01980813
05-01-2000
Edward C. Hill, Jr., Complainant, v. William S. Cohen, Secretary, Department of Defense, Agency.
Edward C. Hill, Jr. v. Department of Defense
01980813
May 1, 2000
Edward C. Hill, Jr., )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01980813
v. ) Agency No. ZA-96-001
)
William S. Cohen, )
Secretary, )
Department of Defense, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision
(FAD) concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of
unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,
29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted in accordance with 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).
For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED in PART
and REVERSED in PART.
BACKGROUND
During the period in question, complainant was employed as a GS-12
Position Classification Specialist at the agency's Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) Administrative Support Center in Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO
counseling and, subsequently, filed a complaint on November 9, 1995
alleging that the agency discriminated him on the bases of race (Black),
religion (Seventh Day Adventist Christian), sex (male) and age (41) when:
(1) he was denied sick leave (accumulated and advanced) and was charged
Absent Without Leave (AWOL);
(2) he was denied change of team leader; and
(3) his work schedule was altered so that his religious needs were not
accommodated.
Issue 1
The record reveals that in September 1994, complainant requested use of
112 hours of accumulated sick leave, which was approved by his supervisor.
Later the same month, he submitted another request for 117.5 hours
of sick leave (85.5 advanced sick leave plus 32.5 hours as a buffer
in case anything came up in the future). At this time, complainant's
leave balance was 34 hours of annual leave and 26.3 hours of sick leave.
The 85.5 hours were approved, but his request for the 32.5 hour buffer was
not approved. When the complainant was informed that buffer leave could
not be approved, he changed his request to 85.5 hours, which was approved.
The record shows that complainant's doctor sent medical documentation
regarding complainant's medical problems and need for an extended leave
of absence from his work on August 13, 1994 and again on September 28,
1994.<2> Despite the fact that complainant's doctor had already sent
medical documentation twice, complainant's supervisor sent complainant
a letter on October 4, 1994 requesting medical documentation based on
his request for 117.5 hours of sick leave. This letter also informed
complainant that he would be placed on AWOL status until this information
was submitted. On October 13, 1994, the supervisor sent complainant
another letter reiterating the need for medical documentation to
support his request for advanced sick leave. The supervisor received
another medical report from complainant's doctor on October 20, 1994,
and she approved his request for advanced sick leave on October 24, 1994
(85.5 hours).
On February 14, 1995, complainant requested 16 hours of sick leave,
which was approved. Since complainant had no sick leave remaining, the
system placed him in a Leave Without Pay (LWOP) category. On February 27,
1995, complainant submitted two requests for advanced leave (24 hours of
advanced sick leave - approved on March 1, 1995; 18 hours of advanced
annual leave - not approved). On March 1, 1995, complainant submitted
another request for advanced sick leave (35.45 hours). This request
was to cover February 14, 15 and 21 through 23. This request was not
approved because all requests are to be submitted in advance, or if an
emergency, immediately upon return to work. Because the request was
not submitted until March 1, 1995, it was considered untimely.
On March 13, 1995, complainant was placed on leave control due to his
failure to follow established leave procedures and his excessive usage of
unscheduled annual and sick leave. On March 15, 1995, complainant called
his supervisor to inform her he would be two hours late because he was
working on his grievance. The supervisor advised him that he was needed
in the office and charged him AWOL based on the leave control letter.
Complainant was also charged AWOL for absences on March 16, April 7 and
April 12. No other employee has been charged AWOL.
Issue 2
The record reveals that although complainant alleged that he was denied
a change in team leader, his supervisor claimed that complainant never
requested such a change. Complainant submitted no evidence to support
the claim that he had requested the change.
Issue 3
The record reveals that complainant had informed his supervisor of his
need to take time off on Friday afternoons for religious observance.
The supervisor approved complainant's request to leave one hour early on
Fridays and make up the time Thursday mornings between December 1993 and
February 1994. The supervisor approved complainant's request again to
leave one and a half hours early on Fridays and work an extra one and
a half hours on Thursdays between November 18, 1994 and February 1995.
