Electrical Workers IBEW Local 1547 (Veco, Inc.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 31, 1990

300 N.L.R.B. 1065 (N.L.R.B. 1990)

1065
300 NLRB No. 144
ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW 1547 (VECO, INC.)
1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied as the
record, the exceptions, and brief adequately present the issues and the posi-
tions of the parties.
2 Member Devaney does not rely on the evidence that Elliott was the only
on-site supervisor available for grievance adjustment. See Operating Engineers
Local 3 (Kasler Corp.), 298 NLRB 214 fn. 7 (1990).
3 Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to rely on that part of the judge’s
analysis which refers to a relationship between the Respondent’s organizing,
Elliott’s control of access to employees, and ‘‘collective bargaining’’ within
the meaning of Sec. 8(b)(1)(B), as set forth in the penultimate paragraph of
his ‘‘analysis and conclusions.’’
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Local 1547, AFL–CIO (Veco, Inc.) and William
Elliott. Case 19–CB–5948
December 31, 1990
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH
On July 20, 1988, Administrative Law Judge Gerald
A. Wacknov issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions to the judge’s decision, and
the General Counsel filed a brief answering the Re-
spondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions1 and brief and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and con-
clusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
As fully set forth in his decision, the judge found
that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) by
fining union member William Elliott under its ‘‘no
contract-no work’’ rule after Elliott had refused to co-
operate in the Respondent’s efforts to organize the Em-
ployer’s employees. We agree with the judge that the
finding of a violation is in accord with the principles
set forth in NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local
340 (Royal Electric), 481 U.S. 573 (1987).
In agreeing with the judge’s conclusion that Elliott
was an employer representative within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(1)(B), we rely on the parties’ stipulation
that he adjusted employee grievances. We note that
this is supported by evidence that he was the only on-
site supervisor available for grievance adjustment and
by evidence of specific instances of his resolution of
employee grievances concerning wages in relation to
the nature of work performed and grievances con-
cerning unsafe equipment and work in certain weather
conditions—types of disputes that would likely be con-
tractual grievances if a collective-bargaining agreement
was in effect.2 See, e.g., Plumbers Local 60 (ITMC
Corp.), 299 NLRB 401 (1990); Operating Engineers
Local 101 (St. Louis Bridge), 297 NLRB 485 (1989).
Further, we agree with the judge that the Respond-
ent’s efforts to organize the Employer’s employees
during the time period material to the unfair labor
practice, and particularly its admission in a document
dated April 1, 1986, that it was ‘‘presently trying to
organize’’ the Employer, establish that it was currently
seeking a collective-bargaining relationship. See NLRB
v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 340, supra, fn. 3;
Sheet Metal Workers Local 16 (Losli International),
299 NLRB 972 (1990); ITMC Corp., supra; St. Louis
Bridge, supra at 487.
In concluding that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(B) by fining Elliott, we rely on the entire
course of the Respondent’s conduct—from its state-
ments in mid-March 1986 threatening Elliott if he did
not cooperate in the Respondent’s organizing effort,
through the notice of union charges that caused El-
liott’s departure from the Employer’s work project in
mid-April, and culminating in the levy of fines against
him in June for violating the Respondent’s ‘‘no con-
tract-no work’’ rule. The Respondent’s initial threats
aimed at conscripting Elliott into assisting in the cam-
paign to organize the employees whose grievances he
would be adjusting if the campaign succeeded, coupled
with the notice to him of union charges (albeit not ex-
pressly tied to his refusal to aid the campaign), trig-
gered his departure as the Employer’s 8(b)(1)(B) rep-
resentative on that project. The fines imposed in June
were simply the final effectuation of a course of con-
duct calculated, inter alia, to exert an adverse effect on
Elliott as an adjuster of grievances from employees
whom the Respondent was seeking to represent. That
the organizational campaign had not succeeded by the
time that any of these actions occurred does not make
the Respondent’s effort lawful. In light of these cir-
cumstances, we find that the Respondent, by fining El-
liott, coerced the Employer within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B).3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers Local 1547, AFL–CIO, Anchor-
age, Alaska, its officers, agents, and representatives,
shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Ed Escamilla, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Helene Antel, Esq., of Anchorage, Alaska, General Counsel
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GERALD A. WACKNOV, Administrative Law Judge. Pursu-
ant to notice, a hearing with respect to this matter was held
before me in Anchorage, Alaska, on April 21, 1988. The ini-
tial charge was filed on September 11, 1986, by William O.
