Effective Delivery Systems LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 11, 2018

No. 87185700 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 11, 2018)

Mailed: June 11, 2018
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
————
In re Effective Delivery Systems LLC
————
Serial No. 87185700
————
Tamsen Valoir of Boulware & Valoir,
for Effective Delivery Systems LLC.
Jacquelyn A. Jones, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 120,
David Miller, Managing Attorney.
————
Before Taylor, Wolfson and Pologeorgis,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Pologeorgis, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Effective Delivery Systems LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the mark STRONVIVO (in standard characters) for “nutritional
supplements” in International Class 5.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of

1 Application Serial No. 87185700, filed on September 28, 2016, based on an allegation of use
in commerce under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming
December 1, 2012 as the date of first use and March 31, 2013 as the date of first use in
commerce.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Serial No. 87185700
2
likelihood of confusion with the following two registered marks owned by the same
Registrant:
1. STRON BONE (in standard characters; BONE disclaimed) for “dietary food
supplements” in International Class 5;2 and
2. STRON BONE and design (BONE disclaimed), as displayed below, also for
“dietary food supplements” in International Class 5.3

When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration, the appeal resumed. The appeal is fully briefed. We affirm the
refusal to register.4
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts
in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood of
confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567

2 Registration No. 4432575, issued on November 12, 2013.
3 Registration No. 4388938, issued on August 20, 2013. The description of the mark statement
reads as follows: “The mark consists of a symbol of concentric circles with the stylized text
‘Stron Bone.’”
4 All TTABVUE and Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) citations reference
the docket and electronic file database for Application Serial No. 87185700. All citations to
the TSDR database are to the downloadable PDF version of the documents.
Serial No. 87185700
3
(CCPA 1973); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201,
1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, however, two key
considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods or services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d
1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d)
goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods
and differences in the marks.”).
In this case, we have based our Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion findings and
decision on only one of the cited registrations, i.e., on Registration No. 4432575, which
is of the standard character mark STRON BONE for the International Class 5 goods
identified in the registration as “dietary food supplements.” A finding of likelihood of
confusion between Applicant’s mark and this previously registered mark suffices by
itself to bar registration of Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d); we need not find
likelihood of confusion as to both of the cited registrations. See In re Max Capital Grp,
Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2010); In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d
1198, 1201-02 (TTAB 2009).
A. Similarity of the Marks
We first address the du Pont likelihood of confusion factor focusing on “the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (quoting du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567). “The proper test is not a side-by-side
comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
Serial No. 87185700
4
terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs., Inc. v.
Triumph Learning, LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(quotation omitted).
Because this factor is based on the marks in their entireties, our analysis cannot
be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various components; that is, the
decision must be based on the entire marks, not just part of the marks. In re Nat’l
Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It
is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it
must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”). On the other
hand, there is nothing improper in assigning more or less weight to a particular
feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the
marks in their entireties. Nat’l Data, 224 USPQ at 751.
Applicants’ mark is STRONVIVO in standard characters. The cited mark is
STRON BONE also in standard characters. Both marks are visually and aurally
similar inasmuch as they both begin with the identical letters “STRON.” We find that
the prefix STRON in Applicant’s mark and the initial term STRON in the cited mark
are the dominant features of the respective marks, particularly since the letters
STRON appear first in each mark. Consumers are generally inclined to focus on the
first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps.,
73 USPQ2d at 1692 (“VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in
Serial No. 87185700
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the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); In re Integrated Embedded, 120
USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (“[T]he dominance of BARR in [a]pplicant’s mark
BARR GROUP is reinforced by its location as the first word in the mark.”); Presto
Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often
the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a
purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions). Moreover, we find
that the term “STRON” is a coined and arbitrary term when used in relation to the
goods at issue, as conceded by Applicant.5
The inclusion of the term BONE in the cited mark is less significant since it is
descriptive of Registrant’s goods and has been appropriately disclaimed. In re Dixie
Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re
Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Moreover, we
take judicial notice that the English translation of the Italian word VIVO (which
comprises the suffix of Applicant’s mark) is “alive; living; live, vivacious.”6 As such,
the term is somewhat suggestive of general or good health, as conceded by Applicant.7
This is significant because it is well established that the scope of protection afforded
a suggestive or nonarbitrary term is less than that accorded an arbitrary or coined
mark. See In re Shawnee Milling Co., 225 USPQ 747, 749 (TTAB 1985). Because

