Edward J. Chavez, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 4, 2009
0120080516 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 4, 2009)

0120080516

09-04-2009

Edward J. Chavez, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.


Edward J. Chavez,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120080516

Hearing No. 480-2007-00068X

Agency No. 4F-900-0173-06

DECISION

On November 9, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's October

5, 2007 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted for de novo review, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the agency's final order.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether, in this case, the AJ properly issued a decision without a

hearing in favor of the agency.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Mail Processing Clerk, PS-05, at the Bell Gardens, California Post

Office. On July 14, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging

that he was discriminated against on the bases of race/national origin

(Hispanic), sex (male), disability (diabetes, prostate condition, asthma,

and varicose veins), age (58), and reprisal for prior EEO activity

[arising under Title VII, ADEA and Rehabilitation Act], when:

(1) on March 7, 2006, he was issued a letter of warning; and

(2) prior to April 3, 2006, he was not used as a 204-b and not given

Level 6 duties.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely

requested a hearing. When complainant did not file a timely objection,

the AJ assigned to the case granted the agency's March 1, 2007 motion

for a decision without a hearing. The decision was issued on September

30, 2007.

AJ Decision

The AJ found that complainant did not proffer sufficient evidence

to establish that he is disabled pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act.

Additionally, the AJ found as to issue (1), that complainant was unable

to establish a prima facie case of discrimination on any of the alleged

bases, in that he did not identify any other employee with the same

supervisors who had an attendance record comparable to complainant's

attendance record and who was not issued a letter of warning. The AJ

further found that the record contained no evidence that complainant's

membership in a protected group motivated management to issue a letter

of warning.

As to issue (2), the AJ found that complainant established a prima facie

case of sex, national origin, and age discrimination since he was not used

or was used less than a similarly-situated co-worker (who was presumably

not in complainant's protected groups) as a 204-b supervisor in and

after November 2005. The AJ found that no prima facie case of disability

or reprisal discrimination was established. The AJ additionally found

that a manager articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for

not using complainant as a 204-b and for level 6 duties, which was that

"[c]omplainant was unable to follow my instructions without verbal and

written challenges. These challenges were not only disruptive on the

workroom floor but also with the management staff."

The AJ next found as follows: complainant has not proffered evidence

which raises a material dispute about management's reason for not using

complainant as a 204-b and for level 6 duties. In fact, complainant

himself asserts that he had previously spoken his mind to his manager

about operational matters, and that his manager "preferred a person he

could push and they would bend." Further, complainant confirms that he

was used as a 204-b supervisor prior to the disagreement about complainant

moving equipment, and was not used as a 204-b after the disagreement.

Complainant has not proffered evidence which shows that management's

articulated reason for not using him as a 204-b supervisor and for level 6

duties was not entitled to credence and was a pretext for discrimination.

The AJ found no discrimination. The agency subsequently issued a final

order adopting the AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove that

he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant contends that personal problems (illness among his

family members, and his need to care for children/grandchildren) affected

his ability to respond to the agency's Motion for Summary Judgment.

He asserts that his brother (who subsequently died from cancer) was

at his worst right around the time when the agency filed its Motion.

Complainant now requests "a chance to oppose and respond to those

reasons why the 'motion for a decision without a hearing' should be

answered by me in contradiction to all these statements by the agency.

Many of which are taken out of context or I can easily contest with other

facts." Complainant also essentially contends that his representative

was deficient and did not advise him adequately about the need to oppose

the agency's Motion. In reply, the agency asks the Commission to affirm

the final order.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Initially, although we are sympathetic to the personal challenges that

complainant faced around the time when the agency filed its Motion for

Summary Judgment, we note that complainant, in his appeal brief, also did

not take advantage of the opportunity to provide any substantive argument

as to why the Motion ought to have been denied, and a hearing held.

That is, he has not set forth the argument that he feels he would have

presented in an Opposition to the Motion, such as specifying any genuine

issues of material fact or credibility which ought to be resolved at

a hearing. Additionally, we note that complainant is responsible for

choosing his representative, and we cannot now remand the complaint for

a hearing on the basis that he believes his representative did not advise

him well.

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and

factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them, de novo.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from

an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .");

see also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9,

1999) (providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a

decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will

be reviewed de novo").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or

she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not

to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine

issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must

be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of

fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder

could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105

(1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect

the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing

conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is

not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ

may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only

upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for

summary disposition. See Petty v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal

No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). After a careful review of the record,

the Commission finds that the AJ's decision referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. Moreover, we find that the AJ properly

issued a decision without a hearing because complainant failed to show

that a genuine issue of material fact exists.

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

We find that, assuming complainant is disabled under the Rehabilitation

Act, and that he could establish a prima facie case of discrimination

on the alleged bases, the agency has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, the LOW was

issued for complainant's irregular attendance, which he does not deny

occurred. As to being denied 204-b duties, the manager stated that he

decided who would be an acceptable candidate for acting in a supervisor

position based upon many factors that include attendance; craft work

habits; personality; interest in supervising; and ultimately performance

as an acting supervisor. The manager stated that complainant was unable

to follow his instructions without verbal and written challenges, and

that these challenges were not only disruptive on the workroom floor

but also with the management staff. The Officer-in-Charge stated that

the reason complainant was not being used as a 204-b was because of a

prior incident between complainant and the manager, wherein complainant

refused to follow an instruction.

In an attempt to establish pretext, as to the LOW, complainant contends

that four of the nine incidents of unscheduled absences cited in the

LOW were because he had a car accident and had to take the bus, and

then borrowed a car which sometimes started and sometimes did not start

right, and he had to let it warm up before driving. He also claims that

sometimes his absenteeism was due to symptoms of his disabilities.1 As

to issue (2), complainant claims that he was not chosen to be a 204-b

because of his membership in protected groups, and because he and his

manager have different personalities. We find no persuasive evidence

of pretext. Although the record clearly establishes that complainant and

his manager may have had conflicting personalities, there is no evidence

that the manager was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus.

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's decision without a hearing was appropriate, as no genuine issue of

material fact is in dispute.2 Therefore, we AFFIRM the agency's final

order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an

attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____9-04-09_____________

Date

1 There is no indication that complainant, in his complaint, alleged

that he requested and/or was denied a reasonable accommodation which he

needed in order to have fewer absences from work.

2 In this case, we find that the record was adequately developed for

the AJ to issue a decision without a hearing.

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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