1066 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Elliott, an individual. Thereafter, on October 17, 1986, the
Regional Director for Region 19 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (the Board) issued a complaint and notice of
hearing alleging a violation by International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers Local 1547, AFL–CIO (the Respondent),
of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act).
On June 12, 1987, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation and
motion to transfer case to the Board, the Board issued an
order granting motion approving stipulation and transferring
proceedings to the Board. On November 2, 1987, the Board
issued an order rejecting stipulation and remanding to the
Regional Director, premised on the Board’s determination
that, in view of the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court’s
determination in NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local
340 (Royal Electric), 481 U.S. 573 (1987), raised issues of
fact and law which warranted a hearing before an administra-
tive law judge.
The parties were afforded a full opportunity to be heard,
to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, and to intro-
duce relevant evidence. Since the close of the hearing, briefs
have been received from the General Counsel and counsel
for Respondent.
On the entire record, and based on my observation of the
witnesses and consideration of the briefs submitted, I make
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Veco, Inc. (Veco) is a State of Alaska corporation with its
principal office and place of business in Anchorage, Alaska,
where it is engaged in the oil field construction and mainte-
nance business. Veco, in the course and conduct of its busi-
ness operations, has annual gross sales of goods and services
valued in excess of $500,000, and annually sells and ships
goods or provides services from its facilities within the State
of Alaska to customers outside the State, or sells and ships
goods or provides services to customers within the State,
which customers are themselves engaged in interstate com-
merce by other than indirect means, of a total value in excess
of $50,000. Further, Veco annually purchases and causes to
be transferred and delivered to its facilities within the State
of Alaska goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
directly from sources outside the State, or from suppliers
within the State which in turn obtained such goods and mate-
rials directly from sources outside the State.
It is admitted, and I find, that Veco is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is admitted that Respondent is, and has been at all times
material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issue
The principal issue raised by the pleadings is whether the
Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act by
fining a field superintendent for violating certain provisions
of the Respondent’s constitution and bylaws.
B. The Facts
Veco is an oil field service and construction company. It
has ongoing contracts with various employers for service and
maintenance of their facilities at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska (also
referred to as the North Slope). During 1986 Veco contracted
to perform various services for Arco, including the construc-
tion of a 7-mile overhead power line and connecting roads.
This particular project was headed by a field (or project) su-
perintendent, William O. Elliott, who was fully responsible
for ensuring, according to John Caragan, a Veco vice presi-
dent, ‘‘that the job is done on time, on schedule and under
budget.’’
Elliott, who had been a union member for 30 years, was
given full authority to obtain the equipment and tools needed
to complete the job. He testified that during his initial em-
ployment conversation with Grover Moreland, North Slope
construction manager for Veco, Elliott made it clear that one
of the conditions for accepting the job was that he be al-
lowed to select the employees.
Elliott reported to work on February 16, 1986. He person-
ally interviewed and hired about 20 employees, including 5
or 6 foremen, and, during the course of the project, fired 2
employees. He established employee classifications, set em-
ployee wages according to a company wage scale, and up-
graded employees when they merited increases. He scheduled
the progress of the job, made up the crew lists, and laid off
various employees when certain portions of the job had been
completed. Elliott reported to the project manager, stationed
at Prudhoe Bay, who primarily handled the paperwork and
came out to the jobsite only about once a month. It was El-
liott’s responsibility to resolve all employee complaints or
problems, and the parties stipulated that Elliott ‘‘acted as a
representative of the Employer in adjusting employee griev-
ances.’’
Elliott testified that in mid-March 1986, IBEW Business
Agent Jim Morgan, and another unidentified individual, came
out to the jobsite. Morgan stated that they ‘‘were going
around visiting jobs.’’ Elliott related the ensuing conversation
as follows:
A. They told me it wasn’t very union-like for me to
be working for a non-union employer. I told them that
if they wanted that employer to be union, they should
have organized it. And they asked me for a list of the
employees that I had.
Q. Again, who asked you for the list?
A. Okay. This would be the person with Jim Mor-
gan, and I still don’t know his name, so . . . .
. . . .
Q. Go ahead with that part of the conversation,
please.
