.
Long returned to the room at some point and Wisecup continued to express her frustration at
not knowing about the change before the enrollment period closed. After some further 10
discussion of the impact to her personally, Wisecup returned to the rental desk. According to
Wisecup, the rental agents were “going crazy, flipping out” over the loss of short-term
disability. She testified that employees continued to discuss the issue for several days. On
December 10, Wisecup, as steward, filed a grievance over the elimination of short-term
disability benefits.15
The General Counsel called two other employees who attended these meetings with
Dow and Long. Rental agents Sara Rivera and Wanda Rivera, who are not related, attended
the same meeting but a different one than Wisecup attended. Sara and Wanda Rivera arrived
after the meeting had started. Both recalled that rental agents Cesar, Mohammad and Karel 20
were already there when they arrived and that Long was talking about operational issues, such
as the fleet of cars and low customer service scores when they entered the meeting. At one
point, one of the other employees asked about short-term disability and Dow confirmed that
this benefit was being eliminated. After the other employees left the meeting, Sara and Wanda
Rivera stayed to discuss this issue with Dow.7 Wanda Rivera testified that she asked Dow 25
whether short-term disability was being taken away because of the union contract and whether
these benefits were being eliminated at other company locations. According to Wanda Rivera,
Dow said that if a location was non-union, the employees there would keep their benefits.
Sara Rivera essentially corroborated Wanda Rivera. According to Sara Rivera, when Dow
was asked whether other locations would also lose short-term disability, Dow replied that at 30
locations where there was no union, employees would keep short-term disability benefits and
that the Alamo employees could not keep this benefit because their union contract did not
mention a short-term disability benefit. Dow said that, as a union location, the Respondent
had to follow what the contract says. Sara Rivera testified further that she asked Dow whether
the employees would have short-term disability if it was not for the Union, and Dow 35
responded, “yes, because the Respondent had to follow the union contract.” Both Riveras
confirmed Wisecup’s testimony that the elimination of short-term disability was a topic of
conversation among employees at the rental counter for several days after the meeting.
Dow and Long were called as witnesses by the Respondent in an attempt to rebut this 40
testimony. Dow recalled the meeting with Wisecup after the enrollment period had closed.
According to Dow, the purpose of this meeting was to determine what Wisecup wanted to do
with her unused sick leave because, under the collective bargaining agreement, employees can

7 Both Riveras recalled that Long left the meeting to take a phone call and Dow was alone when
they talked to her.
JD(ATL)–8–12
7
cash out unused sick leave in December. Dow has a practice of meeting with employees
individually to go over their options around that time of the year. Dow testified that she
suggested to Wisecup that she not cash out her two weeks of sick leave but save it because
short-term disability was being eliminated in 2010. Dow acknowledged that Wisecup
expressed surprise at this announcement, questioning whether she could have elected short-5
term disability during the enrollment period. Dow told her she could not and then pulled out a
copy of the collective bargaining agreement, opening it to Article 23. According to Dow, she
read the three paragraphs quoted above to Wisecup verbatim. When she was finished,
Wisecup said she didn’t understand and became visibly upset. Dow admitted that Wisecup
asked why Dow hadn’t said something sooner. Dow also conceded that Wisecup mentioned 10
that Article 23 refers to the “Comprehensive Group Insurance Plan” and that plan had
included short-term disability. Dow testified, consistent with Wisecup, that Dow said that the
contract did not specifically provide for this benefit. Dow also acknowledged that Wisecup’s
reaction to the news was the reason she and Long decided to hold the group meetings in early
December.15
Dow and Long testified that these meetings were voluntary and that, although five
meetings had been scheduled, only three were held because of lack of attendance. Dow
testified that 15 employees attended these meetings while Long testified that no more than 12
employees, all customer facing employees, attended these meetings. Dow and Long’s 20
testimony was not altogether different from that of General Counsel’s witnesses. For example,
they admitted that Long apologized to the employees for the way the Respondent had handled
that change in benefits. They confirmed that Wisecup was upset at the meeting and directed
“accusatory” comments toward Dow over not having been informed about this change during
the enrollment period and that Wisecup tried to raise her personal issues with the change but 25
that they told her to do so after the meeting. On the critical question of what was said
regarding the reason for the change and whether employees at non-union locations were
affected, Dow testified that employees were told that the National employees were covered
under the Respondent’s time-off policy and did not have a collective bargaining agreement.
Employees were told that, with respect to union locations, whether employees would have 30
short-term disability depended on what was in the collective bargaining agreement. Dow
specifically denied telling employees at the meeting Wisecup attended that the benefit was
being eliminated because of the Union. Dow also testified that, at the meeting attended by
Sara and Wanda Rivera, this question was initiated by the employees, and that neither she nor
Long referred to the Union in connection with the elimination of short-term disability. Again, 35
the Riveras were told that it depended on the language in their contract. Long testified in
much the same way, emphasizing that employees were told that, whether they would continue
to have short-term disability benefits would depend on what the collective bargaining
agreement at each location provided and that non-union employees were covered for short-
term disability by the Respondent’s time-off policy. Both Dow and Long recalled Felgentres’ 40
questioning whether eliminating short-term disability benefits was legal. According to Dow
and Long, Long responded by telling the employees that they worked for a very large
company and she was confident that the people in the benefits department and their attorneys
would not allow them to do anything illegal.
45
JD(ATL)–8–12
8
The complaint alleges that the Respondent, through statements made by Dow and
Long in the meetings with Wisecup and with the small groups of employees, violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by telling employees they would be losing their short-term disability
benefits because they were represented by a union. To some extent, resolution of this issue
turns on credibility of the witnesses. To the extent there is any difference in the testimony of 5
General Counsel’s and Respondent’s respective witnesses, I shall credit the testimony of
Wisecup, and Sara and Wanda Rivera. I note initially that all three were still employed by the
Respondent at the time they testified and that their testimony was adverse to their employer’s
interest. The Board has frequently cited this as a factor favoring reliance on such testimony.