In December 1994, the supervisor informed complainant that she would be
putting all employees on a standard schedule in 1995 because the existing
variances in employees' work schedules were too inconvenient for her.
This resulted in complainant no longer being permitted to leave early
on Fridays for worship purposes and make up the time on Thursdays.
Complainant consulted the Employee Relations Office, which advised him
to resolve the matter by taking annual leave. Complainant began to take
annual leave in January 1995, but his supervisor told him that he could
no longer take annual leave on Friday afternoons. Complainant took his
concerns to the Personnel Director and was subsequently permitted to take
annual leave for two and a half hours on Fridays. On March 27, 1995,
complainant requested to use compensatory time for religious observance
on March 31, 1995, and his supervisor approved this request.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the agency informed complainant
of his right to request either an EEO administrative hearing or an
immediate FAD. Complainant did not request a hearing, and the agency
therefore issued a FAD dated October 1, 1997, finding that complainant
had not been discriminated against. It is from this decision that
complainant now appeals.
With regard to Issue 1, the FAD concluded that complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on gender, age, race
and/or religion because he presented no evidence that similarly situated
individuals not in his protected classes were treated more favorably
under similar circumstances. Specifically, the FAD stated that there was
no showing that similarly situated individuals were treated differently
because, due to complainant's unique history of excessive use of both
annual and sick leave, there were no similarly situated individuals for
comparison with complainant. The FAD also noted that complainant failed
to follow the established procedures for requesting leave.
Regarding Issue 2, the FAD found that complainant failed to establish
a prima facie case of sex discrimination because there was no showing
that similarly situated employees outside of the complainant's protected
class were treated more favorably.<3> The FAD also stated that there
was no showing in the record, other than complainant's formal complaint
and affidavit, that the complainant had actually made the request to
his supervisor for a change of team leader.
Regarding Issue 3, the FAD found that complainant was not discriminated
against when his work schedule was altered so that his religious needs
were not accommodated. <4> The FAD stated that there was no showing
in the record that complainant was ever denied accommodation of his
religious needs. The FAD concluded that complainant failed to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination based on religion because there
was no showing that other employees outside of complainant's protected
class were treated more favorably.
In its conclusion, the FAD stated that even if complainant had
succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the
preponderance of the evidence failed to establish that the reasons
articulated by management for disputed actions were a pretext for
unlawful discrimination. The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.
Complainant made no contentions on appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Issue 1
Under the three-part evidentiary scheme established by the Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), complainant has
the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination,
i.e., he must put forth facts which if true and unrebutted would create
an inference of discrimination. If complainant meets this burden,
the burden then shifts to the agency to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action. Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Complainant
must then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate
reason articulated by the agency was not its true reason, but was rather a
pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256; St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). Although this analysis was developed in the
context of Title VII, it is equally applicable to claims brought under
the ADEA. Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
In this instance, complainant must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination based on race, sex and age by showing: (1) that he
is a member of a protected class under Title VII and/or ADEA; (2)
that he was subjected to adverse treatment or was denied an employment
benefit or opportunity by the agency; and (3) that similarly situated
individuals not in his protected class were treated more favorably.
O'Neal v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910490 (July
23, 1991). The record is undisputed that complainant is a member of
protected classes and that he was denied sick leave and charged AWOL.
However, complainant has not demonstrated that similarly situated
individuals not in his protected class were treated more favorably.
In order for comparative employees to be considered similarly situated,
all relevant aspects of complainant's employment situation must be
nearly identical to those of the comparative employees. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Illinois Central R.R., 665 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
In the instant case, complainant alleged that younger White female
employees in the office were permitted to take off of work for several
months for medical problems and were not charged AWOL, denied sick
leave or asked to submit medical reports. However, complainant failed
to demonstrate that these employees were similarly situated to him.
Specifically, complainant did not show that the female employees in
his office had similar records regarding pattern of attendance and use
of leave. The record indicates that complainant was unique in his use
of unscheduled annual and sick leave. Because complainant was unable
to demonstrate that there were similarly situated employees not of his
protected groups who were treated more favorably than him, and has not
otherwise presented evidence sufficient to raise the requisite inference,
he has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
Accordingly, we find that complainant has not established that he was
discriminated against as alleged.