A. Okay. They—well, Morgan’s partner asked me
for a list of the employees that we had on the right-
of-way working, and I told him that they were not enti-
tled to that. And they asked to speak to the employees.
And I told them they could talk to them at the man
1067ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 1547 (VECO, INC.)
1 The ‘‘man camp’’ was Arco’s main construction camp where Veco’s em-
ployees were housed for the duration of the project.
2 The job was scheduled to be completed before mid-May.
3 Unfair labor practice charges were filed by Smith (19–CA–17908), Willis
(19–CA–17862), and Prater (19–CA–17777). Based on these charges the Re-
gional Director for Region 19 issued a consolidated complaint and notice of
hearing. Thereafter on February 24, 1986, the allegations in this complaint
were adjusted in a non-Board settlement.
4 The form ‘‘organizing letter’’ signed by Business Representative/Organizer
Jim Fowler and by Randal Prater states that the Respondent has requested that
Prater go to work for Veco ‘‘as the IBEW is presently trying to organize said
company.’’ Further, under the terms of the letter, Prater agrees to cooperate
with the Union in its organizing attempt, and to contact the Respondent’s rep-
resentatives, in writing, weekly, to update them on his progress in this attempt;
to mail in weekly written reports; to refrain from resigning his employment
without permission; and to terminate his employment if advised by the Union.
5 While a written stipulation of facts states that Prater was not hired by
Veco until June 21, 1986, a verbal addendum to the stipulation by Respond-
ent’s attorney, which was agreed to by the General Counsel, is consistent with
the foregoing and appears to be accurate.
camp,1 but not on Veco’s time. And so the person that
was with Mr. Morgan got angry and told me that if I
didn’t quit working for Veco, I wouldn’t be able to
work on another IBEW project in the state.
Well, at that point, that fellow was really, really
mad, and I was starting to smile. And Mr. Morgan took
him and left.
Q. What do you mean took him and left?
A. He got him by the arm and took him and put him
in their little IBEW rig and they went away.
Q. Was there anything else that you recall being said
in that conversation?
A. Other than that I wouldn’t work in the state on
another IBEW job if I didn’t quit for Veco.
The record indicates that at the time of the foregoing con-
versation Elliott was not aware that on March 7, 1986, Wil-
liam Price, a member of Respondent, who was apparently
working for another North Slope employer, filed internal
union charges against Elliott alleging violations of Respond-
ent’s constitution for ‘‘working for Veco as a lineman.’’ The
record is clear, however, that at no time was Elliott working
with the tools of the trade as a lineman.
About a month later, in mid-April 1986, Elliott received
a message from his home in Oregon that there was a reg-
istered letter from the IBEW waiting for him. He surmised
that it was a union charge against him and immediately re-
turned home after obtaining an agreement with Veco that he
could return to the job in about 2 weeks.2 However, Elliott
never returned to the job thereafter.
On June 17, 1986, Respondent’s trial board met and heard
the charges brought by Price against Elliott. On that date it
decided that Elliott had violated certain provisions of Re-
spondent’s constitution and bylaws by working for an em-
ployer with whom Respondent did not have a collective-bar-
gaining relationship. On June 23, 1986, Respondent notified
Elliott of the decision of the trial board.
Elliott was found guilty of violating the following sub-
sections of article XXVII, section 1, of the IBEW constitu-
tion:
ARTICLE XXVII
MISCONDUCT, OFFENSES AND PENALTIES
Sec. 1. Any member may be penalized for commit-
ting any one or more of the following offenses:
(1) Violation of any provision of this Constitution
and the rules herein, or the bylaws, working agree-
ments, or rules of a L.U. [Local Union].
. . . .
(5) Engaging in any act or acts which are contrary
to the member’s responsibility toward the I.B.E.W., or
any of its L.U.’s, as an institution, or which interfere
with the performance by the I.B.E.W. or a L.U. with
its legal or contractual obligations.
(6) Working for, or on behalf of, any employer, em-
ployer-supported organization, or other union, or the
representatives of any of the foregoing, whose position
is adverse or detrimental to the I.B.E.W.
He was also found guilty of violating the following section
of the bylaws of Local Union 1547:
Sec. 12. No member shall solicit employment or hire
himself out direct to any employer without permission
of the Business Manager.
The fines against Elliott for the foregoing violations to-
taled $5000, with the understanding that $2500 of the
amount would be suspended if Elliott refrained from engag-
ing in similar violations for 1 year.
