East End Bus Lines, Inc. and Floyd Bus Company, Inc., A Single Employer

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 3, 2018

366 NLRB No. 54 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 54
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
East End Bus Lines, Inc. and Floyd Bus Company,
Inc., a Single Employer and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 1205. Cases
29–CA–188517 and 29–CA–194097
April 3, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN KAPLAN AND MEMBERS PEARCE
AND MCFERRAN
The General Counsel seeks a default judgment in this
case pursuant to the terms of an informal settlement
agreement. Upon a charge and amended charges filed by
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 1205
(the Union) on November 21, 2016, December 21, 2016,
and January 12, 2017, respectively, the General Counsel
issued a complaint and notice of hearing on January 30,
2017, against East End Bus Lines, Inc. and Floyd Bus
Company, Inc., as a single employer (collectively, the
Respondent). On March 10, 2017, based upon a second
charge filed by the Union against the Respondent on
March 2, 2017, the General Counsel issued an order con-
solidating cases, amendment to the complaint (the con-
solidated complaint), alleging that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5), (3), and (1) of the Act by, among
other things, unilaterally transferring work and employ-
ees from the Respondent’s Medford, New York bus yard,
where employees are represented by the Union, to its
Brookhaven/Yaphank, New York yard, where employees
are outside of the bargaining unit.
On March 16, 2017, the Respondent and the Union en-
tered into, and the Regional Director for Region 29 ap-
proved, a bilateral informal settlement agreement of the
allegations in the consolidated complaint (the Settlement
Agreement).
The Settlement Agreement contained the following
provisions:
RESTORE THE STATUS QUO — Respondent will
transfer back all bus routes … charter, mid-day, and
late runs that were performed by East End Bus Lines,
Inc. (“East End”) out of the Respondent’s Medford
yard (“Medford work”). Respondent agrees to follow
the following schedule in effectuating the transfer of
this work:
By March 20, 2017, Respondent will inform all current
employees of Floyd Bus Company, Inc. (“Floyd”) that
all former Medford work will be transferred back to
East End and will be performed out of the Medford
yard. Respondent will solicit volunteers to transfer and
perform this work as employees of East End. The em-
ployees who volunteer will begin working as employ-
ees of East End by March 27, 2017.
Beginning March 20, 2017, Respondent will transfer
back the prior mid-day, late runs and charter work to
the Medford yard. This work will only be performed
by Floyd employees to the extent East End employees
are not willing or available to perform the work.
By April 10, 2017, Respondent will fill remaining East
End positions by transferring Floyd employees to East
End in order of reverse seniority. Employees who were
employed by First Student Inc., immediately prior to
working for Floyd will be exempt from any mandatory
transfer. Respondent may then fill any remaining open
positions at East End with new hires. In the circum-
stance that Respondent is unable to fill all open posi-
tions at East End with new hires, it shall bargain in
good faith with the Union. No employee transferred
from Floyd to East End will have their wage rates re-
duced.
…
PERFORMANCE — … Respondent agrees that in
case of non-compliance with any of the terms of this
Settlement Agreement by the Respondent, and after 14
days’ notice from the Regional Director of the National
Labor Relations Board of such non-compliance without
remedy by Respondent, the Regional Director will reis-
sue the complaints previously issued on January 30,
2017, and March 10, 2017, in the instant case(s).
Thereafter, the General Counsel may file a motion for
default judgment with the Board on the allegations of
the complaint. Respondent understands and agrees that
the allegations of the aforementioned complaint will be
deemed admitted and its Answer to such complaint will
be considered withdrawn. The only issue that may be
raised before the Board is whether Respondent default-
ed on the terms of this Settlement Agreement. The
Board may then, without necessity of trial or any other
proceeding, find all allegations of the complaint to be
true and make findings of fact and conclusions of law
consistent with those allegations adverse to the Re-
spondent on all issues raised by the pleadings. The
Board may then issue an order providing for a full rem-
edy for the violations found as is appropriate to remedy
such violations. The parties further agree that a U.S.
Court of Appeals Judgment may be entered enforcing
the Board order ex parte, after service or attempted ser-
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
vice upon Respondent/Respondent at the last address
provided to the General Counsel.