See Evergreen America Corp., 348 NLRB 178, 207, fn. 63 (2006) and cases cited therein. In 10
contrast, Dow and Long, as managers for the Respondent charged with implementing its
personnel policies and communicating with employees regarding their benefits, have a vested
interest in testifying favorably for the Respondent and ensuring that it is not found to have
violated the law. In any event, I find that the distinction between the General Counsel’s and
the Respondent’s version of these statements is a “distinction without a difference.”15
Respondent’s witnesses concede that they told the employees that, although their
short-term disability benefits were being eliminated, employees in the non-union locations,
such as the adjacent National Car Rental operation, would continue to receive such a benefit
as part of the company’s time-off policy. Although they deny stating that the change was due 20
to the employees’ status as union-represented employees, they admittedly told them the
benefit was being eliminated because of their union contract, which Dow and Long claimed
did not provide for a short-term disability benefit. This was said notwithstanding the fact that
the employees had received this benefit for the duration of the contract as part of the
“Comprehensive Group Insurance Plan”, which the Respondent’s witnesses acknowledged 25
included a short-term disability component. The employees’ surprise and “confusion” in
response to this statement was understandable. An objective employee would reasonably
believe that the Respondent was eliminating a benefit received by non-union employees
because he or she had chosen to be represented by a union which had negotiated a contract for
them and that, without the union, they would continue to receive this benefit they had come to 30
rely upon. Such a statement would have a reasonable tendency to chill employees exercise of
their right to select a union as their representative and interfere with, restrain and coerce the
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. See generally, NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-619 (1969). See specifically Hill Park Health Care Center, 334
NLRB 328, fn.2 (2001); Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 285 NLRB 673 (1987); Alaska Pulp Corp., 35
300 NLRB 232, 243-244 (1990), enfd. mem. 972 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
The case cited by the Respondent in its post-brief submission of relevant recent case
law is distinguishable. In G & K Services, 357 NLRB No. 109 (Nov. 7, 2011), the Board
addressed the issue whether an employer’s pre-election statement to employees regarding 40
whether the benefits available at non-union facilities would be available to them if they
decertified their union was objectionable conduct warranting a new election. The Board
reiterated that, under established precedent, an employer may lawfully inform employees of
the wages and benefits its nonunion employees receive and respond to requests for
information from employees about such benefits. Only when employer statements amount to 45
an implied promise of benefits will the conduct be found objectionable. Again applying
JD(ATL)–8–12
9
precedent, the Board noted that whether a statement amounted to a promise of benefit
depended on the circumstances in which it is made and whether, under those circumstances,
an employee would reasonably interpret the statement as a promise. “Although an employer
may compare union and nonunion benefits and make statements of historical fact, ….even
comparisons and statements of fact may, depending on their precise contents and context, 5
nevertheless convey implied promises of benefits.” 357 NLRB No. 109, supra, slip op. at 2,
and case cited there. In G & K Services, supra, applying precedent, a majority of the Board
found the employer’s conduct objectionable. In the case before me, the employer’s statements
were more than a recitation of fact regarding what benefits might be available to the
employees if they had no union. Rather, the Respondent told the employees they were losing a 10
benefit they currently enjoyed precisely because they had a union contract that, in the
Respondent’s view, did not provide for this benefit. Although the statements were made in
response to employees’ questions, those questions were initiated by the Respondent’s surprise
announcement that employees were losing a benefit. This was not a situation where
employees on their own sought information regarding benefits historically provided to non-15
union employees.
Having considered the evidence and the circumstances under which Dow and Long
told employees the reason they were losing short-term disability benefits, I find that the
statements went beyond permissible statements of fact and were unlawful threats that 20
employees would lose benefits if they continued to be represented by the union. Accordingly,
I conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged.
There is no dispute that the Respondent in fact terminated the short-term disability
benefit for unit employees effective January 1 and that it did so unilaterally, i.e. without 25
bargaining with the Union. The complaint alleges that, in doing so, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)1), (3) and (5). At the hearing, the Respondent offered a great deal of evidence
showing the process by which it made the decision to eliminate short-term disability benefits
for the Miami employees. The decision was made as part of the Respondent’s integration of
its personnel policies and benefit programs following the acquisition of Vanguard. According 30
to the Respondent’s witnesses, this process began soon after the acquisition was complete.
Dana Beffa, the Respondent’s Vice President in charge of the employee benefits department,
spent several months reviewing the Vanguard benefit plans, including the short-term
disability plan at issue here. Beffa testified that she reviewed in particular the following
language in the Vanguard Comprehensive Group insurance Plan:35
FUTURE OF THE PLAN
Vanguard intends to continue the plan, but has the sole right, at its
discretion and acting through its board of directors or authorized delegate, to 40
amend or terminate, at any time and without notice, the plan and any component
plan that is part of this plan. For example, Vanguard may decide to terminate the
plan in connection with a corporate merger or other change in control, or in the
event of a restructuring of Vanguard’s employee benefits program.
45
JD(ATL)–8–12
10
Beffa testified that she interpreted this language as giving the Respondent the right to make
changes to the plan. She reviewed similar language that was contained in the short-term
disability plan document. Beffa testified that she also discussed the issue with the
Respondent’s then Vice President of Labor Relations who agreed with her interpretation.
According to Beffa, it was then determined that short-time disability would be treated as a 5
time off policy rather than a benefit.
At the same time that Beffa was reviewing benefits, a committee within the Human
Resources Department began reviewing all of Vanguard’s existing personnel policies with the
intent of integrating them with Respondent’s existing policies. A subcommittee was created 10
just to review time off policies. Collin Lane, then Corporate Human Resource Manager for
the Southeast Team, headed this committee. The committee worked on integrating these
policies until August 2009. Lane testified that the committee decided to wipe the slate clean
and build a new time off policy from scratch. The final draft of the new time-off policy that
was issued August 1, 2009 included a short-term disability benefit to replace a sick leave 15
policy that existed in the Respondent’s organization. The new policy specifically stated that,
for those employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the collective bargaining
agreement would govern to the extent any provision of the new personnel policies was
inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement. Once the new policies were finalized,
the Respondent conducted a series of power point presentations for its human resources 20
personnel and management to educate them on the new policies. These presentations included
the caveat that the policies would not apply to employees covered by a collective bargaining
agreement.
Lane testified that Dow contacted him in July 2009, in the midst of these power point 25
presentations, with a question whether the unionized employees in Miami would be entitled to
short-term disability under the new policies when they went into effect on August 1, 2009.
According to Lane, this prompted him to review the collective bargaining agreement. As a
result of this review, Lane testified that it was determined that the Miami employees would
retain the short-term disability plan that was part of the Vanguard comprehensive insurance 30
plan until the end of the year and that the Respondent would self-administer the plan for the
remainder of the year.
Respondent also conducted power point presentations for the employees, including
those in Miami, to review the new policies and benefits. Dow and Long conducted these 35
presentations for the unit employees. Dow testified that she told the employees that they
would continue to receive the vacation and time off set forth in the collective bargaining
agreement, She did not specifically tell the employees that they would not be entitled to short
term disability benefits after January 1. As previously noted, the Respondent did not conduct
open enrollment meetings in the fall of 2009 because it was busy implementing the integrated 40
policies and benefits.
On January 1, 2010, when the unit employees in Miami lost their short-term disability
benefit, the nonunion employees at National and enterprise in Miami and elsewhere continued
to receive short-term disability as part of the time-off polices recently implemented. Because 45
JD(ATL)–8–12
11
the unit employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the Respondent did
not extend the new short-term disability time-off policy to them.
The parties agree that the Board’s decision in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980),
enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), establishes the test for 5
determining whether the elimination of short-term disability benefits for unit employees
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Under this test, the General Counsel must first
establish that employees’ union or protected activity was a motivating factor in the
employer’s decision. If the General Counsel meets this burden, then the Respondent must
come forward with evidence that it would have made the same decision or taken the same 10
action even in the absence of union or protected concerted activity. Because direct evidence of
unlawful motivation is seldom available, the General Counsel may rely upon circumstantial
evidence to meet his burden. See Naomi Knitting Plant, 328 NLRB 1279, 1281 (1999).
