Elias Sardonis et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 11, 2019

13045257 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 11, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/045,257 03/10/2011 Elias Sardonis 0141.0015US2 2561
107992 7590 09/11/2019
HoustonHogle LLP
1666 Massachusetts Avenue
Suite 12
Lexington, MA 02420
EXAMINER
OUELLETTE, JONATHAN P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/11/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@houstonllp.com
grant.houston@houstonllp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ELIAS SARDONIS, MELANIE STRODTMAN,
and ROBERT STOBER
____________

Appeal 2017-0106141
Application 13/045,2572
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) claims 1–4, 7–14, 17–21,
27–29, and 31–33. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
March 6, 2017), Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 7, 2017), the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 5, 2017), and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed June 30, 2016).
2 Appellants identify “Jenzabar, Inc.” as the real party in interest. Appeal
Br. 1.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
According to Appellants, the present claims relate generally “to a
retention management system” (Spec. ¶ 8).
Claims 1, 11, 21, 27, and 33 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
1. A workflow method for student retention management in an
academic retention management system, the method comprising:
[a] displaying alert submission forms on display devices
of computer systems enabling users to create alerts concerning
retention issues for students in the academic retention
management system on user computing devices;
[b] the academic retention management system displaying
the alerts to institutional personnel on the user computing devices
including types of the alerts and student names for the student for
whom the alerts were created;
[c] displaying student alert screens
[c.i] enabling users to view and assign follow-ups
for the alerts on the user computing devices by displaying
on the user computing devices a table of actions that
includes a concern type, a status of the follow-ups as being
pending or completed, names of the students for whom the
follow-ups were created, and names of users to whom the
follow-ups have been assigned for each of the alerts and
[c.ii] enabling assignment of new follow-ups by
selecting a concern type and users to whom the follow-ups
are assigned,
[c.iii] wherein after the follow-ups are assigned
notification messages are sent to the users to whom the
follow-ups were assigned to enable the users to view the
follow-up assignments; and
[d] an application server tracking a status of the follow-
ups as being pending or completed.

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–4, 7–14, 17–21, 27–29, and 31–33 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly
more.3
Claims 1–4, 7–14, 17–21, 27–29, and 31–33 are rejected under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yaskin (US
2010/0009331 A1, pub. Jan. 14, 2010) in view of Jenzabar (Jenzabar’s
Retention Management Solution 1.0: Installation Guide, Jenzabar, Inc., pub.
June 29, 2009).

ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).

3 Appellants request “clarification of the scope of the rejection” (Appeal Br.
6). Appellants assert that “[w]hile the rejection nominally lists: 1–4, 7–10,
21–23, 27–29, and 31–33. The text of the rejection only discusses claims:
1, 11, 27, and 33” (id.). However, the Examiner addresses independent
claim 11 in the body of the rejection (see, e.g., Final Act. 2–4), and this
conveys that the rejection includes independent claim 11 and claims 12–14
and 17–20, which depend therein, in the § 101 rejection. Accordingly, the
record sufficiently shows claims 1–4, 7–14, 17–21, 27–29, and 31–33 to be
under rejection.
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
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claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application, i.e., that “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception
in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such
that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see
also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance.
Appellants argue that the Examiner’s rejection is in error because the
Examiner “appears to have failed to set forth a prima facie rejection” (see
Reply Br. 2–3; see also Appeal Br. 6–7). Appellants’ argument is not
persuasive.
In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner
analyzes the claims using the Mayo/Alice two-step framework (see Final
Act. 2–4; see also Ans. 2–6). The Examiner determined that independent
claim 1 is directed to “managing retention alerts and follow-ups” (Final Act.
2; Ans. 4), which the Examiner considers to be an abstract idea, inasmuch as
it may be characterized as being related to “certain methods of organizing
human activity” (Final Act. 2). The Examiner further determined
independent claim 1 does not include additional elements or a combination
of elements sufficient to transform the claim into a patent-eligible
application of the abstract idea (see Final Act. 3–4; see also Ans. 5–6). The
Examiner, thus, has followed the two-part framework specified by the
Supreme Court in Mayo/Alice consistent with Office guidelines.
In response to the Examiner’s determination, Appellants argue that the
Examiner’s rejection is in error because the Examiner’s analysis is “based on
a misunderstanding of the claim language” (Appeal Br. 9). We cannot
agree.
