Electric Wiring, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 29, 1971

193 N.L.R.B. 1059 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

ELECTRIC WIRING, INC. 1059
Electric Wiring, Inc. and International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 379. Case
11-CA-4301
October 29, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On April 12, 1971, Trial Examiner Benjamin K.
Blackburn issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not
engaged in the unfair labor practice conduct alleged
in the complaint and recommending that the com-
plaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the
attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the
General Counsel filed exceptions to the Decision and
a supporting brief and the Respondent filed cross-
exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, the
cross-exceptions, and the entire record in the case,
and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
It is ordered that the complaint herein be, and it
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
to herein as the Charging Party or the Union , filed an unfair
labor practice charge against each company . On September
2 the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board , by the Regional Director for Region II (Winston-
Salem , North Carolina), issued complaint in this case.
Respondent's answer , duly filed, admitted certain allega-
tions of the complaint and denied others , including the
allegation that it had committed any unfair labor practices.
All four cases were originally assigned to Trial Examiner
John Gregg . Gregg , after hearing Case I1-CA-4299 and
Case 11-CA-4302, opened the hearing in Case
I 1-CA-4300 on December 9, then recessed without taking
any testimony . Subsequently , this case and Case
I 1-CA- 4300 were reassigned to me . I opened the hearing in
this case on January 5, 1971. Thus, the hearing in this case
was held in Hickory, pursuant to due notice , before me on
January 5, 27, and 28 , 1971. The issues litigated were (1)
whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union
when it had committed no independent unfair labor
practices , and (2) whether a strike in which Respondent's
employees engaged in concert with the employees of
Industrial , Hickory, and United was an unfair labor
practice strike . All parties appeared and were given full
opportunity to participate , to adduce relevant evidence, to
examine and cross -examine witnesses , to argue orally, and
to file briefs . Upon the entire record , including briefs filed
by the General Counsel and Respondent , and from my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying under oath, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, a corporation with its office and principal
place of business in Hickory, North Carolina, is engaged in
the business of electrical contracting. During the 12 months
dust prior to issuance of the complaint herein, it performed
services valued in excess of $50,000 for enterprises each of
which, in the same time period, shipped its products valued
in excess of $50,000 directly from the State in which it is
located to customers located in other States. On the basis of
these admitted facts, I find that Respondent is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
BENJAMIN K. BLACKBURN, Trial Examiner: This is the
fourth, in the order in which they were tried, of four
companion cases in which the respondents are electrical
contractors located in Hickory, North Carolina. The other
three involve Industrial Electric Company, Case
11-CA--4299; Hickory Electric Company, Case
I1-CA-4302; and United Electric Company, Case
I I-CA- 4300. Industrial Electric Company is referred to
herein as Industrial; Hickory Electric Company, as
Hickory; United Electric Company, as United; and
Electric Wiring, Inc.,' as Respondent or Electric. All four
cases began on 3-aly 1, 1970,2 when International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 379, referred
' Name as amended at hearing
z Dates are 1970 unless otherwise indicated
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
the Charging Party is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
1. The relationship of the four cases
The Union began a campaign to organize Hickory
electrical contractors around June 1 . The first meeting was
193 NLRB No. 166
1060 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
held on June 16. Employees of Electric, Industrial, Hickory,
and United attended. Some, if not all, of them signed
authorization cards. Other employees signed cards at other
times and under other circumstances.
On June 25, S. Eugene Ruff, the Union's business
manager, sent identical certified letters to Electric,
Industrial, Hickory, and United claiming to represent each
company's employees and requesting recognition as their
collective-bargaining representative. On June 26 each
company refused to accept delivery of the letter addressed
to it. On June 27 each letter was returned unopened to Ruff.
The Union held a meeting on the evening of June 28.
Employees of all four companies attended. After a
discussion of the companies' refusal to accept the Union's
demand letters and terminations of employees which had
taken place around the same time at Industrial and
Hickory, a motion to strike was made by Ronald Coffey, an
employee of United. It was seconded by Edgar Elmore, an
employee of Electric. The vote was taken by show of hands.
It was unanimous in favor of striking.
