Electrical Workers IBEW Local 2127 (Siemen Allis)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 7, 1984

271 N.L.R.B. 885 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

ELECTRICAL WORKES IBEW LOCAL 2127 (SIEMAN-ALLIS)
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local No. 2127 (I-T-E Electrical Products, A
Division of Siemen-Allis, Inc.) and John Rucks.
Case 10-CB-4117
7 August 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS ZIMMERMAN, HUNTER, AND
DENNIS
On 8 November 1983 Administrative Law Judge
Hutton S. Brandon issued the attached decision.
The General Counsel filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order
as modified. '
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local No. 2127, Decatur, Georgia, its of-
ficers, agents, and representatives, shall take the
action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(a) and re-
letter the subsequent paragraphs.
"(a) Make available to employees of I-T-E Elec-
trical Products, A Division of Siemen-Allis, Inc., at
all reasonable times, the grievance forms which, by
the terms of the Respondent's collective-bargaining
agreement with that Employer, are requisite in the
prosecution of employee grievances."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge.
t Consistent with the facts and the violation found, Members Zimmer-
man and Hunter will amplify the remedy, proposed by the judge, by re-
quiring that the Respondent make available to employees at all reasona-
ble times the grievance forms which, by the terms of the collective-bar-
gaining agreement, are requisite in the prosecution of grievances.
Member Dennis does not join her colleagues in ordering the Respond-
ent to make available grievance forms to employees at all reasonable
times. The Respondent violated Sec. 8(bXIXA) of the Act by threatening
to withhold grievance forms. In Member Dennis' view, it is improper for
the Board to require any affirmative action other than notice posting to
remedy such a threat.
271 NLRB No. 138
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees of I-T-E Elec-
trical Products, A Division of Siemen-Allis, Inc.,
that we will not make grievance forms available to
them and will refuse to accept or completely proc-
ess their grievance because they are not members
of our Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re-
strain or coerce employees of I-T-E Electrical
Products, A Division of Siemen-Allis, Inc., in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL make available to employees of I-T-E
Electrical Products, A Division of Siemen-Allis,
Inc., at all reasonable times, the grievance forms
which, by the terms of our collective-bargaining
agreement with that Employer, are requisite in the
prosecution of employee grievances.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL No.
2127
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HuTTON S. BRANDON, Administrative Law Judge.
This case was heard at Atlanta, Georgia, on October 3,
1981.1 The charge was filed by John Rucks, an individ-
ual (Rucks), on June 24, and the complaint issued on
August 5, alleging that International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local No. 2127 (Respondent or the
Union), violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act), by threatening employees
of I-T-E Electrical Products, A Division of Sieman-Allis,
Inc. (the Company), that the Union would not process
grievances of employees in a bargaining unit represented
by the Union unless they were members of the Union,
and by refusing to process a grievance of Rucks on and
after June 23.
The issues are essentially factual and require determi-
nation of whether the Union threatened not to process
grievances of employees because of their lack of union
membership and refused to process the grievance of
Rucks because he was not a union member.
On the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
All dates are in 1983 unless otherwise stated.
885
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Union, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Company is a Delaware corporation with offices
and places of business in Tucker, Georgia, where it is en-
gaged in the manufacture of electrical distribution equip-
ment. During the past calendar year the Company sold
and shipped finished products valued in excess of $50,000
directly to customers located outside the State of Geor-
gia. The complaint alleges, the Union admits, and I find
that the Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The complaint also alleges, the Union admits, and I
also find that the Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement
It is undisputed that the Union is the recognized col-
lective-bargaining representative of the Company's em-
ployees at certain of its locations in the Atlanta area in-
cluding its operation in Tucker, Georgia, involved
herein. The Company and the Union have been parties
to a collective-bargaining agreement for several years, in-
cluding all times material herein. Pertinent provisions of
the latest collective-bargaining agreement which has ap-
plication to the case sub judice are found under articles
X and XII involving, respectively, the grievance proce-
dure and vacations.
More specifically the provision on grievance proce-
dure defines a grievance as a "dispute between the Com-
pany and an employee or employees, or the Union,
which is reduced to writing on a form supplied by the
Union and filed for processing through the grievance
procedure." The procedure is initiated prior to reducing
the grievance to writing by presentation of a verbal com-
plaint by an employee with his steward to the employ-
ee's immediate supervisor. If the matter is not settled
within 3 workdays it is reduced to writing and signed by
the aggrieved employee. The steward and the involved
supervisor proceed to the second step of the procedure.