Under the first prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
first determine if the claims recite an abstract idea. In this regard, we note
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that the Specification is titled “WORKFLOW METHOD AND SYSTEM
FOR STUDENT RETENTION MANAGEMENT.” The Background
section of the Specification describes that “[a]cademic enterprise systems are
used to manage student and business information at colleges, universities,
high schools, and other academic institutions” (Spec. ¶ 3). According to the
Specification,
[a]cademic institutions are always concerned with student
attrition. When a student withdraws from an academic institution
there is certainly a loss of revenue to the institution, but more
importantly, it suggests a failure. As a result, personnel at many
institutions are dedicated to engaging at-risk students in hopes of
reducing attrition. In fact, retentions systems have been
developed to identify at-risk students. Systems are available that
access student grades in order to identify the students that are at-
risk.
(id. ¶ 6).
Consistent with this description, independent claim 1 recites broadly a
“workflow method for student retention management in an academic
retention management system” including steps for “displaying alert
submission forms . . . enabling users to create alerts concerning retention
issues for students,” “displaying the alerts to institutional personnel,”
“displaying student alert screens enabling users to view and assign follow-
ups for the alerts,” and “tracking a status of the follow-ups.”
Upon reviewing the Specification and the claim as whole, as
summarized above, we agree with the Examiner that independent claim 1
recites broadly “managing retention alerts and follow-ups” (Final Act. 2).
Here, independent claim 1 collects information (i.e., alerts from an alert
submission form (limitation [a]) and assignments of follow-ups (limitations
[c.i]–[c.ii])), displays information (i.e., the collected alert information
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(limitation [b])), transmits information (i.e., assignment notifications
(limitation [c.iii])) and tracks information (i.e., the status of the follow-ups
(limitation [d])).
Thus, it is clear that independent claim 1 covers managing retention
alerts and follow-ups that, under the 2019 Revised Guidance, fall under the
category of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” that include
“commercial . . . interactions,” such as “business relations” and “managing
personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52. Accordingly, independent claim 1 recites an abstract idea. See
Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (concluding that “[s]tanding alone, the act of providing someone an
additional set of information without disrupting the ongoing provision of an
initial set of information is an abstract idea”).
Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, we turn to the second prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised
Guidance and determine whether the claims recite a practical application of
the recited judicial exception. Here we look to see if, for example, (i) any
additional elements of the claims reflect an improvement in the functioning
of a computer or to another technological field, (ii) an application of the
judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine, (iii) a
transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing
(iv) or a use of the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55;
See also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
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Appellants argue that claim 1 improves “the functioning of computers
and specifically academic retention management systems” (Appeal Br. 8).
However, we agree with the Examiner that the only additional elements of
the claims “are recitation of generic computer structure (i.e., a processor to
execute instructions to perform the method), which . . . would be routine in
any computer implementation” (Ans. 5). The additional elements simply
allow a generic computer to perform the claimed operations using generic
computer functions (see Spec. ¶¶ 49, 57, 59).
We find no indication in the Specification, nor do Appellants direct us
to any indication, that the steps recited in independent claim 1 invoke any
assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different
state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that persuasively attributes
any improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed
invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or us[es] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
Turning to Step 2B of the of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
determine whether the additional elements (1) add a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that is not well-understood, routine, and
conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive
concept may be present or (2) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
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level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may not be present. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56.
Appellants argue that claim 1 is “directed to specific features
associated with academic retention management systems” (Appeal Br. 8–10;
Reply Br. 1–2). However, other than merely reciting portions of
independent claim 1 (see, e.g., Appeal Br. 8–9; see also Reply Br. 1–3),
Appellants provide no further argument, such as how the elements are
arranged in a non-generic or unconventional manner such that it is a
technical improvement over prior art ways of “managing retention alerts and
follow-ups” or over other prior art “academic retention management
system[s].” See BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Exemplary independent claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract
in prior cases, uses generic computer technology to collect, store, display
and transmit data, and does not recite an improvement to a particular
computer technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am.
Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract
because they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer
animation”).
In this regard, we note that the structural limitations (i.e., academic
retention management system, display devices, computer systems,
computing devices, application server) for performing the steps of enabling
users to create/receive alerts, displaying the alerts, enabling users to view
and assign/create follow-ups for the alerts, sending/transmitting notification
messages, and tracking/processing the status of follow-ups are routine
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computer functions that may be performed by any computer system. See In
re Katz, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower
construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ discussed
below, those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer
without special programming”); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath &
Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that considering
claims reciting data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and
transmission as an “‘ordered combination’” reveals that they “amount to
‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply [an] abstract idea”
using generic computer technology) (internal citation omitted).