The Union held a meeting on the evening of June 30.
Ruff instructed the employees on how to conduct
themselves on a picket line. Picket signs were prepared.
There was no discussion of the fact that Coffey and Ronnie
White had been discharged that day by United for
engaging in union activities.
On the morning of July 1 pickets appeared at the office of
each company and at various jobsites where the companies
were engaged in projects. The strike has not yet ended.
On August 31 the Union's attorney wrote to each
company. He alluded to the Union's letter of June 25 and
reasserted the Union's representation of a majority of that
company's employees. He demanded recognition.
On September I 1 each company sent an identical letter to
the Union's attorney acknowledging receipt of his August
31 letter, asserting that it was the company's first notice of
the Union's demand, stating that it doubted the Union's
claim to represent a majority, suggesting an amicable Labor
Board election as the best method of resolving the dispute,
and refering the Union's attorney to its attorneys, who were
the same for each company.
On September 21 the Union's attorney wrote to each
company. He pointed out that the four letters he had
received were identical and concluded that they had been
written by company counsel. He took issue with each
company's assertion that it had no knowledge of the
Union's claim to represent its employees prior to his letter
of August 31. He pointed to the strike as obvious proof of
the employees' support of the Union. He expressed his
regret at the company's seeking to prevent its employees
from enjoying union representation.
On October 1 the law firm representing all four
companies sent identical letters to the Union's attorney on
behalf of each company. These letters chided the Union's
attorney for communicating directly with the law firm's
clients despite the wording of the September 11 letters,
continued the argument over whether Ruff's June 25 letters
constituted a legal demand for recognition, reasserted each
company's doubt of the Union's majority, and renewed the
suggestion of an election.
Neither the Union nor the management of any of the four
companies has filed a petition for a Labor Board
representation election.
2. What happened at Electric
Harper Huffman, Electric's vice president, held a meeting
of Electric's employees in the shop around June 26. He told
the men they did not need an outsider to represent them,
predicted factories in the area would stop utilizing Electric's
services if it went union, and argued Electric could not
afford to pay union wages. On July 3 he spoke to various
pickets at different locations. In these conversations, he
inquired what their gripes were and what it would take to
get them to return to work, suggested Respondent and its
employees might be able to get along better without the
Union as a middleman, listened to their complaint he had
violated their legal rights by refusing to accept the Union's
letter of June 25, told them he had done so on the advice of
his lawyer,3 listened to their suggestion he resolve the
dispute by talking to Ruff, and responded Ruff should talk
to his lawyer because he had as much right to representa-
tion as they did.
On August 2, Ruff telephoned Huffman at his home.
Ruff told Huffman he thought Huffman had been
misinformed about the Union, it was not out to break
Electric financially. He asked Huffman why Huffman did
not just go ahead and sign a contract. Huffman replied he
did not believe the Union represented a majority of his
employees. Ruff pointed out that the number of Electric's
employees who had gone out on strike demonstrated the
Union's majority. Huffman replied "Well, let's have a vote
and prove it."
B. Analysis and Conclusions
1. The refusal to bargain
The only unfair labor practice alleged in the complaint in
this case is Electric's refusal, since on or about June 25, to
recognize and bargain collectively with the Union. There is
no allegation that Electric violated Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act or that it committed any independent violation of
Section 8(a)(1). I agree with the General Counsel that
nothing said by Huffman in the meeting in the shop around
June 26 or to the pickets on July 3 restrained or coerced
employees, or interfered with their Section 7 rights, and
thus did not constitute violations of the Act.
The key issue is whether, on the facts presented, Electric
should be required to bargain with the Union. The parts of
the General Counsel's brief which bear on this issue read:
Following [N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575] the Board has . . . found violations of Section
8(a)(5) in the absence of independent violations of the
Act. See Wilder Manufacturing Co., Inc., 185 NLRB No.
3 The only conflict between Huffman's testimony and the testimony of conferred with a lawyer at 9 p.m on June 26 , after the letter had been
the General Counsel's witnesses about these various conversations relates returned . Nevertheless , I credit the General Counsel's witnesses over
to this point Huffman said he told the pickets he returned the letter Huffman as to what Huffman said to them about his motive for returning
because he was afraid it contained authorization cards the sight of which the letter
might get him into legal trouble I credit Huffman's testimony that he first
ELECTRIC WIRING, INC.
