Engineers & Fabricators, Inc

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 17, 1966

156 N.L.R.B. 919 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 919
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL, if requested by Local 259, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, AFL-CIO, give effect
to the terms of the agreement reached with that Union on August 10, 1964,
said contract to be effective retroactive to August 18, 1964, and we will make
whole our employees for any losses suffered by reason of our refusal to give
effect to the contract.
WE WILL, if no request is made to place the August 10, 1964 , contract in
effect, bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive rep-
resentative of the unit described herein with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of work , and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an under-
standing is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The
bargaining unit is:
All shop employees in our service and parts departments at 138-22
101st Avenue, 138-19 101st Avenue, and 139-11 Queens Boulevard,
Jamaica, New York, excluding new and used car salesmen, office clerical
employees, watchmen, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights to self-organization , to form
labor organizations, to join or assist Local 259, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and
all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
M & M OLDSMOBILE, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 16
Court Street, Brooklyn, New York, Telephone No. 596-5386.
Engineers & Fabricators , Inc. and United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 23-CA-1948 and 23-RC-2336. Jan-
uary 17, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On September 8, 1965, Trial Examiner Owsley Vose issued his Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices; rec-
ommending in effect that the objections be sustained and the repre-
sentation petition in Case No. 23-RC-2336 be dismissed; and further
recommending that Respondent cease and desist from the unfair labor
practices found, and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
156 NLRB No. 86.
920 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed
'exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief;
the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions with a supporting brief;
and the Charging Party filed an answering brief in support of the
Decision.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Zagoria].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
1. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Respondent had violated
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with
the Union. The General Counsel proved that Respondent failed to
reply to the Union's request for recognition as the bargaining agent
of Respondent's employees, and ignored the Union's offer of an exam-
ination of authorization cards by a disinterested party; that, on three
occasions, Respondent's vice president made it clear to employees that
the continuation of Respondent's loan policy might be contingent on
the results of the forthcoming representation election or upon the
allegiance of the particular employee; and that, in the course of
individual preelection interviews which Respondent had instructed
its foremen to hold with all employees, eight employees were variously
'questioned about their union sympathies, threatened about the security
of their positions and the permanence of their benefits, informed of
merit raises, and promised rewards for the defeat of the Union. That
i Respondent has filed a motion to strike the answering brief submitted by the Charg-
ing Party , on the ground that the brief does not comply with the requirements of Sec-
tion 102 .46(d), Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure , Series 8 , as amended.
We agree that the brief is deficient in several respects , and herewith grant the motion to
strike.
Respondent ' s request for oral argument before the Board is hereby denied as the record,
the exceptions and cross -exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the issues and the
positions of the parties.
2In section III, D, 2, b, of the Decision , the Trial Examiner erroneously finds that the
authorization card executed by Floyd Mathews was signed in the presence of Union Solici-
tor James Tillie, whose testimony as to the authenticity of Mathews ' card is credited by
the Trial Examiner . The record shows , however , that Jimmy Montgomery , rather than
Tillie , testified that he solicited and witnessed the card. Since the Trial Examiner also
credits Montgomery immediately thereafter on his authentication of cards signed in a
similar fashion by other employees , and since no witness contradicted Montgomery 's testi-
mony about Mathews ' card, we think it fair to conclude that such testimony should be
accepted as credible.
The inadvertent references to Appendix B and Appendix C in the first paragraphs of
section III, b, 2, c, I, and II, should be corrected, respectively, to Appendix C and Ap-
pendix D.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 921
the interrogation, promises, and intimidation were in some instances
accomplished with a measure of subtlety in no sense diminished their
likely impact on the employees. On these facts, and after due con-
sideration of the evidence offered by Respondent in its defense, the
Trial Examiner concluded that Respondent's refusal to recognize and
bargain with the Union was in violation of the requirements of
8(a) (5).
We think the Trial Examiner's conclusion is sound. When an
employer's failure to accord recognition to a union which represents
a majority of his employees is inspired, not by a genuine doubt of the
union's right to represent the employees, but by an intention to repudi-
ate the concept of collective bargaining or by a design to thwart union-
ization, the employer is held to be in violation of 8 (a) (5).3 The
question of the employer's good or bad faith in refusing to deal with
the union must, of course, be assessed in the light of the facts of each
case, including any reasons he may offer to justify the refusal and any
conduct violative of the Act for which he may be held accountable 4
Here, Respondent's vice president made threats to several employees
relating to Respondent's loan policy; Respondent's foremen frequently
went beyond the pale of lawful behavior in the course of the individual
preelection interviews which had been ordered by Respondent; and in
addition Respondent made calculated announcements of merit raises
not clearly required by past practices just prior to the election. In
the face of this conduct, Respondent's protestations of various good-
faith reasons for refusing to recognize the Union ring hollow. We
find, rather, that the refusal was born of a desire to gain time to subvert
the Union's majority status. As recommended by the Trial Examiner,
we sustain the objections to the election, dismiss the representation
petition, and order the Respondent to bargain, upon request, with the
Union.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order
with the following modifications :
:[1. Substitute the following as paragraph 2(a)
["(a) Upon request , recognize and bargain collectively with United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO , as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the appropriate unite, and embody in a signed agree-
ment any understanding reached."
3 Joy Silk Mi118 , Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd . as modified , 185 F. 2d 732 (C.AD.C .), cert.
denied 341 U S. 914.
4 Cameo Lingerie, Inc., 148 NLRB 535.
5 We agree with the Trial Examiner that the principles applied in cases such as Stow
Menufacturmg Co, 103 NLRB 1280, enfd. 217 F 2d 900 (C.A. 2), and Greystone Knit-
wear Corp, and Donwood, Ltd, 136 NLRB 573, enfd 311 F. 2d 794 (C A. 2), cited in
the Trial Examiner 's Decision , equally support the issuance of a bargaining order here.
922 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
[2. Add the following immediately after the word "below" in the
third indented paragraph of attached Appendix A : "and embody
in a signed agreement any understanding reached".]
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These cases , involving both objections to conduct affecting the results of an election
and an unfair labor practice charge filed by the Charging Party ( herein referred to as
the Union ) were heard by Trial Examiner Owsley Vose at Houston , Texas, on
April 19 through 22 and May 10 through 12, 1965, pursuant to a complaint issued
on January 29, 1965, and an order of consolidation dated February 18, 1965. The
complaint alleges violations of Section 8(a) (5) and ( 1) of the Act.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses , and after due
consideration of the briefs filed by all parties , I make the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is engaged at Houston, Texas, in the manufacture and sale of
heat exchangers and related products. During 1964 Respondent shipped from its
Houston plant direct to out-of-State destinations more than $50,000 worth of finished
products. During the same period the Respondent purchased from out-of-State
sources and had shipped to its plant at Houston in excess of $50,000 worth of raw
materials. Upon these facts, I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as the Respondent admits.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Preliminary statement; issues involved
In his complaint the General Counsel alleges that the Respondent on and after
October 1, 1964, engaged in a course of conduct designed to undermine the Union's
majority status, and that therefore its failure on and after October 14, 1964, to
recognize and bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of
its employees in a stipulated appropriate unit constituted a violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. In his brief the General Counsel urges that the election which
was held at the plant on November 18, 1964, be set aside and that a bargaining order
be issued in favor of the Union under the theory of the Bernel Foam, Irving Air
Chute, and Aero Corporation line of cases.'
Pursuant to a petition filed by the Union, Clifford Potter, the Regional Director
at Houston, on October 15, 1963, issued a Decision and Direction of Election in
Case No. 23-RC-2144, in which he directed an election among the Respondent's
production and maintenance employees, with certain specified inclusions and exclu-
sions, a unit which the Regional Director, upon the stipulation of the parties, found
to be appropriate within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. At the election,
which was held on November 7, 1963, 62 votes were cast for the Union and 89
against, with 2 challenged ballots. No objections were filed by the Union and a
certification of results issued on November 18, 1963.
On October 14, 1964, Robert Corley, a staff representative of the Union, mailed
a letter to the Respondent stating that a majority of the Respondent's production
and maintenance employees, including the very same categories of employees as
were included in the unit found appiopriate in the 1963 Decision and Direction of
i Bernel Foam Products Co., Inc., 146 NLRB 1277; Irving Air Chute Company, Inc,
Marathon Division, 149 NLRB 627, enfd . 350 F. 2d 176 (C A. 2) ; Aero Corporation, 149
NLRB 1283.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 923
Election, have selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. The
letter continued as follows:
Therefore, this is to request that your company recognize the afore-mentioned
Union as the bargaining representative for said employees in the above described
unit. We are prepared and now are offering to demonstrate our majority status
to you through a card check of the employees who have designated and author-
ized this Union to act as their collective bargaining representative We will agree
for any responsible disinterested person, such as a minister or a rabbi or a
member of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, to make this card
check.
Please treat this request for recognition as the majority representative of the
employees in said unit as a continuing request; and if you are not prepared to
allow us to prove our majority to you at this time in some feasible manner
other than a formal board election after a hearing, but would wish to do so in
the future, please contact me at once by phone or letter at the above Houston
address and phone number.
No other person or organization now represents a majority of the above
described unit, and you are hereby cautioned against entering into any contract
or any collective bargaining negotiations with any other organization presuming
to act as agent for or in behalf of any such employees. You are further
cautioned to take no unilateral action in regard to rates of pay, hours of work,
and all other conditions of employment without first contacting the United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and giving them a chance to meet and
bargain on any such changes.
This will serve as the Union's request that the Company bargain collectively
with the Union and negotiate to a conclusion the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement regarding all matters pertaining to wages, hours of work, working
conditions, and other conditions of employment.
We stand ready and willing to meet with your designated representative at an
early date, mutually agreeable to the parties, to conclude such negotiations.
This letter was received by John Van Alstyne, the vice president and general manager
of the Respondent, on Thursday, October 15, 1964.
That same day Van Alstyne attempted to reach John B. Abercrombie of the law
firm which for some years has represented the Respondent but was informed that he
was out of the city until the following Monday.
On Saturday, October 17, before Abercrombie's return to Houston, Van Alstyne
received in the mail a copy of the Union's petition for certification filed in Case No.
23-RC-2336. When Van Alstyne reached Abercrombie on Monday, October 19, he
informed him of the filing of the Union's petition for certification. To Van Alstyne's
inquiry whether Abercrombie was going to answer the Union's letter of October 14
requesting recognition, Abercombie responded in effect that the Union's petition took
care of that. The Respondent did not reply in any way, either orally or in writing,
to the Union's letter of October 14.
The hearing on the Union's petition for certification was scheduled for October 30.
On October 29, Staff Representative Corley called Attorney Abercrombie on the
telephone and inquired whether an agreement could be reached for holding a consent
election. Abercrimbie replied that he would see if such an agreement could be
worked out when the parties got together at the hearing on the following day. This
was the first contact between the Respondent and the Union after the Respondent's
receipt of the Union's letter of October 14. The next day, before the hearing
commenced, the parties signed a stipulation for certification upon consent election.
Although there was disagreement between the Respondent and the Union as to
whether Bobby Ryan, the Respondent's scheduler, was a supervisory employee, the
Union agreed that the scheduler could be included in the appropriate unit. The
election was set for November 18.
In the election 82 votes were cast for the Union, 82 were cast "No," and 1 ballot
was challenged by the Union, that of Bobby Ryan, which has not yet been opened and
counted. The question of the disposition of Ryan's ballot is one of those raised by
the Union's objections here under consideration.
