0120080306
05-07-2009
Edward Jackson, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.
Edward Jackson,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Pacific Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120080306
Hearing No. 480-2007-00242X
Agency No. 4F-900-0223-06
DECISION
On October 23, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's
September 25, 2007 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity
(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42
U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
621 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant to 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS
the agency's final order.
BACKGROUND
At the time of the events giving rise to this complaint, complainant
worked as a Building Equipment Mechanic at the agency's Los Angeles
Processing & Distribution Center in Los Angeles, California. The record
reflects that in September 2005, complainant submitted a request for
a transfer to Dallas, Texas through the agency's eReassign system.
In February 2006, complainant requested that his records be sent to a
facility in Dallas, Texas. On March 31, 2006, the Acting Human Resources
Specialist (AHRS) received an automatically generated e-mail informing
her that complainant had requested a transfer to a facility in Dallas,
and she requested copies of his live discipline records, supervisor
evaluation, "Datakeeper Reports," and training record. On June 29, 2006,
complainant spoke with AHRS to find out why his paperwork had not been
sent to the Dallas facility. On June 29, 2006, AHRS requested a copy
of complainant's supervisor evaluation, and she forwarded complainant's
paperwork to the Dallas facility after receiving the evaluation. On May
16, 2007, complainant learned that his request for reassignment had been
approved, and he was reassigned to Dallas effective June 23, 2007.
On October 4, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he
was discriminated against on the bases of race (African American), sex
(male), religion (Christian), color (Black), disability (knee injury),
age (53), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under the
Rehabilitation Act when, in February 2006, complainant was not granted
a transfer to Dallas, Texas due to the agency delaying the processing
of his request.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and a notice of his right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely
requested a hearing. When complainant did not object, the AJ assigned to
the case granted the agency's May 23, 2007 motion for a decision without
a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on September 20, 2007.
The AJ's decision found that complainant failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. The agency subsequently issued a final
order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove that
he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Neither complainant nor the agency submitted a statement on appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and
factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them, de novo.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from
an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see
also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999)
(providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a decision
without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed
de novo"). This essentially means that we should look at this case
with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate)
or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's, factual conclusions and
legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional
discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal
employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9,
� VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that
the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and
legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC
"review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including
any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its
decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its
interpretation of the law").
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing
a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context
of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a
decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the
record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty
v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant
must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating
that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances
that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will
vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately
prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
Assuming arguendo that complainant established a prima facie case
of discrimination, we find that the agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. AHRS submitted a declaration
into the record indicating that "the three month delay between the date
Dallas requested complainant's records and the date we sent the records to
Dallas likely resulted from the high volume of employees that were hired,
requests for in-service reassignments, and requests for reassignments
that I processed." AHRS indicated in an affidavit that, on average,
there are 400-500 reassignment requests from employees wanting to leave
from or transfer to the Los Angeles District, and "all reassignments are
processed (treated) in the same manner." AHRS further indicated that she
sent complainant's paperwork to the Dallas facility immediately after she
received a copy of complainant's supervisor evaluation on June 29, 2006.
Complainant now bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext for
discrimination. Complainant can do this directly by showing that the
agency's proferred explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 256. Upon review, we concur with the AJ's determination that
complainant failed to provide any evidence of pretext in the record.
Complainant did not submit a statement on appeal, and we are not
persuaded, based on the record of investigation, that complainant has
shown the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext for
unlawful discrimination. Furthermore, we find that the record is devoid
of any evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory
animus towards complainant's race, color, sex, religion, disability,
age, or in retaliation for complainant's prior protected activity.
CONCLUSION
The Commission finds that summary judgment was appropriate in this
case because no genuine issue of material fact exists. We note that
complainant failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions
were motivated by discriminatory animus towards him. We discern no
basis to disturb the AJ's decision.
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, including arguments
and evidence not specifically addressed in the decision, the agency's
final order is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1208)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the
request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as
stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
May 7, 2009
Date
2
0120080306
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
6
0120080306