E. I. DuPont Newport Local (DuPont & Co.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 31, 1990

300 N.L.R.B. 1165 (N.L.R.B. 1990)

1165
300 NLRB No. 163
E. I. DUPONT NEWPORT LOCAL 9 (DUPONT & CO.)
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings.
The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s
credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evi-
dence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully ex-
amined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 The judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(B) by fining employees Pierce and Burris for accepting temporary su-
pervisor positions and by refusing to refund dues erroneously withheld from
Pierce during July 1989. In adopting the judge’s decision, we rely on his find-
ing, amply supported by the record, that Pierce and Burris, as temporary super-
visors, possessed authority to adjust grievances at the first step of the parties’
negotiated grievance procedure. See NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local
340, 481 U.S. 573, 586 (1987); Sheet Metal Workers Local 68 (DeMoss Co.),
298 NLRB 1000 (1990). Member Cracraft dissented in part in the latter case.
In the present case, however, she joins her colleagues in finding that the Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(B) because the fines were not levied as a result
of the supervisors performing rank-and-file work during an employer-union
dispute.
1 General Counsel’s motion to correct transcript, except for the first pro-
posed correction, is granted.
E. I. DuPont Newport Union, Local No. 9 and E. I.
DuPont De Nemours and Company. Cases 4–
CB–5912 and 4–CB–5969
December 31, 1990
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY
On July 3, 1990, Administrative Law Judge Michael
O. Miller issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the General
Counsel and the Charging Party filed briefs in opposi-
tion to the Respondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions2 and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, E. I. DuPont Newport
Union, Local No. 9, Newport, Delaware, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall take the action set
forth in the Order.
Richard Heller, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Robert F. O’Brien, Esq. (Tomar, Simonoff, Adourian &
O’Brien), of Haddonfield, New Jersey, for the Respondent.
Thomas L. Sager, Esq., of Wilmington, Delaware, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was heard in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on March 12
and 13, 1990, based on unfair labor practice charges filed on
September 11, 1989, as amended on September 21, 1989
(Case 4–CB–5912) and December 5, 1989 (Case 4–CB–
5969) by E. I. DuPont De Nemours (the Employer or the
Charging Party) and complaints issued by the Regional Di-
rector of Region 4 of the National Labor Relations Board
(the Board) on December 1, 1989, and January 30, 1990. The
complaints allege that E. I. DuPont Newport Union, Local
No. 9 (Respondent) restrained and coerced the Employer in
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act) by fining member-supervisors and by re-
fusing to return moneys improperly deducted from the pay
of one of them. Respondent’s timely filed answer denies the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
On the entire record,1 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs
filed by all parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE EMPLOYER’S BUSINESS AND THE UNION’S LABOR
ORGANIZATION STATUS PRELIMINARY
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Employer, a Delaware corporation, is engaged in the
manufacture of chemicals and related products and maintains
its principal office and place of business in Wilmington,
Delaware. In the course and conduct of its business oper-
ations, it annually sells and ships products valued in excess
of $50,000 directly from its plants in Delaware to points lo-
cated outside that State. The Respondent admits, and I find
and conclude, that the Employer is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act.
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find and
conclude that the Respondent is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Employer’s Holly Run plant, in Newport, Delaware,
manufactures a single product, a pigment used in the produc-
tion of data, video, and magnetic tape. It operates on a 7-
day, around-the-clock basis, with four shifts of production
employees rotating through the schedule. Its supervisory hier-
archy includes a plant manager who is responsible for all as-
pects of the operation, an area supervisor responsible for
day-to-day plant operations, and four group or shift super-
visors. The Holly Run plant is the only plant involved in
these proceedings.
The collective-bargaining unit at the Holly Run plant con-
sists of about 90 employees, including approximately 35 pro-
duction employees as well as others in maintenance, quality
control/lab, shipping, and clerical positions. All of these em-
ployees, except for two secretaries, are represented by the
Union. The collective-bargaining relationship goes back for
many years. However, since 1974, there have been no new
contracts. The terms of the 1974 agreement continue to apply
except where specific changes have been negotiated. One
1166 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 All dates hereinafter are 1989 unless otherwise stated.