B. Chronology of events
1. The Union's drive for signatures on bargaining authorization cards
On September 1, 1964, eight of the Respondent's employees met with Staff Rep-
resentative Corley and another union representative at the union office. Because
924 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the Union's failure in the 1963 election to obtain a majority of the votes in the
Board-conducted election, although the Union had obtained signed authorization
cards from a majority of the employees, it was decided that the goal of the 1964
campaign would be to obtain signatures on cards from 120 employees, or about
two-thirds of the employee complement in the shop. It was arranged that the employ-
ees present at the meeting and any additional solicitors who could be obtained would
solicit signatures on the authorization cards and that the signed cards would be
turned over to Noah Melton (Arky) for delivery to Corley. Any other cards could
be mailed directly to Corley. This was the procedure followed throughout the
campaign. The great bulk of the signed cards were turned over to Melton and were
picked up by Corley at Melton's home at intervals.
The text of the authorization cards used in the Union's membership drive is as
follows:
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO
I hereby request and accept membership in the UNITED STEELWORK-
ERS OF AMERICA, and of my own free will hereby authorize the United
Steelworkers of America, its agents or representatives, to act for me as a
collective bargaining agency in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and to enter into
contracts with my employer covering such matters.
SIGNATURE --------------------------------------------------
(Please do not Print)
ADDRESS -----------------------------------------------------
Street City
PLANT -------------------------------------------------------
DATE ------------------------------------- DEPT. ------------
PAY NO INITIATION FEE OR DUES WITH THIS CARD
By September 17 the union solicitors had obtained signatures on authorization
cards from a majority of the 171 employees in the appropriate unit.2 Thereafter
the Union's progress in obtaining signatures on authorization cards was much slower.
However, by October 14 at least 114 signed authorization cards had been turned
over to Staff Representative Corley. On October 16 Corley delivered all the cards
in his possession to a representative of the Board when he filed the petition for
certification.
2. The Respondent's efforts to counter the Union's organizing drive
a. Background
Vice President Van Alstyne first became aware of the Union's organizing drive in
the last week of September when several of the employees came to him and told
him that they had signed cards for the Union, but were not in favor of it and had
signed only to keep peace with their fellow workers. The seriousness of the Union's
1964 campaign was brought home to Van Alstyne when, on October 15, he received
the Union's letter requesting recognition. No reply of any kind was ever made to
this letter As found above, Attorney Abercombie had advised Van Alstyne that
none was required in view of the Union's filing of the petition for certification.
The following week Van Alstyne had a meeting of all the foremen, which was
attended by Abercrombie. Van Alstyne questioned the foremen as to whether the
men under them favored the Union. According to Van Alstyne, the foremen stated,
that "they did not think the Union had enough to carry the election." Van Alstyne
did not inquire as to the basis for the foremen's opinion. At this meeting the foremen
were told to observe the written instructions given them at the time of the 1963
election.3
9 This is just an indication of the Union 's rapid progress at first in signing up em-
ployees. This statement is not intended to suggest that the Union had valid bargaining
authorizations from a majority of the employees at this time This question will be con-
sidered hereinafter
'These instructions included warnings to the supervisors to guard against making any
threats or promises, or statements which might be misunderstood as threats or promises,
and to avoid questioning employees about union matters. These instructions were prefaced,
in part, with the following introduction:
The Company is strongly opposed to having a union here. We intend to do our best
to convince the employees, in a fair manner, that they should vote against the Union.
You will be largely responsible for carrying out this program
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 925
Either at this meeting or later on Van Alstyne issued instructions that the foremen
should talk to each of the employees under their supervision, show them the wage
rates of five other concerns having employees in the same general work categories
as the Respondents, ask them to compare their own wage rates with those other
concerns, and point out the, benefits which they enjoyed as employees of the
Respondent.
The Respondent used in its 1964 preelection campaign against the Union the
same techniques which it had used successfully in the 1963 campaign, including the
use of posters which were placed throughout the plant and direct mail appeals to
the employees to vote against the Union. One of the posters, which was painted
in brilliant colors, after listing various benefits assertedly enjoyed by the Respondent's
employees, concluded with the following message in bold lettering:
THE UNION HAS DONE NOTHING FOR YOU IN THE LAST YEAR!
Now it offers nothing but promises.
YOU GOT AND HELD YOUR JOB BY YOURSELF
Why split your pay with the Union?
VOTE FOR YOURSELF! VOTE NO UNION!
The other posters used similarly stressed "VOTE NO UNION."
As soon as the agreement had been reached to hold the election on November 18,
the Respondent commenced its letterwriting campaign. The first letter was sent to
all employees on November 2. The text of this letter, which was signed by John
Van Alstyne, is as follows:
This letter might be titled "Here We Go Again." On November 7, 1963,
the National Labor Relations Board held an election among our men to decide
whether or not you want to be represented by the Steelworkers Union. The
vote was 89 for Efco and 62 for the Steelworkers.
Well, the Union and its supporters weren't satisfied. They didn't even wait
a year before filing another petition asking for another election. At the hear-
ing on the Union's petition last Friday, it was agreed that an election would
be held on November 18, from 2:30-4.30 p.m. in the Pipe Shed. You will
have a chance then to vote on the important question of union representation.
Efco's position is the same as it was last year. We are convinced that getting
the Steelworkers in our plant will be harmful to both you and Efco, and that
we are all better off with our present relationship. We urge you to vote NO
in this election.
In the time remaining before this election , you will be hearing from me and
your supervisors about why you should vote against this union . We are not
going to try to "snow" you, or put out a lot of propaganda. We just want to
give you the facts so that your decision on how you vote will be based on the
whole picture. We hope, we know that with the facts you will support yourself
and your Company and vote NO Union.
Van Alstyne's second letter dated November 4 reads as follows:
Remember that the Steelworkers Union is in the business of selling itself to
employees just like a used car salesmen is in the business of selling clunkers.
Every trick and gimmick will be used to get you to sign on the dotted line, and
the only thing for sure from then on is that they'll be around to collect the
payments.
Investigate , think and discuss Efco 's proven performance and concern for you
against this union's sales pitch. Through the years, Efco, with your help, has
been a leader in the heat exchanger business and in industry in Houston in
paying top wages and good benefits; providing steady work without layoff;
recognition of length of service; freedom from discharge without real cause;
granting a fair share of Efco's earnings to our men through the profit sharing
plan; and recognition of you as an individual . We are proud of Efco's record
and believe you should be also.
In line with Efco's policy , in the last year we increased our vacation plan so
that our men now get 1 week vacation after 1 year service , 2 weeks' after 2 years,
and one additional day for each year of service from 11 years up to a maximum
of 4 weeks' vacation after 20 years of service. We have also given general
wage increases of 5¢ an hour in November 1963, 40 in August 1964, increased
the maximum rates of our top classifications by 3¢ an hour and granted many
merit increases . These things were done without a union.
You don't need the Steelworkers for good wages, benefits and working con-
ditions at Efco. Vote NO on November 18th.
926 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Further letters in the same vein were sent out on November 11 and 13. The Novem-
ber 11 letter concluded as follows: "Don ' t be mislead Don't trade what you now
have for empty promises and false hopes . VOTE NO UNION."
During the preelection campaign the Union either handed out or mailed to employ-
ees "literature" in which it attempted to rebut statements made by the Respondent
either in its letters or in the personal interviews with the employees . Most of this
literature was in cartoon form and the Respondent 's officials were portrayed in these
cartoons in a most unappealing light.
b. Vice President Van Alstyne's threats to curtail employee loans if the Union
succeeded in organizing the shop
The Respondent has a policy of loaning sums of money to its employees to tide
them over emergency situations. The Respondent introduced into evidence records
of the separate loans made to employees during the months of September through
December 1964. These records show that the Respondent made from 40 to 60 sepa-
rate loans a month during these months, the least number being made during the month
of September, before the Respondent became aware of the Union's renewed mem-
bership drive (Van Alstyne testified that he heard about the union drive during the
last week in September). The typical loan ranges from $10 to $150, but some indi-
vidual loans go much higher. No interest is charged on these loans Many of the
loans aie repeat loans made to the same employee, and in some cases two loans may
be made to the same employee on the same day. In the nature of things, each loan
must be passed on individually. Van Alstyne apparently makes the decision about
granting loans His testimony indicates that various factors are taken into considera-
tion, such as the nature and extent of the emergency, the total sum already borrowed
by the employee, and the arrangements which can be made for repaying the loan.
The record, including Van Alstyne's testimony, establishes that on three occasions
in October and November 1964, Van Alstyne took advantage of the opportunity pre-
sented by the granting of loans to impress on employees seeking the loans that they
should vote against the Union in the election. Early in October Van Alstyne
approached Jimmy Tillie, one of the employees who had been actively soliciting
employees to sign authorization cards, at his work. According to Tillie's testimony,
the following conversation ensued:
Johnny (Van Alstyne) walked up to me and said, "One of the older men
told me you were a union man." I said, "I sure arm." He said, "Well, how
come? You were against it last year."
I said, "I would still be against it if you all treated me right."
Van Alstyne did not specifically deny the foregoing conversation. Further Van
Alstyne admitted knowing that Tillie had opposed the Union in 1963. Van Alstyne
testified also that Tillie told him during a conversation in October that "he was for
the Union." I find that the above-quoted portion of the conversation took place in
accordance with Tillie's testimony.
The conversation continued, so Tillie testified, with a question from Van Alstyne
concerning the nature of Tillie's grievance. Atter Tillie explained his grievance at
length, Van Alstyne replied, according to Tillie, "Well, if you are a union man, you
need not look to borrow any more money from me or get any more money out of
the Company."
Van Alstyne denied making any such statement. His version of this aspect of the
conversation is that he told Tillie, "Jim, if you say you are for the Union, that is
your business But I have been very good in lending you money." It will be noted
that even under Van Alstyne's version, there is a suggestion of some inconsistency
between union membership and the continuation of the Respondent's beneficial loan
policy. As stated in N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U S. 405, 409,
"Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now con-
ferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up
if it is not obliged." For reasons more fully explained below, I credit Tillie's testimony
regarding this conversation
On October 6, not long after Tillie's first conversation with Van Alstyne, Tillie
approached Van Alstyne in the shop about a loan. According to Van Alstyne, Tillie
opened the conversation by saying, "I know you told me the other day that you
wouldn't lend me any more money." Tillie testified that the conversation continued
as follows
I told him I needed to borrow some money, I believe it was seventy-five dollars.
He said, "Are you still a union man?"
I didn't answer.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 927
He said, "If you are, I can't let you have it " He said, "If you aren't, all right."
And he brought me a check back for it.
As stated above, Van Alstyne testified that Tillie began this second conversation by
saying, "I know you told me the other day that you wouldn't lend me any more
money." Van Alstyne's version of this conversation continues as follows:
And I stopped him quick and I said, "I didn't tell you that, Jim. If you are
in an emergency, I am in position to lend you money."
He told me he needed sixty dollars.
I told him, "Jim, I will get it for you."
In the same conversation he said, "I guess a bunch of us after this is over will
get run off from here." And I didn't answer him.
I find that this second conversation took place as testified to by Tillie. Tillie
impressed me as a forthright witness who would not fabricate the testimony about
Van Alstyne's stating that loans would not be made to union members. As found
below, two other employees testified to Van Alstyne's making similar statements to
them Van Alstyne's contrary testimony is rejected.
On November 4, 1964, Edmund Duve requested a loan from Van Alstyne. Duve's
testimony regarding this incident is as follows:
Mr. Johnny Van Alstyne walked on the floor and as he walked on the floor
I saw him over there and I went over there and asked him, I wanted to borrow
forty dollars because my wife was in the hospital and I was running short. So
I needed some money, so I asked him
So he told me, "If we had a union, would they borrow some money?"