On May 24, 2017, the Regional Director for Region 29
informed the Respondent that it had not complied with
the Settlement Agreement, listed the actions needed for
compliance, and warned that, if the Respondent did not
cure its noncompliance, the complaint would be reissued
in accordance with the performance clause of the Settle-
ment Agreement. In a June 8, 2017 response, the Re-
spondent denied that it was in noncompliance, noting
that although it had not returned 26 big bus routes and 14
van routes to the Medford yard, it had made every effort
to solicit Floyd employees who worked out of the
Brookhaven/Yaphank yard to voluntarily transfer to the
Medford yard, hire new employees to fill the remaining
open positions at the Medford yard, and bargain in good
faith with the Union regarding the transfer of work to the
Medford yard.
On July 7, 2017, the General Counsel issued a Com-
plaint Based on Breach of Affirmative Provisions of Set-
tlement Agreement. On July 10, 2017, in accordance
with the Settlement Agreement, the General Counsel
filed a Motion to Transfer Proceedings to the Board and
Motion for Default Judgment with the Board. On July
13, 2017, the Board issued an Order Transferring Pro-
ceeding to the Board and Notice to Show Cause why the
motion should not be granted. On July 27, 2017, the
Respondent filed a Response to Notice to Show Cause
and Memorandum in Support, disputing the allegation
that it had breached the Settlement Agreement. On Au-
gust 3, 2017, the General Counsel filed a reply to Re-
spondent’s Response to Notice to Show Cause.
The Board has delegated its authority in this proceed-
ing to a three-member panel.1
Ruling on Motion for Default Judgment
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent has
not returned all of the big bus and van routes to the Med-
ford yard nor has it complied with the fourth paragraph
of the “Restore the Status Quo” portion of the Settlement
Agreement to transfer Floyd employees in order of re-
verse seniority to the Medford yard. The Respondent
admits that it has not returned 26 big bus routes and 14
van routes to the Medford yard. It argues, however, that
it has not failed to comply with the Settlement Agree-
ment because some Floyd employees refused to accept
transfers to the Medford yard and it was unable to hire a
sufficient number of new employees to perform the work
due to a general shortage of bus drivers on Long Island.
In support, it submitted exhibits which show that, on

1 Member Emanuel took no part in the consideration of this case.
March 20, 2017, it informed the Floyd employees that it
would be transferring work back to the Medford yard and
that it sought and obtained some volunteers for that
transfer. It also submitted the following exhibits: (1) 42
“Yard Transfer Acceptance/Refusal Acknowledgement
Forms” from 30 Floyd employees who refused a transfer
to the Medford yard despite a warning on the form that
“refusal of assigned route/transfer is equal to a voluntary
resignation;”2 (2) printouts of job postings on indeed.com
advertising a $1250 signing bonus; (3) a picture of a
“NOW HIRING” banner that appears to offer the same
$1250 signing bonus as the online job postings;3 and (4)
a flyer offering current employees $1000 for referring a
successful applicant to work at East End.
The Respondent’s reliance on the refusal of the Floyd
employees to accept transfers to the Medford yard is
misplaced for several reasons. First, the Respondent
failed to follow the terms established in the “Restore the
Status Quo” portion of the Settlement Agreement, which
provided that if an insufficient number of employees
volunteered to transfer to the Medford yard, the Re-
spondent “will” transfer Floyd employees in order of
reverse seniority. The Respondent argues that it tried to
effect those transfers but that the employees refused. A
more accurate description is that the Respondent solicit-
ed volunteers to transfer and then, when that failed, de-
cided to disregard its obligations under the Settlement
Agreement. The Respondent did not transfer its least
senior employees to begin working at the Medford yard
as required under the Settlement Agreement; it merely
asked them if they would transfer.4
The Respondent claims that many of its employees
would have sooner quit than be transferred to the Med-
ford yard, and if it had attempted to force the transfers as
required by the Settlement Agreement and the employees
did in fact resign, it would then be faced with a shortage
of East End and Floyd drivers, potentially jeopardizing
its ability to perform on its school bus contracts. This

2 The record shows that, on two separate occasions, the Respondent
requested that 12 employees transfer to the Medford yard. The 12
employees refused the Respondent’s transfer request both times. The
transfer forms state that company policy treats a refusal to transfer as a
voluntary resignation, but the Respondent clearly did not enforce that
policy against these 12 employees after the first time they refused the
Respondent’s transfer request. Otherwise, the Respondent never could
have requested that they transfer a second time. Moreover, even after
the second refusal, there is no indication in the record that the Re-
spondent enforced that policy.