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, and the claims
depending therefrom. Independent claims 11, 21, 27, and 33 contain
limitations substantially similar to those of independent claim 1, and so we
also sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of these independent claims and
the claims depending therefrom.
Obviousness
We are not persuaded of error by Appellants’ argument that the
combination of Yaskin and Jenzabar fails to disclose or suggest “tracking a
status of the follow-ups,” as recited by independent claim 1 (see Appeal Br.
10–12; see also Reply Br. 3–6). More particularly, Appellants argue that
claim 1 requires “enabling assignment of new follow-ups by selecting a
concern type and users to whom the follow-ups are assigned, wherein after
the follow-ups are assigned notification messages are sent to the users to
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whom the follow-ups were assigned to enable the users to view the follow-
up assignments” (Appeal Br. 11).
The Examiner maintains the rejection is proper, and cites paragraphs
34, 55–56, 64–65, 68, 94–95, 117, and 124 of Yaskin, as disclosing the
argued limitation (see Ans. 6–8; Final Act. 6–7). We have reviewed the
cited portions of Yaskin, and agree with the Examiner that Yaskin discloses
the disputed limitations.
In making this determination, we note that Yaskin is directed to
an integrated student retention system that automatically raises
flags identifying at-risk students; permits students to raise flags
identifying themselves as at-risk; permits providers to raise flags
identifying students as at-risk; provides systems facilitating the
process of enabling students to obtain assistance; provides
systems for tracking students and providers; and provides
systems for measuring effectiveness.
(Yaskin ¶ 2). Yaskin discloses that its “system manages information so that
it is delivered to relevant parties depending on the context of the problem to
which it relates and intervenes as necessary to make sure that students are
getting help when needed” (id. ¶ 28). Yaskin further discloses that “[o]nce
flags are raised or created, a variety of people are notified based on the flag
type and the student” (id. ¶ 94). The “students can be directed to
interventions” and “[a]dvisors and counselors are notified to start
interventions” (id.). Additionally, Yaskin discloses that alert messages are
sent “to certain providers based on the type of flag raised for each student,
and based on the roles and relations certain providers might have with the
student” (id. ¶ 35). Providers further have the option of “inviting the student
to make an appointment” and to “enter a note regarding the need for the
student to visit the instructor during office hours and to suggest to the
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student to visit the tutoring center” (id. ¶¶ 64–65). Appointment referrals
“allow[] staff to request that a student seek help from a service on campus”
and the system “notifies all parties of the need for the student to visit the
service and tracks that it happens” (id. ¶ 91).
Appellants argue that Yaskin’s “appointment scheduling” and/or
“interventions” cannot be assigned to an administrator (Appeal Br. 11; Reply
Br. 4–5), and as such, fails to disclose or suggest “the notion of the creation
of follow-ups for alerts for students, tracking of those follow-ups, and the
assignment of those follow-ups” (Appeal Br. 11). We cannot agree.
At the outset, we note that Appellants fail to direct us to any specific
definition in their Specification for the term “follow-ups” which would serve
to distinguish the term from the appointments/referrals disclosed in Yaskin,
and relied on by the Examiner (see Ans. 6–8; see also Final Act. 5–6). See
In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“[d]uring examination [of a patent application, a pending claim is]
given [the] broadest reasonable [construction] consistent with the
specification, and . . . claim language should be read in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art”)
(internal citation and quotations omitted). Here, Appellants’ Specification
describes that “[f]ollow-ups include face-to-face meetings, email
communications, telephone conversations, written communications directed
at the at-risk student by the assignee” (Spec. ¶ 90). Thus, we agree with the
Examiner that Yaskin discloses “follow-ups” (see Ans. 6–8; see also Final
Act. 6–7).
As discussed above, each student in the system of Yaskin has a profile
that can include flags and follow-ups (i.e., an appointment or referral) based
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on the type of flag in the profile (Yaskin ¶¶ 35, 94). The system
automatically notifies the providers assigned to the particular follow-up
measure (e.g., advisors, counselors, instructor, departmental head, disability
services, writing center) (see, e.g., id. ¶ 91). Therefore, because
Yaskin discloses a process which enables the viewing, creating and
assignment of follow-ups for alerts as well as notification of relevant
personnel for the follow-ups and tracking of the follow-up created as
discussed, supra, we find one of ordinary skill in the art would
appreciate that Yaskin’s system is “displaying student alert screens enabling
users to view and assign follow-ups for the alerts,” as presently claimed.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2, 3,
and 7–10 because Appellants have not argued the separate patentability of
these claims.