I said "Probably they would or probably they wouldn't "
So he started off and he told me I shouldn't vote for the Union, they didn't
want a union in the shop.
About an hour later he came back and brought my check for forty dollars.
Gene Ansley, another union solicitor, called Van Alstyne on the telephone from
the shop on November 5 and told him that he needed to borrow some money Van
Alstyne told Ansley to come up to the office After showing Ansley the sheets set-
ting forth the wage rates of some other employers in the same line of work, Van
Alstyne stated that "he had heard that [Ansley] was pushing the Union." Ansley
replied that "he didn't have any comments about that." 4 Van Alstyne then went on
to ask "who was going to loan [him] money if the Union came in." Van Alstyne loaned
Ansley $50 on this occasion.
Van Alstyne denied using the precise words attributed to him by Duve and Ansley
but admitted that he had reminded the employees at the time he granted them the
loans how "very good" the Respondent had been to them in lending them money, and
that he had asked them "to think about it in the coming election " Thus the differ-
ence between the employees' versions of what was said by Van Alstyne on these occa-
sions and that of Van Alstyne is largely one of degree I conclude that this difference
should be resolved in favor of the employees' versions. Van Alstvne was admittedly
strongly opposed to the Union and it is wholly consistent with his own self-interest
in the matter for him to have spoken to the employees as they testified. Under all the
circumstances, and in view of Van Alstyne's action in granting merit raises in an
effort to interfere with the election (infra, section III, B, 2, c), I conclude that the
employees' testimony is entitled to credit. Accordingly, i find that Vice President Van
Alstyne threatened Duve and Ansley, and Tillie, as well, that the Respondent would
curtail employee loans if the Union came in
c. The Respondent 's grant of merit increases in the period immediately
preceding the election and its other efforts to secure a "NO" vote
For some years the Respondent has had, on paper at least, a plan to review the
employees ' wages twice a year to determine whether they are entitled on the basis of
their performance to a higher wage rate within the scheduled range for each job.
Employees who are at the top of the wage range do not receive merit increases. Such
employees , however, do share in across -the-board increases which the Respondent
grants from time to time.
In 1955 the Respondent informed the employees that it had decided to change
dates upon which it reviewed the employees ' wages for merit increases from March 1
and September 1 to May 15 and November 15 of each year . In practice , however,
the Respondent did not regularly follow the plan . The Respondent introduced into
4 This portion of Ansley's testimony is undenled.
928 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
evidence records of the dates on which merit raises were granted in the years 1962
through 1964. These records show that the Respondent granted merit raises at vari-
ous times during these years and did not adhere closely to the May 15-November 15
dates.
With respect to the first half of 1962, the Respondent's records show that it granted
a few merit raises in January and that the bulk of its merit raises were made effective
on May 3, 1962. Only a few merit raises were granted in the second half of 1962
and most of these were made effective on September 27. The remainder became
effective on various dates in July, October, and November 1962.
In the first half of 1963 the Respondent granted merit increases to be effective on
various dates in January, March, April, and May. More were handed out during
April than any other month during this time. In the second half of 1963 the merit
raises granted by the Respondent were divided almost equally between those handed
out on August 15 and those made effective on November 21. In the first half of
1964 a large number of merit wage increases was granted on May 21, 1964, 6 months
after the previous batch.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Respondent has not followed any regular
pattern in granting merit wage increases. Only twice in the 21/2-year period ending
in June 1964 had the Respondent handed out any substantial number of merit raises
on approximately the May 15-November 15 dates provided in its plan, and in both
of these instances the raises were made effective on the 21st of the month (Novem-
ber 21, 1963 and May 21, 1964), after the 15th of the month. The Respondent's
,employees had been given an across-the-board increase of 4 cents per hour effective
on August 13, 1964. Under all the circumstances the Respondent's employees would
have had no basis for regarding their failure to receive a merit increase before the
-election on November 18 as a departure from past practice.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Respondent had not established any firm pattern
with respect to the granting of merit raises in the past, and despite the fact that it
had been less than 6 months since the effective date of the last merit raises, the
Respondent, early in November, commenced processing merit raises and on Novem-
ber 12 announced to a number of the employees that they had been granted such
'increases. This was just 6 days before the election was scheduled to be held at the
shop. During this period the Respondent granted merit raises to a total of 66 of
the employees in the appropriate unit, more than a third of the total work force.
A higher percentage of the employees received merit raises on this occasion than at
any time in the past 3 years (38 percent as compared with 27 percent a year earlier).
These merit raises were announced to the employees in individual interviews with
the foremen held in their offices. The foremen have small insulated plywood rooms
adjacent to their particular work areas which are used as their offices. The shop is
such a noisy place that consultation outside the office is very difficult. At the time
the employees were notified of their merit raises they were shown tables giving the
wages in other shops performing similar work in Houston and Dallas and asked
to compare their wages with the wages in these other shops. In addition, the fore-
man sought to explain the benefits of working for the Respondent. This was done
pursuant to Van Alstyne's instructions.
d. The foremen's coercive interviews with employees
Gene Ansley was one of the first employees to be called in for his interview. Early
in November, prior to November 5, Douglas Phillips, the foreman of the Respond-
ent's welding department, summoned Ansley to his office. After showing Ansley
the tables giving the wage rates in other shops, Phillips asked Ansley why the men
wanted a union. Ansley replied that he did not have any comments at that time.
Phillips noted Ansley's reply on a piece of paper. As Ansley started to leave Phillips
told him that he had recommended him for a nickel raise. The foregoing findings
are based upon Ansley's uncontradicted testimony. Foreman Phillips was not
called as a witness.5
Woodrow Simmons was the foreman of the tube bundle department. Among
those talked to by Simmons in his office were Edmund Duve, Woodrow Duve, and
Larry Langham According to Edmund Duve's testimony, which I credit, Simmons
asked him at the outset "what the Union would do for [him], how it would help."
e Ansley's uncontradicted testimony clearly places this incident prior to Ansley's obtain-
ing a loan from Van Alstyne on November 5 This is significant in that it shows that
the Respondent began processing the merit raises shortly after it agreed on the holding
of the consent election and about the same time it launched its campaign, by means of
letters and posters, to obtain a "no" vote in the election
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 929
Duve replied , "Probably it would help; probably it wouldn 't." 6 Then Simmons
entered into a discussion of the various benefits of working for the Respondent and
disadvantages of belonging to a union , which Duve in his testimony reported in
terms evincing strong hostility to the Union , and which under Simmons ' version,
merely constituted permissible arguments in favor of maintaining the status quo
at the Respondent 's plant. It is undisputed that at the conclusion of this discussion
Simmons affixed his initials to a pink slip with Edmund Duve 's name and "six cents"
on it and that Duve received a 6-cent wage increase on his next paycheck. It is
unnecessary for me to resolve the conflicting testimony regarding this discussion for,
as set forth below, I find that Simmons' questioning of Edmund Duve about what
the Union could do for him was, in any event , a violation of the Act under the
particular circumstances of this case.
About a week before the election Foreman Simmons called Woodrow Duve into
his office. As Simmons testified , he asked Woodrow Duve "if he was not happy,
if he wasn 't happy what his trouble was." After Duve had completed his
explanation Simmons asked Duve to compare his wages working for the Respondent
with those on the comparative wage tables which Simmons showed to Duve. At
the same time Simmons told Duve that he had a 17-cent raise for him and com-
mented that that was probably the biggest raise Duve had ever received from the
Respondent . Simmons then went on to say, according to Woodrow Duve's uncon-
tradicted testimony , that he "should think about what [he ] got now and after the
election, on election day."
On November 9 Larry Langham was in Foreman Simmons' office checking on
some work when Simmons came in. Simmons asked Langham what he "thought
about all this union business ." Langham gave a noncommittal reply. Explaining
that he was "supposed to talk to all the boys in the department ," Simmons inquired
what Langham 's "gripe" was . After Langham mentioned various complaints, Sim-
mons showed Langham the wage tables , declaring , "Now, I want you to think a
long time about what you are going to do, which way you are going to vote. You
know what you have now . You know what you might get." Then Simmons asked
Langham, "What do you think about getting up a grievance committee." When
Langham inquired , "who wi ll they go to ," Simmons responded , "Mr. Ed Dillman"
(the Respondent 's president ). Simmons was not questioned concerning his inter-
view with Langham and consequently Langham's testimony stands undenied in the
record. A few days later , on November 13, Foreman Simmons came down to the
saw where Langham was working and told him that he had an 11 -cent raise for him.
Around November 13 or 14 Foreman Simmons asked Jimmy Tillie to step in his
office. After telling Tillie to sit down , the following conversation took place , accord-
ing to Tillie 's credited testimony:
I sat down , and he asked me what the Union had promised me.
I said, "They hadn't promised me anything."
He said, "Well , what the hell do you expect to gain?"
I said, "Well, the boys are all hearing about what contracts Texas Tube got
and American Can and they got better benefits than we have got."
And he says , "You better check into that. Them boys have not got the con-
tract they say they have."
I said, "They may not, but I believe they have." 7
6 Simmons denied asking this question of Edmund Duve and he also denied mentioning
the Union during the conversation However, he admitted asking Duve whether Duve
was unhappy with things around the plant and what he was unhappy about. Both Larry
Langham and Jimmy Tillie testified that during their interviews Simmons asked them
some question about the "union business" or "what the union had promised " Under
all the circumstances I credit Edmund Duve's testimony set forth above In any event,
even crediting Simmons' version , his question constituted a subtle means of ascertaining
Duve's union sentiments.
7 Simmons denied asking Tillie what the Union had promised him or what he expected
to gain through it He admitted , however , that the discussion about the Texas Tube and
American Can contracts occurred , as testified to by Tillie. Simmons further admitted
that he had asked Tillie , as he had asked the others, what he was unhappy about Sim-
mons was too sweeping in his denials of Tillie ' s testimony , in my opinion. He denied
Tillie's testimony, quoted below , regarding arguments as to the disadvantages of having
a union-the very arguments which the Respondent in its written instructions had
suggested were permissible forms of campaigning against the Union. And they are argu-
930 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Simmons then continued the discussion as follows, as Tillie credibly tesitfied:
He said, "Well, I tell you the Union can't get you anything." He said, "The
only way they can get a contract is go on strike and you all can't stand a strike
the way you borrow money." He said, "If you go on strike, while you are
walking the picket line for the Union the Company is hiring more men." He
said, "They can hire a nigger for $1.25 an hour like White Boiler and Metal
Works are doing, and get all the men they need. That is what the Company
can do if the Union goes on Strike." 8
During this discussion, which, according to Tillie, lasted about 30 minutes, Simmons
showed Tillie the wage tables of the other employers above mentioned.
George Smith was called into the office of Aubrey Stevens, the day-shift foreman
of the Respondent's fit-up department, on or about November 12. According to
Smith's testimony, which I credit, Stevens first showed Smith a slip of paper saying
that he had been granted a 6-cent merit raise. Then Stevens showed Smith the
comparative wage tables and told him that he was not telling him how to vote, but
that he "better think about it before [he voted] for the Union." 9 Smith further
testified that Stevens told him on this occasion that if the Union did come in "that
we would have to be working with Negroes, and if a strike was called and [he]
went to some other place to get a job, that [he] could be fired or fined-[he didn't]
remember exactly which one it was." Stevens denied making these remarks but
admitted discussing the plight of strikers at another factory who had been replaced
while out on strike. In my opinion, Smith misunderstood the gist of these remarks
and properly construed, they were permissible arguments against the Union.'()
Foreman Stevens called Joe Goetz into his office the second week in November.