3 The photograph of the banner is very low resolution and most of
the writing is indiscernible. The words “NOW HIRING!” and “$1250”
are legible, and an image of a school bus is apparent in the picture.
4 Because the Respondent did not actually treat refusal to transfer as
resignation as the transfer forms stated, the attempted transfers were for
all practical purposes voluntary, not mandatory.
EAST END BUS LINES, INC. AND FLOYD BUS COMPANY, INC. 3
assertion is highly speculative as the Respondent never
attempted to fully comply with the Settlement Agree-
ment’s requirement to transfer the Floyd employees.5
However, even if its assertion were true, it was a situa-
tion of the Respondent’s own making as it voluntarily
executed the Settlement Agreement in which it agreed to
implement the transfers. In addition, the Settlement
Agreement only came about because of the Respondent’s
unlawful transfer of work to Floyd and the
Brookhaven/Yaphank yard in the first place.6 It cannot
now evade its obligations under the Settlement Agree-
ment by pointing to the precariousness of a situation that
is of its own creation.
In addition, the Respondent did not even comply with
the timeline laid out in the Settlement Agreement, which
required it to finish the process of transferring employees
to the Medford yard by April 10, 2017. The Respond-
ent’s own evidence shows that it did not begin the pro-
cess until more than 2 weeks after that deadline. The
earliest any employees signed the forms refusing to
transfer was on April 27, 2017, which was also the first
day that the Regional Office contacted the Respondent
for an update about its compliance with the Settlement
Agreement. The Respondent provided no evidence that,
prior to April 27, it made any effort to transfer employ-
ees to the Medford yard, and certainly not during the
timeline it explicitly agreed to in the Settlement Agree-
ment. Additionally, the Respondent’s evidence of its
attempt to hire new drivers does not render it in compli-
ance with its obligations because the Settlement Agree-
ment provided for filling positions with new hires only if
the mandatory transfers—which the Respondent never
effectuated—were insufficient.7
Finally, it is no defense that the Respondent complied
with certain other provisions of the Settlement Agree-
ment, such as returning the charter, mid-day, and late
runs to the Medford yard. See Midwestern Video Per-
sonnel, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 120 (2016) (employer de-
faulted when it paid only one of two required install-
ments of backpay to a terminated employee and failed to
make a required interest payment). The Settlement

5 One could similarly speculate that the employees would have ac-
cepted the transfers rather than lose their jobs if they believed that the
Respondent would actually enforce its stated policy of treating a refusal
to transfer as a voluntary resignation.
6 The Settlement Agreement did not include a nonadmissions
clause.
7 Although the Respondent submitted evidence of an attempt to hire
new drivers, none of that evidence is dated. The indeed.com postings
bear the date “5/31/2017” on the bottom, but that appears to be the date
that the Respondent printed the ads that it submitted as evidence of
compliance and not necessarily the date on which they were posted to
the website. The banner and flyer are undated.
Agreement explicitly provides that “in case of non-
compliance with any of the terms,” the General Counsel
will reissue the complaints and file a motion for default
judgment. In addition, the noncompliance provision in
the Settlement Agreement provides that “[t]he only issue
that may be raised before the Board is whether Respond-
ent defaulted on the terms of this Settlement Agree-
ment.” As described above, the Respondent has failed to
comply with the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement
Agreement further provides that “[t]he Board may then,
without necessity of trial or any other proceeding, find all
allegations of the complaint to be true and make findings
of fact and conclusions of law consistent with those alle-
gations adverse to the Respondent on all issues raised in
the pleadings.” Accordingly, we grant the General
Counsel’s Motion for Default Judgment and find, pursu-
ant to the noncompliance provisions of the Settlement
Agreement set forth above, that all of the allegations in
the reissued complaint are true.8
On the entire record, the Board makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, East End has been a domestic
corporation with an office and place of business located
at 3601 Horseblock Road, Medford, New York, and has
provided school bus transportation services for children
in Suffolk County, New York.