In August 1985, Respondent authorized three employees—
Gerald R. Smith, Edwin Willis, and Randal G. Prater—to or-
ganize the employees of Veco. On or about August 30, 1985,
these employees were laid off, allegedly because of their or-
ganizing activity.3
On April 1, 1986, Respondent again authorized Prater to
organize the employees of Veco, and Prater executed a form
‘‘organizing letter’’ outlining his duties and responsibilities.4
Prater sought work with Veco, apparently not on Elliott’s
project, and was hired in early June 1986. He worked for
Veco for only about 10 days at which time his organizing
efforts ceased. On June 30, 1986, James Fowler, a business
agent/organizer for Respondent, met with Prater and, appar-
ently, another employee, as part of Respondent’s efforts to
continue organizing the employees of Veco.5 However, it ap-
pears that thereafter, on about June 21, 1986, because of the
scarcity of work opportunities, both Prater and another em-
ployee were given permission to seek and maintain employ-
ment with Veco on a nonunion basis and were no longer
under a commitment to continue their organizing efforts.
Nevertheless, their assistance, although not required, contin-
ued to be solicited by Respondent, and the parties stipulated
that between June 30, 1986, and approximately April 1987,
there were no organizing efforts by the Respondent directed
at Veco. However, in approximately April 1987, the Re-
spondent did engage in a formal organizing campaign, in-
cluding the solicitation of cards. This organizing campaign
culminated in a letter in July 1987 notifying Veco of Re-
spondent’s organizing efforts.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
The Supreme Court, in Electrical Workers IBEW Local
340, supra at 595, held as follows:
Section 8(b)(1)(B) was enacted to protect the integ-
rity of the processes of grievance adjustment and col-
lective bargaining—two private dispute-resolution sys-
1068 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6 Sec. 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents—(1) to restrain or coerce . . . (B) an employer in the selection
of his representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or the ad-
justment of grievances . . . .’’
7 481 U.S. at 586.
8 Id. at 2311 and 2313.
9 Id. at 589–590.
10 While Elliott testified that he left the project and returned home ‘‘volun-
tarily,’’ it is clear that he did so because he surmised, correctly, that the cer-
tified letter awaiting him from the Respondent charged him with the offenses
for which he was subsequently fined. Further, Elliott did not quit his job pre-
maturely, as suggested by Respondent. Rather, he took a leave of absence in
order to resolve the matter with Respondent, with the intention of returning
to work. He subsequently changed his mind, however, deciding that he could
not further jeopardize his future employment opportunities and financial situa-
tion by continuing to work for Veco. Apparently, Elliott also based his deci-
sion on the fact that the job would be completed in several weeks, at which
point his employment for Veco would have ended.
11 The Respondent maintains that Business Agent Morgan did not make any
requests of Elliott during the mid-March 1986 conversation, and that therefore
the Respondent should not be held accountable for the remarks of the unidenti-
fied individual who accompanied Morgan. However, Morgan did nothing, ei-
ther during the conversation or thereafter, to disengage himself or Respondent
from the requests and statements made by the unnamed individual. Nor did
Morgan testify in this proceeding. Under the circumstances, I find that the
statements and requests of the unnamed individual are attributable to Respond-
ent. See Iron Workers Local 433 (AGC of California), 228 NLRB 1420
(1977); Teamsters Local 959 (Frontier Transportation), 248 NLRB 743, 745
(1980); University Towers, 285 NLRB 199 (1987).
tems on which the national labor laws place a high pre-
mium. Although some union discipline might
impermissibly affect the manner in which a supervisor-
member carries out Section 8(b)(1)(B) tasks or coerce
the employer in its selection of a Section 8(b)(1)(B)
representative, union discipline directed at supervisor-
members without Section 8(b)(1)(B) duties, working for
employers with whom the union neither has nor seeks
a collective-bargaining relationship, cannot and does not
adversely affect the performance of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
duties. Consequently, such union action does not coerce
the employer in its selection of Section 8(b)(1)(B) rep-
resentatives.
The question directly presented in the instant case is
whether a union restrains or coerces an employer in violation
of Section 8(b)(1)(B)6 of the Act when it fines a supervisor-
member who acts both as a representative of the employer
in adjusting grievances and, as discussed below, is asked to
assist a union that is attempting to organize the employer’s
employees, for the purported reason that the supervisor-mem-
ber is violating the union’s ‘‘no-contract-no-work’’ rule.
The parties agree that the Court in Electrical Workers
IBEW Local 340 has formulated a threefold test for deter-
mining whether a union’s discipline of a supervisor-member
violates Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act: First, the supervisor
involved must be engaged in ‘‘collective bargaining, griev-
ance adjustment, or some other closely related activity’’;7
second, the union must have a collective-bargaining relation-
ship with the employer or seek to have such a relationship
in the future;8 and third, the union’s rules or the discipline
it imposes for violating its rules must do more than ‘‘merely
diminish an employer-representative’s willingness to serve’’
in that capacity.9
The parties stipulated that Elliott ‘‘acted as a representa-
tive of the Employer in adjusting grievances.’’ Further it is
clear that Elliott was given complete authority over every
phase of the project, including labor relations, on a daily
basis, from the commencement of the project until its com-
pletion, and that he exercised this authority until such time
as the Respondent caused him to quit.10
The record shows that, in fact, Elliott did adjust employee
complaints, problems, or grievances during his tenure with
Veco. Further, in American Broadcasting v. Writers Guild,
437 U.S. 411 (1978), cited with approval by the Court in
Electrical Workers IBEW Local 340, the Supreme Court
states, at fn. 25:
It is suggested that there was insufficient proof that
the hyphenates who worked actually engaged in griev-
ance adjustment of any kind during the strike. But the
findings were to the contrary; and, in any event, there
is no question that they were authorized to do so and
were available for that purpose when and if the occa-
sion arose. Section 8(b)(1)(B) obviously can be violated
by attempting coercively to control the choice of the
employer’s representative, before, as well as after, the
representative has actually dealt with the grievance.
Further, as argued by the General Counsel, it is clear that
the Respondent identified Elliott as Veco’s representative for
purposes of obtaining permission to organize those Veco em-
ployees under Elliott’s supervision. Thus, Respondent’s rep-
resentatives11 not only reproached Elliott for working for
Veco, but simultaneously requested that he give them a list
of Veco’s employees on that project and that he grant their
request for permission to speak to the employees during
working time in furtherance of Respondent’s admitted con-
temporaneous attempt to organize all of Veco’s Prudhoe Bay
employees.
Respondent argues that the only evidence of any orga-
nizing activity is the fact that Prater’s employment by Veco
overlapped that of Elliott’s for 10 days, and that any organi-
zational activity during Elliott’s tenure was minimal and, un-
like the subsequent activity in 1987, informal. Contrary to
Respondent’s apparent assertion, it is clear that Prater was
not casually requested by Respondent to informally ascertain
the level of interest in Respondent among Veco’s nonunion
employees. Rather, prior to obtaining employment with
Veco, Prater was required to execute a very specific agree-
ment, also signed by the Respondent’s business representa-
tive, stating that ‘‘the IBEW is presently trying to organize’’
Veco, and requiring Prater to cooperate in the organizational
attempt and send in weekly written reports to update the Re-
spondent as to his progress. Moreover, Respondent’s direct
attempt to elicit Elliott’s assistance in this endeavor is be-
yond dispute. Consequently, Respondent’s argument does not
withstand scrutiny.
Respondent maintains that it is ‘‘factually irrefutable’’ that
the Respondent ‘‘had no incentive to coerce Veco’s choice
of collective-bargaining representative in fining Mr. Elliott,’’
and takes the position that its dispute with Elliott was solely
motivated by its legitimate role in policing the members’
compliance with a valid no-contract-no-work rule. Thus, ac-
cording to Respondent, its discipline of Elliott cannot be
deemed to have coerced or restrained Veco; rather, such dis-
cipline was intended to accomplish no other purpose than a
legitimate union end sanctioned by the Court in Electrical
1069ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 1547 (VECO, INC.)
12 See also Carpenters Local 14 (Kaplan Properties), 217 NLRB 202
(1975).
13 Supra, fn. 7.
14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objec-
tions to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of ap-
peals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor
Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.’’
Workers IBEW Local 340, namely, merely to diminish El-
liott’s willingness to continue in Veco’s employ.12
Contrary to Respondent’s contention, the record evidence
demonstrates otherwise. It is significant that Elliott’s testi-
mony stands unrebutted and that the focus of the conversa-
tion between Elliott and the two union representatives was
organizational in nature. Thus, Elliott, Veco’s highest field
representative, was first implicitly threatened with discipline,
and concomitantly was asked to accede to Respondent’s two-
fold request, namely, to give the representatives a list of em-
ployees, and to permit the representatives to speak to the em-
ployees while they were working in the field. When Elliott
refused, the unidentified representative became ‘‘angry’’ and
‘‘really, really mad,’’ at which point he told Elliott that if
he did not quit, he would never work on another IBEW
project in the State. Under the circumstances, Elliott could
have reasonably surmised that the threat was a direct result
of his refusal to cooperate with the representatives, and that
he could preclude any adverse repercussions by compro-
mising his position as field superintendent and assisting the
Respondent in its organizational activities. Moreover, in the
absence of any contrary evidence, I find that a preponderance
of the record evidence substantiates this very intent, particu-
larly in view of the fact that, within a short time after Re-
spondent’s request to Elliott, Respondent permitted its mem-
ber, Prater, to work for Veco provided he actively attempt
to organize Veco’s nonunion employees on behalf of the Re-
spondent. Had Elliott not refused to cooperate with the rep-
resentatives, it is fair to assume, under the circumstances,
that Elliott would have been accorded the same ‘‘waiver’’
from the application of Respondent’s constitution and bylaws
as Prater.
Thus, from the foregoing, I conclude that the record does
demonstrate that Respondent’s dispute with Elliott was not
limited solely to Elliott’s obligations as a member of Re-
spondent, but rather was directly related to Elliott’s role as
a supervisor who adjusted grievances and, more importantly
under the circumstances, possessed and exercised the author-
ity to make decisions which involve, as the General Counsel
maintains, ‘‘the vital incipient stages of collective bar-
gaining—the organizational campaign.’’ Clearly, organiza-
tional activity is a necessary predicate to collective bar-
gaining, and Elliott, in denying Respondent access to Veco’s
employees, was exercising 8(b)(1)(B) authority within the pa-
rameters of the Court’s criterion that the supervisor be en-
gaged in ‘‘collective bargaining, grievance adjustment, or
some other closely related activity.’’13
On the basis of the foregoing, I find that by fining Elliott
the Respondent has coerced and restrained Veco in the selec-
tion of Veco’s representative for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act, as alleged. Electrical Workers
IBEW Local 340, supra; American Broadcasting Co. v. Writ-
ers Guild, supra; San Francisco-Oakland Mailers Union No.
18 (Northwest Publications), 172 NLRB 2173 (1968).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Veco is, and has been at all times material, an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is, and has been at all times material,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. William O. Elliott has been, at all times material, a rep-
resentative of an employer, Veco, for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.
4. The Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act by re-
straining and coercing an employer in the selection of its rep-
resentatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances by levying a fine against William
O. Elliott.
6. The unfair labor practices described above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Since I have found that the Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B)
of the Act, I shall recommend to the Board that the Respond-
ent be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in such un-
fair labor practices. I shall also recommend to the Board that
the Respondent be ordered to take certain affirmative action
in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record in this case, I issue the following rec-
ommended14
ORDER
The Respondent, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers Local 1547, AFL–CIO, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Restraining and coercing an employer, Veco, in the se-
lection of its representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances by levying a fine
against William O. Elliott.
(b) In any like or related matter restraining or coercing
Veco in the selection of its representatives for the purposes
of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the fine levied against William O. Elliott and
expunge from Respondent’s records all the documents relat-
ing to the internal union charge, trial, and fine.
(b) Notify in writing both Veco and William O. Elliott that
the Respondent has taken the foregoing action.
(c) Post at its office in Anchorage, Alaska, copies of the
attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’15 Copies of the notice,
1070 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tives, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to mem-
bers are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
to insure those notices are not altered, defaced or covered by
any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of of this Order what steps have been taken
to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of The United States Government
WE WILL NOT restrain and coerce an employer, Veco, in
the selection of its representatives for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining or the adjustment of grievances by levying a
fine against Field Superintendent William O. Elliott.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related matter restrain or co-
erce Veco in the selection of its representatives for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining or the adjustment of griev-
ances.
WE WILL rescind the fine levied against William O. Elliott
and WE WILL expunge from our records all the documents re-
lating to the internal union charge, trial, and fine.
WE WILL notify in writing both Veco and William O. El-
liott that we have taken the foregoing action.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELEC-
TRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 1547, AFL–CIO