Stevens showed Goetz the pay charts of the other employers and asked Goetz to
compare his rate with those paid by these companies. Stevens also sought to point
out other ways in which the Respondent had been good to him. Stevens then turned
the discussion to Dillman, the Respondent's president. Among other things, accord-
ing to Goetz, Stevens asked him "if [he] thought a man who worked so hard to
build up something like that, something like his shop, would stand by and let the
Union come in and tell him how to run things" Stevens then went on to say,
Goetz' testimony continues, that "he believed Mr. Dillman would shut the gates
before he would let the Union take over." Stevens further told Goetz "that he
wished that the men would get a grievance committee and present their problems
before management." Then Stevens added that he thought that the employees would
have gotten some of the sick leave which they previously had petitioned for "if it
hadn't been for the Union."
Stevens testified that he told Goetz that he was not asking him now he intended
to vote, but "just to give it some close consideration before he voted, regardless of
which way." While admitting that he had discussed with Goetz how mighty hard
Dillman had worked to build an organization and also admitting that he had dis-
cussed sick leave with him, Stevens denied telling Goetz that he believed that Dill-
man would close the gates and he denied attributing the employees' failure to
obtain sick leave to the Union. I do not credit Stevens' denials. Goetz' testimony
has the ring of truth to it. There was no point in Stevens bringing up Dillman's
hard work in building up the business unless he had some object lesson to pose.
While Goetz became confused at one point in his testimony, I believe he was honestly
confused, as he impressed me as sincerely trying to tell the truth. I find the con-
versation between Stevens and Goetz occurred as testified to by Goetz.
ments which Tillie would not be likely to invent and put in Simmons' mouth. For all
these reasons, and because Edmund Duve's testimony concerning Simmons' interview
with him was in a like vein, I do not credit Simmons' denial that he questioned Tillie as
to what the Union had promised him
8 While hostility to the Union is clearly manifested in the above-quoted statement, I find
that the statement standing alone constitutes no more than a permissible expression of
views, argument, or opinion protected by Section 18(c) of the Act
0 Stevens testified that he had told Smith that "regardless how he voted, he had better
give it some serious thought "
1' In view of the fact that no other witness attributed to Stevens or any other supervisor
any attempt to reject the racial issue into the campaign, I conclude that most Stevens
said regarding the employment of Negroes was that if the employees went out on strike
they could be replaced by lower paid Negro employees.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 931
The day of the election, November 18, Foreman Stevens had a conversation with
Mack Strain, an employee who a few weeks earlier had transferred out of Stevens'
fit-up department to the welding department. Strain testified that Stevens came up
to him where he was working and asked to speak to him. Strain followed Stevens
outside. There Stevens opened the conversation by saying, "I hear you are still
a union man." When Strain admitted that he was, Stevens continued, "You just
learned to weld and you haven't been in this department only a few weeks. I
believe that the Union will hurt you more than it will help you. You should think
about it a long time before voting the Union in."
When asked whether he made the above-quoted statement, Stevens replied, "I did
not mention the Union to the man. I told him in his considering, regardless of how
he voted, he better consider that he was just learning his trade, and that was the
extent of the conversation." Whether one accepts the version of Strain or that of
Stevens, the implication of Stevens' remark was that Strain's job was vulnerable
because he was a new man at the trade of welding and that he should therefore
consider carefully before deciding to vote for the Union in the election. I do not
credit Stevens' denial that he said to Strain, "I hear you are a union man." There
was no point in Stevens seeking out Strain and attempting to dissuade him from
voting in favor of the Union unless he had the idea that Strain still favored the
Union. Strain was no longer under Stevens' supervision and it was not Stevens'
responsibility to interview. Strain It was only logical, under the circumstances, that
Stevens should open the conversation in some such manner.
According to Strain, Stevens stated further in this conversation that he had one
of his brothers working for him at the time, and "as soon as things cooled off he
was going to try to bring [Strain's] younger brother off the cleanup job in the
machine shop and put him to working for [Stevens]." Stevens testified that it was
Strain who asked him to take Strain's younger brother in the fit-up department,
rather than the other way around. I credit Strain rather than Stevens. The record
shows that it was Stevens who was seeking to bring about favorable action on
Strain's part rather than vice versa. Stevens had already used the stick approach
in reminding Strain of the vulnerability of his position due to his lack of experience
as a welder. Now he sought to add the carrot, a favor to Strain's younger brother,
for Strain's voting against the Union in the election.
C. Conclusions concerning the Respondent's interference, restraint, and coercion
As found upon the basis of the credited testimony of Tillie, Drive, and Ansley,
Vice President Van Alstyne, on several occasions, in October and November 1964
threatened them that employee loans might be curtailed if the Union succeeded in its
organizing drive. Such threats unquestionably constitute interference, restraint, and
coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In the context of such threats,
Van Alstyne's questioning of Tillie and Ansley regarding whether they were union
men or union pushers assumed a coercive aspect, and accordingly constituted a
further violation of 8(a)(I).
As indicated above, Van Alstyne's version of these conversations was that he had
merely reminded the employees at the time he granted the loans how "very good"
the Respondent had been to them and asked them "to think about it in the coming
election." Even under this version of the conversations, in my opinion, Van Alstyne
has exceeded permissible bounds. The Respondent was under no obligation to grant
any employee a loan. Each application required independent consideration by the
Respondent. The decision to grant an employee a loan constituted a favor to the
employee. As the Supreme Court held in N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts Company,
375 U.S. 405, 409, the Act "prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but
also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the
express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unioniza-
tion and is reasonably calculated to have that effect." In my opinion, there can be
no doubt not only that Van Alstyne's purpose was to interfere with the employees'
freedom of choice in the election but also that Van Alstyne's grant of the loans
under the circumstances of this case was reasonably calculated to achieve this purpose.
Accordingly, Van Alstyne's conduct violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act even upon
his version of the facts.
Subsequently, in the week or 10-day period immediately preceding the election,
the Respondent granted individual merit raises to more than a third of its employees.
The Respondent had not administered its merit raise plan in the past in such a way
as to warrant the employees in anticipating that they would be given merit raises
217-919-66-vol. 156-60
932 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
prior to the election . The last review had resulted in merit raises effective May 21,
1964, which was 6 months after the previous merit raises given in November 21,
1963. Since May 21, 1964, an across-the -board increase had been granted effective
August 13, 1964, and a few of the employees were given merit raises after that
date. The Respondent had no legitimate interest which could not be just as well
served by waiting until after the election to announce this large group of merit
raises. A reasonable inference to be drawn by the employees from the Respondent's
taking action at this time was that it was attempting to demonstrate that no union was
needed to advance their interests in the shop . I conclude that the Respondent 's grant
of merit raises at this time and under the circumstances of this case-with the elec-
tion in the offing and the Respondent actively campaigning for a "No" vote by means
of posters , letters to the employees , interviews with the employees individually-
was not only deliberately undertaken to induce a "No" vote in the election but
also was reasonably calculated to have this effect. Under the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in N L.R .B. v. Exchange Parts Co., supra, 409, the Respondent's conduct violated
Section 8 ( a)( I) of the Act.
With respect to the conduct of the foremen during the individual interviews with
their employees , I have found that both Foremen Simmons and Stevens , at the same
time they informed the employees that they would receive merit raises , cautioned
them to think very seriously how they were going to vote in the election. In my
opinion, in the atmosphere then prevalent in the shop , with the Respondent actively
campaigning for a "No" vote , the suggestion that the employees carefully consider
how they were going to vote was tantamount to warning them to be very hesitant
about voting in favor of the Union. Such a warning , when coupled with the grant
of an unexpected ( at that time ) merit raise, constituted an interference with the
employees ' rights under the Act 11 Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Flomatic Corp, 347 F. 2d 74
(C.A. 2). Foreman Simmons implied that Edmund Duve's and Woodrow Duve's
present benefits might not continue to be available if the Union won the election.
This veiled warning compounded Foreman Simmons' violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
In addition , both Foremen Simmons and Stevens suggested to employees during
interviews that they consider forming employee grievance committees . These remarks
clearly contemplated the formation of a grievance committee as an alternative to
the Union and in the circumstances of this case constituted an impermissible form
of campaigning against the Union. Irving Air Chute Co., Inc. v. N.L.R B., 350
F. 2d 176 (C A. 2).
As found above , Foremen Simmons and Stevens , in their interviews with employ-
ees, both posed some form of question to employees , the effect of which, if answered,
would reveal the nature of the employees ' interest in the Union . The employees,
for the most part, gave noncommittal answers. Such questioning is undoubtedly
a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when engaged in at the same time the
employees were notified of their being granted merit raises and cautioned to think
very seriously about their vote in the election. In such circumstances questions
seeking to ascertain the extent of the employees ' union sympathies take on a
coercive impact.12
I reach the same conclusion with respect to the foreman 's questioning of Tillie
and Strain , neither of whom received wage increases in November 1964. Foreman
Simmons' questioning of Tillie as to what he expected to gain through the Union
occurred in the course of a conversation brimming with hostility to the Union in
which Simmons suggested , although without unlawfully threatening Tillie, that a
possible consequence of the unionization of the plant would be the loss of employ-
ees' jobs. Foreman Simmons, by calling Tillie into his office and questioning him
as to what the Union had promised him, was in effect challenging him to defend his
support of the Union . In the context of events in this case , including the Respond-
ent's antiunion campaign which was then in full swing, such questioning assumed
coercive proportions . With respect to Foreman Stevens' questioning of Mack Strain
as to whether he was-"still a union man," it was linked with the warning to be
III reach the same conclusion in the case of Langhamm who was informed of his merit
raise by Foreman Simmons a few days after he was cautioned by Simmons regarding his
vote in the election . The reasonably foreseeable effect of the conduct of Foremen Simmons
and Stevens in all of these cases was to interfere with the employees ' freedom of choice
in the election
"Foreman Phillips ' questioning of Ansley about why the men wanted a union was also
violative of 8(a )( 1) since it occurred in the interview during which Phillips informed
Ansley of his merit raise.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 933
,careful how he voted in the election since he was "just learning his trade" of welding
and hence was in a vulnerable position. In addition, Stevens' questioning of Strain
was immediately followed by Stevens' offer to help out Strain's younger brother "as
soon as things cooled off " In the context of such a threat and offer of a benefit,
Foreman Stevens' questioning of Strain about whether he was still a union supporter
undoubtedly interfered with Strain's freedom of choice in the election.
Finally, Foreman Stevens, in his interview with Goetz, told him that "he believed
Mr. Dillman [the Respondent's president] would shut the gates before he would let
the Union take over." Stevens also attributed the employees' failure to receive sick
leave benefits to the advent of the Union. Such statements made by a foreman in
the course of an interview in which the foreman was attempting to "sell" the
employee on supporting the Respondent's position in the coming election are coercive
in their effect, and therefore constitute further violations of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
D. Conclusions concerning the Respondent's refusal to bargain
collectively with the Union
1. The law and its application on the facts of the case
It has long been settled that an election is not the only means by which a union's
representative status may be established. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak
Flooring Co., 351 US. 62, 71-72; N.L R.B. v. Sunrise Lumber & Trim Corp., 241
F. 2d 620 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 355 U.S. 818. Thus, there is no absolute right
vested in an employer to demand an election. Where a union has obtained author-
ization cards signed by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, designat-
ing the union as their bargaining representative, an employer violates 8(a)(5) if,
absent a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status, he refuses to recognize and
bargain with the union. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 185 F. 2d 732, 741
(C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 341 U.S 914; N.L.R.B. v. Philamon Laboratories, Inc.,
298 F. 2d 176, 179 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 370 U.S. 919; The Colson Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 347 F. 2d 128, 135-136 (C.A. 8); N.L.R B. v. The Bedford-Nugent Corp.,
317 F. 2d 861, 864 (C.A. 7); N.L R.B. v. Elliott-Williams Co., Inc., 345 F. 2d 460,
463-464 (C.A.7).