During the 12-month period preceding reissuance of
the complaint, which is representative of its annual oper-
ations in general, East End has provided services valued
in excess of $250,000 to the South Country Central
School District, Suffolk County, New York, an entity
which is directly engaged in interstate commerce.
We find that East End has been an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
At all material times, Floyd has been a domestic cor-
poration with an office and place of business at 3 Grucci
Lane, Brookhaven, New York, and has been engaged in
providing school bus transportation services for children
in Suffolk County, New York.
Based on a projection of its operations since about Au-
gust 2016, at which time Floyd commenced operations,
Floyd, in conducting its business operations described
above, will annually provide services valued in excess of
$250,000 to the Floyd District, Suffolk County, New
York, and the South Country Central School District,

8 See U-Bee, Ltd., 315 NLRB 667, 668 (1994). Also, pursuant to
the noncompliance provisions, we find that the Respondent’s answer to
the original consolidated complaint has been withdrawn.
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Suffolk County, New York, entities which are directly
engaged in interstate commerce.
We find that Floyd has been an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
At all material times, East End and Floyd have had
substantially identical management, business purposes,
operations, equipment, customers, supervision, and own-
ership.
At all material times, East End and Floyd have been
affiliated business enterprises with common officers,
ownership, directors, management, and supervision; have
administered a common labor policy; have shared com-
mon premises and facilities; have provided services for
each other; have interchanged personnel with each other;
have interrelated operations and provide transportation to
common school districts; and have held themselves out
to the public as a single integrated business enterprise.
Based on the operations and conduct described above,
we find that East End and Floyd constitute a single inte-
grated business enterprise and a single employer within
the meaning of the Act.
We find that, at all material times, the Union has been
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
At all material times, the following individuals have
held the positions set forth opposite their respective
names and have been supervisors of the Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and
agents of the Respondent within the meaning of Section
2(13) of the Act:
John Mensch (Mensch) – Owner and President
Jerri Alexander (Alexander) – Human Resources Rep-
resentative
The following employees of the Respondent (the Unit)
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act:
All full-time and regular part-time drivers, monitors,
mechanics, dispatchers, and maintenance workers em-
ployed by Respondent at its facility located at 3601
Horseblock Road, Medford, New York, but excluding
all other employees, guards, watchmen, office clerical
employees, professional employees, confidential em-
ployees, and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of
the Act.
On February 26, 2016,9 Region 29 of the National La-
bor Relations Board conducted an election in Case No.
29–RC–168266, in which a majority of the employees in
the Unit selected the Union as their representative for the
purposes of collective bargaining. On August 3, pursu-
ant to a Decision and Certification of Representative is-
sued by the Regional Director of Region 29, the Union
was certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining rep-
resentative of the employees in the Unit employed by the
Respondent. At all material times, based on Section 9(a)
of the Act, the Union has been the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the Unit.
On about January 26, the Respondent won the bid to
provide bus transportation services for the William Floyd
Union Free District School (Floyd School District). On
about May 23, the Respondent filed for a certificate of
incorporation with the New York State Department of
State. On about August 11, Floyd School District and
East End entered into an Indemnification Agreement
whereby the Floyd School District agreed to allow East
End to subcontract school bus driver services from East
End to Floyd.
The Respondent engaged in the following conduct:
1. On about August 11, the Respondent, by Mensch,
at a safety refresher course held in the Bellport Middle
School, informed its employees that it would be futile for
them to select the Union as their bargaining representa-
tive by telling unit employees that they were nonunion.
2. On about September 6, the Respondent, by Alexan-
der, at the Medford yard, told employees that it was
changing the time of employees’ safety refresher course
and dry-run payments because they had selected the Un-
ion as their collective-bargaining representative.