Issue 2
Applying the same analysis to Issue 2, complainant has failed to establish
a prima facie case of sex discrimination because there was no showing that
similarly situated employees outside his protected class were treated
more favorably than him. Nor did he present other evidence sufficient
from which to draw an inference of discrimination. Complainant provided
no evidence that female employees were granted a change of team leader
upon request while his request was denied. In addition, there is doubt
in the record about whether complainant actually made the request for a
change of team leader. Complainant failed to provide any evidence that
he had made such a request. Accordingly, we find that complainant has
not established that he was discriminated against as alleged.
Issue 3
Title VII places a duty upon employers to reasonably accommodate religious
beliefs and practices, unless such accommodation would place an undue
hardship upon the employer. In order to establish a prima facie case of
failure by the agency to accommodate complainant's religion, complainant
must show that: (1) he has a bona fide religious belief, the practice of
which conflicted with an employment duty; (2) he informed the agency of
this belief and conflict; and (3) the agency nevertheless enforced its
requirement against complainant. Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433,
1438 (9th Cir. 1993); Partridge v. United States Postal Service, EEOC
Appeal No. 01943980 (April 11, 1996).
Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the agency
to demonstrate that it cannot reasonably accommodate complainant without
incurring undue hardship, or that complainant has been accommodated.
Title VII, � 701(j), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. � 1605.2(c)(1); Protos
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 133 (3rd Cir. 1986).
The Supreme Court has found that accommodations which create more
than de minimis monetary or efficiency costs cause undue hardship.
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). A showing of
undue hardship cannot be merely hypothetical, but must instead include
evidence of an actual imposition on coworkers or disruption of work
schedules or routines. Tooley v. Martin Marietta, 648 F.2d 519, 521
(4th Cir. 1987).
The Commission has found acceptable several alternatives for accommodating
conflicts between work schedules and religious practices, including
voluntary substitutes and swaps, flexible scheduling and lateral transfer.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1605.2(d). Flexible scheduling can include the use
of compensatory time to make up time lost due to the observance of
religious practices. See 5 U.S.C. � 5550a. When there is more than one
method of accommodation available which would not cause undue hardship,
the agency must offer the alternative which least disadvantages the
individual with respect to his or her employment opportunities, such
as compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. See 29
C.F.R. � 1605.2(c)(2)(ii).
Applying this analysis to the instant case, we find that complainant
established a prima facie case of discrimination. Pursuant to his
bona fide religious belief as a Seventh Day Adventist, complainant
wanted to worship on his Sabbath, which begins at sunset on Friday.
This conflicted with his work schedule, and complainant notified the
agency of the conflict. Between December 1993 and February 1994, the
agency accommodated complainant's need to leave early on Fridays for
worship purposes by allowing him to work compensatory time on Thursdays
to make up the time lost. A similar arrangement was made again between
complainant and the agency for the period between November 1994 and
February 1995. However, beginning in January 1995, complainant's
supervisor stopped allowing complainant to work compensatory time on
Thursdays and enforced the agency's requirement that complainant work
on Friday afternoons. In order to leave early on Fridays for worship
purposes, complainant was required to use annual leave.
We disagree with the determination in the agency's final decision that
complainant was never denied accommodation for his religious needs.
When the agency terminated the arrangement by which complainant could
use compensatory time on Thursdays in order to leave early on Fridays and
instead required him to take annual leave, it disadvantaged complainant
with respect to a term, condition or privilege of employment in violation
of 5 U.S.C. � 5550a and 29 C.F.R. � 1605.2(c)(2)(ii). Flexible scheduling
through the use of compensatory time would have disadvantaged complainant
less than forcing him to use his annual leave. Further, it seems unlikely
that allowing complainant to continue to use the compensatory time
alternative would have caused an undue hardship on the agency. Moreover,
the agency failed to show that continuing to allow complainant to make
use of the flexible scheduling arrangement would have caused it undue
hardship. Accordingly, we find that the agency improperly determined
that it had not failed to accommodate complainant's religious practice.