On October 15, 1964, the Respondent received from the Union a letter requesting
recognition of the Union and the opening of collective-bargaining negotiations. In
the letter the Union proposed a card check by a disinterested person as a means of
proving its majority status. The Union indicated in the letter that if the Respond-
ent declined to accept a card check but later changed its mind and was willing to
accept proof "in some feasible manner other than a formal Board election after a
hearing," such a course would be acceptable to the Union. Two days later the
Respondent received in the mail a copy of the Union's petition for certification. The
Respondent admittedly made no response of any kind to the Union's letter. On
October 29, 1964, the day before the hearing which the Board had scheduled in
the representation proceeding, Union Representative Corley called Attorney Aber-
crombie to inquire whether the Respondent would agree to a consent election.
Abercrombie indicated that the Respondent would try to cooperate. The next day,
Friday, October 30, before the hearing opened, the parties entered into a stipulation
for certification upon consent election. The election was scheduled for November 18.
Concededly, the Respondent has not bargained collectively with the Union, rely-
ing, of course, upon the inconclusive outcome of the election as justification therefor.
There is no question about the appropriate unit in this case. It is the same unit
agreed upon by the parties as being appropriate in both the 1963 and 1964 repre-
sentation proceedings. Regarding the Union's majority status in the appropriate
unit, as set forth below, I find that at the time the Respondent received the Union's
letter requesting recognition and bargaining, the Union, in fact, had in its possession
valid bargaining authorization cards signed by more than a majority of the Respond-
ent's employees. Under the authorities cited above, if the Respondent insisted upon
the election as the only means by which the Union could establish its majority status
without a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status, then an unlawful refusal
to bargain may be found. The facts summarized below, in my opinion, warrant the
conclusion that the Respondent did not have a good-faith doubt of the Union's
majority status when it rejected the Union's offer to have its authorization cards
checked by a disinterested person and instead insisted upon a Board-conducted
election.
934 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As found above, the Respondent signed the consent-election agreement on Friday,
October 30. On the following Monday the Respondent embarked in earnest upon
its campaign to defeat the Union in the election by sending out to the employees
the first of the series of letters in which it urged the employees to vote "No" in
the election.13 In the following 2 weeks the Respondent sent the employees three
additional letters in which it presented vigorous arguments against voting for the
Union in the election. These letters repeated some of the same arguments against
the Union which were contained in colorful antiunion posters which were erected
in the plant during this period.
During this same period Van Alstyne threatened both Edmund Duve and Gene
Ansley that employee loans might be discontinued if the Union came in. Van
Alstyne, about a month earlier, a few days after he was first advised of the Union's
membership drive, had made a similar threat to Jimmie Tillie.
As the day for the election approached the Respondent intensified its efforts, having
the foremen call each of the employees into the office for individual interviews in
which they sought to "sell" the employees on the benefits of working for the Respond-
ent without a union. This was the only inference the employees could draw from
the foremen's conduct, in view of the propaganda letters and posters to which they
were then being exposed.
Over a third of the Respondent's employees were given individual merit raises
about a week before the election, raises which the employees had no reason to
anticipate that they would be given at that time. At least some, if not most, of these
merit raises were announced to the employees by the foremen in the individual
interviews at which the foremen sought to drum up support for the Company in
the election. In some instances the foremen, at the time they informed the employ-
ees of their merit raises, expressly cautioned them as to how they voted in the elec-
tion, and suggested that employee benefits might not be continued if the Union won.
In one interview the foreman uttered a veiled threat that the Respondent would
"shut the gates" before dealing with the Union and in two instances the foremen
suggested the formation of an employee grievance committee as an alternative to
the Union.
The foregoing course of conduct, in my opinion, clearly interfered with the
employee's freedom of choice of representatives in the election and precludes any
finding that the Respondent acted in good faith in insisting upon an election. I find
that here, as in N.L.R B. v. Joy Silk Mills, supra, 741 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 341
U.S. 914, the Respondent's conduct was "due to a desire to gain time and to take
action to dissipate the Union's majority." See also Irving Air Chute V. N.L.R.B.,
350 F. 2d 176 (C.A. 2).14
The Respondent argues that its insistence upon an election cannot be regarded
as being in bad faith in view of the fact that the Union itself proposed this course
in its letter requesting recognition . However, the Union's proposal assumed that
the Respondent would not immediately engage in a campaign of unfair labor prac-
tices aimed at effecting the Union's defeat in the election. Having engaged in such
unlawful conduct which prevented the employees from deciding in a free and fair
election what their desires were with respect to union representation, the Respondent
manifestly cannot rely on the fact that one of the Union's alternative proposals for
13 The paragraph in the letter in which the Respondent states "We are convinced that
getting the Steelworkers in our plant will be harmful to both you and Efco," in the
context of events of this case, comes close to being the equivalent of the much litigated
paragraph condemned by the Board in Sagamore Shirt Company, d/b/a Spruce Pine Man-
ufacturing Company, 153 NLRB 309. However, since this question was not litigated
at the hearing no finding will be made in this regard.
111 have considered the various facts upon which the Respondent relies as establishing
a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status, including the fact that repeated asser-
tions of majority status had been made by unions in the past, including one by the Union
a year earlier, and that they all had proven groundless ; the fact that several employees
had volunteered to Van Alstyne the information that they had signed cards only to avoid
continued pestering by union solicitors, and the fact that the Respondent's foremen had
informed him concerning their belief that a majority of their employees did not favor
the Union. However, the Respondent's efforts to dissipate the Union's majority status
commencing only a few days after it became aware of the Union's membership drive
effectively refute any claim that the Respondent was acting in good faith. Comfort, Inc.,
152 NLRB 1074.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 935
proving its majority status was by means of a consent election to be conducted by
the Board. Frantz & Co., Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 1322; 59 LRRM 1645; Freeport
Marble & Tile Co., Inc., 153 NLRB 810.15
Furthermore, even though the Respondent's insistence upon an election be assumed
to have been based upon a good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status in the
first place, this will not relieve it of the consequences of its unlawful course of
conduct in this case. Despite the Respondent's various acts of interference, restraint,
and coercion, the Union managed to get 82 votes in the election, there were 82
"No" votes, and 1 ballot was challenged. In view of this fact it is reasonable to
infer, as I do, that absent the Respondent's unfair labor practices, the Union would
have won the election. Indeed, had the Respondent "remained neutral" (N.L.R.B.
v. Stow Manufacturing Co., 217 F. 900, 904 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 348 U.S. 964),
the Union might have carried the election by a very comfortable margin. The court
held in the Stow case that in refusal-to-bargain situations like the present where the
employer's unfair labor practices have rendered the holding of a free and fair election
impossible, the Board may enter the usual bargaining order even though the Union
loses the election. N.L.R.B. v. Stow Manufacturing Co., supra, 904-905; Irving
Air Chute Co. v. N.L.R.B., 350 F. 2d 176 (C.A. 2). See also Gotham Shoe Manu-
facturing Co., Inc., 149 NLRB 862; Sullivan Surplus Sales, Inc., 152 NLRB 132.16
Finally, the courts have held in a number of cases that where an employer's acts
of interference, restraint, and coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
dissipate a union's majority and prevent the employees from freely exercising their
choice of representatives, the Board may, in order to remedy these unfair labor
practices, issue an order directing the employer to bargain collectively with the
Union, upon request, provided that the Union had a majority at all relevant times.
Greystone Knitwear Corp, 136 NLRB 573, 575-576, enfd. 311 F. 2d 794 (C A. 2);
Summit Mining Corporation v. N.L R.B., 260 F. 2d 894, 900 (C.A. 3); Piasecki
Aircraft Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 280 F. 2d 575, 591-592 (C.A. 3), cert. denied
364 U.S 933; Editorial "El Iinparcial" Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 278 F. 2d 184, 187 (C.A. 1);
D. H Holmes Company, Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 179 F. 2d 876, 879-880 (C.A. 5);
Local No. 152 of/w International Brotherhood of Teamsters etc. V. N.L.R.B.,
343 F. 2d 307, 309 (C A.D.C.); see also Western Aluminum of Oregon Incorporated,
et al., 144 NLRB 1191, 1192; Freeport Marble & Tile Co., supra. Under the doc-
trine of this line of cases also a bargaining order is appropriate in this case.
Aside from the Respondent's many contentions regarding the Union's alleged lack
of majority status, one further contention made by the Respondent in connection
with the refusal-to-bargain aspect of the case remains for discussion. It is that it
was under no obligation to bargain collectively with the Union when it received the
Union's letter requesting recognition and bargaining on October 15, 1964, since less
than 12 months had passed since the election which was held on November 7, 1963.
This argument is predicated on Section 9(c)(3) of the Act which precludes the
Board from directing any election in a bargaining unit in which, in the preceding
12-month period, a valid election shall have been held. There is nothing in the Act
specifically providing for the immunity from bargaining for which the Respondent
contends. In fact, the Act by its express terms requires employers to bargain with
the majority representative of their employees in an appropriate bargaining unit,
without exception. In view of this fact it seems most unreasonable to construe
9(c)(3), which imposes a procedural limitation on the Board's authority to conduct
elections and which limitations have been fully observed in this case (more than
16I cannot accept the Respondent's further contention that the Union's letter was not
a clear and unequivocal demand for bargaining. The letter explicitly requested recogni-
tion of the Union and the opening of collective bargaining negotiations. In view of the
Respondent's subsequent unlawful conduct, it may not take refuge in the fact that
originally the Union appeared to be willing to await the outcome of the election before
pressing its bargaining demand further.
16 In my opinion, the Respondent's reliance on N L.R.B. v. Flomatic Corp., supra, is
misplaced. As the court of appeals noted in its subsequent decision in Irving d.ar Chute,
in Flomatic "there was only a minimal ¢ 8(a) (1) violation and no demand and refusal to
bargain" (59 LRRM at 3056). In this case not only was there an explicit demand for
recognition, bargaining , and conduct amounting to refusal, but also the Respondent's
unfair labor practices cannot fairly be characterized as "minimal ." Particularly in a
case like the present, wherein a shift of only one or two "No" votes would have resulted
in the establishment of the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
Respondent's employees, a bargaining order is essential to undo the effects of the Re-
spondent 's unfair labor practices.
936 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
12 months elapsed between the 1963 and 1964 elections ), as effecting a change in,
the fundamental law regarding the obligation to bargain collectively and the remedy
for unfair labor practices . As noted above , in situations like the present , employers
are held to the obligations flowing from previous requests for bargaining because,
in the Board 's judgment , such action often provides the only effective means of
remedying the unfair labor practices found. In my opinion the Respondent 's argu-
ment is not applicable in the present situation.
2. The Union's majority status
a. The employee complement in the appropriate unit
According to a list furnished by the Respondent, there were 171 employees in:
the appropriate unit on October 15, 1964, the day on which the Respondent received
the Union's letter requesting recognition and bargaining. This figure includes the
position of scheduler, which was expressly included in the appropriate unit in the
stipulation for consent election signed by all parties. In the Union's objections to the
election, which have been referred to me for consideration, it is urged that the-
Respondent's scheduler, Bobby Ryan, is a supervisor within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act, and that the position of scheduler should be excluded from the
appropriate unit on this ground, leaving a total of 170 employees in the appropriate
unit on the date of the Respondent's receipt of the Union's bargaining request. I,
find it unnecessary to pass on this question since the same number of employees.
constitutes a majority-86-whether the employee complement is 170 or 171. In-
the bargaining order hereinafter directed I have included the position of scheduler
because the stipulation for consent election so provided.
b. The Respondent's challenge of the authenticity of certain authorization cards
Authorization cards bearing the names of 114 of the 171 employees in the appro-
priate unit were received in evidence in this case. These cards contain an unequivocal
authorization to the Union to act as the collective-bargaining representative of the
signers. Also received in evidence were forms W-4, U S. Treasury Department,
Internal Revenue Service, Employees Withholding Exemption Certificates, signed by
each of the 114 employees whose authorization cards were received in evidence.