In this case, the General Counsel relies upon the statements of Dow and Long in 15
November and December 2009 as establishing unlawful motivation. I have already found
these statements, linking the employees’ loss of this significant benefit to their status as
union-represented employees, to be unlawful. The General Counsel also relies on the other
unfair labor practice alleged in the complaint as establishing animus. To the extent I have
found such violations, General Counsel’s prima facie case is met. The question remains 20
whether the Respondent has shown that it would have taken the same action, i.e. eliminating
short-term disability benefits for the unionized Miami Alamo employees, if they were not
represented by the Union. Clearly it would not. Respondent’s own witnesses testified that the
non-union employees at Miami National and Miami Enterprise continued to receive short-
term disability benefits, albeit as a time-off policy, even after the Alamo employees lost this 25
benefit. Thus, in the absence of their union activity, the Alamo employees also would have
received short-term disability under the time off policy. I also agree with counsel for the
General Counsel that the Respondent has not shown that it was compelled to terminate its
short-term disability benefit plan for the Miami Alamo employees by external factors over
which it had no control. On the contrary, the Respondent plan was self-insured and, at least 30
after August 1, 2009, self-administered. The Respondent made a choice to eliminate this
benefit only for the union-represented employees. Because it did not replace the benefit with
the alternative time-off policy available to non-union employees, the union represented
employees in the Alamo unit were the only ones left without such a benefit. Accordingly, I
find, as alleged in the complaint, that the Respondent’s January 1, 2010 termination of its 35
short-term disability plan covering the unionized Alamo employees violated Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act.
The Respondent argues in its brief that it could not extend the new short-term
disability time-off policy to the Alamo unit employees when it terminated their benefit plan 40
because such a change would have to be bargained with the Union. This argument transitions
nicely into the Section 8(a) (5) allegation in the complaint, which claims that the Respondent
committed an unfair labor practice by acting unilaterally when it terminated the unit
employees’ short-term disability benefit. Nothing prevented the Respondent from bargaining
with the Union regarding this change, including whether to replace the benefit with a time-off 45
policy, as the Respondent did with non-unit employees. Although the Respondent’s managers
JD(ATL)–8–12
12
deliberated over this change for an extended period of time before making the decision to end
this employee benefit, it never notified the Union that it was contemplating such a move and
never afforded the union an opportunity to bargain over this change. This despite the fact that
the Union was seeking to initiate bargaining for a new contract to replace the expiring
agreement while the Respondent was implementing these changes. Instead, the Respondent 5
acted as if there were no Union representing these employees.
The Respondent argues that it was privileged to Act unilaterally because the Union
had waived its right to bargain over changes in the Comprehensive Group Insurance Plan by
language in the contract and in the plan documents. While this argument has some superficial 10
appeal, it does not withstand close scrutiny. As the Respondent acknowledges, in order to find
a waiver of the right to bargain, the contractual language must be “clear and unmistakable.”
Metropolitan Edison v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983); Provena St. Joseph Medical Center,
350 NLRB 808 (2007). The language in the plan documents, and the Vanguard Employee
Handbook can not be a clear and unmistakable waiver by the Union because the union was 15
not a party to these documents, did not negotiate the language in them, nor did it consciously
agree to this language. The reference to the comprehensive group insurance plan in Article 23
of the contract did not serve to incorporate all of the terms of those plans in the contract.
Trojan Yacht, 319 NLRB 741, 742, fn. 5 (1995). Cf. Bath iron Works, 345 NLRB 499 (2005);
Mary Thompson Hospital, 296 NLRB 1245, 1249 (1989), enfd. 942 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1991).20
Finally, the language in Article 23, Section 3, which exempts “provisions of the … Plans”
from the “grievance, arbitration or negotiation procedure established [in the contract]” does
not clearly and unmistakably waive the Union’s right to bargain before the plan itself is
eliminated. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent has not established a waiver by the Union
that would privilege its unilateral conduct here.25
Based on the above, I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act by unilaterally terminating unit employees’ short-term disability benefits on January 1,
2010.
30
B. Alleged Interference with Union’s Visitation Rights
The parties’ collective bargaining agreement contained, at Article 5, the following
language regarding union visitation:
35
After making his or her presence known to a member of management, a duly
authorized officer or Business Representative of Teamsters Local 769 shall be
permitted to enter the premises of the Employer for the purpose of determining
whether the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement are being followed.
It is understood that such visits shall in no way interfere with the business of the 40
Employer.
Union Business representative Eddie Valero testified that his usual practice when visiting the
facility pursuant to the above provision is to notify a supervisor that he is there once he arrives
at the facility. He testified that he had never experienced any problems visiting the facility 45
before January 4. Although Dow testified that Valero normally notified her in advance that he
JD(ATL)–8–12
13
was coming to the facility, she conceded on cross-examination that he sometimes made
impromptu visits to the facility, informing her or a supervisor after he had arrived. She also
acknowledged that the visits for which he gave advance notice included visits to meet with
her to discuss grievances. In any event, the above contract language does not require advance
notice.5
Valero testified that he visited the Miami Alamo facility on January 4 in response to a
report he received about a decertification petition being circulated on company time. He was
accompanied on this visit by fellow union agent Rolando Peña and Kim Horner, a laid-off
Alamo employee and former union steward. Only Valero testified about this incident. 10
According to Valero, he and his companions first went to the Quick Turnaround Area (QTA),
where returned cars are washed and cleaned, to look for a supervisor to notify of his presence.
Before Valero could find a supervisor, Dow came out of the building with her arms raised,
screaming at Valero, asking why he was there. Valero told her he was looking for a
supervisor. Dow replied that she would follow him during the visit. When Valero asked why, 15
Dow said she had orders from above. Valero told Dow that he was there to conduct an
investigation and that, if she interfered, he would file charges with the NLRB.
Valero testified that he and his group left the QTA and went inside the building, with
Dow following. She stood next to him while he sat on a bench in the lobby. Valero testified 20
that this continued for about 35 minutes. Valero then called Esther Stanley, Respondent’s
corporate Labor Relations Coordinator, and informed her that union representatives were
being followed and that the Respondent was interfering with an investigation. Valero told her
this was a courtesy call before he filed unfair labor practice charges. According to Valero,
Stanley put him on hold and, while waiting on hold, the call was dropped. Valero then 25
received a call from Collin Lane, the Respondent’s Director of Labor Relations. When Lane
asked what was going on, Valero told him the he was trying to conduct an investigation and
that Dow was following him. Lane asked how far she was from him and Valero replied that
Dow was standing right next to him. Valero also told Lane that this was a courtesy call before
he filed charges with the Board. When Lane asked what Valero would put on the charges, 30
Valero told him he would find out when the charges reached his desk. Valero, Peña, Horner
and Dow spent a total of 50 minutes in the lobby.