CONCLUSION
Based on a review of the record and for the reasons cited above, it is
the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final decision
regarding Issues 1 and 2 and find that complainant has not established
that the agency discriminated against him as alleged. With respect to
Issue 3, it is the decision of the Commission to REVERSE the agency's
final decision and find that, beginning in January 1995, it failed to
accommodate complainant's religious practice.
ORDER (E1092)
The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:
1) The agency shall restore complainant's annual leave time, which he
was forced to use when the agency stopped accommodating his religious
practices beginning in January 1995.The agency shall determine the
appropriate amount of annual leave benefits due complainant, pursuant to
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the
date this decision becomes final. The complainant shall cooperate in
the agency's efforts to compute the amount of benefits due, and shall
provide all relevant information requested by the agency. If there is a
dispute regarding the exact amount of leave to restore, the agency shall
restore to complainant the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar
days of the date the agency determines the amount it believes to be due.
The complainant may petition for enforcement or clarification of the
amount in dispute. The petition for clarification or enforcement must
be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the
statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision."
The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's
Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the
agency's calculation of benefits due complainant, including evidence
that the corrective action has been implemented.
2) We note that complainant is no longer employed in the Classification
and Pay Administration Division. Nevertheless, the agency shall continue
to take reasonable steps to ensure that failure to accommodate religious
practice does not recur.
3) The agency shall provide training to the individuals responsible
for the failure to accommodate (specifically, the Director of the
Office of Civilian Personnel and the Chief of the Classification and Pay
Administration Division) as to the current state of the law on employment
discrimination, particularly the "Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Religion" contained at EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1605.
POSTING ORDER (G1092)
The agency is ORDERED to post at its Administrative Support Center in Fort
Belvoir, Virginia copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice,
after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative,
shall be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the
date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty
(60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall
take reasonable steps to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other materials. The original signed notice
is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in
the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision,"
within (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the
complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,
the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a
civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior
to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a
civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph
below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407
and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the
underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �
2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to
an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the
complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall
be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of
fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T1199)
This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it
also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a
portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in
an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR
DAYS from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion
of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion
of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative
processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action AFTER
ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you filed your
complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until
such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.
If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE
COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD,
IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file
a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
May 1, 2000
____________________________
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20507
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
An Agency of the United States Government
This notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission dated _____________________
which found that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. has occurred at this facility.
Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any
employee or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE,
COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL
DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,
or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
The Defense Logistics Agency, Administrative Support Center, Fort
Belvoir, Virginia (hereinafter "DLA Administrative Support Center")
supports and will comply with such Federal law and will not take action
against individuals because they have exercised their rights under law.
The DLA Administrative Support Center was found to have discriminated
against the complainant on the basis of religion when it failed
to make a good faith effort to accommodate his religious beliefs or
show that such accommodation would constitute an undue hardship on its
operations. The DLA Administrative Support Center was ordered to restore
complainant's annual leave time, which he was forced to use when the
agency stopped accommodating his religious practices; to take reasonable
steps to ensure that failure to accommodate religious practice does not
recur; and to provide training to the responsible officials. The DLA
Administrative Support Center will ensure that officials responsible
for personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will
abide by the requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity
laws and will not retaliate against employees who file EEO complaints.
The DLA Administrative Support Center will not in any manner restrain,
interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who exercises his
or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates
in proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment opportunity law.
Date Posted: _____________________
Posting Expires:
29 C.F.R. Part 1614
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.
2While there is evidence in the record that complainant suffered
from medical problems, complainant never requested accommodation of a
disability. The record also shows that complainant never alleged that
he had been discriminated against based on disability. Accordingly,
this decision will only address the allegations raised in complainant's
complaint.
3Complainant alleged only sex discrimination with respect to this
allegation.
4Complainant alleged only discrimination based on religion with respect
to this allegation.