These W-4 forms, which were furnished by the Respondent, are the documents pur-
suant to which the Respondent calculates the amount of withholding from wages.
for income tax purposes.
With respect to the authorization cards of the 10 employees listed in the footnote
below 17 the Respondent contends that they were not authenticated in any acceptable
manner and hence should not have been received in evidence. Regarding the cards
of Whitley and McSwain, I agree that the cards purportedly signed by them may
not be relied on to establish their authorization of the Union to represent them.
However, in the case of McSwain, his own testimony establishes that he signed a
card identical with those signed by the other employees during the 1964 membership
drive. Hence, it is immaterial that McSwain testified that he did not sign General
Counsel's Exhibit No. 6-56, the card offered by the General Counsel as proving
McSwain's bargaining authorization. See Aero Corporation, 149 NLRB 1283. The
card of Whitley will not be counted in determining whether the Union represented
a majority of the employees.
The cards of James and Mathews were signed in the presence of James Tillie,
who testified concerning the circumstances of their signing. Since I have found
Tillie to be a reliable witness, I must reject the Respondent's challenge of the
authenticity of the cards of James and Mathews. In the cases of Donald Alsobrooks,
Broussard, and Jerry Brown, the employees who gave them the cards testified con-
cerning the circumstances of their doing so and about receiving the signed cards
back from each of them on the following day. This testimony, in my opinion, con-
stitutes an adequate basis for receiving the cards of these employees in evidence.
However, in view of the Respondent's challenge of the authenticity of their signatures
on these cards, I have compared the signatures appearing on the cards purporting to
be signed by these three employees with the W-4 forms of these employees and am
satisfied that in each case the same person who signed the W-4 form also signed
the authorization card.
14 Donald L. Alsobrooks, Herbert It. Broussard, Jerry W Brown, Teddy R Fitchner,
Carl W. James, Clifton E. Kelley, Tommy R. McSwain, Floyd C. Mathews, John H. Owen,
and William M. Whitley.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 937
It is true, as the Respondent points out, that the cards of Fitchner, Clifton Kelley,
and Owen were received in evidence without any testimony authenticating their
signatures. However, this was done only after I had compared the signatures on
these three authorization cards with those on the W-4 forms furnished by the
Respondent for these three employees and had concluded that in each case the same
person had signed both documents. There is nothing in the record casting doubt
on the authenticity of the signatures of these three employees on the authorization
cards in question. Although these three employees were still in the employ of the
Respondent at the time of the hearing, the Respondent did not call them as wit-
nesses. Under all the circumstances, the Respondent's challenge to the authenticity
of the authorization cards of Fitchner, Kelley, and Owen is rejected. Philamon
Laboratories, Inc., 131 NLRB 80, footnote 1, enfd. 298 F. 2d 176, 179-180
(C.A. 2), cert. denied 370 U.S. 919; Colson Corp. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 134; Combined
Metal Mfg. Corp., 123 NLRB 895, 896-897; Aero Coi poratton, sups a, footnote 11.
c. The Respondent's contentions regarding the invalidity
of certain authorization cards
The Respondent does not raise any objection to the validity of the bargaining
authorization cards signed by the 64 employees listed in Appendix B hereto. How-
ever, with respect to the cards of 50 of the remaining employees whose cards were
received in evidence, the Respondent contends that representations were made to
these employees by union solicitors of such a nature as to invalidate the cards as
bargaining authorizations.
In Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268 and Aero Corporation, supra,
the Board clarified the law regarding the use of bargaining authorizations to estab-
lish a Union's majority status in certain unfair labor practice situations. A basic
principle in such cases is that documents timely executed which unequivocally author-
ize a labor organization to act as the collective-bargaining agent of the signers must
be treated as valid bargaining authorizations in the absence of a showing of coercion
in their procurement or representations that "despite the purpose clearly and expressly
stated on the cards themselves, the cards would be used only for a different, more
limited purpose." Aero Corp., supra, 1290. Under the Cumberland Shoe and
Aero decisions it is clear that a representation that "a purpose of the cards was to
secure a Board election" is not enough to invalidate an otherwise valid bargaining
authorization (144 NLRB at 1269). On the other hand, representations that "the
only purpose of the cards" was to obtain an election (Cumberland case, 144 NLRB at
1269) or that "other than for the election, cards were not binding on people who
signed them" (Morris & Associates, Inc, 138 NLRB 1160, 1164) are sufficient to
invalidate a bargaining authorization which is unequivocal in its terms.
To facilitate discussion of the Respondent's contentions regarding the alleged
invalidity of the authorization cards, I treat the cases of 47 of the 50 employees in
groups. Whitley's case has already been disposed of. The cases of Cegielski and
Ener are discussed separately. In the first group of employees, whose names are
listed in Appendix C, are included the 23 employees as to whom the record shows
that union solicitors made statements to them before they signed authorization cards
to the effect that a purpose of signing a card was to obtain a union election in the
shop.18 In the second group are I1 employees to whom more sweeping statements
were made by union solicitors before signing cards and as to whom a more difficult
question is raised as to whether the solicitors' statements rendered their authoriza-
tion cards invalid. As to these 11 employees, who are listed in Appendix D, I con-
clude for the reasons set forth below that their cards are entitled to be counted.
In the third group are the 13 employees listed in Appendix E whose cards, I conclude,
were rendered invalid because of the circumstances under which they were executed.
In considering the Respondent's contentions regarding the invalidity of certain
authorization cards it should be borne in mind that the Union and its solicitors con-
templated that an election would be held and that it would be the election which
would decide the question of representation in the shop.19 Consequently, it is not
1B Typical statements of this nature are as follows:
"He said they were taking up the cards for an election, to hold an election there at
the company" (Buchanan ) ; "Probably would have an election" (Edmund Duve) ;
"He said the reason we were signing the card was to get enough signatures in order
to have an election" (Herrin).
1e Had the Respondent refrained from unlawful conduct which I have found prevented
the employees from exercising free choice in the election , the election would have settled
the question of union representation.
938 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
surprising that the solicitors frequently made reference to the need to have cards
signed in order to get an election. But the fact that the solicitors thus made refer-
ence to an election does not mean, as the Respondent contends, that all the solicitors
were seeking was to give ,the employees a chance in an election to decide whether
they wanted a union . The Union's goal was to win the election and thus achieve
bargaining rights, not merely to have an election held. Hence it cannot readily be
assumed, as does the Respondent, that the union solicitors placed the emphasis on
merely obtaining an election and not upon obtaining converts to their cause. The
Union accomplished nothing simply by obtaining the signatures of employees who
were opposed to the Union-employees who were going to vote against the Union
in the election.
I.
Regarding the 23 employees in the first group (listed in Appendix B) to whom
statements were made that the Union was seeking signatures on authorization cards
to hold an election, I conclude, in view of the decision of the Board in the Cumber-
land Shoe and related decisions discussed above, that the statements made to them
were insufficient to invalidate the bargaining authorizations signed by them. There
are several employees in this group regarding whom special contentions are raised
which require separate discussion.
General E. Alsobrooks and Buren E. Risinger: The Respondent makes the addi-
tional contention with respect to the cards of these and a few other employees that
they were "Signed After Demand for Bargaining." However, in- all but one of
these cases, Henry Duve, the record fails to establish that the cards were signed
afterwards and the portions of the record to which I am referred show merely that
these employees did not themselves insert the date on the authorization card. In
view of this fact I conclude that what the Respondent must have intended to argue
with respect to all in this group except Henry Duve was that the record inadequately
establishes the date on which they signed cards.20
Robert Corley, the staff representative of the Union in charge of the campaign,
credibly testified that he had possession of all of the cards involved in this case from
the time they were turned over to him, that with the exception of Henry Duve's
card all of these cards were turned over to him on or before October 14, 1964; and
that he gave all these cards, except Henry Duve's, to a representative of the Board
at the Regional Office on October 16, 1964. All of the cards received in evidence
in this case except Henry Dave's bear the following date stamp "RECEIVED, OCT.
16, 1964, NLRB 23RD REGIONAL OFFICE, HOUSTON, TEXAS." The record
clearly shows that General Alsobrooks signed his card during the 1964 campaign.
Risinger, himself, testified that he signed his card "about middleway" of the 1964
campaign. The Respondent's challenge of the cards of General Alsobrooks and
Risinger, on the grounds of inadequate proof of date of signing, is rejected.
David T. Buchanan: In Buchanan's case the additional contention is made that
he revoked his bargaining authorization. This contention is based upon Buchanan's
testimony as to a conversation that he had with Noah Melton, one of the union
solicitors, after he signed the authorization card. Buchanan testified as follows:
"I talked to him and told him I didn't care, I couldn't make good sense out of what I
could find out about the Union. They couldn't tell me nothing, I couldn't understand
anything they had to say and as far as I am concerned they could take my card and
tear it up." Buchanan was vague and evasive in placing the date of this conversa-
tion with Melton. However, at one point Buchanan testified that it occurred "a
short period of time before the election." When asked "Would a short period of
time be a week?", Buchanan replied, "Possibly." I find that this conversation with
Melton occurred about a week before the election, in the midst of the Respondent's
illegal campaign to defeat the Union in the election. In view of this fact, I conclude
that Buchanan's revocation of bargaining authority, which otherwise would have
been effective, cannot be relied on by the Respondent since it is reasonable to infer
that it was attributable to the Respondent's unfair labor practices.21
20 I need not consider whether Henry Duve's card was signed too late, for the reason
that I am not counting Henry Dave's card in any event, due to the fact that the Union
accepted his card with the understanding that he would vote against the Union
21 Sullivan Surplus Sales , Inc., 152 NLRB 132. In this connection it is noteworthy
that Buchanan was one of the employees who, prior to the election, volunteered to Van
Alstyne that he had signed an authorization card in order to get rid of the union solicitors
who were bothering him to sign. At this time Buchanan told Van Alstyne that he "didn't
particularly care for the Union."
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 939
Jerry W. Kelley: Kelley's card is dated "8/10/64." Kelley testified that he signed
a card during the union campaign to get signatures , which I construe to mean the
1964 campaign. Under the circumstances, I find that Kelley signed the card on
September 10, 1964, and that he mistakenly dated it August 10, 1964. The Respond-
ent's contention that Jerry Kelley's card was stale is rejected.
Louis C. Manchack: In Manchack's case, in addition to the testimony about need-
ing cards for an election , the Respondent relies on testimony of Manchack concern-
ing a conversation which he had with Melton and two paid union representatives at
his home after he signed a union authorization card. Manchack testified regarding
this occasion as follows:
A. It was more of a question and answer . I just wanted to know their view-
point. They tried to enlighten me the best way they could, and I think, if I
remember right, I told the men , "Now, just because you are here at my con-
venience , at my request and I have signed the card, that doesn't mean that I
am going to vote union. I haven't made up my mind," which I hadn't made
up my mind at the time.
Q. Did they have any answer to that?
A. They said, "That is your privilege. You vote the way you want to vote."
In my opinion, this conversation, which took place after Manchack signed a card
and which does not constitute an effective revocation of the unequivocal bargaining
authorization previously given the Union, does not impair the validity of Manchack's
prior authorization.
