Earl Alexander, Appellant,v.Robert M. Walker, Acting Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 24, 1998
05970526 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 24, 1998)

05970526

12-24-1998

Earl Alexander, Appellant, v. Robert M. Walker, Acting Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Earl Alexander v. Department of the Army

05970526

December 24, 1998

Earl Alexander, )

Appellant, ) Request No. 05970526

) Appeal No. 01960566

v. ) Agency No. 9508F1060

)

Robert M. Walker, )

Acting Secretary, )

Department of the Army, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION ON RECONSIDERATION

INTRODUCTION

On February 24, 1997, Earl Alexander (hereinafter referred to

as appellant) timely initiated a request to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (the Commission) to reconsider the decision

in Alexander v. Dep't of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 01960566

(January 22, 1997). EEOC regulations provide that the Commissioners

may, in their discretion, reconsider any previous Commission decision.

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a). The party requesting reconsideration must

submit written argument or evidence which tends to establish one or

more of the following three criteria: new and material evidence is

available that was not readily available when the previous decision

was issued, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1); the previous decision involved

an erroneous interpretation of law or regulation, or material fact,

or a misapplication of established policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2);

and the decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). For the reasons

set forth herein, appellant's request is denied.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether appellant's request meets any of the

statutory criteria for reconsideration.

BACKGROUND

The previous decision gave a complete account of the facts at issue in

this case, and the Commission adopts that version of the facts herein.

A summary of the relevant facts and issues follows. Following lumbar disc

surgery in 1985, appellant experienced intermittent episodes of lower

back pain and numbness. As a result, appellant's orthopedic surgeon

recommended that appellant avoid certain physical activities, e.g.,

bending, twisting, and so on. In 1989, the agency's Medical Director

found that appellant was medically disqualified from his position as a

WG-10 Boiler Plant Operator because the position required heavy physical

labor and because appellant's restrictions were permanent.

Appellant obtained a position as a Supply Clerk.<1> In February 1995,

appellant applied for a WG-11 Boiler Plant Operator--apparently a

supervisory position. Appellant provided a physician's statement

indicating that he would be able to perform the duties of the

above position. Acknowledging the physician's letter, the Medical

Director--having examined appellant and noting that the position was

characterized as "physical"--said that in his opinion, appellant did

not meet the physical requirements of the position and that his existing

limitations should not be removed.

In June 1995, appellant filed the instant EEO complaint alleging

disability discrimination. Allegation 1: Appellant asserted that

the Medical Director, in advising that appellant could not meet the

physical requirements of the position, chose to disregard his personal

physician's recommendation that he could perform the duties of the WG-11

Boiler Plant Operator position. Allegation 2: Appellant also asserted

that in April 1989, the Medical Director chose to misquote and disregard

the recommendations of an orthopedic physician, and had maintained an

inaccurate medical record since that time to appellant's detriment.

Appellant indicated that he was aware of this erroneous information as

the result of a nonselection in 1991. Allegation 3: Appellant contended

that the Medical Director had forced him to take early retirement.

In its final decision (FAD), the agency dismissed appellant's

complaint. The agency dismissed allegation 1 as moot because appellant had

been selected for and placed in the WG-11 Boiler Plant Operator position

for which he had applied. The agency dismissed allegation 2 for untimely

EEO contact. Finally, the agency dismissed allegation 3 on the grounds

that it raised a matter that had not been brought to the attention of

an EEO counselor. In this regard, the agency noted that the allegation

had since been brought to the attention of an EEO counselor and that

appellant had received a notice of right to file on September 9, 1995.

Appellant appealed from the FAD.

The previous decision affirmed the FAD. The previous decision found

that appellant's EEO contact regarding allegation 2 was untimely.

Specifically, the previous decision found that appellant admitted that he

was aware of the "allegedly false medical information" as the result of a

1991 nonselection, but nonetheless waited almost 4 years before raising

the matter with an EEO counselor. Thus, the allegation was not timely

under a continuing violation theory. The previous decision further found

that allegation 1 was moot because the agency provided the SF-50 showing

that appellant was selected for the WG-11 Boiler Plant Operator position.

That is, the agency apparently credited the statement of appellant's

physician over that of the Medical Director as appellant had requested,

and placed him in the position.

In his reconsideration request, appellant contends that the previous

decision erred in affirming the FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider any previous decision

when the party requesting reconsideration submits written argument or

evidence which tends to establish that at least one of the criteria

of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c) is met. For a decision to be reconsidered,

the request must contain specific information that meets the criteria

referenced above.

Appellant appears to argue that a continuing violation exists in

this case, which would make his EEO counselor contact timely as to

allegation 2.

The previous decision noted that the existence of a continuing violation

can extend the 45-day limitations period for contacting an EEO counselor.

The previous decision also noted that appellant's prior knowledge or

suspicion of discrimination was relevant to determining the existence of

a continuing violation. Because appellant admitted that he was aware of

the alleged discrimination in 1991 and did not contact an EEO counselor

about the matter until 1995, the previous decision found that appellant

had failed to demonstrate a continuing violation. We find no error in

the previous decision's finding regarding allegation 2.

Appellant also contends that allegation 1 is not moot because he

subsequently took early retirement as a result of the Medical Director's

actions.<2>

Record evidence showed that appellant was placed in the WG-11 Boiler

Plant Operator position. That is, the agency apparently credited the

medical statement of appellant's physician over the recommendation given

by the Medical Director. Consequently, we find that the previous decision

properly determined that allegation 1 was moot. Appellant's assertion

that the Medical Director's actions subsequently forced him to take

early retirement was the subject of another complaint, see EEOC Appeal

No. 01970231 (February 10, 1997), and is more properly addressed therein.

Because we find that appellant's request fails to meet any of the

statutory criteria for reconsideration, we therefore deny the request.

CONCLUSION

After a review of appellant's request for reconsideration, the

previous decision, and the entire record, the Commission finds that

appellant's request for reconsideration fails to meet the criteria of

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c), and the request hereby is DENIED. The decision

in EEOC Appeal No. 01960566 hereby is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0993)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

DEC 24, 1998

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

1 In his reconsideration request, appellant asserts that the previous

decision erroneously identified the location of this position as Stockton,

California, and that he always worked in Odgen, Utah. The Commission

finds that the error was harmless.

2 Appellant's complaint regarding his constructive discharge allegation was

addressed in EEOC Appeal No. 01970231 (February 10, 1997). The decision

remanded the complaint to the agency for further processing.