Valero testified that, about five to seven minutes after his telephone conversation with
Lane, Long came out of her office and asked Valero if he had called the attorneys. When 35
Valero answered affirmatively, Long told him he was welcome to use the break room. Valero
said the investigation was not in the break room. Long again told Valero he could use the
break room and that he was not to interrupt the workforce. According to Valero, he told Long
that he was not interrupting the workforce, that he was conducting an investigation and that
they knew why he was there. Long then spoke to Dow before returning to her office. At that 40
point, Valero and his companions left the building and returned to the QTA with Dow
following. Dow continued to follow the union visitors when Valero and the others went back
inside the building to go to the break room. Valero testified that Dow finally left them after he
and the others went in the break room. However, according to Valero, a manger would
occasionally come to the break room door and look in on them. After about 25 minutes, 45
JD(ATL)–8–12
14
Valero and the other visitors left the break room and checked the bulletin board before leaving
the facility.
Dow, Long and Lane all testified for the Respondent and corroborated Valero as to the
sequence of events. Dow claimed, in contrast to Valero, that it was he who was acting 5
aggressively when she first confronted the group in the QTA. Dow admitted following Valero
and his group but claims she did so to figure out what they were doing there. Long
acknowledged telling Valero that he had to use the break room. There is no dispute that
Valero returned to the Respondent’s facility on January 5 and 6 without incident. He was
accompanied by even more people on these visits.10
The General Counsel alleges that the conduct of Respondent’s agents on January 4
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The General Counsel relies on the language in the
collective bargaining agreement and Valero’s testimony regarding the established practice for
conducting such visits. The violation is based on Dow’s alleged deviation from this practice. 15
The Respondent argues that Valero’s visit was the departure from the contract and practice,
relying on Dow’s testimony that Valero would usually give her advance notice of his visits.
The Respondent also claims that the purpose of the visit, to investigate the reports of
circulation of a decertification petition on company time, was not permitted under the
contract. Finally, the Respondent argues that Respondent did not deny the Union access, in 20
fact, permitting Valero to stay at the facility and use the break room and not interfering with
his two subsequent visits.
I credit Valero’s testimony, which was corroborated by Dow, that he did not always
give advance notice before visiting the facility. As previously noted, the contract did not even 25
require such notice. I also agree with the General Counsel that the purpose of this visit was
consistent with the language in the contract. Valero was investigating whether the Respondent
was undermining its status as the recognized collective bargain representative under Article 1
of the contract by permitting circulation of a decertification petition on company time.
Finally, nothing in the contract permits the Respondent to limit Valero to using the break 30
room during these visits. The only restriction is that Valero or any other union representative
visiting the facility may not “interfere with the business of the employer.” The Respondent
offered no evidence that Valero or his group interfered with its business during the January 4
visit. In fact, the Respondent offered no satisfactory justification for Dow’s conduct that day,
or for Long’s insistence that the union visitors restrict themselves to the break room.35
Based on the above, I find that the Respondent did interfere with the union’s access to
employees during this visit and that, by doing so, it violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act
as alleged in the complaint. Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 265 NLRB 766, 777-779
(1982). See also Pavilions at Forrestal & Princeton Healthcare, 353 NLRB 540, 564 (2008)40
reaffirmed at 356 NLRB No. 6 (October 22, 2010). Cf. H.M.S. Machine Works, 284 NLRB
1482, 1483, 1487 (1987) and West Lawrence Care Center, 308 NLRB 1011 (1992) where the
Board found similar conduct amounted to surveillance in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
45
JD(ATL)–8–12
15
C. Other Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
The employee petition to decertify the union, which is at the heart of this case, was
circulated among employees beginning on January 1 and continuing until about January 19. 5
The complaint alleges that, during this time, several of the Respondent’s admitted supervisors
engaged in conduct that violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In addition, the complaint alleges
one incident that occurred after the Respondent had withdrawn recognition from the union.
Specifically, it is alleged that Station Manager Johnny Betancourt interrogated employees
about their union membership and solicited employees to withdraw membership in the Union 10
on January 28. Although the Respondent denied this allegation in its answer, it amended the
answer at the hearing to admit this unfair labor practice.8 The pre-withdrawal of recognition
violations are still contested.
Glinda Jefferies, who has been employed by the Respondent as a return agent for 13 15
years and also served as a union steward for four years, testified as a witness for the General
Counsel regarding an incident that occurred on January 13, which is the subject of two
complaint allegations. Jefferies testified that she arrived for work sometime between 7:15 and
7:45 am that morning, consistent with her practice of coming to work early so she can eat her
breakfast in the break room before her shift starts at 8 am. She testified that she was sitting at 20
a table near the door entrance, by the time clock, and could see down the hallway from where
she was. Jefferies testified that she observed fellow employee Cirilo Garcia talking to
managers Larry Elsass and Rudy.9 According to Jefferies, Garcia was holding a paper while
Elsass and Browne spoke to him. She testified that she heard Elsass and Browne ask Garcia
how many signatures he got and when Garcia responded, Rudy told him it was not enough 25
and to go back and get more. After they finished talking, Jefferies saw Garcia leave through
the back door.
There is no dispute that Garcia was the employee who started the decertification
petition and obtained many of the signatures on it. Jefferies testified that, before this incident, 30
Garcia had approached her and asked her to sign it. When Jefferies asked if she could see the
petition so she could read it before signing, Garcia told her he would not let her see it unless
she was going to sign. At that point, Jefferies told Garcia that she would not sign it. Jefferies
also testified that she observed Garcia soliciting employees to sign the petition in the car wash
area (or QTA) while he and other employees were working. She also observed Elsass and 35
Browne standing in the front of the QTA while Garcia did this. According to Jefferies, she has
a clear view of the QTA from where she works checking in customers returning their rental
cars.
Garcia, who has worked for the Respondent for about 25 years and was a service agent 40
in the QTA at the time involved here, testified as a witness for the Respondent. He denied that

8 The Respondent argues that this one incident is de minimis and does not warrant a remedy. I will
address this contention later in my decision.
9 Rudy was later identified as Rudolfo Browne, one of the Respondent’s station managers and an
admitted supervisor.
JD(ATL)–8–12
16
any supervisors questioned him about the petition or told him that he needed to get more
signatures. Garcia primarily speaks Spanish and testified through an interpreter. Elsass and
Browne also testified for the Respondent, each denying that they questioned Garcia about the
petition or told him to get more signatures. Elsass, the Branch Manager, also testified that he
does not speak Spanish. He admitted that he is able to communicate basic instructions to 5
Garcia and that he has used other employees to translate for him when necessary. Browne,
who is the Station Manager in charge of the QTA and spends about 80% of his time there,
testified that he speaks both English and Spanish. Elsass denied being aware that Garcia was
circulating a petition to decertify the Union. He did admit to seeing Garcia with “papers” in
his hand but professed no interest in their contents. Browne, on the other hand, admitted that 10
he was aware of Garcia’s activities because Garcia volunteered this information to him.
Browne claims that he did not actually see the petition. He acknowledged that he informed the
Respondent’s managers during an evening shift change meeting that Garcia was doing a
petition to decertify the Union.