Glenn A. Moore: The Respondent's contention that Moore's card does not con-
stitute a valid bargaining authorization is based upon Moore's testimony that "a
couple" of union solicitors talked to him about signing a card, that Mack Strain was
one of them, that they told him that they "lacked a few men of having enough cards
to hold the election out there." Moore further testified that one of these statements
was made by one of the union solicitors after Moore had already signed a card.
Moore's testimony further shows that the card which Moore actually signed was
one of two which he found in the front seat of his car, that before signing the card
he read it, and that he personally filled in all of the blanks on the card.
I cannot accept the Respondent's contention regarding the invalidity of Moore's
card. In the first place the comment made by Strain or the other solicitor to Moore
to the effect that the Union "lacked a few men of having enough to have an election
out there" does not carry with it the implication that the cards will be used only
for the purpose of obtaining an election and not for the purpose for which the card
was drafted, i.e., of obtaining membership in the Union and designating it as the
collective-bargaining representative of the signer. As pointed out hereinabove, only
where such a representation is made will the bargaining authorization be regarded as
invalid. Furthermore, particularly where, as here, the card has been signed after
some deliberation about the matter, out of the presence of the solicitor, it seems
unreasonable to disregard the employee's unequivocal act of signing an application
for membership in the Union and a delegation of bargaining authority to it solely
because of some statement previously made by a union solicitor about needing signed
cards to have an election. Moore's card wil The counted towards the Union majority.
Alex J. Perez: In the case of Perez, the Respondent relies on Perez' testimony that
George Smith, who gave him a union card, told him as follows:
He explained this card to me. He told me that this would help my fellow
employees to get a union election to see if they actually needed a union or
wanted a union in the ship.
George Smith testified that he merely asked as he offered him a card, "Will you
sign this," that Perez said, "Yes," and that Perez took the card and returned it to
him the next day signed. Accepting Perez' version of the conversation, I find that it
falls short of constituting a representation to Perez that his card would not be
used for the purpose stated thereon, and only for the altogether different purpose of
obtaining an election. Perez' card will be counted.
Johnnie Ketchey, Lloyd Tully, and Roscoe Wells: In the case of these three
employees, the Respondent relies on the testimony of Mack Strain. The crucial
portion of the conversation, which the Respondent inadvertently attributes to Karl
Strain, was actually spoken by Ketchey, Tully, and Wells, the employees being
solicited, rather than by Mack Strain, the solicitor. Thus, it was Ketchey, Tully,
and Wells who told Mack Strain that signing the cards "would just help get the
election " There is no evidence in the cases of any of these three employees of the
kind of misrepresentation by a union agent which would warrant invalidating
their cards.
940 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II.
The statements made to the second group of 11 employees listed in Appendix C
presents a more difficult problem Solicitors made statements to the employees in
this group of two general types. In some cases only one type of statement was
made. The first was to the effect that employee signatures on cards were necessary
in order to have an election at the plant. The second type of statement was to the
effect that the employees would have the right to vote as they chose at the time of
the election. These statements were not necessarily made in the conjunctive.22
Regarding the second type of statement it should be remembered that it was true
that any employee becoming dissatisfied with the Union in the interval between
signing the card and the election could either revoke his authorization or simply
vote against the Union in the election. Consequently there was no misrepresentation
involved in solicitors' telling employees that they could vote as they liked in the
election.
Under the decisions of the Board in the Cumberland Shoe and related cases it
appears that only where the evidence shows that the solicitors made representations
to employees to the effect that they would not be bound by the language on the cards
which they signed and that the cards would be used only for some other purpose
than that stated on the card, will the employees' action in signing the cards not be
given effect. I have carefully considered the testimony regarding the statements
made by solicitors to these 11 employees and conclude that no such representations
were made in these cases. As I construe the statements made to these employees,
the solicitors were merely telling them that they had a right to change their minds
at the election if in the meantime they had a change of heart about the Union. The
making of such a statement, under controlling Board precedent, does not afford a
basis for rejecting an otherwise unequivocal bargaining authorization. The cards of
the employees listed in Appendix D will be counted in determining the Union's
majority status.
With respect to Charles D. Felchak, one of the employees listed in Appendix D,
the portion of the record relied upon by the Respondent is as follows:
Q. '[By Mr. ABERCROMBIE.) When you signed the card, or the day you signed
the card, were you told the card was not binding on you as far as how you
voted in the election?
A. No, I wasn't told it but I knew a man could vote as he pleases in the
election, on the election date.
This testimony, far from showing that any solicitor made any disqualifying repre-
sentations to Felchak, actually establishes the opposite. The fact that Felchak
understood that he could vote as he pleased in the election, which understanding
was accurate, simply has no bearing on the question before me; i.e., the question
whether Felchak's card should be counted in determining the Union's majority status.
-A sample of both types of statements is contained in the testimony of Andrew S
Duncan as follows
Q All right. At the time you were given the card did Kilroy say anything to you
about what the card was for or did he-or how did he put it when he asked you to
sign it?
A. Well, I was under the understanding-
TRIAL EXAMINER : What did he say, not what you understood, but what did he
tell you
The WITNESS: Well, that the card-he told me they needed a certain percentage
of signatures from the shop to hold a union election, and that my signature would
naturally increase the percentage of signatures.
Q. [By Mr. ABERCROMBIE I What else was said?
A. Well, I asked him if this meant that I had to vote for the Union, and he
said no.
I told him, I more or less told him that, one way or another, it didn't matter
because I was just trying to help out on percentage because I had just started to work
there and most of the welders seemed like they wanted to sign, and I told him I
would sign to help in the percentage part.
Q. Did you say anything to him about voting?
A. Yes, sir, I told him that, or asked him if I ever changed my mind, that if this
card meant I had to vote for the Union.
Q. [By Mr. ABERCROMBIE I What was his reply9
A. He replied that I was under my own choice ; if I wanted to vote for the Union
I could ; if I didn't, I wouldn't have to.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 941
In contending in the case of Joe E. Stzelecke that his authorization card should be
disregarded , the Respondent relies on the following testimony concerning a state-
ment made to him by a solicitor whose identity he could not recall:
Q. At the time he gave you the card, what did he tell you about the card,
what did he say to you?
A. Well, he said that if I signed it, it wasn 't nothing that said I was a
member of anything , and he said I still had time to make up my mind which
way I wanted to vote.
Stzelecke was questioned on cross-examination as follows:
Q. '[By Mr. AvEDON.] This man talked to you about signing for the Union,
he tried to talk you into signing a card , didn't he? He told you they needed
the Union?
A. Yes, sir, he did say that.
Q. That it would be a good thing if the Union came in to represent them?
A. Yes, sir. He said in a way it would be.
Q. And this is one way to get the Union to come in and protect the men's
rights so supervisors couldn't push them around?
A. He said it would bring better wages.
Q. It would bring better wages?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. After he said this to you , you signed the card?
A. Yes, sir. He told me to think it over if I wanted to or didn't want to,
he didn't make me sign it or anything like that.
Q. And then you grabbed the card and signed it?
A. Yes, sir.
On the above testimony as a whole , I conclude the statement of the unnamed
solicitor set forth above should not be deemed to invalidate Stzelecke 's card. It
does not appear that this solicitor said anything to Stzelecke about the bargaining
authorization not being binding on Stzelecke if he signed a card.
The Respondent contends that Stzelecke 's card should not be counted for the
further reason that this union solicitor also said to him at the time he signed the
card that "a bunch of other guys had signed the cards and they have a majority of
them signed up." This statement was untrue at that time. There is no evidence
that the above-quoted statement was a material factor in Stzelecke 's decision to sign
the card. In fact Stzelecke's testimony quoted in the preceding paragraph indicates
that it was not. In N.L.R.B. v. The Rohtstein & Co., Inc., 266 F. 2d 407 (C.A. 1),
cited by the Respondent , the employee's reliance on the solicitor 's false claim of
majority status was a material factor in the court's decision to overrule the Board
on this issue .. The record in this case does not indicate that Stzelecke placed any
reliance on the solicitor 's representation regarding majority status. In these circum-
stances I believe that it must be regarded as the type of puffing and exaggeration
which is not deemed to invalidate otherwise valid authorization cards..
In the case of Perry L. Thomas the record shows the following regarding the
circumstances of his being solicited to sign an authorization card:
Q. Well, whether exact or inexact , as best you can recall , what was said to
you at the time you were handed the card?
A. Well, as best I can remember, they were trying to get a union in for the
benefit of the employees out there . And that was about the only thing that
was said to me, you know, that I can recall.
Q. All right. When you were handed the card , did the person handing you
the card tell you that the Union needed the cards signed in order to have an
election?
A. My understanding was, not from the man that told me , but just from
the general information-
Mr. AVEDON: I am going to object to that.
TRIAL EXAMINER : Yes, we are interested in what the man told you.
The WITNESS: Maybe he told me. Maybe he said it. I don 't know. It's
just in my head.
Later counsel for the Respondent continued the questioning as follows:
Q. '[By Mr. ABERCROMBIE.] Were you told by the person that handed you
the card that the card was not binding on you as far as the way you voted
in the union election?
A. Yes, sir.
942 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Q. You were told that , that is was not-
A. I was also told that this card would be revealed . But it is.
Tiu&s., EXAMINER : Did the person handing you the card tell you that?
The WirNEss: Yes, sir, that was told.
Q. [By Mr. ABERCROMBIE .] He asked you to sign a card?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he told you that if you signed a card it wouldn 't be binding on you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he also tell you that you didn 't have to vote for the Union or join
the Union because you had signed the authorization card?
A. No, sir, he didn't say that.
Q. He just said it wasn 't binding on you?
A. Yes, sir.
Thomas' testimony in response to the Respondent 's counsel 's leading questions,
when considered in light of his testimony as a whole, indicates to me that he
intended to convey the idea that this unnamed union solicitor had told him that the
authorization card which he signed would not bind him to vote in favor of the
Union in the election , and nothing more. I so find. Such a statement , as pointed out
hereinabove , does not warrant invalidating an unequivocal bargaining authorization.
The case of D. A. Weiss presents a credibility problem. Weiss testified as follows
about Tillie's solicitation of him to sign an authorization card:
He was asking me to sign the card . I told him I didn 't know whether I wanted
to sign one or not . He said well , it didn 't make any diffffeffrence one way or
another, if I signed it or didn 't; I had a right to vote the way I wanted to. So
I signed the card.
Tillie's testimony regarding this incident is as follows:
We had been working together, practically all day and I told Weiss, we was
talking about-whether we needed a union or not, and I told him that every-
body was entitled to his own opinion, and if they wanted a union they would
have to sign those cards or we wouldn't have no union. And if they would
sign a card they would be union members if the Union come in. And I bent
over and one dropped out of my pocket and Mr. Weiss picked it up.
I credit Tillie's testeimony quoted above. Tillie appeared to remember more of
the details of the incident and he impressed me as a truthful witness. I find nothing
in Tillie's testimony about his solicitation of Weiss warranting the invalidation of
Weiss' card.
The Respondent also inadvertently includes D. A. Weiss and Eddie J. Zientek, in
addition to General Alsobrooks and Buren Risinger, in the group as to whom it
contends they signed cards after the request for bargaining. As indicated in the
discussion of the cases of Alsobrooks and Risinger, there is no evidence supporting
this contention regarding any of these four employees. The testmiony of Jimmy
Tillie, who solicited Weiss' signature on the card makes it apparent that Weiss' card
was signed during the 1964 campaign. Zientek testified that he signed his card 5
weeks after he was hired on August 11, 1964. Upon the basis of the foregoing
testimony and the testimony of Union Representative Corley, discussed in the cases
of General Alsobrooks and Risinger, I find that the cards of Weiss and Zientek were
signed during the 1964 campaign on or before October 14.
