Elizabeth P. Foster, Complainant,v.Mike Donley, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 15, 2009
0120091905 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 15, 2009)

0120091905

07-15-2009

Elizabeth P. Foster, Complainant, v. Mike Donley, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Elizabeth P. Foster,

Complainant,

v.

Mike Donley,

Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120091905

Agency No. 7K0J08006

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

agency decision dated February 18, 2009, finding that it was in compliance

with the terms of the July 14, 2008 settlement agreement into which the

parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.402, 1614.405 & 1614.504(b).

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

[Complainant] will be converted to a regular employee retroactive to

16 May 08. This guarantees her between 20-40 hours of work a week and

provides benefits if she elects to receive them. The AF Form 2548,

Non-Appropriated Fund Request for Personnel Action, will be completed

within five working days from the date of the last signature on [the

negotiated settlement agreement].

The Agency will provide an equitable, fair, and professional

distribution of work hours in scheduling bartenders for

parties/special occasions. Factors such as performance,

availability, seniority and willingness to work a variety

of special functions will all be considered in helping club

management determine work schedules for special functions.

The current club manager will review the work schedules of

bartenders on a monthly basis to ensure fairness.

By letter to the agency dated January 12, 2009, complainant alleged that

the agency was in breach of the settlement agreement. Specifically,

complainant alleged that the agency failed to schedule bartenders in a

fair and equitable manner. Complainant stated that management scheduled

her for the minimum number of hours possible for regular status - 20,

and that others who have less seniority and are not categorized as

"bartenders" were given more hours than she or given the hours she

normally worked.

In its February 18, 2009 final decision, the agency concluded that it

did not breach the July 14 settlement agreement. The agency stated

that complainant acknowledged that she worked an average of 28 hours per

week between July 13, 2008 and January 1, 2009 and such is more than the

average worked by any other employee. The agency added that complainant

was scheduled to work several parties and special occasions, and that

the club manager reviewed the schedule for fairness on a weekly basis.

The instant appeal from complainant followed. On appeal, complainant

reiterated previous contentions and added that the agency failed to

address her January 12 breach allegations. Also, complainant provided a

list of the total number of hours she and other employees worked between

July 13, 2008 and January 3, 2009, as well as a list of eleven parties

that she worked between August 1 and December 21, 2008.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of

contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

In the instant case, we find that complainant failed to meet her

burden of proving breach. See Vega v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01986613 (June 30, 2000). After careful review of the record and

consideration of "the plain meaning rule," we are not persuaded that

the agency breached the settlement agreement as complainant alleged.

Complainant did not voice particular concern with the first paragraph,

although that is the provision regarding weekly work hours. In fact,

the first paragraph provides that the agency change complainant to a

regular employee and hence guarantee her between 20-40 hours of work

a week, and complainant acknowledged that she is scheduled for at

least 20 hours per week. The second paragraph addresses "equitable,

fair, and professional" scheduling for "parties/special occasions" and

complainant stated that she worked eleven parties during a five month

period following the execution of the July 14 agreement. Such a standard

is difficult to gage and we find that complainant did not establish that

eleven parties in five months is not "equitable, fair, and professional."

Based on the above, we AFFIRM the agency's finding of no breach.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 15, 2009

__________________

Date

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0120091905

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120091905