15
The complaint alleges that, on January 13, during the conversation overheard by
Jefferies, Elsass interrogated employees regarding the employees’ support for the Union and
Browne encouraged employees to circulate a decertification petition. Resolution of these
allegations turns on credibility. Although both Jefferies and Garcia were still employed by the
Respondent at the time they testified, Jefferies was the only one testifying adverse to the 20
employer’s interest. Garcia, as the proponent of the petition, had aligned his interest with
those of the employer. Similarly, Elsass and Browne, as supervisors charged with being
responsible for an alleged unfair labor practice, had a vested interest in disputing Jefferies’
testimony. In assessing the respective credibility of the witnesses, I also note that Jefferies
was a reluctant witness and often appeared uncomfortable testifying in front of Dow and25
Long, managers at the facility where she worked. I also note that the Respondent chose not to
cross-examine Jefferies, even after reviewing two affidavits she provided during the
investigation. Her testimony on direct examination was unimpeached.
The Respondent argues that I should discredit Jefferies testimony for linguistic 30
reasons, In the Respondent’s view of the evidence, because Garcia does not speak or
understand English, his conversation with Elsass and Browne had to have taken place in
Spanish and, because Jefferies does not speak or understand Spanish, she could not have
understood what was said. the Respondent also argues that, because Elsass speaks only
English, he could not have interrogated Garcia. This argument ignores the testimony of Elsass 35
that he is able to engage in basic communication with Garcia in English. Moreover, because
Browne speaks Spanish, he was able to translate whatever Elsass said for Garcia. Thus, the
testimony of Jefferies that “they” asked Garcia how many signatures he had. It is significant
that Jefferies did not testify as to Garcia’s response to this question, probably because it was
given in Spanish. Browne’s statement that Garcia needed more signatures is the type of basic 40
communication that could have been conveyed in English and Spanish and thus be understood
by Jefferies.
Based on the above, I shall credit the testimony of Jefferies and find that, on January
13, Elsass and Brown interrogated Garcia regarding how many signatures he had and 45
JD(ATL)–8–12
17
encouraged him to get more employees to sign the decertification petition. Narricot
Industries, 353 NLRB 775, 776 (2009).
The complaint alleges one other incident of interrogation by one of the Respondent’s
supervisors that occurred before the withdrawal of recognition. Vanessa Gonzalez was the 5
witness who testified regarding this incident. Gonzalez, who was hired in June 2009 and was
working as a kiosk greeter in January, testified that on January 16 supervisor Louis Dieppa
escorted her to her vehicle at the end of her shift.10 As they walked to her car, Gonzalez asked
Dieppa what was going to happen to the bus drivers, who would no longer be needed because
the Airport was going to take over operation of the busses. Gonzalez told Dieppa that she had 10
heard that the drivers were going to be offered severance pay because they were part of the
union. Dieppa responded that he did not know what was going to happen to the Alamo drivers
but that the National drivers would not be affected because they were not unionized. Dieppa
then asked Gonzalez if she was in or out of the union and Gonzalez replied that she did not
feel comfortable responding to that question. According to Gonzalez, Dieppa apologized, 15
changed the subject and they continued walking to her car.
In a statement that Gonzalez provided to the Respondent’s counsel shortly before the
hearing, she recalled that this conversation occurred sometime after January 19, after the
Respondent had withdrawn recognition from the Union. At the hearing, Gonzalez testified 20
that, when she was interviewed by the Respondent’s counsel for that statement, she did not
recall the exact date of the conversation. She further testified that her recollection of the date
provided in the affidavit she gave during the General Counsel’s investigation was better
because it was closer in time to the events. She also testified that she had checked the calendar
before testifying and was certain the conversation occurred either on January 15 or 16. 25
Because the Respondent did not call Dieppa to testify regarding this conversation,
Gonzalez’ testimony is uncontradicted. Moreover, I found her to be a very credible witness
and note the fact here as well that she was still employed by the Respondent when she
testified. Her recollection of the dates and the content of the conversation was genuine and not 30
embellished or contrived. Accordingly, I shall credit this testimony. However, it must still be
determined whether the questioning here rises to the level of unlawful interrogation. See
Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), affirmed sub nom. Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). In that case, the Board rejected a per se
approach to allegations of interrogation in favor of consideration of the circumstances in 35
which the questioning occurred. Among the circumstances to be considered are the identity of
the questioner, the location of the questioning, whether the questioning solicits information
about other employees, and whether the employee being questioned is an open union
supporter.
40
I find that Dieppa’s question, whether Gonzalez was “in or out”, occurring in the
parking lot while he escorted Gonzalez to her vehicle, was not coercive. I note, in particular,
that when Gonzalez told Dieppa that she did not feel comfortable answering the question, he
did not pursue it and instead changed the subject. I also note that it was Gonzalez who

10 Gonzalez was working a shift that ended at midnight.
JD(ATL)–8–12
18
introduced the union to the conversation by asking about the unit bus drivers. This is not a
situation where Gonzalez was called to a supervisor’s office and subjected to questions
regarding her and other employees union sympathies. While I have found that the Respondent
committed other unfair labor practices, the conversation between Gonzalez and Dieppa was
devoid of any coercive statements. Accordingly, I shall recommend that this allegation be 5
dismissed.
D. The Respondent’s Withdrawal of Recognition
There is no dispute that the Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union on 10
January 19. On that date, the Respondent posted in its break room the following notice to its
employees from Airport Market Manager Long:
The Company has received petitions from over half of our employees requesting
that the Teamsters no longer represent them. Because the union no longer has the 15
support from this many employees we have decided to stop recognizing or dealing
with the Union. We have taken that action based on the clear wishes of the
majority of our people.
As a result, we are now working with Human Resources, management and our 20
attorneys to determine what actions we can and cannot take regarding any
changes to your pay and benefits. We do not know yet what the Union’s response
will be; because this situation is still unfolding we are unsure how long it will take
to consider any changes in pay or benefits. Please understand, however, that it is
our intention to implement changes that will bring about overall improvements.25
We are very grateful to see that so many of our employees want to work directly
with us without the involvement of the Union. We will continue to keep you
informed with any developments and what steps we will be taking to bring about
overall improvements.30
Thank you for continuing to work hard to make Alamo a great place, and for
giving us the chance to work with you and without a union.
The Respondent, through its attorney, also faxed a letter to the union on January 19, at about 35
3:00 pm, informing the Union of its decision to withdraw recognition based on a petition it
had received from employees.
Long testified for the Respondent regarding the receipt of the decertification petition
and what steps the Respondent took before withdrawing recognition. According to Long, 40
when she unlocked her office on the morning of Monday, January 18, she discovered an
envelope on the floor that apparently had been slipped under the door. The first seven pages
of the petition were in the envelope. Long testified that three more pages of the petition were
left on her desk sometime later that day. She received the last page, containing only one
signature, the next day when that employee handed it to her in the early morning. The petition45
JD(ATL)–8–12
19
in evidence, which Long identified as the one she received on January 18 and 19, consists of
eleven pages. The following statement appears at the top of each page:
The undersigned employees of Alamo Rent A Car in Miami, Fl do not want to be
represented by the Teamsters Local 769, hereafter referred to as “union”5
Should the undersigned employees constitute 30% or more, but less than 50% , of
the bargaining unit represented by the union, the undersigned employees hereby
petition the National Labor Relations Board to hold a decertification election to
determine whether the majority of employees no longer wish to be represented by 10
the union.
