Ecolink Intelligent Technology, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 29, 2021

2019006741 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/799,393 10/31/2017 Brandon Gruber 81230.940US1 2927
34018 7590 04/29/2021
Greenberg Traurig, LLP
77 W. Wacker Drive
Suite 3100
CHICAGO, IL 60601-1732
EXAMINER
TRAN, THANG DUC
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/29/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chiipmail@gtlaw.com
clairt@gtlaw.com
jarosikg@gtlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRANDON GRUBER
Appeal 2019-006741
Application 15/799,393
Technology Center 2600
Before JASON V. MORGAN, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–22. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 We refer to the Specification, filed October 31, 2017 (“Spec.”); Final
Office Action, mailed February 11, 2019 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed
April 23, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed July 26, 2019
(“Ans.”); and Reply Brief, filed September 13, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ecolink Intelligent
Technology, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 15/799,393
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to event notification using an intelligent
digital assistant. Spec., Title. Claim 1, reproduced below with formatting
altered, labels added, and argued limitations emphasized in italics, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system for providing user-defined event notifications,
comprising:
[(i)] an intelligent digital assistant coupled to a local area
network for receiving an audible event definition from a
user;
[(ii)] a plurality of electronic systems coupled to the local area
network each for determining whether an event has
occurred; and
[(iii)] an event detection and notification server, coupled to the
intelligent digital assistant and the plurality of electronic
systems via a wide-area network, the event detection and
notification system[3], comprising:
[(a)] a memory for storing processor-executable
instructions and user account information;
[(b)] a network interface to the wide-area network; and
[(c)] a processor coupled to the memory and the network
interface for executing the processor-executable
instructions that causes the event detection and
notification system to:
[(1)] receive, by the processor via the network
interface, an audible event definition from the
intelligent digital assistant, the audible event
definition comprising an audible request from a
user to the intelligent digital assistant to be
notified when a first user-defined event occurs;
[(2)] interpret the audible event definition to identify
from amongst the plurality of electronic systems a

3 Should prosecution be continued, the Examiner may want to determine
whether there is proper antecedent basis for “the event detection and
notification system.”
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Application 15/799,393
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one of the plurality of electronic systems that can
be used to determine whether the first user-defined
event occurs;
[(3)] determine, based at least in part on signal
information generated by the identified one of the
plurality of electronic systems, that the first user-
defined event has occurred; and
[(4)] provide, by the processor via the network
interface, a notification to the user in response to
it being determined that the first user-defined
event has occurred.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Shaw US 2015/0147997 A1 May 28, 2015
Rabb US 2016/0341435 A1 Nov. 24, 2016
Kudurshian US 2017/0358305 A1 Dec. 14, 2017
Heitz, III (“Heitz”) US 2018/0012462 A1 Jan. 11, 2018
Zimmerman US 2018/0208448 A1 July 26, 2018

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 4, 11–13, 15, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Kudurshian and Heitz. Final Act. 2–21.
Claims 3 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Kudurshian, Heitz, and Shaw. Final Act. 22–25.
Claims 5–8, 16–19, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Kudurshian, Heitz, and Zimmerman. Final Act. 26–
40.
Claims 9, 10, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Kudurshian, Heitz, and Rabb. Final Act. 40–49.
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Application 15/799,393
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We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant replicates arguments to similar independent claim 12. Appellant
does not separately argue claims 2–11 and 13–22. Except for our ultimate
decision, we do not discuss the merits of the § 103 rejections of claims 2–22
further herein.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).

OPINION
Examiner’s Findings and Appellant’s Contentions of Error
The Examiner finds Kudurshian’s intelligent digital assistant discloses
a system for providing user-defined event notification including claim
elements (i), (ii), (iii)(a), (iii)(c), (iii)(c)(1), and (iii)(c)(2). Final Act. 2–5.
The Examiner relies on Heitz for disclosing identified deficiencies of
Kudurshian, including claim element (iii) and the processor of claim element
(c) including the capabilities recited by claim elements (3) and (4). Id. at 5–
8. According to the Examiner, one skilled in the art would have combined
the teachings of Kudurshian and Heitz “to provide a friendly techniques for
discovering, categorizing, and notifying users of events of interest are in
great need.” Id. at 8.
Appellant contends the rejection is improper, arguing in essence:
(1) the Office Action is fatally unclear and ambiguous (Appeal Br. 8);
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(2) Kudurshian fails to teach interpreting the audible event definition
to identify from amongst the plurality of electronic systems a one of the
plurality of electronic systems that can be used to determine whether the first
user-defined event occurs as required in claim element (iii)(c)(2)(Appeal Br.
5–7); and
(3) Kudurshian fails to teach an audible event definition that
comprises a notification when a first user-defined event occurs as required in
claim element (iii)(c)(1) (Appeal Br. 7–8).

