Emma J. Lee, Complainant,v.Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 13, 2000
07a00007 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 13, 2000)

07a00007

07-13-2000

Emma J. Lee, Complainant, v. Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Emma J. Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs

07A00007

July 13, 2000

Emma J. Lee, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 07A00007

v. ) Agency No. 97-1107

) Hearing No. 250-97-8221X

Togo D. West, Jr., )

Secretary, )

Department of Veterans Affairs, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

The agency timely initiated an appeal from its own final action concerning

complainant's equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1>

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). Complainant alleges she was

discriminated against based on race (Black) and physical disability

(asthma, arthritis, knee pain, dyspnea, degenerative joint disease

with deformity of her lower extremities, diabetes, and hypertension,

with complications from medication and obesity) when, on May 21, 1996,

and August 7, 1996, her request for a disability-accessible parking

space was denied. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final action.

The record reveals that complainant is a GS-3-5 Uniform Clerk in the

Laundry Section at the agency's Medical Center facility in Memphis,

Tennessee. From 1987 through early 1996, the agency allowed her to

use a disability-accessible parking space. However, in 1996, due

to construction at the facility, the agency advised complainant and

various other employees that they would would no longer be afforded

disability-accessible parking spaces.<2>

Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency on August 21,

1996, alleging that the agency had discriminated against her as referenced

above. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a

copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision

finding no discrimination. The AJ concluded that complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because she did

not demonstrate that similarly situated employees not in her protected

classes were treated differently under similar circumstances, or adduce

other evidence sufficient to permit an inference of discrimination. With

respect to complainant's disability discrimination claim, the AJ concluded

that complainant was not an "individual with a disability" within the

meaning of the Rehabilitation Act because she was not substantially

limited in a major life activity.<3> The AJ further found, in the

alternative, that even assuming complainant is a qualified individual

with a disability, it would pose an undue hardship for the agency to

provide complainant with a disability-accessible parking space.

On November 19, 1999, the agency issued its final action, stating that

it would not implement the AJ's decision with respect to complainant's

disability discrimination claim, which it now deemed meritorious

notwithstanding that the agency defended against it at the hearing.

The agency concluded that the AJ's decision erred factually and legally in

concluding that complainant is not an individual with a disability within

the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act because she was not substantially

limited in the major life activity of working. The agency concluded

that complainant is substantially limited in the major life activities of

walking and breathing. The agency further concluded that the AJ erred in

finding that it would pose an undue hardship for the agency to provide

complainant with a disability-accessible parking space. Accordingly,

the agency awarded equitable relief, and directed that a supplemental

investigation be conducted with respect to compensatory damages and

attorney's fees and costs. In accordance with 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,657 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(a)), because it was not

implementing the AJ's decision, the agency simultaneously filed its own

notice of appeal with this Commission. Complainant has not filed any

contentions on appeal.

Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a)), all post-hearing factual findings by an

Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.�

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474,

477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding that discriminatory intent

did not exist is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). In the instant case, the AJ made no factual

findings with respect to the ways in which complainant's various

impairments affected her in the performance of any major life activity

other than working, and therefore we review the factual record on these

issues de novo. To the extent the AJ made certain factual findings in

support of his legal conclusion that even assuming arguendo complainant

is a qualified individual with a disability, it would pose an undue

hardship for the agency to accommodate complainant's request for an

parking space, these findings are not supported by substantial evidence,

as reviewed below.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

decision improperly concluded complainant is not an individual with a

disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.<4>

An "individual with a disability" is one who: (1) has a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;

(2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such

an impairment. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). Major life activities include,

but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i). A "qualified" individual with a disability

is one who satisfies the requirements for the employment position

he/she holds or desires and can perform the essential functions of that

position with or without reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m).

The Supreme Court has held that the determination of whether a person is

an "individual with a disability" must be based on his or her condition

at the time of the alleged discrimination. The positive and negative

effects of mitigating measures used by the individual, such as medication

or an assistive device, must be considered when deciding if he or she

has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United

Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).

The record evidence establishes that complainant's numerous physical

impairments identified above substantially limited her in the major

life activity of walking. By letter dated May 6, 1996, complainant's

physician advised the agency:

[complainant] is presently being followed for asthma, hypertension and

severe degenerative joint disease with deformity of her lower extremities.

Because of the above medical conditions, her ability to ambulate is

limited.

Please allow [complainant] to use the handicap parking area closest to

the hospital.

By letter dated June 17, 1996, the same physician further advised the

agency that "[i]t is very difficult for [complainant] to ambulate

even with mechanical assistance," referring to complainant's use

of a cane. Based on this evidence, we conclude that complainant's

physical impairments, in combination, substantially limit her in the

major life activity of walking, and accordingly she is an individual

with a disability within the meaning of the statute. We further find

that complainant is a "qualified" individual with a disability because,

according to hearing testimony by both complainant and her supervisor,

she is able to perform the essential functions of her position. Therefore,

irrespective of the parking space distribution criteria established by

agency or facility policy, the agency had a duty under the Rehabilitation

Act to provide complainant with a reasonable accommodation absent,

inter alia, a showing of undue hardship.