5 March 30, 2017 Response to Office Action, p. 1.
6 See translation in COLLIN’S ITALIAN DICTIONARY, © 2018, www.collinsdictionary.com. The
Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries that
exist in printed format. In re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB 2014),
aff’d, 823 F.3d 594, 118 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Threshold.TV Inc. v. Metronome
Enters., Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1031, 1038 n.14 (TTAB 2010).
7 March 30, 2017 Response to Office Action, TSDR, p. 2.
Serial No. 87185700
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suggestive matter is generally entitled to less weight, the inclusion of the suffix VIVO
in Applicant’s mark is also less significant in our analysis regarding the similarities
of the marks.
Furthermore, while we recognize that more or less weight may be properly
assigned to a given component of a mark, we still must consider the marks as a whole
in determining likelihood of confusion. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794
F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Despite the fact that the suffix
VIVO in Applicant’s mark and the second word BONE in the cited mark differ
visually and aurally and may convey different connotations, consumers familiar with
Registrant’s STRON BONE dietary food supplements may well conclude that
Applicant’s STRONVIVO nutritional supplements are a new line of health
supplements from the maker of the STRON BONE dietary food supplements. See In
re Southern Belle Frozen Foods Inc., 48 USPQ2d 1849, 1851 (TTAB 1998) (consumers
familiar with registrant’s SHRIMP ROYALE packaged shrimp meal may conclude
applicant’s SEAFOOD ROYALE frozen crab product is a new line of seafood from the
maker of the SHRIMP ROYALE product). This is due to the fact that the proper focus
is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather
than specific impression of trademarks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d
1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735,
1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d mem, 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re C.H. Hanson Co.,
116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing Joel Gott Wines LLC v. Rehoboth Von
Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (TTAB 2013)).
Serial No. 87185700
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Finally, Applicant’s reliance on the non-precedential disposition of a prior Board
ex parte proceeding, i.e., In re Black & Decker Corp., Serial No. 75215991 (TTAB
August 31, 2000) (“Black & Decker”),8 is unavailing. We initially note that a decision
designated as non-precedential is not binding upon the Board. See In re Proctor &
Gamble Co., 105 USPQ2d 1119, 1120-21 (TTAB 2012) (citation to non-precedential
opinions is permitted but not encouraged; however, non-precedential decisions are
not binding on the Board). Notwithstanding, we find the decision in Black & Decker
to be distinguishable from the instant case.
In Black & Decker, the Board found that there was no likelihood of confusion
between the applicant’s mark VERSAPAK for “flashlights and [a] combination
flashlight with recharger for consumer use” and the cited, registered mark VERSA-
LITE for “flashlights for use by electric utility, gas and telephone personnel and by
policemen and firemen” because of the significant differences in the channels of trade
and actual purchasers of the goods and the differing commercial impressions of the
marks.9 Specifically, the Board noted that the term “VERSA” in the applied-for mark
was suggestive of the versatility of different features of applicant’s flashlight while
the term “VERSA” in the registered mark was suggestive of the versatility of
registrant’s flashlights in a wide variety of professional uses.10 Unlike in Black &
Decker, Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods are not limited to particular trade

8 The Board’s decision in Black & Decker precedes Applicant’s main appeal brief in the filing
docketed at 7 TTABVUE. 7 TTABVUE 3-10. We will cite to the decision as it appears at 7
TTABVUE.
9 . 7 TTABVUE 5-10.
10 Id. at 9.
Serial No. 87185700
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channels, uses, or consumers. The shared wording “STRON” does not create a
different commercial impression when viewed in connection with “nutritional
supplements” and “dietary food supplements.” Therefore, contrary to Applicant’s
assertion, the non-precedential decision in Black & Decker is not relevant to the
issues in this proceeding.
While the marks at issue in this case share the identical term STRON, they differ
in that each mark includes additional wording not present in the other. Nonetheless,
we find that when considered in their entireties, the similarities in the marks
outweigh their differences. Although the suffix in Applicant’s mark and the second
term in the cited mark differ, these terms are descriptive or suggestive of the
identified goods and, therefore, will not likely be impressed upon potential purchasers
as significant distinguishing features. We therefore find that, when considered as
whole, Applicant’s mark is sufficiently similar in appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impression to the cited mark for confusion to be likely. Accordingly, the
first du Pont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. Strength of Registrant’s Mark and Nature and Number of Similar
Marks in Use on Similar Goods
Under the sixth du Pont factor, the Federal Circuit has stated that “evidence of
third-party use of similar marks on similar goods ‘can show that customers have been
educated to distinguish between different marks on the basis of minute distinctions.”’
Jack Wolfskin Ausrutung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium
Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Juice
Generation, 115 USPQ2d at 1674). “The weaker [a registrant’s] mark, the closer an
Serial No. 87185700
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applicant’s mark can come without causing a likelihood of confusion and thereby
invading what amounts to its comparatively narrower range of protection.” Juice
Generation, 115 USPQ2d at 1674.
Evidence of third-party registrations and use of similar marks may be used to
prove weakness of a mark in two ways: conceptually and commercially. A mark’s
strength is measured both by its conceptual strength (distinctiveness) and its
marketplace strength (recognition). In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96
USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Applicant argues that the cited STRON BONE mark should be afforded a narrow
scope of protection because the common term STRON, although not a word itself, is
similar to the weak and diluted term “strong” as demonstrated by the crowded field
of STRONG-formative marks for supplements. Applicant further argues that
STRON, by virtue of its similarity to the word “strong,” should be considered less
distinctive as an identifier for supplements.11 In support of its argument, Applicant
submitted status and title copies of twenty, use-based third-party registrations for
marks that include the term “STRONG” used in connection with various dietary and
nutritional supplements.12
We find Applicant’s argument unpersuasive. The cited mark is STRON BONE,
not STRONG BONE. Applicant has failed to submit any evidence that demonstrates
that consumers would view the term “STRON” as an abbreviation or misspelling of

11 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 13, 7 TTABVUE 23.
12 March 30, 2017 Response to Office Action, TSDR pp. 14-43.
Serial No. 87185700
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the word STRONG. In fact, the Examining Attorney submitted search results from
the websites at www.abbreviations.com, www.acronymfinder.com,
www.onelook.com, and www.wordnik.com that show that “STRON” is not a known
abbreviation of the word “strong.”13 Moreover, as noted above, Applicant itself has
argued that “’STRON’ is a coined term with no meaning.”14
Accordingly, Applicant’s third-party registration evidence for marks that include
the term STRONG has no probative value and, therefore, fails to narrow the scope of
protection to be afforded to Registrant’s mark, either commercially or conceptually.
Thus, the sixth du Pont factor is neutral.
C. Similarity of the Goods
The next step in our analysis is a comparison of the goods identified in Applicant’s
application vis-à-vis the goods identified in the cited registration, the second du Pont
factor. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110
USPQ2d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comps. Servs. Inc.,
918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.2d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002). It is
settled that it is not necessary that the respective goods be identical or even
competitive in order to find that they are related. It is sufficient if the respective goods
are “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing
[be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that goods emanate from the

13 April 21, 2017 Office Action, TSDR pp. 21-24.
14 Id., TSDR p. 6.
Serial No. 87185700
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same source.” Coach Servs., Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1722 (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v.
Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); see also In re Martin’s Famous Pastry
Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Melville
Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991). The issue is not whether purchasers
would confuse the goods, but rather whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to
the source of these goods. L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (TTAB
2012); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830, 831 (TTAB 1984).
Applicant’s goods are identified as “nutritional supplements.” Registrant’s goods
are “dietary food supplements.” The Examining Attorney argues that Applicant’s
“nutritional supplements” are essentially identical to Registrant’s “dietary food
supplements.”15 Applicant does not address the issue of the similarities of the goods
in its main appeal brief and, in its reply brief, specifically states that it does not
dispute the Examining Attorney’s contention that the goods at issue are essentially
identical.16
Although Applicant does not contest the Examining Attorney’s characterization of
the respective goods, we look to the record to ascertain whether the Examining
Attorney has met her burden in establishing that the involved goods are sufficiently
related to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., In re White Rock
Distilleries Inc., 92 USPQ2d 1282, 1285 (TTAB 2009) (finding that examining
attorney failed to establish on the record before the Board that applicant’s goods and

15 Trademark Examining Attorney’s Brief, p. 8, 9 TTABVUE 9.
16 Applicant’s Reply Brief, p. 2, 10 TTABVUE 3.
Serial No. 87185700
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registrant’s goods are related).
The Examining Attorney made of record sixteen third-party, use-based
registrations, each identifying, under a single mark, both “nutritional supplements”
and “dietary food supplements.”17 Although such registrations are not evidence that
the marks shown therein are in use or that the public is familiar with them, they
nonetheless have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the
goods listed therein are of a kind which may emanate from a single source under a
single mark. See In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB
1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co. Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988).
As examples:
1. NOFLUX (Reg. No. 5154032) is registered on the Principal Register for
“dietary supplements; dietary and nutritional supplements; dietary food
supplements; food supplements; nutritional supplements”;

2. FUNCTIONAL MALE (Reg. No. 5040780) is registered on the Principal
Register for “dietary food supplements; dietary supplements; dietary
supplements for human consumption; dietary and nutritional supplements;
health food supplements; herbal supplements; vitamin and mineral
supplements”;

3. DEXATRIM MAX COMPLEX 7 (Reg. No. 5071913) is registered on the
Principal Register for “dietary and nutritional supplements; dietary food
supplements”;

4. OMEGAPOWER (Reg. No. 5058720) is registered on the Principal Register
for “dietary and nutritional supplements; dietary food supplements; dietary
supplements; all the foregoing containing omega-3 fatty acids”; and

5. MIRACLE FLEX (Reg. No. 5067929) is registered on the Principal Register
for “dietary food supplements; dietary and nutritional supplements.”

17 April 21, 2017 Office Action, TSDR pp. 40-76.
Serial No. 87185700
13
The Examining Attorney also submitted the following Internet evidence
demonstrating that nutritional supplements and dietary food supplements, while not
necessarily identical goods, are nevertheless similar in terms of nature, purpose, and
function, namely, they are both products that contain vitamins, dietary elements or
herbs to supplement a person’s diet with nutritional content.
1. A Wikipedia entry for “dietary supplement” that defines the term as
a product that is intended to supplement a person’s diet and to
ensure that a person gets enough essential nutrients, despite it not
being usable as a meal replacement; that the product is or contains
a vitamin, dietary element, or herb; that dietary supplements
include, inter alia, vitamins, dietary minerals, amino acids and
proteins, and essential fatty acids.18

2. A dictionary definition of the term “nutritional supplements” from
www.medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com that defines the term
as follows: “Nutritional supplements include vitamins, herbs, meal
supplements, sports nutrition products, natural food supplements,
and other related products used to boost the nutritional content of
the diet.” The entry also states that the purpose of nutritional
supplements is to “boost overall health and energy, to provide
immune system support and reduce the risks of illness and age-
related conditions; to improve performance in athletic and mental
activities; and to support the healing process during illness and
disease.”19

The evidence of record clearly establishes that Applicant’s goods and Registrant’s
goods are closely related, if not essentially identical in function and purpose, and are

18 Id., TSDR pp. 6-7. The Board will consider evidence taken from Wikipedia so long as the
non-offering party has an opportunity to rebut that evidence by submitting other evidence
that may call into question the accuracy of the particular Wikipedia information. Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (“TBMP”) § 1208.03 (June 2017). To the extent
Applicant had any concerns regarding the accuracy of this Wikipedia evidence, Applicant
could have so stated in its Request for Reconsideration. Applicant did not do so, however.
Accordingly, we will consider the Wikipedia evidence submitted by the Examining Attorney.
19 April 21, 2017 Office Action, TSDR p. 13.
Serial No. 87185700
14
offered by third parties under the same marks. Accordingly, the second du Pont factor
also favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
D. Similarities in Trade Channels and Classes of Purchasers
With regard to the channels of trade and class of purchasers, because there are no
limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers in either the application
or cited registration and the identified goods are closely related, we must presume
that the goods identified in the application and registration travel through all normal
and usual trade channels for such goods, and that they are sold to all classes of
prospective purchasers for those goods. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1161; see also
Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1723 (absent limitation “goods are presumed to travel
in all normal channels ... for the relevant goods.”). The Examining Attorney
submitted online marketplace evidence demonstrating that the ordinary channels of
trade for “nutritional supplements” and “dietary food supplements” are health food
stores, pharmacies and vitamin/supplement shops. As examples:
1. Screenshots from the website of the online retailer Garden of Life
advertising and offering for sale both “nutritional supplements” and
“dietary food supplements”;20

2. Screenshots from the website of Walgreens also advertising and
offering for sale various dietary and nutritional supplements;21

3. Screenshots from the GNC website advertising and offering for sale
various vitamins and supplements;22 and

4. Screenshots from the website of CVS pharmacy also advertising and

20 Id., TSDR pp. 27-29.
21 Id., TSDR pp. 30-32.
22 Id., TSDR pp. 35-38.
Serial No. 87185700
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offering for sale protein and nutritional supplements.23

In view of the foregoing, we find that the goods identified in the application and
the cited registration are sold through the same channels of trade to the same class
of purchasers. These factors weigh in favor of a finding that confusion is likely.
E. Nature and Extent of Any Actual Confusion
Applicant points to the absence of evidence of actual confusion, the seventh du
Pont factor, as weighing in its favor. Specifically, Applicant maintains that although
both Applicant’s mark and Registrant’s mark have been used in commerce since 2013,
no actual confusion has been experienced.24 A showing of actual confusion would of
course be highly probative of a likelihood of confusion. The opposite is not true,
however. The lack of evidence of actual confusion carries little weight. J.C. Hall Co.
v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 340 F.2d 960, 144 USPQ 435, 438 (CCPA 1965). The issue
before us is the likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion. Herbko Int’l Inc. v. Kappa
Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (actual confusion
not required). Further, any suggestion that there has been no actual confusion
between the marks based on the coexistence of Applicant’s mark and the mark in the
cited registration is entitled to little probative value in the context of an ex parte
appeal. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 65 USPQ2d at 1205; see also In re Kangaroos
U.S.A., 223 USPQ 1025, 1026-27 (TTAB 1984). Therefore, this du Pont factor is
neutral.

23 Id., TSDR p. 39.
24 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 14, 7 TTABVUE 24; Applicant’s October 6, 2017 Request for
Reconsideration, TSDR p. 8.
Serial No. 87185700
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II. Conclusion
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record, including those
not specifically discussed herein, and all relevant du Pont factors. Because we have
found that the marks at issue are similar and that Applicant’s identified goods are
closely related to Registrant’s goods (and virtually identical in function and purpose)
and that they would move in the same or overlapping trade channels and are offered
to the same or similar classes of purchasers, we conclude that Applicant’s mark so
resembles the cited mark STRON BONE as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake,
or to deceive under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act is affirmed.