Analysis
We have considered in this Decision only those arguments Appellant
actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments not made are waived. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018).
To the extent consistent with our analysis herein, we adopt as our own
the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in (1) the action from
which this appeal is taken and (2) the Examiner’s Answer in response to
Appellant’s Appeal Brief, and concur with the conclusions reached by the
Examiner. We highlight the following for emphasis.
We address Appellant’s contentions of error seriatim as follows:
1. Sufficiency of the Rejection
Applicant asserts the Examiner “has not clearly and unambiguously
set forth what in Kudurshian is asserted to correspond to at least the claimed
‘plurality of electronic systems’ and the claimed ‘notification system.’”
Appeal Br. 8. As a consequence, Appellant argues “the rejection of claim 1
as set forth in the Office Action is so uninformative that it prevents
Applicant from responding thereto and, as such, the rejection of claim 1
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under 35 U.S.C. § 103 must be withdrawn.” Id. (citing In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly noted “the prima facie case is
merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of
production.” Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The court has held
that the Office carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie
case when its rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by
notifying the applicant of the reasons for rejection, “together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of
continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” In re Jung, 637 F.3d at
1362 (citation omitted). All that is required of the Office is that it set forth
the statutory basis of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative
manner as to meet the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132. Id.; see also
Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that 35
U.S.C. § 132 “is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it
prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds
for rejection.”).
Because we find the Examiner has provided sufficient information to
allow Appellant to respond to the rejection, we determine the Examiner has
set forth a prima facie case of unpatentability of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103. Final Act. 2–8.
2. Kudurshian teaches interpreting the audible event definition to
identify from amongst the plurality of electronic systems a one
of the plurality of electronic systems that can be used to
determine whether the first user-defined event occurs as
required in claim element (iii)(c)(2)
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The Examiner finds Kudurshian teaches a digital assistant, which can
refer to any of several types of information processing systems that interpret
speech input to infer user intent and to then perform actions based on the
inferred user intent. Final Act. 4, citing to Kudurshian ¶ 261. According to
the Examiner, determining whether the user intent is to perform a searching
task or instead an object management task serves to identify which
electronic system to use. Id. at 5, citing to Kudurshian ¶ 256. The Examiner
further finds Heitz’s “plurality of devices coupled together to form a system”
and smart devices that communicate on a network teach or suggest the
recited plurality of electronic system coupled to an intelligent digital
assistant via a wide-area network. Id. at 6, citing to Heitz ¶¶ 11, 19.
According to the Examiner, the reason for combining the teachings of
Kudurshian and Heitz “is to provide a friendly techniques for discovering,
categorizing, and notifying users of events of interest are in great need.” Id.
at 8.
Appellant argues the Examiner improperly applies Kudurshian’s
digital assistant for teaching both the recited event detection and notification
server and the recited electronic systems. Appeal Br. 5–6.
The Examiner responds, finding that Kudurshian teaches:
The digital assistant can also receive speech inputs indirectly
through one or more electronic devices. For example, the device
configurations indicate that the user device is communicatively
connected to one or more electronic devices such as a
smartphone, a tablet, or the like. As described, in some examples,
the digital assistant further determines whether the user intent is
to perform a task using a searching process or an object
managing process.
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Ans. 7–8 (emphasis omitted; citing to Kudurshian, ¶ 256). The Examiner
further finds that Heitz teaches “a plurality of devices coupled together to
form a system, such as one or more client devices and one or more servers.”
Ans. 8 (emphasis omitted), citing to Heitz ¶ 11.
Appellant replies, arguing that the Examiner relies on Heitz for
disclosing “a plurality of smart devices connected to a network.” Reply
Br. 2. According to Appellant, by asserting the combination of Kudurshian
and Heitz, the Office is acknowledging that the system of Kudurshian does
not teach the plurality of the electronic devices coupled to the personal
digital assistant as required by the claim. Id. 2–3. Consequently, Appellant
argues, there is no disclosure by Kudurshian of an event detection and
notification system that will identify a system that can be used to determine
whether a user-defined event has occurred. Id.
We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive. We disagree there is no
description that the speech is received from other systems than the digital
assistant itself. Appeal Br. 5–6. As found by the Examiner (Ans. 7–8),
Kudurshian describes receiving speech inputs “indirectly through another
electronic device that is communicatively connected to the user device”
including “through one or more electronic devices” (Kudurshian ¶ 256).
Thus, we disagree with Appellant’s argument that Kudurshian does not teach
the plurality of the electronic devices coupled to the personal digital assistant
as required by the claim.
We are further unpersuaded Kudurshian does not “disclose, teach, or
suggest an event detection and notification server that functions use an
audible event definition to identify from amongst a plurality of electronic