At that point the grievance is presented to a company
staff manager by the grievance committee consisting of
the involved steward and the aggrieved employee or
other designated union officer. "The grievance at this
step must be taken up within 2 working days and the
ruling on it by the Staff Manager must be made within 3
days." Absent resolution at this stage the grievance pro-
ceeds to step 3 within 5 days and involves a hearing with
another company official and the grievance committee
which may include at this level international representa-
tion of the Union. Failing resolution at this level the
matter may then be "considered" for final and binding
arbitration.
The provision on vacations which gives rise to the
complaint of Rucks herein is set forth at article XII, sec-
tion 4, as follows:
Vacations: The annual vacation period shall consist
of two consecutive weeks commencing the last full
week in July. All employees are assured they will
be permitted to schedule vacation during this
period. Employees will be encouraged to select al-
ternate dates by mutual consent. If sufficient em-
ployees select dates other than the vacation period,
operations will continue during the vacation period.
The selection of alternate dates will be made during
the second week of May each year. A decision will
be made by the end of May as to whether sufficient
people have selected alternate dates to allow contin-
ued operations during the vacation period. Changes
to scheduled dates will be permitted by mutual con-
sent except no changes will be allowed to the vaca-
tion period. In instances where more employees
select the same period than can be permitted to
allow for efficient operations, seniority shall prevail.
B. Rucks' Grievance and His Efforts to File It with
the Union
Pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement provi-
sion on vacaations the Company in early May solicited
from employees their individual preferred vacation dates.
Rucks, who had been employed by the Company in 1979
and who was entitled to 8 days of vacation, requested
various dates outside the annual vacation period specified
in the bargaining agreement. On May 16, the Company
posted a notice announcing that "As in the past, there
will be no vacation shutdown at the Atlanta Area Serv-
ice Center," indicating that employees would be allowed
to take their requested alternative vacation dates.
On June 21, however, Emile Castanette, operations
manager for the Company, held a meeting with employ-
ees and announced that because of business conditions
the Company would shut down the last week of July
and the first week of August. Employees were allowed
to ask questions, but the effect of the Company's action
was to revoke alternate vacation dates requested by em-
ployees and require employees to take their vacations
during the 2-week shutdown.
Castanette testified herein for the Union that the shut-
down was the first he had experienced since becoming
operations manager 2 years earlier. However, he testified
that it was his understanding that there had been previ-
ous shutdowns during the annual vacation period by the
Company in past years. Castanette explained in his testi-
mony that the Union was advised prior to the general
announcement of the shutdown, given the reasons for it,
and raised no objections to it. His testimony in this
regard was corroborated by Robbie Sparks, the union
president. In addition, Castanette explained that the same
business conditions which dictated the shutdown had
also caused the Company to lay off about 10 employees
about June 22. The Union was aware of these adverse
conditions and the layoffs and understood the shutdown
to be a device which would assist in avoiding the neces-
sity of additional layoffs. According to Castanette, the
business conditions which necessitated the shutdown
were not clear in May when the Company announced
there would be no vacation period closings.
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ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 2127 (SIEMEN-ALLIS)
Since Rucks was entitled to only 8 days of vacation
and because the shutdown would span 10 working days,
net result for him was the loss of 2 days of pay. He con-
sidered himself aggrieved because of the shutdown deci-
sion and decided to complain, contending that since he
believed enough employees had, consistent with the va-
cation provision in the bargaining agreement, selected al-
ternate vacation periods other than during the annual va-
cation period the Company could not discontinue oper-
ations during that period.
Rucks, who had joined the Union in 1981 but resigned
in November 1982, approached Earnest Thompkins, the
union steward in his area, on June 22 concerning his
complaint and asked Thompkins to go in with him to see
Ryan Garner, the Company's manufacturing manager,
about his grievance. Thompkins, Rucks testified, refused
saying that the Company was entitled to shutdown.
Later the same day, Rucks again approached Thomp-
kins and asked for a grievance form. Thompkins stated
he did not have a form and told him to get one from
Union President Sparks, also an employee of the Compa-
ny. Rucks responded that he did not think it was his re-
sponsibility to go to Sparks.
Rucks discussed the matter with Garner who told him
to file a grievance on plain paper. That evening Rucks
prepared his grievance at home and brought it to work
with him the next morning. After making copies Rucks
took a copy to Thompkins and asked him to accept it as
his grievance. Thompkins responded that Rucks had
nothing to grieve about. Rucks asked if he was refusing
to accept it. Thompkins replied that he was not and told
him to lay it on Thompkins' worktable. Rucks did so and
then left. Rucks testimony was that Thompkins did not
read the grievance, and Rucks specifically testified
Thompkins did not know or understand the details of the
grievance. He conceded, however, that Thompkins told
him he had nothing to grieve about and that the Compa-
ny was following policy in the vacation shutdown.
Rucks took another copy of the grievance to Sparks in
her work area. Sparks according to Rucks, would not
accept the grievance because it was not on the appropri-
ate grievance form. Rucks explained that Thompkins had
not had the appropriate form when Rucks had asked
him. According to Rucks, Sparks replied that she did not
feel Rucks had a right to the forms because Rucks was
not a union member and did not pay union dues. Sparks
suggested that Rucks go to Garner like he "always did."
Rucks did submit his grievance to Garner and Garner
subsequently ruled on it, denying it, and writing the fol-
lowing on the back of the grievance:
It is our understanding and opinion that the intent
of the contract language relative to vacation periods
is that employees are only guaranteed vacation
during the (2) week period commencing the last full
week of July. All other periods are by mutual con-
sent.
Business conditions appear to favor closing this year
during this period, thus, it may be necessary to
deny vacation requests for alternative periods.
Rucks did not provide the Union with a copy of Gar-
ner's ruling, nor did he make an effort to take it any fur-
ther through the grievance procedure.
Somewhat limited corroboration of Rucks' testimony
is found in the testimony of employee Michael Stewart.
Stewart stated that he observed Rucks give the written
grievance to Thompkins on the morning of June 23. Al-
though Stewart admittedly was not close enough to hear
what was said between Rucks and Thompkins, he testi-
fied that he saw Thompkins shake his head. He also saw
Rucks lay a copy of the grievance on Thompkins work
table. Stewart testified that Thompkins then pushed the
grievance off the table.
Thompkins testified that when initially asked by Rucks
to go in to talk with supervision regarding Rucks' com-
plaint, Thompkins agreed to go with Rucks bt told
Rucks to set up the meeting. However, according to
Thompkins, Rucks did not "get back with" him. Thomp-
kins admitted that Rucks asked him about a grievance
form and that Thompkins did not have one with him at
the time. Thompkins claimed he told Rucks that he
would bring one in the next day. The next day, however,
Rucks presented Thompkins with the grievance which
was written out on a plain piece of paper. Thompkins
said he told Rucks to leave it on his work table and ad-
mitted that he did not immediately read it. Thompkins
implicitly contradicted Stewart's testimony that he
pushed Rucks' grievance off the table by testifying that
he took the grievance to Sparks who asked if Rucks had
followed procedure. Sparks told Thompkins that she
would follow up on the matter and Thompkins then took
Rucks' grievance back to his work area where he put it
in a folder. The grievance remained in the folder until
after the charge was filed herein.
Sparks testified for the Union that Rucks had come to
her with his written complaint on June 23, explaining
that he wanted to file a grievance about the shutdown.
She admitted that both she had Rucks became "hostile"
and said she suggested that Rucks take the grievance
back to Thompkins and follow correct procedure. Rucks
replied that he had talked to Garner and that Garner had
said it was alright to file the grievance on the plain
paper. Sparks did not specifically deny the statement at-
tributed to her by Rucks about the availability of griev-
ance forms to nonmembers of the Union. Sparks related
she ultimately was shown a copy of Garner's response to
the grievance but that the Union was never asked to take
the matter to arbitration.
Sparks contended that the Union does process griev-
ances of nonunion member employees. In this regard the
Union presented evidence of five grievances processed
by the Union over the past 3 years which involved em-
ployees who were not members of the Union. One of
those grievances involved Rucks as a member of a group
of employees who were aggrieved by certain employer
action. At the time of that particular grievance Ruck was
not a member of the Union.
Weighing the testimony of Rucks on the one hand and
that of Sparks and Thompkins on the other, I credit
Rucks. He displayed clear recall and testified with con-
viction and apparent honest. Further, his testimony ap-
887
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pears corroborated by the record considered as a whole.
Thompkins appeared somewhat uncertain in his testimo-
ny and both he and Sparks failed to specifically deny
critical aspects of Rucks' testimony. Consequently, I
credit Rucks where his testimony contradicts that of
Thompkins and Sparks.