III.
The third group of employees consists of 13 employees whose cards I conclude
should not be counted in determining the Union's majority status. All except one
in this group, Walton, did not sign authorization cards until late in the Union's
campaign From the testimony concerning the statements made by union solicitors
to the employees in the group, I conclude that the pattern of the solicitation changed
in the latter part of the campaign The approach of union solicitors during this
period is typified by that of Edwin Keely to Dave L. Jones on or about October 13,
1964. Jones credibly testified that Keely asked him if he would sign a card, saying
that "they needed about eight more so we could call it to an election and once and
for all see if we wanted union represcntation or not." Keely added that "it would
be nothing but to call it to election." When asked whether Keely had said anything
to him about the way he could vote in the election, Jones answer as follows: "He said
it didn't make no difference. It had no bearing on the way we voted." In one or two
cases the solicitor expressly stated that signing the card did not mean the signer
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 943
would become a union member. Although the testimony of the employees con-
cerning their solicitation to sign union authorization cards varies to some extent in
each case, as I construe this testimony, it establishes that the solicitors represented
to each of the employees that the cards would be used only for the purpose of bring
about an election and that they would not be used for the purpose stated on the
cards. Such representations, under the Board decisions cited above, invalidate the
cards in question.
I have included Kenneth R. Dodgen, who signed a card on October 6, 1964, in
the third group of 13 employees whose cards should not be counted towards the
Union's majority. However, it is with some misgivings because it is not clear in
his case that George Smith, who solicited him, represented to him that the card
would be used only for the purpose of obtaining an election. However, the pattern
of Smith's solicitation at this stage generally follows that of the other solicitors near
the end of the drive. Smith admitted telling Plattsmier during the latter part of
the campaign, "Well, maybe we can get an election in here. Would you sign one
for it?" Under all the circumstances, I conclude that Smith made the same sort
of representations to Dodgen as he did to Plattsmier and Dodgen's card should
not be counted.
Two miscellaneous contentions concerning the invalidity of authorization cards
remain for discussion. In the case of Eugene Cegielski the Respondent contends
that his card is invalid because it was solicited by one of the Respondent's foremen.
When asked on direct examination how he received the card which he had signed,
Cegielski answered that "It was passed through the shop." Cegielski further testified
that he "read it at the shop, but took it home and signed it." Cegielski did not
remember either who gave him the card, or to whom he returned it. When asked
on cross-examination from whom he received the card, Cegielski testified, "One of
the shop foremen. I don't remember who." The record does not support the
Respondent's claim that the unnamed foreman actually "solicited" Cegielski's Sig-
nature. It shows merely that an unnamed foreman "passed" him the card. Such
proof, in my opinion, is insufficient to bring Cegielski's case within the rule of the
Flint River Mills and Insular Chemical cases relied upon by the Respondent.23 In
both of these cases the supervisors involved played an "active role" in the organizing
activities of the employees. There is no such evidence in this case. Ratner this
case is more like Aero Corporation, 149 NLRB 1283, in which the Board held that
the fact that a minor supervisor "passed on" a number of cards from one employee
to another did not invalidate the cards there involved. Cegielski's card will be
counted.
Troy Ener is another employee in the group as to whom the Respondent inadvert-
ently contends signed cards after the demand for bargaining. As stated above, the
record wholly fails to support this contention. While Ener himself did not date his
card, it bears the date of "9-17-64," and Ener's testimony is that he signed the card
"a little bit before" the end of the campaign. The Respondent's challenge of Ener's
card upon the ground of inadequate proof of date of signing is rejected.
d. Recapitulation
Adding to the 64 employees listed in Appendix B as to whom the Respondent does
not challenge the validity of their bargaining authorizations the 23 employees listed
in Appendix C, the 11 employees listed in Appendix D, and 2 employees not listed
on any appendix, Troy Ener and Eugene Cegielski, I find that a total of 100 of the
Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit validly authorized the Union to act
as their bargaining representative on or before October 14, 1964. This constitutes
a majority of the 171 employees in the appropriate unit on October 15, 1964.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, my Rec-
ommended Order will direct that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom, and that
it bargain collectively with the Union, upon request, and that it post appropriate
notices. Even in the absence of a refusal to bargain, I would find this remedy appro-
priate in the circumstances of this case in view of the Respondent's violations of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, which prevented the employees from exercising a free
28 Flint River Mills, Inc., 107 NLRB 472, 470-477 and Insular Chemical Corporation
and Rubber Corporation of America ( Insular Division ), 128 NLRB 93, 97.
'944 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
choice of representatives in the election . In view of my conclusions herein, my Rec-
onmiended Order will provide for the dismissal of the pending representation proceed-
ing, Case No 23-RC-2336.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By threatening employees with loss of benefits or other reprisals because of their
union activities, granting or promising benefits to interfeie with the employees' free
choice of representatives, coercively questioning employees concerning their union
sympathies, promoting the formation of an employees' grievance committee, and by
granting merit wage increases to interfere with the employees' free choice of repre-
sentatives, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (l) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees employed by the Respondent at its
Houston, Texas, plant, including assembly men, welders, drill press operators, boring
mill operators, lathe operators, grinders, checkers, burners, helpers, cleanup men,
carpenters, abrasive saw operators, toolroom attendants, tube rollers, leadermen, fit-
ters, inspection department clerks, receiving clerk, janitor, bandsaw operators, main-
tenance men, paster operators, layout men, tube benders, utility men, painter, bending
roll men, milling machine operators, scheduler, truckdrivers, inspectors, chippers,
and watchmen, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, employ-
ees classified as foremen in the production and maintenance departments, all employ-
ees in the sales, engineering, production control, purchasing, estimating, and fiscal
departments, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
3. On and at all times since October 14, 1964, United Steelworkers of America„
AFL-CIO, has been the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the
aforesaid collective-bargaining unit.
4. By refusing on and after October 15, 1964, to recognize and bargain collectively
with United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5 The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and the entire record, and pursuant
to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I recommend that
the Respondent, Engineers & Fabricators, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with loss of benefits or other reprisals because of their
union activities, granting or promising benefits to interfere with the employees' free
choice of representatives, coercively questioning employees concerning -their union
sympathies or activities, promoting the formation of an employees' grievance com-
mittee, and granting wage increases to interfere with the employees' free choice of
representatives; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed
as requiring the Respondent to revoke any wage increase which it has heretofore
granted.
(b) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in
the appropriate unit set forth in the Conclusions of Law above.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of the right of self-organization, to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies of
the Act
(a) Upon request, recognize and bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appro-
priate unit set forth in the Conclusions of Law above.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC. 945
(b) Post at its facility in Houston, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix A." 24 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 23, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the
Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon ieceipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writing, within 20 days from
the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.25
The petition for certification of representatives in Case No. 23-RC-2336 is hereby
dismissed.
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
25 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with loss of benefits or other reprisals
because of their union activities, grant or promise benefits to interfere with the
employees' free choice of representatives, coercively question employees about
their union sympathies of activities, promote the formation of an employees'
grievance committee, or grant wage increases to interfere with the employees'
free choice of representatives. However, we are not required to revoke any
wage increase which we have heretofore granted.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or
any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or
all such activities
WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bargain collectively with United Steel-
workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit set foith below:
All production and maintenance employees employed at our Houston,
Texas, plant, including assembly men, welders, drill press operators, boring
mill operators , lathe operators , grinders , checkers , burners, helpers, cleanup
men, carpenters, abrasive saw operators, toolroom attendants, tube rollers,
leadermen, fitters, inspection department clerks, receiving clerk, janitor,
bandsaw operators, maintenance men, palter operators, layout men, tube
benders, utility men, painter, bending roll men, milling machine operators,
scheduler, truckdrivers, inspectors, chippers, and watchmen, excluding office
clerical employees, professional employees, employees classified as foremen
in the production and maintenance departments, all employees in the sales,
engineering, production control, purchasing, estimating, and fiscal depart-
ments, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
ENGINEERS & FABRICATORS, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
"(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
946 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 6617 Fed-
eral Office Building, 515 Rusk Avenue, Houston, Texas, Telephone No. Capitol
8-0611, Extension 4271.
APPENDIX B
1. Donald L. Alsobrooks 22. Jerry C. Hairgrove 44. Lyt M. Pape
2. Gene E. Ansley 23. Eunice E. Hale 45. Granville B. Powell, Jr.
3. Robert C. Baxter 24. Pete M. Harris 46. Troy L. Rawls
4. Jerry W. Broccolo 25. James A. Hibler 47. Joseph J. Raymond
5. Herbert R. Broussard 26. Charles D. Hoover 48. Olie B. Reaves
6. Douglas C. Brown 27. Carl W. James 49. James K. Simmons
7. Jerry W. Brown 28. Edwin A. Keely 50. George A. Smith
8. Jodie Brown 29. Clifton E. Kelley 51. Ralph C. Smith
9. Jones H. Byrd 30. Alois E. Kohut 52. Alvin Sofka
10. Dennis E. Cain 31. Woodrow L. Lahrmann 53. Lee R. Sorrels
11. Howard D. Campbell 32. Larry L. Langham 54. Mack Strain
12. Joseph S. Caswell 33. Kenneth L. McHenry 55. Elroy A. Tesch
13. Tex W. Cloud 34. Floyd C. Mathews 56. Jimmie D. Tillie
14. James A. Douglas 35. Charles W. Matlock 57. George G. Tinnin
15. Glenn B. Edgeman 36. Emanuel P. Maywald 58. Innis Wagner, Jr.
16. Arthur M. Fedrick 37. Noah T. Melton 59. Melvin W. Whitlock
17. Lonnie M. Fedrick 38. Elroy O. Michael 60. Terry S. Williams
18. Teddy R. Fitchner 39. Jimmy H. Montgomery 61. Daniel M. Wolff
19. Alfred C. Gloyna 40. Arthur T. Nix 62. Willie F. Wolff, Jr.
20. Cletus J. Goetz 41. Jerry L. Odneal 63. John M. Woodson
21. Alexander A. Gutowski 42. Pete P. Ognoskie 64. Eddie R. Zwernemann
43. John H. Owen
APPENDIX C
1. General E. Alsobrooks 9. Charles S. Le Cara 17. Billy J. Phillips
2. David T. Buchanan 10. Louis Manchack 18. Buren E. Risinger
3. Edmund Duve 11. Tommy R. McSwain 19. Paul R. Rush
4. Woodrow Drive 12. Glenn A. Moore 20. Karl D. Strain
5. Ernest R. Eggert 13. Albert L. Ognoskie 21. Zack Strain
6. William C. Herrin 14. Robert L. Parrott 22. Lloyd Tully
7. Jerry W. Kelley 15. Raymond W. Pawlik 23. Roscoe Wells
8. Johnnie Ketchey 16. Alex J. Perez
APPENDIX D
1. Alfred A. Baack 5. Lee R. Kubecka 9. Perry Thomas
2. Andrew S. Duncan 6. Harold D. Lebeck 10. D. A. Weiss
3. Charles D. Felchak 7. Joe E. Stzelecke 11. Eddie J. Zientek
4. James C. Followell 8. Jerry P. Patterson
Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Association of Western Pulp
and Paper Workers, Petitioner
Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Local No . 482, International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Petitioner
Georgia-Pacific Corporation , Paper Division , Samoa, Petitioner
and International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper
Mill Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 20-RC-6507, 2O-RC-6544,
and 2O-RM-769. January 17,1966
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon separate petitions duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, a consolidated hearing
156 NLRB No. 92.
1