76 and Pacific Abrasive Supply Co, 182 NLRB No. 48.
Although in these latter cases, the Board has not
rationalized its findings in terms of "good-faith doubt"
about majority, Counsel for the General Counsel notes
that in Pacific Abrasive, the Board stated: "We find on
these facts that `any bona fide dispute as to the existence
of the required majority of eligible employees' which
might have existed at the time the Union made its
demand upon Respondent was dissipated.. . .
(Emphasis supplied.) It is at least an open question
whether Gissel has finally eliminated considerations of
"good faith doubt" from 8(a)(5) cases, at least where no
independent unfair labor practices are committed and
the question is one of the employer's knowledge of union
majority. Thus in the instant cases (where a majority
exists) Counsel for General Counsel would contend that
even in the absence of independent violations, a
bargaining order is warranted based upon (1) The
Employer' s return of the Union's demand letter
unopened, (2) The Union's card majority, and (3) The
existence of a majority as evidenced to the Employer by
an employee strike.
Section 8(a)(5) is a congressional mandate to bargain
with the "representatives of his employees." That
mandate cannot be evaded by refusing letters and
information about bargaining demands, the identity of
the representative or other matters that lead to a duty to
bargain.
* * *
The Supreme Court, in [I.L.G.W.U. v. N.L.R.B., 366
U.S. 7311, contemplated a situation where the Employer
behaves like a reasonable man and suggested that he
had nothing to fear if he did so. This is exactly what the
Employer in this case has not done vis-a-vis the
representation rights of his employees. Under the
principles of Wilder and Pacific Abrasives, supra, a
bargaining order is here required to remedy this
Respondent's evasive refusal to bargain with the
majority representative of his employees.
The answer to this issue is found in Wilder Manufactur-
ing, cited by the General Counsel, supra There the Board
originally held that the respondent had not violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. However, on remand from the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, it
reversed itself. In doing so, it said, in pertinent part:
We are left, however, with another issue suggested by
the court's reference to the Gissel opinion, and have
found it necessary to pursue upon this remand the
further question of whether, recognizing that there are
no independent unfair labor practices involved, the
facts here require a conclusion that this Employer knew
that a majority of his employees supported the Union
and nevertheless refused to bargain. A finding of such
knowledge would, of course, have to be predicated upon
more than the mere presentation of authorization cards
in a number sufficient to indicate a majority inasmuch
as the Supreme Court has given tacit approval to the
principle that an employer may reject a card showing
1061
and insist upon an election. We do not believe, however,
that it has yet been made clear whether a violation of
8(a)(5) will be found if the record contains ( 1) evidence
in addition to mere cards sufficient to communicate to
the employer convincing knowledge of majority status,
and (2) insufficient evidence that the employer's refusal
to grant recognition was based upon a genuine
willingness to resolve any doubts concerning majority
status through the Board's election processes.
In the instant case, the record demonstrates not only
that 11 out of the 18 production and maintenance
employees had signed authorization cards, but also that
all of the card signers dramatically evidenced their
support for the Union by actively participating in a
picket line and in a strike, and, furthermore, that an
officer of the Respondent conceded in his testimony
that he told his fellow officers that the Union "had 10 or
11" of the employees.
Upon this record we are compelled to find that the
Employer did have knowledge that a majority of his
employees supported the Union. We also do not find
any facts in the record which evidence a genuine
willingness, on the part of the Respondent, to resolve
any lingering doubts which might have remained as to
majority status by resort to the Board's election
procedures. The Employer did not itself file an election
petition or urge or even suggest to the employees or the
Union the use of such procedures, nor did it at any time
indicate a willingness to participate in a representation
proceeding, wherein any unit question, as well as any
issue of majority status could have been resolved in an
orderly manner. In the interest of encouraging all
parties to avail themselves of our election procedures,
we would not be inclined to enter a bargaining order if,
absent independent unfair labor practices, the record
supported a finding that the Respondent had in good
faith indicated a willingness to utilize those procedures,
since, as the Supreme Court has said, a Board-
conducted election is indeed the "preferred route" for
determining employee desires.
On this record, however, where there is substantial
evidence to demonstrate employer knowledge of
majority status and no evidence demonstrating a
willingness or desire on the part of the Employer to
resolve any doubt which it may have entertained
through the election process, we must conclude that the
refusal to bargain constituted a violation of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act and that a bargaining order is, here,
an appropriate remedy.
See also United Packing Company of Iowa, Inc., 187 NLRB
No. 132.
Here, Huffman and his attorneys consistently took the
position that the issue of whether the Union did, in fact,
represent a majority of Electric's employees should be
resolved through an amicable Labor Board election. Thus
there is evidence in the record of Respondent' s genuine
willingness to utilize those procedures which the Supreme
Court has called the "preferred route" for determining
employee desires. Therefore, since Respondent committed
no independent unfair labor practices, I find that it has not
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to
1062 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
accept delivery of the Union's June 25 letter demanding
recognition and thereafter refusing to recognize and
bargain with the Union.
2. Related issues
This record does contain substantial evidence to
demonstrate Respondent's knowledge of the Union's
majority status. Several issues relating to the prerequisites
to bargaining were hotly contested at the hearing. Strictly
speaking, in view of my finding that Respondent was
genuinely willing to go to a Board election, I do not reach
any of these issues. However, I am mindful of the fact that
mine is not the last work in this case. Therefore, I now turn
to those related issues.
a. The supervisor issue
Respondent contends that six of the electricians em-
ployed by Electric just prior to the strike were supervisors
within the meaning of the Act. They are Wayne Bowman,
Douglas Hollar, Clyde Keller, Howard Poovey, Glenn
Ragan, and Maurice Robinson.4 All are considered by
Huffman to be "superintendents" or "job foremen" in the
sense that he places them "in charge of" building and
construction projects on which Electric is the electrical
subcontractor.
This same issue arose in Industrial Electric Company,
Case I 1-CA-4299, in which Trial Examiner John Gregg's
Decision (TXD-54-71) issued on February 8, 1971, and in
United Electric Company, Case 11-CA-4300, in which I
have today issued my Decision (TXD-185-71). Reduced to
its simplest terms, the question posed is whether electricians
whose primary responsibility on a project is to deal with
such persons as the general contractor's superintendent on
behalf of the electrical subcontractor and who tell other
electricians on the project what to do next and how to do it,
to whatever limited extent such directions are necessary, are
required to exercise independent judgment in the Section
2(11) sense of that phrase. Trial Examiner Gregg ruled, on
the basis of the record made before him in Industrial, that
they are. In United, I ruled, on the basis of the record made
before me in that case as well as this one, that they are not.
The testimony in this record relating specifically to the way
Electric operates requires no different conclusion. Like
United, Electric designated one man to be "in charge of" a
particular project and pointed him out to general
contractors' superintendents and similar interested persons
as its "superintendent" or "job foreman." But, as with
United, the leadership which those men had to give to other
employees on the job, as distinguished from the judgment
they might have to employ in dealing with technical
problems raised by those over Electric on the project, did
not rise above the routine level. Therefore, none of the six
men Respondent contends are supervisors within the
meaning of the Act can be so found on the ground that they
responsibly directed the work of others.
However, this record does contain clear and uncontro-
verted evidence that Douglas Hollar and Glenn Ragan
effectively recommended the hiring of employees. At the
time the strike began, Ragan was in charge of Electric's part
of the construction of a new dormitory at Appalachian
State University in Boone, North Carolina. Boone is 50
miles from Hickory. Because of the distance involved,
Ragan and the other men working on that job did not
report to Electric's shop in Hickory each morning as did the
men working on jobs closer to Hickory. Instead, they
reported directly to the jobsite in Boone. Several men
applied for jobs at Boone. Ragan called Huffman in
Hickory and got his permission to hire them. In each case,
Huffman approved Ragan's decision to hire without any
further independent investigation of the applicant's qualifi-
cations. At the same time, Hollar was in charge of the
Alexander County High School job, about 20 miles from
Hickory. Here, most of the time, the men also reported
directly to the job in the morning. Hollar's experience with
applicants for jobs at the site was similar to Ragan's. On the
basis of this evidence, I find that Douglas Hollar and Glenn
Ragan were supervisors within the meaning of the Act at all
times relevant herein. There is no evidence that Bowman,
Keller, Poovey, or Robinson ever, hired or effectively
recommended hiring of employees for Electric.