In addition, should the undersigned employees constitute 50% or more of the
bargaining unit represented by the union, the undersigned employees hereby
request that our employer immediately withdraw recognition from the union, as it 15
does not enjoy the support of a majority of employees in the bargaining unit.
This statement appears only in English, despite the fact that a number of the Respondent’s
employees speak primarily Spanish. There are a total of 92 signatures on the eleven pages,
with each signature dated individually. The dates on the petition span the period from January 20
1 through January 19.
Long testified that, upon receipt of the petition, she counted the signatures, compared
the names on the petition to a “PeopleSoft” payroll document, and compared the signatures to
W-4 and I-9 forms and other documents containing employee signatures in order to verify that 25
a majority of the unit had signed. Long further testified that there were 159 employees in the
unit at the time. Although Long testified that she received all but the last (eleventh) page of
the petition on January 18, three of the signatures on the ninth page are dated January 19. In
an effort to explain this discrepancy, the Respondent called Jesus Torres, a rental agent, to
testify that he solicited all the signatures on that page while at work on January 18 and that the 30
three employees mistakenly wrote January 19 as the date. However, this testimony is
contradicted by the Respondent’s payroll records and work schedules which show that those
three employees were not at work on January 18, but did work on January 19.
As previously noted, Cirilo Garcia is the employee who initiated the decertification 35
effort. His name and signature is the second one on the first page. He admittedly does not read
English and did not compose the language that appears at the top of each page. According to
Garcia, he got the language from an employee named Andy who works in the office. “Andy”
is actually Leandy Milanes who was employed at the time as an administrative director, a
position within the bargaining unit. Garcia testified that he asked Garcia for a notebook to use 40
to get employee signatures and that Andy told him he had something better, giving him the
form that was ultimately used. Milanes corroborated Garcia’s testimony that he was the
source of the language on the petition. He testified that he found this language by doing a
google search.
45
JD(ATL)–8–12
20
Garcia testified that he collected all of the signatures on the first two pages as well as
some on the third page. According to Garcia, he enlisted another employee, who speaks
Haitian Creole, to help him collect signatures. He at first identified that employee as “Luca”
but later recalled that his name was “Ducasse”.11 Garcia testified that he also had help from
employees Sylvia Falcon and Perla Diaz in soliciting signatures on the petition. Perla Diaz’ 5
signature is the second one on the fourth page of the petition and Falcon’s signature is the first
one on the fifth page. Although Garcia testified on direct examination that he was the one who
placed the petitions in the envelope and slid it under Long’s door, his testimony on cross-
examination became muddled regarding how many pages and which pages were in the
envelope. At one point he testified that he only placed three pages in the envelope. Later he 10
testified that Falcon gave him her page but not Perla Diaz. There was also some inconsistency
in his testimony regarding the pages of signatures that were collected by Rental Agent Jesus
Torres.
Torres also testified for the Respondent regarding his solicitation of the signatures on 15
the eighth and ninth pages of the petition. All of these signatures are dated on and after
January 16. The employees solicited by Torres were rental agents, greeters and other customer
facing employees whose discontent over the loss of short-term disability benefits was
described by Wisecup and Sara and Wanda Rivera. Torres testified that, in the course of
soliciting these signatures, he discussed with the employees the benefits they had and what 20
was available to the unrepresented employees at National Car Rental. According to Torres, he
obtained from Dow a chart comparing the benefits at Alamo and National. Falcon also
testified for the Respondent regarding her solicitation of the names on the fifth through
seventh pages of the petition, all of which are dated January 8 to 14. Falcon worked as a
damage clerk in the off-site maintenance department and the employees who signed these25
pages were the mechanics who work at that facility. Falcon admitted that she collected the
signatures while on the clock.
The Board, in Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717 (2001), held that an
employer may withdraw recognition from an incumbent union only where it is able to prove 30
that the Union lost the support of a majority of unit employees. A good faith belief based on
objective considerations is no longer enough. The Respondent must show an actual numerical
loss of majority support. Here, the Respondent relies upon the petition circulated by Cirilo
Garcia and others as proof of the actual loss of majority support. That petition was signed by
91 employees. Respondent concedes, based on the testimony of Long, who authenticated the 35
signatures by comparing them with company documents, that two of the signatures (Ducasse
Sainvil and Charles Chenet) could not be verified. That left 89 signatures deemed valid by the
Respondent. Although Counsel for the General Counsel raised some doubts about the
credibility of Long and the employees who testified regarding the solicitation of these
signatures, the dates upon which three individuals signed and whether the solicitation was 40
done on company time, she offered no evidence to refute the testimony that the signatures
were authentic. The documents used to compare the signatures are in evidence and a cursory
review supports the testimony of Long that at least 89 signatures are authentic. The testimony
of Long, based on payroll records in evidence, that there were 159 unit employees at the time

11 The name “Ducasse Saintvil” appears on the first page of the petition.
JD(ATL)–8–12
21
is uncontradicted. Thus, the Respondent has proved numerically that, by January 19, more
than half of the employees in the unit had signed a petition expressing their desire to decertify
the Union.
The General Counsel’s theory of a violation is that, even if the Union had lost support 5
of a majority of unit employees, the Respondent could not rely on the petition because the
Respondent’s own unfair labor practices caused employee disaffection and tainted the
petition. Penn Tank Lines, 336 NLRB 1066, 1067 (2001) and cases cited there. However, the
Board has held that not all unfair labor practices will be found to have tainted a petition
showing loss of majority. Where the employer has engaged in a general refusal to bargain 10
with the incumbent union, a causal connection between the unfair labor practice and the loss
of majority support will be presumed. Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp., 322 NLRB
175, 178 (1998), enfd. in rel. part and remanded, 117 F.3d 1454 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In all other
cases, the General Counsel bears the burden of proving a causal connection between the
unfair labor practices and the loss of majority support. Master Slack, 271 NLRB 78, 84 15
(1984). The Board has identified four factors to consider in evaluating whether the necessary
causal connection exists. These factors are: (1) the length of time between the unfair labor
practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the nature of the violation, including the
possibility of a detrimental or lasting effect on employees; (3) the tendency of the violation to
cause employee disaffection; and (4) the effect of the unlawful conduct on employees’ 20
morale, organizational activities, and membership in the union. The Board has held that this is
an objective test, i.e. whether the unfair labor practices would have a reasonable tendency to
cause employee disaffection. Wire Products Mfg. Corp., 326 NLRB 625, 626, fn.13 (1998).
Although the Board has, on occasion, considered the subjective testimony of employees
regarding the cause of their disaffection from the Union, it more recently has suggested that 25
such evidence is irrelevant. See Comau, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 185, slip op. at p. 6 (January 3,
2012) and cases cited there.
I have already found that the Respondent committed several unfair labor practices
shortly before and during the time period in which the decertification petition was circulated. 30
Specifically, I have found that the Respondent told employees in November and early
December 2009 that they would no longer have short-term disability benefits effective
January 1 because of their union contract. Respondent discounts the impact of this violation
by citing the fact that no more than 15 employees attended group meetings at which this
statement was made. However, the testimony of Wisecup and Sara and Wanda Rivera, that 35
employees talked about the meeting and the upcoming loss of benefits for a period of time
after these meetings, was undisputed. 12 The Respondent also argues in its brief that the
General Counsel did not prove that any of the employees who attended these meetings signed
the petition. That argument is contrary to the record. Although the General Counsel did not
offer independent evidence of this, a review of the petition, which is in evidence, shows that 40
at least three of the employees identified as having attended one of the meetings conducted by
Dow and Long signed the petition, i.e. Sal Baglio who was at the meeting attended by
Wisecup, signed the petition on January 17; and Mohammad Lakhani and Karel Rodriguez,

12 In fact, Jesus Torres who circulated the petition among the rental agents, acknowledged that
benefits was a topic of discussion when he solicited signatures on the petition.
JD(ATL)–8–12
22
who were at the meeting attended by the Riveras, signed the petition on January 16.
Significantly, all three signed on the page circulated by Jesus Torres, who admitted discussing
with the employees he solicited the comparison of benefits between Alamo and non-union
National.
5
I have also found that the Respondent’s termination of the short-term disability benefit
on January 1 violated Section 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act. As noted above, this particular
unfair labor practice caused some discontent among unit employees, particularly the rental
agents and other customer service employees. Even Cirilo Garcia, who initiated the petition
and obtained a significant number of the signatures on the petition, testified that he wanted to 10
get rid of the Union because they promised to get more income and benefits for the employees
and instead, “they took our benefits practically.” Garcia himself was adversely affected by the
loss of short-term disability benefits when he had to use vacation time following oral surgery
in February and a foot fracture in May.
15
Respondent argues that, even if the loss of short-term disability cause some discontent
among the employees, the General Counsel has not shown that this discontent was widely
expressed. In this regard, the Respondent is correct that General Counsel has only offered
evidence of this among the rental agents. However, the 23 or 24 rental agents who signed the
petition when solicited by Torres did so after Elsass and Browne had unlawfully interrogated 20
Garcia by asking him how many employees had signed the petition and told Garcia that he
needed more signatures. As counsel for the General Counsel points out, at the time of this
coercive conversation between Elsass and Browne and Garcia, only 66 employees had signed
the petition, not enough to show a numerical loss of majority support for the Union. It was
after this conversation that Garcia enlisted Torres’ help and Torres was able to get enough 25
signatures from the rental agents to get over the hurdle and reach a numerical majority.
Finally, I have found that the Respondent unlawfully interfered with the union’s right
of access to the facility on January 4. The conduct of Dow in following Valero and the other
union representatives around, standing next to them in the lobby and then periodically 30
checking on them when they were in the break room, would have a reasonable tendency to
deter the employees from approaching Valero with any problems or concerns. Unfair labor
practices of this nature, which undermine a union’s representational status, have been found to
satisfy the Master Slack causation test. See Tenneco Automotive, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 84
(August 26, 2011) and cases cited there.35
Having considered all of the evidence in the record and the arguments of counsel, I
find that the unfair labor practices found in this case, because of their timing and nature, had a
reasonable tendency to cause employee disaffection from the Union. I find further that the
General Counsel has met the burden of proving that the petition was tainted by these unfair 40
labor practices. Therefore, the Respondent was not privileged to rely upon the petition as
proof of the Union’s loss of majority support. The January 19 withdrawal of recognition based
upon the tainted petition was thus unlawful.
JD(ATL)–8–12
23
E. The Respondent’s Post-Withdrawal of Recognition Unfair Labor Practices
There is no dispute that, beginning in February, after the Respondent had withdrawn
recognition from the Union, it ceased deducting and remitting union dues for employees who 5
had signed dues check-off authorizations. It is also undisputed that the Respondent, on
October 12, announced a wage increase for unit employees effective October 29 and
improvements in vacation days, choice days, and holidays effective January 1, 2011 and that
on October 29 and January 1, 2011, respectively, it implemented these changes. It is also
undisputed that, on January 1, 2011, the Respondent made a number of other improvements to 10
employees terms and conditions of employment that are specified in paragraph 14(e) of the
complaint. Respondent admits making these changes without notice and bargaining based on
its position that the withdrawal of recognition was lawful. Having found that it was not, any
subsequent changes the Respondent made to the employees’ wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment without affording the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain 15
would be unlawful and I so find.
The Respondent’s cessation of dues check-off requires further analysis. The Board has
long held that union security and dues check-off arrangements, unlike most terms and
conditions of employment, do not survive expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. 20
Bethlehem Steel Company, 136 NLRB 1500 (1962), enf. denied on other grounds, 320 F.2d
615 (3rd Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 984 (1964). Recently, the Board’s attempt to re-
affirm this holding has run into resistance from the Ninth Circuit. See Hacienda Resort and
Casino, 355 NLRB No. 154 2010). On appeal for the third time, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the Board’s holding as it applies in a right to work state like Florida. Local 25
Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas v. NLRB, –F.3d–; 2011 WL 4031208; 191 LRRM 2609
(9th Cir. September 13, 2011). The court held that in a right to work state, where dues check-
off does not exist to implement union security, dues check-off is akin to any other term of
employment that is a mandatory subject of bargaining and may not be unilaterally
discontinued upon contract expiration. Counsel for the General Counsel relies upon the Ninth 30
Circuit’s decision as well as the concurring opinions of Board Members Liebman and Pierce
in arguing that the Respondent’s failure to continue the check-off provisions after it withdrew
recognition was unlawful. Until a Board majority has adopted this position, I must follow
established Board law as set forth in Bethlehem Steel, supra. See Waco, Inc., 273 NLRB 746,
749 fn. 14 (1984).35
In the present case, the parties collective bargaining agreement was still in effect when
the Respondent withdrew recognition and ceased deducting and remitting union dues by
virtue of the December 28, 2009 agreement to extend the contract through March 31, 2010.
Under existing Board law, Respondent was required to continue dues check-off until the end 40
of March. Because the withdrawal of recognition was unlawful and the cessation of dues
check-off premature, I find the Respondent violated the Act by failing to deduct and remit
dues for the months of February and March 2010.