3. (a) In or around August, the Respondent transferred
bargaining unit work (certain bus routes) previously per-
formed by the Medford yard bargaining unit employees
out of the Unit to Floyd’s nonunit Brookhaven/Yaphank
yard employees.
(b) In or around August, the Respondent trans-
ferred certain bargaining unit employees from the Med-
ford yard out of the Unit to Floyd’s nonunit
Brookhaven/Yaphank yard.
(c) By the conduct described above, the Respond-
ent has unilaterally altered the scope of the Unit
(d) The Respondent engaged in the conduct de-
scribed above in paragraph 3(a) and 3(b) without the
consent of the Union.
(e) Within the 6 months prior to the issuance of the
Complaint Based on Breach of Affirmative Provisions of
Settlement Agreement, the Respondent subcontracted

9 Dates hereafter are in 2016, unless otherwise indicated.
EAST END BUS LINES, INC. AND FLOYD BUS COMPANY, INC. 5
certain bus routes that constitute bargaining unit work
previously performed by Medford yard unit employees
out of the Unit to Suffolk Transportation Corp.
4. In or around August, the Respondent reduced the
work hours of the Medford yard bargaining unit employ-
ees by transferring the charter, late, and mid-day runs
from the Medford yard to the Brookhaven/Yaphank yard.
5. The Respondent engaged in the conduct described
above in paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), and 4 because its employ-
ees joined and supported the Union and engaged in con-
certed activities, and to discourage them from engaging
in those or other concerted activities.
6. On or about September 9, the Respondent unilater-
ally changed its past practice regarding the timing of
employees’ dry-run and safety refresher course pay-
ments.
7. On or about September 30, the Respondent granted
a 2-percent wage increase to its employees at the Med-
ford yard.
8. The subjects set forth above in paragraphs 3(a),
3(b), 3(e), 4, 6, and 7 relate to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment of the Unit and are
mandatory subjects for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining.
9. The Respondent engaged in the conduct described
above in paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), 3(e), 4, 6, and 7 without
prior notice to the Union and without affording the Un-
ion an opportunity to bargain with the Respondent with
respect to this conduct and its effects.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By telling employees that selecting the Union as their
exclusive collective-bargaining representative would be
futile and that the Respondent was changing the timing
of payment for the safety refresher course and dry runs
because the employees had selected the Union as their
exclusive collective-bargaining representative, as de-
scribed above in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Respondent has
been interfering with, restraining, and coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
By transferring bargaining unit work and employees to
the nonunit Brookhaven/Yaphank yard and reducing the
work hours of unit employees at the Medford yard, as
described above in paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), and 4, the Re-
spondent has been discriminating in regard to the hire or
tenure or terms or conditions of employment of its em-
ployees, thereby discouraging membership in the Union
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
By unilaterally transferring bargaining unit work and
employees to the nonunit Brookhaven/Yaphank yard,
altering the scope of the Unit, subcontracting bargaining
unit work out of the Unit to Suffolk Transportation
Corp., reducing the work hours of unit employees at the
Medford yard, changing its past practice regarding the
timing of employees’ dry-run and safety refresher course
payments, and granting a 2-percent wage increase to the
employees at the Medford yard, as described above in
paragraphs 3(a)-(e), 4, 6, and 7, the Respondent has been
failing and refusing to bargain collectively and in good
faith with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The Respondent’s unfair labor practices described
above affect commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act. Specifically, we shall order the Respondent
to comply with the unmet terms of the Settlement
Agreement approved by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 29 on March 16, 2017.10
Accordingly, we shall order the Respondent to transfer
back all big bus routes and van routes (South Country
School District and Longwood School District) that were
performed by East End out of the Respondent’s Medford
yard. We shall also order the Respondent to fill the East
End positions by requiring the Floyd employees to trans-
fer to East End in order of reverse seniority, except for
those employees employed by First Student, Inc. imme-
diately prior to working for Floyd. Furthermore, we
shall order the Respondent to not reduce the wage rates
of any employee transferred from Floyd to East End and
to provide the Region with updates on the progress of the
transferred work on a weekly basis until completed.