As in United, the only other evidence bearing on the
authority of these men relates to whether they could
effectively recommend pay raises for those who worked
with them. Ragan and Hollar made such recommendations
which were granted. Maurice Robinson testified that he
recommended a raise for Glenn Herman, a rank-and-file
employee, but did not know whether it had been granted. I
credit Huffman's testimony that he granted two raises to
Herman because Robinson recommended them and
without making any independent investigation of whether
Herman was entitled to them. However, Huffman's
testimony on direct examination on this point was:
Q. Before you granted the raise, did you conduct
any investigation other than talking to Mr. Robinson?
A. No.
Q. Were there any other foremen you can recall
that recommended wage increases for employees?
A. Well, Doug Hollar's done it on other occasions,
but Glenn Herman has recommended people for raises.
I conclude, from the latter answer, that recommending
other employees for raises is not, alone, a sufficient basis
for concluding that Robinson was a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act. There is no evidence that Bowman,
Keller, or Poovey ever effectively recommended raises for
employees. Therefore, I find that Wayne Bowman, Clyde
Keller, Howard Poovey, and Maurice Robinson were not
supervisors within the meaning of the Act and should be
included in the unit.
Respondent also contends that Paul Welch should be
excluded from the unit as a managerial employee. At the
time of the strike, Welch was working for Electric under an
arrangement whereby he was to solicit work wiring new
houses and perform it on Electric's behalf. He had obtained
only one such contract for Electric. When he was not
working on that contract, he worked on Electric's other
projects in the same way and under the same conditions as
Electric's other employees. This slight distinction is not
4 Huffman also included Walter Hunnicutt in this group However,
Respondent 's brief distinguishes Hunnicutt from the others and,
apparently, abandons the position that he should not be included in the
unit.
ELECTRIC WIRING, INC. 1063
sufficient to disrupt Welch's community of interest with
Electric's other employees in their mutual terms and
conditions of employment and to identify his interest with
those of Huffman, Electric's management. I find that Paul
Welch was not a managerial employee and should be
included in the unit.
b. The Union's majority
On June 25 Respondent employed 25 nonsupervisory
electricians ,5 Larry Ball, Richard Bowman, Wayne Bow-
man, Roger Church, Reginald Cikanek, Stephen Danner,
Edgar Elmore, Glenn Herman, Walter Hunnicutt, John
Jaynes, Clyde Keller, Ray Keller, Benny Lail, Glenn Main,
Joseph Moretz, Raymer Morgan, Kenneth Moyer, Howard
Poovey, Maurice Robinson, William Rogers, Gwyn Spann,
Danny Starnes, Leonard Teague, Blaine Ward, and Paul
Welch. On that day, when Ruff mailed a letter to Electric
requesting recognition, he had in his possession valid cards
signed by Ball, both Bowmans, Elmore, Herman, Ray
Keller, Lail, Morgan, Poovey, Robinson, Spann, Starnes,
Teague, Ward, and Welch6 authorizing the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers to represent them for
purposes of collective bargaining with their employer.
Therefore, at the time of the Union' s initial demand for
recognition, it represented 15 of Electric's 25 employees in
an appropriate unit.
On June 30, Electric hired Johnny Brown. On the
morning of July 1, when the strike began, Brown, Church,
Main, Moretz, and Rogers 7 signed similar cards. Therefore,
on July 1 the Union represented 20 of Electric's 26
employees in an appropriate unit.
Brown, Church, Main, and Moretz all signed in a group
at the Appalachian State University project in Boone as
they were preparing to set up a picket line there. Glenn
Ragan , their supervisor, signed a card for the Union at the
same time. I find that Ragan's participation in union
activities to this extent at this time and under these
circumstances is not sufficient to taint any of the cards held
by the Union.