Finally, the complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) by 45
failing and refusing to process a discharge grievance filed by the Union over the discharge of
JD(ATL)–8–12
24
employee Paul Garcia. Respondent admits this conduct but defends on the basis of its
withdrawal of recognition. Garcia was discharged after the Respondent withdrew recognition
but before the expiration of the contract extension. Since I have found that the withdrawal of
recognition was unlawful, it follows that the Respondent’s refusal to process this grievance
and to meet with the Union for that purpose was unlawful.5
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By telling employees they would lose short-term disability benefits because they
were represented by a union, by interrogating employees regarding their and other employees’10
union support, by encouraging employees to circulate a decertification petition and by
soliciting employees to withdraw membership in the Union, the Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
15
2. By terminating employees’ short-term disability benefits effective January 1, 2010
because they were represented by a union, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
20
3. By unilaterally terminating employees’ short-term disability benefits effective
January 1, 2010, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. By interfering with the Union’s contractual right of access to the Respondent’s 25
facility on January 4, 2010, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. By withdrawing recognition from the Union on January 19, 2010, the Respondent
has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 30
8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. By failing and refusing to deduct and remit dues to the Union for the months of
February and March 2010, pursuant to the check-off provision in the collective bargaining
agreement, before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Respondent has 35
engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) and section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
7. By unilaterally increasing employees’ wages and improving their terms and
conditions of employment on and after January 19, 2010, the Respondent has engaged in 40
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of section 8(a)(1) and (5) and
section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
8. By failing and refusing to process the discharge grievance of employee Paul Garcia
since March 3, 2010, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting 45
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
JD(ATL)–8–12
25
9. Respondent, through its supervisor Louis Dieppa, did not unlawfully interrogate
employees in violation of the Act on January 16, 2010.
REMEDY5
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. In particular, Respondent shall be ordered to restore
recognition to the Union and, upon request, meet and bargain with the Union regarding the 10
terms and conditions of employment of its unit employees and regarding the Paul Garcia
grievance. The Respondent shall also be required to restore the unlawfully terminated short-
term disability benefits for unit employees and, if requested by the Union, to rescind the
unilateral wage increase and other improvements in benefits that were announced and
implemented after the Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union. The Respondent 15
shall also be ordered to deduct and remit dues to the Union pursuant to the contractual dues
check-off provision for the months of February and March 2010. Because the record indicates
that the Respondent employs a significant number of employees who do not speak or read
English, I shall recommend that the attached notice be posted in English, Spanish and Haitian
Creole. I shall also recommend electronic posting pursuant to the Board’s decision in J. Picini 20
Flooring, 356 NLRB No. 9 (October 22, 2010).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended13
25
ORDER
The Respondent, Enterprise Leasing Company of Florida, LLC, d/b/a Alamo Rent-A-
Car, Miami, Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
30
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that their short-term disability benefits were being terminated
because they were represented by Teamsters Local Union No. 769, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“the Union”).35
(b) Interrogating employees regarding their support for the Union or their membership
in the Union or the Union support or membership of other employees.
(c) Encouraging employees to circulate a petition to decertify the Union as their 40
bargaining representative and soliciting employees to withdraw their membership in the
union.

13 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(ATL)–8–12
26
(d) Terminating the short-term disability benefits of employees represented by the
Union because they were represented by the Union and without first notifying the Union and
offering it an opportunity to bargain regarding this change in employees’ terms and conditions
of employment.5
(e) Interfering with the Union’s contractual right of access to the facility.
(f) Withdrawing recognition from the Union as exclusive collective bargaining
representative of its employees in the following Unit:10
All full-time and regular part-time Bus Drivers, Cashiers, Custodians, Damage
Clerks, Greeters, Inventory Clerks, Lead Bus Drivers, Lead Service Agents, Lost
& Found Clerks, Parts Clerks, Phone Operators, Rental Agents, Return Agents,
Service Agents, and Technicians A, B and C, employed by the Employer at its 15
facility at 3355 NW 22nd Street, Road, Miami, Florida; excluding: all other
employees, including office clerical employees, confidential employees,
managerial employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as define
din the Act.
20
(g) Refusing to bargain with the Union regarding grievances.
(h) Failing and Refusing to deduct and remit dues to the Union pursuant to the dues
check-off provision during the term of any collective bargaining agreement.
25
(i) Granting employees in the Unit increased wages and improved benefits without
first notifying the Union and affording it an opportunity to bargain regarding such changes.
(j) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.30
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
Unit and, upon request, bargain with the Union regarding the wages, hours and terms and 35
conditions of employment of Unit employees.
(b) Restore the short-term disability benefits for Unit employees that were in effect
prior to January 1, 2010.
40
(c) Upon request, process the grievance filed by the Union over the discharge of Paul
Garcia.
(d) Deduct and remit to the Union all dues that were owed for the months of February
and March 2010 pursuant to the dues check-off provision of the expired collective bargaining 45
agreement.
JD(ATL)–8–12
27
(e) If requested by the Union, rescind the wage increase that was implemented on
October 29, 2010 and the benefits improvements that were implemented January 1, 2011 and
bargain with the Union before implementing future wage and benefit increases for Unit
employees.5
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Miami, Florida
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix”14 in English, Spanish and Haitian Creole.
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region12, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and 10
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an
internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with
its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure 15
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that,
during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed
the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since December 1, 2009.20
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps
that the Respondent has taken to comply.
25
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.
30
Dated, Washington, D.C. , April 11, 2012.
35
____________________
Michael A. Marcionese
Administrative Law Judge

14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to
a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT tell you that your short-term disability benefits are being terminated because
you are represented by Teamsters Local Union No. 769, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (“the Union”).
WE WILL NOT interrogate you regarding your or your fellow employees’ Union support or
membership.
WE WILL NOT encourage you to circulate a petition to decertify the Union as your
bargaining representative or solicit you to withdraw your membership in the union.
WE WILL NOT terminate your short-term disability benefits because you are represented by
the Union.
WE WILL NOT make changes to your wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment without first notifying the Union and offering it an opportunity to bargain
regarding the proposed changes.
WE WILL NOT interfere with the Union’s contractual right of access to our facility.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the Union or refuse to bargain with it as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of our employees in the following Unit:
All full-time and regular part-time Bus Drivers, Cashiers, Custodians, Damage
Clerks, Greeters, Inventory Clerks, Lead Bus Drivers, Lead Service Agents, Lost
& Found Clerks, Parts Clerks, Phone Operators, Rental Agents, Return Agents,
Service Agents, and Technicians A, B and C, employed by the Employer at its
facility at 3355 NW 22nd Street, Road, Miami, Florida; excluding: all other
employees, including office clerical employees, confidential employees,
managerial employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as define
din the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the Union regarding grievances.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to deduct and remit dues to the Union pursuant to the dues
check-off provision during the term of any collective bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union and put in writing and sign any
agreement reached on terms and conditions of employment for our employees in the
bargaining unit described above.
WE WILL restore the short-term disability benefits for Unit employees that were in effect
prior to January 1, 2010.
WE WILL, upon request, process the grievance filed by the Union over the discharge of Paul
Garcia.
WE WILL deduct and remit to the Union all dues that were owed for the months of February
and March 2010 pursuant to the dues check-off provision of the expired collective bargaining
agreement.
WE WILL, if requested by the Union, rescind the wage increase that was implemented on
October 29, 2010 and the benefits improvements that were implemented January 1, 2011 and
bargain with the Union before implementing any future wage and benefit increases for Unit
employees.
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF
FLORIDA, LLC d/b/a ALAMO RENT-A-CAR
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National
Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union
representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more
about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any
agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website:
www.nlrb.gov.
South Trust Plaza, 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Tampa, FL 33602-5824
(813) 228-2641, Hours: 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT
BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE
OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (813) 228-2455.