Ellis E. Williams, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 26, 2009
0120083804 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 26, 2009)

0120083804

02-26-2009

Ellis E. Williams, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Ellis E. Williams,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120083804

Agency No. 1C-443-0015-08

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's July 31, 2008 final decision concerning his equal

employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

During the period at issue, complainant was employed as a Mail Processing

Clerk, PS-05, at the agency's Youngstown Processing and Distribution

Facility (P&DF) in Youngstown, Ohio.

On February 29, 2008, complainant filed the instant formal complaint.

Therein, complainant alleged that the agency discriminated against him

in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

on January 12, 2008, he was informed that effective February 2, 2008,

he would become an unencumbered regular and that his position would be

abolished effective February 16, 2008.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with

complainant's request, the agency issued a final decision on July 31,

2008, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b).

In its July 31, 2008 final decision, the agency found no discrimination.

The agency concluded that complainant did not establish a prima facie

case of reprisal discrimination. The agency further concluded although

complainant had engaged in prior protected activity and that management

was aware of such activity, he did not provide sufficient evidence of

a causal connection between prior protected activity and the alleged

discriminatory events at issue. The agency further found even assuming,

for the sake of argument only, that complainant established a prima facie

case of reprisal discrimination, management nevertheless articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which complainant

failed to show were a pretext.

The Manager, In-Plant Support (M1) stated that she was the deciding

official to abolish complainant's job. M1 stated that during the

relevant time, the Youngstown P&DF removed two processing machines and

"in order to process all the mail volume we added Tour 2 operation.

We had to move (5) automation jobs from Tour 1 and 3 to Tour 2."

M1 stated that the jobs abolished were "the junior employees and the

employees that had not performed the duties of their jobs for over one

year." M1 stated that she met with the union to discuss procedures for

the creation/movement of jobs. M1 stated that following consultations

with the union, the agency sent out letters to the affected employees,

including complainant. Specifically, M1 stated "per contract, I made the

decision to abolish complainant's job because he was the junior employee

in Tour 3 automation section. The record reflects that complainant,

along with four other junior employees, had their jobs abolished in

accordance with the National Agreement.

Complainant's manager (M2) stated that he had no role in the abolishment

of complainant's job. M2 stated that complainant's job was abolished

because he was "the junior employee in the Automation Section on Tour

Three." M2 further stated that according to M1, "the union agreed when

there is a reduction within the installation we fall under Article R of

the national contract. Management had to abolish five jobs in Automation

Tour One and Tour 3 to create five jobs on Tour Two. The reduction of

a section puts us into Article R. Jobs could not just be changed and

placed on another shift. Jobs had to be abolished first."

The Plant Manager (PM) stated that he was the concurring official

concerning the abolishment of complainant's job. Specifically, PM

stated that M1's determination to abolish the junior employees' jobs

"was made in order to increase machine utilization and provide better

mail flow." PM stated that automation jobs were created on Tour 2 and

"in order to do so we had to abolish jobs on Tour III. Complainant was

a junior employee in sections where jobs were affected." PM stated that

all determinations "were made based on stipulations in APWU contract."

Furthermore, PM stated that complainant's prior protected activity was

not a factor in M1's determination to abolish his job.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably

give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate

responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In the instant case, we find that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. We further find that

complainant has not demonstrated that these reasons were a pretext for

discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final decision because

the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish that

discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court

that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court

also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs,

or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request

is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an

attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 26, 2009

__________________

Date

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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