The 20 unit employees who signed cards for the Union
and Ragan struck Electric on the morning of July 1. The six
unit employees who did notioin in the strike were Cikanek,
Danner, Hunnicutt, Jaynes, Clyde Keller, and Moyer.
Douglas Hollar, the other supervisor, did notjoin the strike.
He quit Electric's employ on July 29 and, sometime
thereafter, signed a card for the Union.
Huffman visited the picket lines set up by the Union from
time to time . He was aware that a majority of his employees
had demonstrated, by participating in the strike, their
support for the Union and desire to have it represent them
for purposes of collective bargaining with him.
c. The Union's demand
While its brief in this case is silent on the point,
5 Harper Huffman and his father , George Huffman , who is semiretired,
run the business On June 25 Electric employed only three other persons,
electricians Douglas Hollar and Glenn Ragan, found to be supervisors
above, and Eva Williams, an office clerical employee I find a unit
composed of all Electric's employees other than office clericals, guards,
and supervisors within the meaning of the Act appropriate for collective
bargaining Electric employs no guards
Respondent challenged the sufficiency of Ruff's June 25
letter as a legal demand for recognition in United and,
apparently, in Industrial and Hickory Electric Company,
Case 11-CA-4302, in which Trial Examiner Gregg's
Decision (TXD-129-71) issued on March 9, 1971. It argued
that the letter was an equivocal demand in that it was
couched in terms of an all-employee unit without specifying
any exclusions. The all-employee unit for which Ruff
demanded recognition on June 25 was an appropriate one
for collective bargaining. Respondent employed no guards,
only one office clerical, and only two supervisors. Ruff's
failure to mention those magic words as types of employees
who would obviously be excluded from a bargaining unit at
Electric under common and well-known Board principles is
a minor deviation from the unit description found
appropriate in footnote 5, above, and not significant
enough to render the demand legally insufficient.
Respondent also relied on the fact that it did not accept
and read the letter on June 26. Huffman's motive for
refusing it is irrelevant. It was enclosed in an envelope
clearly marked as coming from "International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, Local Union 379, 2121 Common-
wealth Ave., Room 101, Charlotte, N.C. 28205." When
Huffman rejected the letter, he rejected the Union's
demand for recognition in a unit appropriate for collective
bargaining at a time when the Union represented a majority
of the employees in that unit.
3. The nature of the strike
Employees of Electric, Industrial, Hickory, and United
voted to strike on June 28 because all four companies had
refused delivery of the Union's demand letters and because
two of them, Industrial and Hickory, had discharged
employees. I have found in United and Trial Examiner
Gregg has found in Industrial and Hickory that the strike
was caused by the unfair labor practices of those three
companies. Therefore, the strike in which Electric's 20
employees have participated since July 1 is, by definition,
an unfair labor practice strike. However, Electric's mere
refusal to accept the Union's demand letter on June 26 did
not constitute an unfair labor practice, as found herein.
Therefore, I am precluded from including in this Decision
any remedy for Electric's employees if and when they apply
for reinstatement and are turned down by Electric. St.
Louis Cordage Mills, Division of American Manufacturing
Company, Inc., 188 NLRB No. 48.
I am aware of no case in which the question of whether
the special protections afforded unfair labor practice
strikers under the Act extend to those who strike their
employer because of the unfair labor practices of another
employer. If such a case ultimately arises at Electric, it
should be an interesting one.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and on the entire
record in this case, I make the following:
6 The cards signed by Ball, Lail, Morgan, and Starnes are undated. I
find, on the basis of other evidence in the record, that all were , in fact,
signed prior to June 25
r I credit Rogers' testimony that he signed a card for the Union around
June 16 at his home but neglected to deliver it to the Union, then signed
the undated card bearing his signature which is in the record on the day
the stoke began.
1064 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Electric Wiring, Inc., is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local Union No. 379, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The allegation of the complaint that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to
recognize and bargain with the Union as the collective-
bargaining representative of its employees since on or
about June 25, 1970, has not been sustained.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.