Appellants’ arguments for independent claims 11, 27, and 33 are
substantially the same as those presented for claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 14–15;
see also Reply Br. 7). As such, we are similarly not persuaded by
Appellants’ arguments for the same reasons as to claim 1, supra. Therefore,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 11, 27, and 33, as
well as claims 12–14, 17–20, 28, 29, 31, and 32, which depend therein, and
are not argued separately.
We also are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the
combination of Yaskin and Jenzabar fails to disclose or suggest “wherein the
alerts are displayed along with dates of creation, users submitting the alerts
and relationships of the users to the students,” as recited by dependent claim
4 (see Appeal Br. 12).
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Instead, we agree with the Examiner that Yaskin discloses displaying
“information associated with [the] alerts including who and when created”
(Ans. 8 (citing Yaskin ¶¶ 68, 97)). In this regard, Yaskin discloses that the
information displayed can include “the provider name who raised the flag”
(id. ¶ 68) and “role display to orient each party to how the community is
helping students” (id. ¶ 98). Yaskin further discloses that an administrator is
able to “see all data collected by the system” (id. ¶ 100). Therefore, because
Yaskin discloses displaying dated information about an alert, including
when a flag was created, a provider who submitted a flag, and the
role/relationship of the users in the system (see ¶¶ 97–100), we find one of
ordinary skill in the art would appreciate that Yaskin’s system displays alerts
along with dates of creation, users submitting the alerts and relationships of
the users to the students.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
dependent claim 4.
Independent claim 21
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner has not
shown that the combination of Yaskin and Jenzabar discloses or suggests the
subject matter of independent claim 21 (see Reply Br. 6–7; see also Appeal
Br. 13–14). More particularly, Appellants argue that Yaskin fails to disclose
or suggest “the user interface including enabling users to specify a
relationship with the students, a status of attempts to contact the students,
and textual notes concerning the intervention,” as recited by independent
claim 21 (see Appeal Br. 13–14; see also Reply Br. 6).
In rejecting independent claim 21, the Examiner states “Yaskin
teaches creating intervention concerns (alerts that indicate intervention is
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needed) and [to] whom the interventions were created for to contact the
student” (Final Act. 8 (citing “the rejections of claim[s] 1 and 7”). In
response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner states Jenzabar “displays
most of the information as such it is capable of displaying any information
that is maintained by the combined systems” (Final Act. 11–12). The
Examiner further states that Yaskin and Jenzabar both “teach about
customization of information to suit the needs of the institution but fail to
explicitly teach all the information claimed” (Ans. 9). Nonetheless, the
Examiner concludes that it “would have been obvious to one skilled in the
art to combine[] all the tracked information of Jenzabar 1.0/website with
Yaskin retention management system as the combination of the invention is
simply a combination of two known processes that when combined would
have performed the same as they did separately” and that it “would have
been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time of invention to combine the
viewing of the status with the flagging of students in one interface” (Ans. 9–
10).
We agree with Appellants that “despite conceding that the specifics of
the claimed invention are not taught by the references, [the Examiner] seems
to take the position that whatever the requirements of the claim are, those
requirements would have been obvious to one skilled in the art in light of the
two applied references” (Reply Br. 6–7). What is missing from the
Examiner’s analysis is where the limitation of “the user interface including
enabling users to specify a relationship with the students, a status of attempts
to contact the students, and textual notes concerning the intervention” recited
in claim 21 can be found in the cited prior art or any specific evidence
showing why one of ordinary skill in the art would have had an adequate
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reason to modify the disclosures of Yaskin and Jenzabar to include the
specific requirements as claimed. Although we agree with the Examiner that
both cited references teach the customization and collection of a variety of
data related to student retention, intervention and follow-ups for flagged
students, the Examiner has not established how the asserted combination
addresses “the user interface including enabling users to specify a
relationship with the students, a status of attempts to contact the students,
and textual notes concerning the intervention,” as recited by independent
claim 21.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4, 7–14, 17–21, 27–29, and 31–
33 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4, 7–14, 17–20, 27–29, and 31–
33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is
reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED