0120073432
12-10-2009
Emma L. Blathers, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, (Veterans Health Administration), Agency.
Emma L. Blathers,
Complainant,
v.
Eric K. Shinseki,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
(Veterans Health Administration),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120073432
Agency No. 200105392006102559
DECISION
On July 31, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's July 19,
2007 final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e
et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is
accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons,
the Commission MODIFIES the agency's final decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED
(1) Whether the agency appropriately determined that complainant was not
subject to discrimination when she was not selected on three separate
occasions.
(2) Whether the agency properly dismissed complainant's ongoing
non-selection claim.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked
as a Nursing Assistant, GS-5, at the agency's Lyons, NJ facility,
where she had been employed for 27 years. On July 9, 2006, complainant
filed an EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated against on
the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), and age (58) when:
(1) on April 13, 2006, she was not selected for the position of Nursing
Assistant; (2) on May 11, 2006, she was not selected for the position of
Patient Services Assistant; (3) on July 10, 2006, she was not selected
for another Nursing Assistant position; and (4), she experienced multiple
non-selections from 1994 to 2006. The agency dismissed claim (4) because
complainant had not contacted a counselor within 45 days of the alleged
discriminatory action.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When complainant
did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. �
1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �
1614.110(b). In its final decision, the agency affirmed the Office of
Resolution Management's dismissal of complainant's fourth claim on the
bases that: (i) complainant had not contacted a counselor within 45 days
of the nonselection; and (ii) for failing to state a claim for which
relief can be granted. With respect to the three remaining claims,
the agency found: (i) complainant had not established a prima facie
case of gender or race discrimination; and (ii) while complainant had
established a prima facie case of age discrimination, she failed to offer
any evidence showing that the agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for its actions were pretextual.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Neither the agency nor complainant submitted briefs on appeal of the
Agency's Final Decision.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo
review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management
Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that
the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine
the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,
and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions
of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's
own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
Claim (4) Procedural Dismissal
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of
discrimination should be brought to the attention of the EEO counselor
within forty-five (45) days of the date of the matter alleged to be
discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action, within forty-five
(45) days of the effective date of the action. The Commission has adopted
a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed to a "supportive facts"
standard) to determine when the forty-five (45) day limitation period is
triggered. See Howard v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970852
(February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation is not triggered until
a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination, but before all the
facts that support a charge of discrimination have become apparent.
In the instant case, complainant presented no persuasive evidence that
she did not reasonably suspect discrimination regarding her ongoing
non-selections until the 45 days that preceded her initial contact with a
counselor on May 5, 2006. Complainant has not shown that she was unaware
of the time limitation period for seeking EEO counseling, nor has she
shown that she was prevented from seeking timely contact for any reasons.
We also note that non-selections are, like hirings, promotions, awards,
"discrete actions," which are "not actionable if untimely filed. See
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the dismissal of claim (4).
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, complainant must satisfy the
three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially
establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected
to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support
an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending
on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804
n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail,
complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
Under the ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29
U.S.C. � 623(a)(1). When a complainant alleges that she has been
disparately treated by the employing agency as a result of unlawful
age discrimination, "liability depends on whether the protected trait
(under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer's decision."
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000)
(citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,610 (1993)). "That is,
[complainant's] age must have actually played a role in the employer's
decision making process and had a determinative influence on the
outcome." Id.
Claim (1)
With respect to complainant's contentions that she was discriminated
against with respect to race and gender, we find that complainant has not
established a prima facie claim of discrimination. The record shows that
with respect to claim (1), all selectees were African-American females.
Therefore, complainant has not identified similarly situated individuals
from outside of her protected classes of race (African-American) and
gender (female) who were treated more favorably nor has she provided
any other evidence that would create an inference of discrimination
based on race or gender. Accordingly, complainant has not satisfied
the requirements of stating a prima facie claim of race and gender
discrimination.
With respect to complainant's allegations of age discrimination,
we find that complainant has established a prima facie claim of
discrimination. Complainant has shown that: (i) she is an employee over
40 years of age; (ii), she experienced an adverse employment action;
(iii) she applied for a position which she was found qualified; (iii) the
selectees were younger than herself. Therefore, complainant has shown
that similarly situated employees outside of her protected class were
treated more favorably. Accordingly, since complainant has established
a prima facie case of age discrimination, the burden shifts to the agency
to show legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.
The agency contends that complainant was not selected because she
received an application review score of 36 points, nearly 30 points
lower than the selectees, who received application scores of 64, 65, and
65 respectively. The agency maintains that the scores were based on the
respective applicant's experience and the ability to articulate specific
competencies. In this regard, the record indicates that the agency
employed objective, standardized procedures to calculate the scores.
Accordingly, we find that agency has offered a non-discriminatory,
legitimate reason for its action. In response, complainant offers no
evidence showing pretext. Therefore, with regard to claim (1), we find
that complainant has not shown that she was discriminated against. The
agency's finding of no discrimination regarding claim (1) is AFFIRMED.
Claim (2)
With regard to claim (2), we find that complainant has not shown a
prima facie claim of race discrimination, as she has not identified
any similarly situated individuals outside her protected class who
was selected for the Patient Services Assistant position. However,
we find that complainant has presented a prima facie claim of
gender discrimination because the record reveals that similarly
situated male employees were selected for the position. Further,
we find that complainant has established a prima facie claim of age
discrimination under the ADEA because all selectees were younger than
complainant. Accordingly, the burden next shifts to the agency to
show that its actions were supported by legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons.
In this regard, the agency contends that complainant was not offered
an interview because her application packet omitted: (i) KSAOs; (ii)
a resume; (iii) and references. In contrast, the record shows that
the selectees all submitted complete application packages. Therefore,
we find that the agency has presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action. Complainant now bears the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's articulated reasons
were a pretext for discrimination. To this end, complainant submits
no information that the agency's reasons were pretextual. Accordingly,
we find that complainant has not shown that she was discriminated
against on account of race, gender or age with respect to claim (2).
The agency's finding of discrimination regarding claim (2) is AFFIRMED.
Claim (3)
We find that complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of
race or gender discrimination with respect to claim (3), as the record
reveals that no individuals outside of complainant's protected classes of
race (African-American) or gender (female) were selected; however, we find
that complainant has stated a prima facie claim of age discrimination,
as both of the selectees were younger than complainant at ages 52 and
29 respectively. Therefore, the burden shifts to the agency to show
that its actions were based on legitimate, non-discriminatory factors.
The agency has failed to meet its burden in showing that its action was
based on legitimate, non-discriminatory factors. The Supreme Court
has described this burden as being met "if the defendant's evidence
raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
[complainant]," and that "[t]o accomplish this, the defendant must
clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the
reasons for the [complainant's] rejection." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
Moreover, it must "frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so
that [complainant] will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext." 450 U.S. at 255-256; Parker v. United States Postal Service;
EEOC Request No. 05900110 (April 30, 1990) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256) see also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993),
citing U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
716 (1983) and Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. While the agency's burden of
production is not onerous, it must nevertheless provide a specific, clear,
and individualized explanation for the treatment accorded the affected
employee. Lorenzo v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05950931
(November 6, 1997).
We find that the agency has not articulated an adequate reason
explaining the discrepancy in treatment between complainant and the
selectees, and thus, has not rebutted complainant's prima facie case
of age discrimination. To this end, no agency selecting officials were
available to testify with respect to claim (3) nor did the agency submit
any specific argument or evidence regarding how its selection decision
was made. Instead, the agency's sole assertion consisted of a perfunctory
statement made by an official, via telephone, that applicants without
experience in "acute med/surg" were not required to be interviewed.
However, this same individual acknowledged that she was not actually
involved in the screening process or the interview phase of the selection
process. Moreover, another agency official, a Human Resource Specialist,
stated that complainant was found to be qualified for the position,
but she was unaware of the reason that complainant was not interviewed.
On balance, therefore, the agency provided no objective bases for its
selection decision. Instead, the agency merely provided a cursory
description of the decision-making process, without indicating how
it applied in its decision not to refer complainant for an interview.
Accordingly, we find that the agency has failed to articulate a specific,
clear, and individualized explanation for its actions, and consequently,
complainant was denied a fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. See
Young v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request 05940517 (October 13,
1995).
CONCLUSION
After a review of the record in its entirety, the Commission AFFIRMS
the agency's final order with respect to claims (1), (2) and (4).
With respect to claim (3), we REVERSE the agency's determination that
complainant did not establish age discrimination. The agency will comply
with the Order below.
ORDER
Within sixty (60) days of the date this decision becomes final the agency
is ordered to:
1. Offer complainant the position of the GS-5, Nursing Assistant,
or a substantially equivalent position, at the Charleston, South Carolina
location, retroactive to the date of her non-selection, July 10, 2006.
Complainant shall have fifteen (15) days from the date of the offer
to accept or decline the position. If complainant should decline the
agency's offer of a position, the date of her rejection shall be the
end date for any back pay due complainant.
2. The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay,
with interest, and other benefits due complainant since July 10, 2006,
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar
days after the date this decision becomes final. The complainant shall
cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and
benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by
the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back
pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the complainant
for the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date
the agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The complainant
may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.
The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the
Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled
"Implementation of the Commission's Decision."
3. The agency shall provide eight (8) hours of EEO training to the
responsible management officials regarding their responsibilities under
EEO laws.
4. The agency shall consider taking appropriate disciplinary action
against the responsible management officials. The Commission does not
consider training to be disciplinary action. The agency shall report
its decision to the Compliance Officer. If the agency decides to take
disciplinary action, it shall identify the action taken. If the agency
decides not to take disciplinary action, it shall set forth the reason(s)
for its decision not to impose discipline. If any of the responsible
management officials have left the agency's employ, the agency shall
furnish documentation of their departure date(s).
5. The agency is ordered to post at its Charleston, South Carolina
offices copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being
signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted
by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision
becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,
in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer
at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the
Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration
of the posting period.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1208)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar
days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall
be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,
DC 20013. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,
and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.
If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant
may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action
to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following
an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,
1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant
has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in
accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil
Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for
enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject
to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of
the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1208)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0408)
This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it
also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a
portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in
an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar
days from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion
of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that portion
of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative
processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after
one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your
complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until
such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.
If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,
identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file
a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time
limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
____12/10/09______________
Date
2
0120073432
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
8
0120073432