C. The Alleged Independent 8(b)(1)(A) Violation of
the Act
The General Counsel relied on the testimony of Stew-
art to establish the additional complaint allegation that
about July 11 the Union threatened employees by stating
that it would refuse to investigate, process, or seek ad-
justment of grievances filed by employees unless they
were members of the Union.
Stewart testified that on July 11 he heard employee
Danny Jackson, an employee who was not a union
member, ask steward Thompkins to go with him to the
office to discuss with supervision a reprimand Jackson
had received for allegedly staying too long in the rest
room. Thompkins, according to Stewart, stated that he
would go with Jackson to the office but added that "if
the matter had to be carried to the Union hall Jackson's
grievance would not be accepted because he was not a
member of the Union." Jackson thereupon told Thomp-
kins to "forget it."
Jackson, who the General Counsel stated on the
record was subpoenaed to attend the hearing but refused
to cooperate, did not testify. Thompkins testified and ad-
mitted that he had offered to go in with Jackson to talk
to supervision about Jackson's complaint. However, he
failed to specifically deny the remark attributed to him
by Stewart in regard to what would happen if Jackson's
grievance went to the union hall.2 Accordingly, I credit
Stewart who impressed me as a credible and disinterest-
ed witness.
D. Arguments and Conclusions
Briefly stated, the General Counsel argues that Re-
spondent failed and refused to process Rucks' grievance
because he was not a member of the Union and thereby
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. In support of the
claim, the General Counsel relied on Sparks' assertion to
Rucks that he had no right to the grievance forms since
Rucks was not a member and did not pay union dues. In
addition, the General Counsel argues that Thompkins'
statement to Jackson as related by Stewart not only inde-
pendently violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, but also
confirms the Union's disposition not to fully process the
grievances of nonunion employees of the Company. In
taking this position the General Counsel asserts that the
relative merit of Rucks' grievance is irrelevant and im-
material. Thus the General Counsel makes no arguments
on the merits of the grievance.
Respondent argues that Rucks' grievance had no merit
since under the collective-bargaining agreement the
Company had traditionally retained the right to shut-
down for the vacation period. Moreover, Respondent
2 It appears that approval of the union membership was required for
processing a grievance to arbitration, but the record is unclear on the
point.
argues that in this specific instance, the Union had itself
agreed to the shutdown.3 Therefore, the Union by not
processing Rucks' grievance was simply exercising its
discretion not to pursue a grievance which had no argu-
able merit.
It has been held that "[a] union must represent fairly
the interest of all the bargaining unit members during the
negotiation, admistration, and enforcement of collective-
bargaining agreements." Electrical Workers IBEW v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). Further, "a union may not ar-
bitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process in a
perfunctory fashion." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191
(1967). However
. . .so long as it exercises its discretion in good
faith and with honesty of purpose, a collective-bar-
gaining representative is endowed with a wide
range of reasonableness in the performance of its
duties for the unit it represents. Mere negligence,
poor judgment, or ineptitude in grievance handling
are insufficient to establish a breach of the duty of
fair representation. 4
A union's inaction which is so unreasonable as to be arbi-
trary constitutes a breach of its fiduciary obligations and
a violation of Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act. King Soopers,
Inc., 222 NLRB 1011 (1976).
In the case sub judice the credited testimony estab-
lishes that Thompkins refused to meet with Rucks and
Garner because, as Rucks testified, Thompkins said there
was nothing to file a grievance on and the Company was
going by the contract. Thompkins was aware of the sub-
stance of Rucks' complaint if not each detail of Rucks'
theory for Rucks conceded that he had told Thompkins
that the Company was not going by the contract in the
vacation shutdown and that Rucks "just didn't see no
way that it was possible that the two week period was
covered in the contract the way they [the company]
stated." When Rucks attempted to file the written griev-
ance, Thompkins again indicated his knowledge of the
substance of the grievance by again telling Rucks that
Rucks did not have anything to grieve about, that the
Company was going by policy. Similarly, Sparks' testi-
mony, uncontradicted by Rucks in this regard and cred-
ited, was that she told Rucks in essence that what he was
contending was that the Company could not have a 2-
week shutdown but that the Union had already agreed
that the Company could shutdown. Under these circum-
stances, I disagree with the General Counsel's assertion
at hearing that the relative merit of Rucks' grievance
was immaterial to the determination of the violation al-
leged. The relative merit of the grievance bears directly
on the arbitrariness of the Union's action or inaction. A
union may not be compelled to process a grievance that
has no arguable claim of merit. Since the Union had ac-
tually agreed with the Company's decision to shutdown
I As a matter of fact, the Company did not engaged in a complete
shutdown for vacation. It appears that a few departments remained open
during the period.
I Service Employees Local 579 (Beverly Manor Convalescent Center), 229
NLRB 692, 695 (1977).
888
ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 2127 (SIEMEN-ALLIS)
for the vacation period, an agreement which was binding
on all unit employees, both union and nonunion, Rucks'
grievance, notwithstanding his individual interpretation
of the contract, could have no arguable claim of merit. I
conclude therefore that the Union's refusal to process the
grievance was not arbitrary or unreasonable and was not
violative of the Act for that reason.
If, of course, the Union's failure or refusal to process
Rucks' grievance was based on his lack of membership in
the Union a clear violation of the Act would be estab-
lished. Teamsters Local 528 (Associated Grocers Co-op),
265 NLRB 415 (1982). Credited evidence presented
clearly establishes union animosity toward nonmembers.
Thompkins statement to Jackson as related by Stewart
reveals the Union's disposition not to fully process griev-
ances of nonmembers. And Sparks' statement to Rucks
about the unavailability of grievance forms to non-
members confirms the Union's disinclination to fulfill its
statutory obligations toward nonmembers. However, it is
to be recalled that at the time of Sparks' statement to
Rucks, Thompkins had already told Rucks that he had
no basis for a grievance and that the vacation shutdown
was in accordance with policy. Further, the Union had
already agreed with the Company regarding the appro-
priateness of the shutdown prior to any attempt by
Rucks to file a grievance on the shutdown. The Union's
agreement with the Company made in good faith was
binding upon all employees in the unit. Thus, it cannot
be said that the Union would have accepted and proc-
essed Rucks' grievance but for Rucks' lack of union
membership. Put another way, I am satisfied that the evi-
dence establishes, notwithstanding the Union's hostility
toward nonmembers, that the Union would still have re-
fused to accept and process Rucks' grievance without
regard to his lack of membership. See generally Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. as modified 662 F.2d
899 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). I
therefore find that the Union did not violate Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act as alleged in the complaint in this
regard.
The above conclusion is not dispositive of the exist-
ence of 8(b)(1)(A) violations by the Union based on the
statements of Thompkins to Jackson and Sparks to
Rucks. In each instance those statements clearly commu-
nicated to unit employees who were not members of the
Union the futility of their resort to the Union to resolve
their job related grievances. Thompkins' statement re-
flected a union disposition not to exhaust the full griev-
ance process on behalf of the nonmembers, while Sparks'
statement revealed a union disposition to not even allow
access to the grievance procedure by withholding griev-
ance forms which were, according to the implication of
Sparks' statement to Rucks, a necessary prerequisite for
initiation of the grievance process. Such statements, even
if not an accurate recitation of the Union's policies, obvi-
ously restrains and coerces employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. See
Boilermakers Local 132 (Kelso Marine), 220 NLRB 119,
121 (1975). Thus, I find that by such statements the
Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.5
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company, I-T-E Electrical Products, A Divi-
sion of Sieman-Allis, Inc. is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Respondent International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local No. 2127, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent did not violate 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by
refusing to accept and process a grievance of John
Rucks.
4. By threatening bargaining unit employees that it
would not make grievance forms available to them and
would not accept or completely process their grievances
because they were not members of the Union, Respond-
ent engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
5. The foregoing unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unlaw-
ful threats constituting unfair labor practices, I shall rec-
ommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed 6
ORDER
Respondent International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local No. 2127, Decatur, Georgia, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees of I-T-E Electrical Prod-
ucts, A Division of Sieman-Allis, Inc. that it will not
make grievance forms available to them or will not
accept or process their grievances because they are not
members of the Union.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of their rights protected by
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions which the
Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act.
s The statement of Sparks to Rucks was not alleged in the complaint as
an independent 8(bXIXA) violation. The occurrence of the statement,
however, was a significant element of the General Counsel's case and
was fully litigated. Under such circumstances, a violation of the Act may
be predicated on the statement even in the absence of a specific com-
plaint allegation. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 225 NLRB 911, 912 (1976).
6 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
889
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(a) Post at its office and meeting places frequented by
its members and employees it represents at the above
company's Tucker, Georgia facilities copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
10, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
7 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where no-
tices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dis-
missed to the extent it alleges unfair labor practices not
specifically found herein.
890