Based on a careful review of the record, we find the AJ incorrectly

concluded that it would pose an undue hardship on the agency to

accommodate complainant's request for an accessible parking space.

The factual findings made by the AJ regarding the undue hardship defense

are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Specifically,

the AJ concluded that providing complainant with an accessible parking

space would require termination of a necessary building expansion.

To the contrary, in its "Memorandum For the Record" setting forth its

reasons for not implementing the AJ's decision, the agency itself notes,

and the record demonstrates, that twelve parking spaces were created

as a result of reconstruction and only eight were filled. See Record

of Investigation, Affidavit B9(b) at 7. Accordingly, complainant could

have been placed in an existing vacant parking space without jeopardizing

the planned building expansion. In addition, as the agency itself notes,

the fact that other employees may file or have filed complaints regarding

the proposed accommodation is in and of itself insufficient to demonstrate

undue hardship on the agency's operations.

Where a discriminatory practice involves the provision of a reasonable

accommodation, compensatory damages may not be awarded where the employer

demonstrates good faith efforts to make a reasonable accommodation.

See 42 U.S.C. � 1981a(a)(3). In the instant case, the agency denied

complainant's request for accommodation largely on the ground that she

did not possess one of the physical conditions given priority under the

facility's parking policy, without regard to the requirements of the

Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, we will not disturb the agency's final

action, which finds compensatory damages to be available to complainant,

and orders a supplemental investigation on the appropriate amount,

if any, to be awarded.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including the agency's

contentions on appeal and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's final action and

ORDER the agency to take remedial action as specified in the order which

follows.

ORDER

To the extent it has not yet done so, the agency is ORDERED to take the

following remedial action:

(1) The agency shall provide complainant with a disability-accessible

parking space.

(2) The agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation pertaining to

complainant's entitlement to compensatory damages incurred as a result of

the agency's failure to provide her with an parking space. The agency

shall afford complainant sixty (60) days to submit additional evidence

in support of her claim for compensatory damages. Within thirty (30)

days of its receipt of complainant's evidence, the agency shall issue

a final decision determining complainant's entitlement to compensatory

damages, together with appropriate appeal rights.

(3) The agency shall provide training regarding the obligations and duties

imposed by the Rehabilitation Act to the personnel responsible for the

agency's actions in this matter. Such training shall include, but not

be limited to, the information set forth in the foregoing decision as

well as the EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and

Undue Hardship Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, No. 915.002

(March 1, 1999).

(4) The agency shall disseminate, to personnel responsible for allocating

disability-accessible parking spaces at any of its facilities, appropriate

information regarding application of the Rehabilitation Act, as set

forth in the foregoing decision.

(5) The agency shall post at its Medical Center facility in Memphis,

Tennessee copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after

being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall

be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date

this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60)

consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where

notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take

reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,

or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be

submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph

entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10)

calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due complainant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at its Memphis, Tennessee Medical Center

facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after

being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall

be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date

this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60)

consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where

notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take

reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,

or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be

submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph

entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10)

calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to

an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the

complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall

be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of

fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,

the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a

civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior

to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a

civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407

and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the

underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �

2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0400)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN

THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

July 13, 2000

_______________ _____________________

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2Prior to this time, the facility had implemented a policy which permitted

such parking spaces to be assigned to "employees who, because of permanent

disability, experience difficulty in walking." Record of Investigation

(ROI) Exhibit C-6. Complainant was advised by memorandum dated April

16, 1996 that due to the effect of facility construction on available

parking space, "[r]eserved handicapped parking has been re-evaluated

to be more in line with the Department of Veterans Affairs' established

guidelines for reserved handicapped parking." ROI Exhibit C-10 at 1.

The referenced agency guidelines provide that "employees eligible

for" such parking spaces include: (a) those who use wheelchairs; (b)

"single or double lower limb amputees"; and (c) those with "lower limb

impairments which require the use of assistor devices for ambulation."

ROI Exhibit C1 at 1.

3The AJ's decision incorrectly states that in addition to demonstrating

that she has an impairment which substantially limits a major life

activity, complainant must demonstrate that she is substantially limited

in her ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of

jobs in various classes compared to the average person with comparable

training, skills, and abilities. To the contrary, the latter standard

only applies if complainant claims that her impairment substantially

limits her in the major life activity of working. Complainant need only

establish that her impairment substantially limits her in one major life

activity, and it need not be working. In the instant case, the AJ did

not specifically address whether or not complainant is substantially

limited in other major life activities, such as walking or breathing.

4We also find that the AJ's decision properly concluded that complainant

has not established a prima facie case of race discrimination in violation

of Title VII.