In addition, we shall order the Respondent, on request
by the Union, to rescind any or all unilateral changes to
employees’ terms and conditions of employment.
As provided in the Settlement Agreement, to ensure
that the bargaining unit employees are accorded the ser-
vices of their selected bargaining agent for the period

10 In a letter to the Respondent dated May 24, 2017 (attached as Ex-
hibit 7 to the General Counsel’s Motion for Default Judgment), the
Regional Director for Region 29 notified the Respondent that it was in
default of key terms of the Settlement Agreement and that, as of that
date, the Respondent had failed to comply or provide evidence of its
compliance with the following terms in the Settlement Agreement:(i)
bargain in good faith with the Union; (ii) rescind any or all unilateral
changes made to terms and conditions of employment; and (iii) transfer
the work to the Medford yard in accordance with the terms of the “Re-
store the Status Quo” section of the Settlement Agreement. The Gen-
eral Counsel has indicated that the Respondent had complied with its
obligation under the Settlement Agreement to restore the charter, mid-
day, and late runs.
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
provided by law, we shall order the Respondent to bar-
gain with the Union, and we shall construe the initial
period of the certification as beginning the date the Re-
spondent begins to bargain in good faith with the Union.
Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 NLRB 785 (1962) (extending
the certification year for one additional year because of
the employer’s refusal to bargain with the union); accord
Burnett Construction Co., 149 NLRB 1419, 1421 (1964),
enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1965); Lamar Hotel, 140
NLRB 226, 229 (1962), enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 817 (1964).
In limiting our affirmative remedies to those enumer-
ated above, we are mindful that the General Counsel is
empowered under the default provision of the Settlement
Agreement to seek “a full remedy for the violations
found as is appropriate to remedy such violations.”11
However, in his Motion for Default Judgment, the Gen-
eral Counsel has not sought such additional remedies and
we will not, sua sponte, include them.12
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, East End Bus Lines, Inc. and Floyd Bus
Company, Inc., a single employer, Medford, New York,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
following affirmative actions necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
1. Transfer back all bus routes (South Country School
District and Longwood School District) that were per-
formed by East End out of the Respondent’s Medford
yard.
2. Fill East End positions by requiring the Floyd em-
ployees to transfer to East End in order of reverse senior-

11 As set forth above, the Settlement Agreement provided that, in
case of noncompliance, the General Counsel may seek, and the Board
may issue “a full remedy for the violations found as is appropriate to
remedy such violations.”
12 See, e.g., Midwestern Video Personnel, 363 NLRB No. 120, slip
op. at 2–3 (2016); Benchmark Mechanical, Inc., 348 NLRB 576, 577
and fn. 3 (2006). The General Counsel specifically requested in his
Motion for Default Judgment that the Board issue “a Decision contain-
ing findings of fact and conclusions of law based on, and in accordance
with, the allegations of the Complaint, remedying such unfair labor
practices, including requiring Respondent to comply with the terms of
the Settlement Agreement, and granting such other relief as may be just
and proper to remedy the violations described in the Complaint.” We
construe the General Counsel’s Motion as seeking enforcement of the
unmet provisions of the Settlement Agreement.
ity, except for those employees employed by First Stu-
dent, Inc. immediately prior to working for Floyd.
3. Not reduce the wage rates of any employee trans-
ferred from Floyd to East End.
4. Provide the Region with updates on the progress of
the transferred work on a weekly basis until completed.
5. On request, rescind any or all changes to employ-
ees’ terms and conditions of employment that were made
without bargaining with the Union and reaching a good
faith, valid impasse.
6. On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in
the following appropriate unit concerning terms and con-
ditions of employment:
All full-time and regular part-time drivers, monitors,
mechanics, dispatchers, and maintenance workers em-
ployed by Respondent at its facility located at 3601
Horseblock Road, Medford, New York, but excluding
all other employees, guards, watchmen, office clerical
employees, professional employees, confidential em-
ployees, and supervisors as defined in Section 2(11) of
the Act.
7. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 29 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. April 3, 2018
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD