Emery F.,1 Complainant,v.Dr. Mark T. Esper, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 11, 2018
0120170375 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 11, 2018)

0120170375

09-11-2018

Emery F.,1 Complainant, v. Dr. Mark T. Esper, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Emery F.,1

Complainant,

v.

Dr. Mark T. Esper,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120170375

Agency No. ARAPG14AUG03154

DECISION

On November 2, 2016, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(a), from the Agency's September 14, 2016, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final decision (FAD).

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether the FAD properly found that Complainant failed to establish that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination based on his race (African American), color (black) and reprisal when: he did not receive compensation for serving as a Management Lead; his first level supervisor was changed; he was removed as Lead on the Conditioned Based Maintenance (CBM) function; removed as a Contracting Officer; demoted to Technical Lead; and his title and the performance period were changed on his performance evaluation.

2. Whether the FAD properly found that Complainant failed to establish that he was subjected to discriminatory harassment based on his race and color when he was required to report his telework activity on an hourly basis; he was instructed to complete training courses at home instead of while on duty; and he was subjected to a study that examined his daily work activity to the minute.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Logistics Management Specialist, GS-0346-13 at the Agency's Logistics and Readiness Center facility in Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The Agency's FAD thoroughly discussed that facts in the record, and the instant decision incorporates them as stated. On November 19, 2014, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (African-American), color (Black), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII as articulated in the statement of Issues Presented above. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with Complainant's request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Disparate Treatment

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); see Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation cases). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 804 n.14. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Assuming, arguendo, Complainant established prima facie cases of discrimination based on race, color, and reprisal (instant complaint), we find that the Agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the incidents Complainant cites to establish his claim, and that Complainant did not demonstrate that any conduct on the part of the Agency was based on discriminatory animus. Complainant began reporting to his first level supervisor, S1, after her assignment as the Chief for Fleet Management on April 15, 2014. Through a series of tests, the Agency determined that the CBM function required a separation into several functions in order to be effectively managed. S1 was assigned the serial Fleet mission, and three subordinates to help the mission. Complainant had not performed any of the tasks as defined under the new role. Complainant's second level supervisor, S2, opined that the assignments and responsibilities which Complainant assumed were consistent with GS-13 level compensation, and not at the level of S1. S1 made a decision to realign her subordinates, in part due to the changing of focus from CBM to Fleet Management. When Complainant was removed as the Lead for the CBM program on October 15, 2015, he was not demoted, his responsibilities were simply shifted to create balance on his team as a result of the shift in the team's priorities. Complainant was assigned as the LRC government lead because he had the skill set to lead this effort. He was relieved of his Contracting duties to focus on core Fleet Management tasks.

With respect to Complainant's allegations regarding S1's interference with him completing training courses, requiring him to report in hourly on his telework days, and logging of his work activity through an assignment tracker, the record reflects that these incidents did not occur exactly as Complainant alleges. While training is allowed during work hours, it is typically scheduled far in advanced so as not to interfere with an employee's work schedule. Additionally, upon inquiring with HR about the ability of employees to work on training courses during duty hours, S1 was advised that this was a permissible practice. She emailed her staff acknowledging that she'd previously misinformed them otherwise, and advised that they could work on the courses as long as it was a requirement of their job. Complainant's performance evaluation was updated to reflect the rating period for which S1 was Complainant's supervisor, as well as, the change in his title to more accurately reflect his responsibilities under his new supervisory chain. S1 requested that Complainant advise her of what he was working on during his telework days so that she would be able to accurately account for his time. S1 implemented a work tracker in her unit for the sole purpose of ascertaining the potential need for additional resources and supports.

In sum, our review of the record confirms the Agency's assertion that its decisions were based on its determination of how best to effectively manage the workplace and its assessment of Complainant's job performance and responsibilities in the workplace. Nothing in the record, or submitted on appeal, demonstrate that the Agency's actions were in any way motivated by discriminatory animus. The Commission has long held that an Agency has broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions, and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent evidence of unlawful motivation. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259; Vanek v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (January 16, 1997).

Harassment

In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [complainant's] employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment." See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services. Inc., 23 U.S. 75 (1998). The Court explained that an "objectively hostile or abusive work environment [is created when] a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive" and the complainant subjectively perceives it as such. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII must be determined by looking at all the circumstances, including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. at 23. An abusive or hostile working environment exists "when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of the victim's employment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. Usually, unless the conduct is pervasive and severe, a single incident, or group of isolated incidents, will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982); Frye v. Dep't of Labor, EEOC Request No. 05950152 (Feb. 8, 1996); Backo v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05960227 (June 10, 1996).

An alteration to an employee's working conditions exists if a tangible, discrete employment action is taken, e.g., hiring, firing, transfer, promotion, non-selection, or the Agency's actions were sufficiently severe and/or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. The harasser's conduct is evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in a complainant's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994).

The Agency concluded that Complainant failed to establish a claim of harassment because he failed to show that that he was subjected to severe or pervasive treatment such as to create an unlawful work environment on any basis. Instead, the incidents complained of here appear to have been reasonable actions of Complainant's supervisor and other management officials taken in the course of discharging their supervisory responsibilities. The incidents identified were in the nature of common interactions and employment actions that would occur between a supervisor and a subordinate employee in the workplace. We agree with the Agency's findings in the FAD that the incidents, considered together and taken as a whole, do not rise to the level of a discriminatorily hostile workplace.

CONCLUSION

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final decision because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0617)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__9/11/18________________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

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