systems a one of the plurality of electronic systems that can be used to
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determine whether the first user-defined event occurs.” Reply Br. 3.
According to Appellant, because “Kudurshian does not include a plurality of
electronic devices that are coupled to a personal digital assistant via a local
area network and an event detection and notification server,” it follows that
there is no disclosure of identifying one of the nonexistent plurality of
systems. Id. Similarly, Appellant argues that although Heitz discloses a
plurality of smart devices, Heitz does not disclose identifying a particular
system. Id. Thus, Appellant argues the combination of Kudurshian and
Heitz fails to teach the argued limitation. Id.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive for several reasons.
Appellant directs attention to paragraphs 33–47 of the Specification for a
description of the argued identifying limitation. Appeal Br. 3. Although the
Specification does not provide a particular definition for what is required to
identify a system that can be used to determine whether a user-defined event
occurs, the Specification gives the following example: “For each type of
communication, i.e., text, email, phone call, and audio alert via intelligent
digital assistant 102, processor 200 may identify a communication system
suitable for delivering a notification of the event” (Spec. ¶ 38); and “voice
servicing system 112/event detection and notification server 114 is
programmed to identify, from [a] portion of [an] audible event definition,
which device or electronic system will determine whether the first user-
defined event occurs” (Spec. ¶ 39). Thus, the claimed identification includes
merely associating a request for information (e.g., email notifications) with a
source of such information (e.g., an email server) as further described at
paragraph 49 of the Specification.
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As found by the Examiner, Kudurshian discloses determining a
process that can be used to satisfy a user’s request. Final Act. 4, Ans. 7–8.
The Examiner further finds Kudurshian discloses that a user may request to
be notified of incoming emails (Ans. 5 (citing Kudurshian ¶ 385)). Thus,
Kudurshian teaches making a selection (i.e., determining a system that can
provide a requested service) to satisfy a user’s request. Because Heitz
discloses a plurality of devices, the combination of Kudurshian and Heitz
reasonably teaches identifying one of those devices or systems from which
to obtain information or otherwise satisfy a user’s notification request. Still
further, we note Kudurshian discloses responding to a user’s request for a
stock price by searching online information (e.g., identifying Internet
websites hosted on remote server systems) (see, e.g., Kudurshian ¶¶ 125,
261) thereby further teaching identifying from among a plurality of
electronic systems (e.g., website servers) one of the plurality of electronic
systems (e.g., a website providing stock prices) that can be used to determine
whether the first user-defined event occurs (e.g., publication of a stock
price). Therefore, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive and we agree with
the Examiner in finding the combination of Kudurshian and Heitz teaches or
suggests the disputed limitation.
3. Kudurshian teaches an audible event definition that comprises a
notification when a first user-defined event occurs as required
in claim element (iii)(c)(1)
The Examiner finds Kudurshian’s “digital assistant [that] provides a
spoken output 874 including ‘Today’s AAPL price is $100.00’” teaches an
audible event notification when a first user-defined event occurs. Final
Act. 5.
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Appellant argues Kudurshian’s spoken output is not a notification of
the occurrence of a first user-defined event. Appeal Br. 7. The Examiner
responds finding that Kudurshian allows the user to define events by
requesting the system to, “[n]otify me of incoming emails.” Ans. 5, citing to
Kudurshian ¶ 0385.
The Examiner further finds Heitz also discloses providing notification
that an event has occurred on a client device in describing a “motion event
that occurred at 12:10 PM” and an “audio event that occurred at 12:45 PM.”
Ans. 6 (emphasis omitted), citing to Heitz ¶ 302.
Appellant’s Specification discloses that examples of events include,
“conditions, or changes in conditions, occurring in or around dwelling 100,
such as a door, window or garage door being opened or closed . . . .” Spec.
¶ 33. Thus, under a broad but reasonable interpretation consistent with the
Specification, Kudurshian’s notification of an incoming email (an event) and
Heitz’s notification of a motion event each teach or suggest the disputed
limitation.
We find under a broadest reasonable interpretation that Examiner’s
disclosure teaches an event notification when a first user-defined event
occurs. Ans. 5.
For the reasons discussed above, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s
contentions of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being rendered unpatentable by Kudurshian over Heitz together
with the rejection of independent claims 12, which is argued together with
claim 1, and the rejection of dependent claims 2–11 and 13–22, which are
not argued separately with particularity.
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–2, 4, 11–13, 15, and
22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable by Kudurshian over Heitz.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 3 and 14 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 over Kudurshian over Heitz, and Shaw.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 5–8, 16–19, and
21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Kudurshian over Heitz, and Zimmerman.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 9, 10, and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Kudurshian over Heitz, and Rabb.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–2, 4, 11–
13, 15, 22
103 Kudurshian, Heitz 1–2, 4, 11–
13, 15, 22

3, 14 103 Kudurshian, Heitz,
and Shaw
3, 14
5–8, 16–19,
21
103 Kudurshian, Heitz
and Zimmerman
5–8, 16–19,
21

9–10, 20 103 Kudurshian, Heitz,
and Rabb
9, 10, 20
Overall
Outcome
1–22

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED