0120092449
08-18-2011
Eileen Y. Smith, Complainant, v. Tom J. Vilsack, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services), Agency.
Eileen Y. Smith,
Complainant,
v.
Tom J. Vilsack,
Secretary,
Department of Agriculture,
(Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120092449
Hearing No. 550-2008-000-70X
Agency No. APHIS-2006-02480
DECISION
On May 20, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s April
21, 2009, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e
et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to
29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission
AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the EEOC Administrative Judge properly issued a decision
without a hearing.
2. Whether Complainant established that the Agency discriminated against
her on the bases of race, sex, and retaliation for prior protected
EEO activity.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant
worked as a Program Director for the California Cooperative Fruit Fly
Preventative Release Program (PRP) at the Agency’s Los Alamitos
facility in California. PRP was a fruit fly eradication program
managed jointly by the USDA, Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ),
and the State of California, Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA).
The State and Federal components were equal partners who were supposed to
work cooperatively, but there were on-going disputes between Complainant
and various managers at the CDFA. Complainant characterized many of
these disputes as harassment. Examples included a CDFA manager (M1)
putting his finger in her face; a different manager (M2) demanding she
apologize to M1; a third manager (M3) stalking and accosting her in
a dark parking lot;1 and a final manager (M4) attacking and verbally
threatening her for 15 minutes at a mediation meeting in March 2006.
Complainant informed her supervisor (S1) of all of these incidents along
with all subsequent disputes between her and the CDFA managers. All the
individuals Complainant accused of harassment were employed by the State
of California, and no Federal employee had authority to take any direct
personnel action against a State employee. S1 brought the incidents to
the attention of the CDFA management, leading to the transfer of M2.
Federal and State management officials ultimately held a series of
mediation sessions due to the ongoing problems. Complainant and M4,
the two employees primarily involved in the disputes, were reassigned
out of the program.
Complainant applied for the position of Assistant State Plant Health
Director (ASPHD) in March 2006. The ASPHD needed to work cooperatively
with State of California Plant Regulatory Officials and was responsible
for issues dealing with the CDFA. S1 and a panel member (P1), with
an EEO observer present, conducted interviews and rated candidates.
Complainant received 14.5 points from both S1 and P1 while the selectee
received 24 and 23 points respectively.
Complainant applied for the position of Sterile Insect Technique (SIT)
Program Director in November 2006. The position was a part of the PRP and
was the position Complainant had previously been reassigned from. S1 and
a panel of two other individuals (P2, P3) rated the applications and,
in the presence of an EEO observer, conducted interviews. Complainant
received an aggregate score of 76 and the selectee received an aggregate
score of 84.8.
Formal Complaint and AJ Decision Without a Hearing
On November 22, 2006, Complainant filed an EEO complaint (Agency
No. APHIS-2006-02480) alleging that the Agency discriminated against her
on the bases of race (Caucasian), sex (female), and reprisal for prior
protected EEO activity under Title VII when:
1. Management failed to resolve and investigate reported stalking,
abuse of power, intimidation, and physical and verbal assaults directed
toward her;
2. On July 13, 2006, she was verbally notified of her directed
reassignment from the Program Director position for the PRP to a Regional
Program Manager position;
3. On August 11, 2006, she learned that she was not selected for the
GS-14 ASPHD position, advertised under vacancy number 677-2006-0237; and
On November 1, 2007, the AJ consolidated Agency Complaint
No. APHIS-2006-02480 with the following issue from Agency Complaint
No. APHIS-2007-00572:2
4. On April 7, 2007, she was not selected for the GS-12/13 SIT Program
Director position, advertised under vacancy numbers 6PQ-2007-0029 and
24PQ-2007-0049.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant
with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right
to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).
Complainant timely requested a hearing. The Agency filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment on March 3, 2008. Complainant filed a Motion
in Opposition on March 28, 2008. The AJ issued a Notice of Intention
to grant the Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Notice) on April
4, 2008. The AJ issued a decision without a hearing on March 13, 2009.
The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding
that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to
discrimination as alleged.
Concerning claim 1, the AJ found that the disputes mentioned in the
complaint were disagreements over operations and personal style,
and that the individuals accused of harassment were employees of the
State of California, whom S1 did not have control or authority over.
The AJ found that S1 did take a number of actions to address the issues
Complainant raised, but noted that there was no success from the efforts
of S1 and State officials to mediate the issues.
Concerning claim 2, the AJ found that the Agency offered legitimate,
non-discriminatory for its actions; specifically, State and Federal
officials felt that the reassignment of both Complainant and M4 was
the only way to resolve the ongoing disputes. The AJ found that the
other reassigned individual was a male and that there was no evidence
from which the fact-finder could infer that Complainant’s race was a
factor in the decision.
Concerning claim 3, the AJ found that Complainant failed to establish a
prima facie case. The AJ found that the selectee was also a Caucasian
female and would be required to work with personnel in the PRP - the
program from which Complainant had just been reassigned because she and
the State managers could not work together.
Concerning claim 4, the AJ found that Complainant established a prima
facie case with regard to sex and reprisal. The AJ then found that
the Agency articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
actions; namely, the individual who scored highest in the application
process was selected. Although Complainant alleged that the panel members
were biased because they were aware of her prior EEO activity and her
issues in dealing with the CDFA, the AJ found that those individuals
might appropriately consider her history with the CDFA in their evaluation
because the position required cooperation with the CDFA.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Complainant
On appeal, Complainant contended that the AJ erred in interpreting the
facts, failed to properly apply the law, ignored the issues that existed,
and improperly denied her a hearing. Concerning her complaint in general,
Complainant contended that the AJ could not have sufficiently analyzed
her claims because the AJ issued the Notice shortly after she filed her
Motion in Opposition. In addition, Complainant contended that the AJ
used the 11-month period between the Notice and the decision to find
support for the Notice. Finally, Complainant contended that all of the
claims were connected and, taken as one continuous act or individually,
demonstrated discrimination dating back to 1998.3
Concerning claim 1, Complainant contended that the CDFA managers (M1-M4)
were all men, and that their actions were taken solely to harass her
because she was a woman. In addition, Complainant noted that she informed
S1 of the harassing incidents and that action was never taken by S1.
Further, Complainant claimed that this failure to act led directly to
her reassignment in claim 2. Finally, Complainant contended that the
AJ erred in finding that the Agency corrected the actions of the CDFA
managers while also finding that the Agency did not have the power to
correct the CDFA managers.
Concerning claim 2, Complainant contended that this issue should
have gone to a hearing because only S1’s testimony and subsequent
cross-examination could establish whether the Agency’s reason for her
reassignment was a pretext for discrimination. In addition, Complainant
contended that she could show a connection between this claim and S1’s
inaction in claim 1 through her own testimony and the cross-examination
of S1.
Concerning claim 3 and 4, Complainant contended that the selection panels
were a sham and the decisions not to select her occurred prior to the
selection process. In addition, Complainant contended that the AJ should
have viewed the legitimacy of the panels as a disputed material fact.
In support of her contentions, Complainant noted that she scored higher
than the selectee on two of the panelists’ rankings with regard to
claim 3, and that S1 was a panel member on both panels.
Agency
Concerning claim 1, the Agency responded that S1 took action when
informed of the allegations of harassment. Specifically, the Agency
argued that S1 was instrumental in the removal of at least M3 and
engaged in mediation sessions with the CDFA over the continued disputes.
In addition, the Agency contended that all of the disputes with the CDFA
involved disagreements over operational decision making.
Concerning claim 2, the Agency contended that Complainant failed
to demonstrate that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was a
pretext for discrimination. The Agency noted S1’s testimony that
there were ongoing problems between the Agency and the CDFA, and that
during mediation it was determined that both Complainant and M4 should
be reassigned. The Agency contended that Complainant admitted the
existence of these problems and offered no evidence to show the stated
reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Concerning claims 3 and 4, the Agency contended that, beyond her own
subjective belief about her relative qualifications for the positions,
Complainant failed to demonstrate that she was more qualified than
the selectees. The Agency noted the following testimony from S1:
(a) the selectee in claim 3 was the most qualified candidate and had
strong interpersonal and mediation skills, which were important in the
cooperative position; and (b) the selectee in claim 4 was the highest
scoring candidate and Complainant had recently been reassigned from
the position.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Standard of Review
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal
and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them,
de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an
appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review
. . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive
for 29 C.F.R Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Ch. 9, § VI.B. (Nov. 9, 1999)
(providing that an AJ’s “decision to issue a decision without
a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed
de novo”). This essentially means that we should look at this case
with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or
reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and
legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional
discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal
employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Ch. 9,
§ VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires
that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and
legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC
“review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including
any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its
decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and
its interpretation of the law”).
Summary Judgment
We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have
issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission’s
regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or
she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. §�
�1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment
procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where
a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary
standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not
to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine
issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must
be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences
must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue
of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact
finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103,
105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential
to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing
a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context
of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a
decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the
record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty
v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally,
an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing
unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given
(1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing,
(2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts,
(3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance
to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to
the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment “where
the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to
discover information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the AJ must
enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to
properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29
C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an AJ could order discovery,
if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision
without a hearing).
After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ’s issuance
of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. The record has been
adequately developed. Complainant was given notice of the Agency’s
motion to issue a decision without a hearing, and she was given an
opportunity to respond. She was also given a comprehensive statement of
undisputed facts, and she had the opportunity to engage in discovery.
On appeal, Complainant asserted that genuine issues of material fact
exist. However, we find that, even if we assume all the facts in favor
of Complainant, as we must here, a reasonable fact-finder could not find
in Complainant’s favor, as explained below. Therefore, no genuine
issues of material fact exist. Under these circumstances, we find that
the AJ’s issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate.
Harassment – Claim 1
To establish a claim of harassment a complainant must show that:
(1) they belong to a statutorily protected class; (2) they were
subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical
conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained
of was based on their statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment
affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;
and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer.
See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Further,
the incidents must have been “sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of [complainant’s] employment and create an
abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The harasser’s conduct should be evaluated
from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim’s
circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc.,
EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 6 (Mar. 8, 1994).
Upon review, we find that Complainant failed to establish a claim of
harassment because she has not connected the alleged unwelcome conduct
to any of her statutorily protected classes. Complainant cited many
incidents, but we find that those incidents involved disputes about how
to run the PRP program. Although Complainant contended that she was the
only female supervisor for the Federal program and that the actions of
M1 – M4 were only because she was a woman, we find that her status as
the sole female does not, by itself, raise an inference that the conduct
was based on her sex.
Complainant also contended that S1’s failure to take action on the
reported incidents was based on her statutorily protected classes.
We find that Complainant again failed to raise any evidence that would
allow us to infer that S1’s actions were based on her race or sex.
With regard to the basis of reprisal, we note that Complainant’s
prior EEO complaint against S1 occurred eight years before the incidents
at issue. We find that the prior EEO complaint is too far removed in
time to establish a nexus between the prior activity and any adverse
treatment by S1 in the present case. Furthermore, we note that the
undisputed record shows that S1 took numerous actions regarding the
reported incidents. The record reflects that S1 reported the incidents
to the State managers, scheduled mediation sessions to resolve issues,
and was responsible for the reassignment of State managers.
Disparate Treatment – Claims 2, 3, and 4
To prevail on disparate treatment claims such as these, Complainant must
satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant
must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was
subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would
support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending
on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at
804. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s
explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
519 (1993). At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion,
and it is her obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See Hicks, supra.
Claim 2
Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case on
the alleged bases, we find that the Agency articulated a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Specifically, S1 attested
that Complainant had numerous disputes with various State managers.
In addition, S1 attested that she and the CDFA managers held mediation
sessions to resolve the issues. Further, S1 attested that the managers
involved, from both the Agency and the CDFA, agreed during these meetings
that the only way to resolve the issues was to reassign both Complainant
and M4, the individuals involved in the most recent disputes.
Upon review, we find that Complainant has failed to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation was
pretextual. Complainant contended she could show on cross-examination
that S1 ignored the reported disputes between her and the CDFA in order
to justify reassigning her. We find that, beyond her bare assertions,
Complainant has offered no evidence that S1’s testimony was untrue.
Without any evidence to contradict the Agency’s stated reason, we find
that Complainant has failed to show that the Agency’s reason was a
pretext for discrimination.
Claim 3
Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case on
the alleged bases, we find that the Agency articulated a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Specifically, S1 attested
that she chose the selectee because the selectee achieved the highest
score during the selection process, showing her to be the most qualified
candidate. In addition, S1 attested that the selectee had mediation
experience and strong interpersonal skills, which would be beneficial
in a position that required working with the CDFA.
Upon review, we find that Complainant has failed to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation was
pretextual. Complainant may demonstrate pretext by showing that her
qualifications were “plainly superior” to the selectee. Bauer
v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981). Complainant contended
that her non-selection was predetermined by S1 and P1, who were the
only panel members in the selection process and were involved in the
decision to reassign her. Although Complainant contended that S1 and
P1 “adjusted” the scores of the applicants in order to stop her from
being selected, we find that there is no evidence of this in the record.4
Without evidence that her qualifications were plainly superior to the
selectee or that the panel manipulated scores, we find that Complainant
has failed to demonstrate that the Agency’s articulated reason was a
pretext for discrimination.
Claim 4
Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case on
the alleged bases, we find that the Agency articulated a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Specifically, S1 attested
that the selectee scored the highest during the selection process,
indicating that he was the most qualified candidate. In addition, S1
noted that Complainant had previously been the SIT Program Director,
but attested that the experience did not make her more qualified than
the selectee because Complainant had been reassigned due to numerous
disputes between her and the CDFA managers. Further, S1 and P2 attested
that it would be highly unlikely that Complainant would be selected for
the position because she had previously been reassigned from the same
position for failing to cooperate with the CDFA.
Upon review, we find that Complainant has failed to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation was
pretextual. Complainant contended that the inclusion of S1 in the
selection process was improper because S1 was the subject of the instant
complaint and had knowledge of her previous tenure in the position.
In addition, Complainant contended that P2 and P3 were biased because P2
was aware of her prior EEO activity and P3 had been a CDFA manager when
she previously held the position. Beyond her bare assertions, we find
that Complainant has presented no evidence that her non-selection was due
to bias by S1, P2, or P3. Further, although Complainant asserted that
P2 was biased, the record reflects that P2 actually scored Complainant
two points higher than the selectee during the application review.
Without evidence that her qualifications were plainly superior to the
selectee or that S1, P2, or P3 were biased against her, we find that
Complainant has failed to demonstrate that the Agency’s articulated
reason was a pretext for discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,
including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the
Agency’s final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive
for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency
head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full
name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal
of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits
as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
____8/18/11______________
Date
1 Complainant attested that she was in the parking lot for a pre-dawn
operation and did not know that M3 was in the area. In addition, she
attested that she was “spooked” when she encountered him and he told
her to move her vehicle.
2 Agency Complaint No. APHIS-2007-00572 originally contained a total
of seven accepted issues. As noted above, the AJ removed one issue
from that complaint and consolidated it with the three issues raised in
APHIS-2006-02480 because that issue was like or related. The remaining
issues, in Agency Complaint No. APHIS-2007-00572, were addressed in
EEOC Appeal No. 0120100039 (March 19, 2010), request for reconsideration
denied, EEOC Request No. 0520100326 (May 28, 2010).
3 Complainant obtained her PRP Program Director position in 1998 through
the settlement of an EEO complaint against S1.
4 We note that when a party moves for a decision without a hearing,
such as the Agency did here, the non-moving party’s opposition must
consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must
be supported by affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for a hearing.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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