3 Detter recalled telling Pierce, when asked about the procedure for resign-
ing, that the first step was to see the payroll clerk to cease dues deductions.
He promised to get back to Pierce with information about what additional
steps he would have to take. Detter admitted never responding further to
Pierce’s inquiry. He asserted that he received nothing in writing from Pierce
regarding either the dues or Pierce’s membership. However, he admitted that
a supervisor had told him that Pierce had gone to the payroll clerk in order
to stop his dues deductions. Noting that Pierce’s recollection of what Detter
told him about resignation is consistent with the Union’s bylaws, which con-
tain nothing restricting resignation, and their comparative demeanors, I credit
Pierce. I similarly credit him over Carey, who claimed that he had no con-
versations with Pierce about resignation.
4 Pierce recalled receiving this notice before he took steps to resign.
5 Detter recalled Pierce angrily demanding the return of his $10. He alleg-
edly told Pierce that if the Union owed the money, Pierce would get it back.
However, he told Pierce, he did not believe that the Union owed him anything.
Noting that the money was never returned, resolution of this minor credibility
conflict is not required.
area which was modified, in 1981, is the grievance proce-
dure.
B. The Temporary Supervisor Program
Since at least 1969, the Employer has had a practice of ap-
pointing unit employees to serve as temporary shift super-
visors. The appointments are based on the recommendations
of various supervisors and may be rejected by the employees
to whom the upgrades are offered. While permanent super-
visors are salaried, temporary supervisors remain hourly paid,
at a rate which is 10 percent above the highest non-
supervisory rate. Over the last decade, 10 or more employees
have served in this capacity, including some who were union
officers at the time of their upgrades. Those who are up-
graded generally remain in the higher position for no more
than 120 days, the period during which their unit seniority
is protected by agreement of the parties.
The temporary supervisor program has not always func-
tioned free of union opposition. In 1979 and 1980, the parties
held a series of negotiations over union objections to it, fi-
nally reaching impasse. In the meeting of May 14, 1979, in
response to a question from the Union, the Employer stated,
‘‘Temporary supervisors have full authority of a permanent
supervisor during the period of their upgrade.’’ In the third
meeting, on December 17, 1980, the Employer agreed to a
union proposal to cease dues deductions for any upgraded
employee immediately upon the upgrade; the cessation was
to be automatic.
Union objections to the temporary supervisor program re-
surfaced in May 1988. In response to a grievance protesting
a warning issued by a temporary supervisor for absenteeism,
Area Superintendent William McClellan wrote, ‘‘In the fu-
ture, Temporary supervision will not be required to write or
present a written progress report [warning].’’ Notwith-
standing this, the Union continued to object to the program,
asserting that it put upgraded unit employees in a difficult
position with the bargaining unit members over whom they
would have authority. The Union further objected to manage-
ment’s practice of not selecting permanent supervisors from
among those who had served in temporary capacities. The
objections came to a head in late May 1988 with a union res-
olution that its members would no longer participate in the
program. At the Union’s request, two employees then serving
as temporary supervisors agreed to step down, returning to
the unit. One of them was Steven Pierce, one of the tem-
porary supervisors whose discipline by the Union is the sub-
ject of this proceeding.
C. Appointments, Resignations, and Discipline of Pierce
and Burris
The Employer did not resume appointments of temporary
supervisors until late June 1989.2 At that time, McClellan of-
fered, and Steven Pierce voluntarily accepted, an upgrade.
Pierce was aware that the Union would take action against
anyone doing so.
On July 12, Pierce asked David Detter, then the Union’s
treasurer, what he had to do to get out of the Union. Detter
replied, ‘‘All you have to do is say you want out.’’ Pierce
said, ‘‘Well, I’m saying I want out’’ and Detter told him,
‘‘You’re out.’’ Pierce had a similar conversation with Alvin
Carey on the following day.3 On July 13, Pierce gave the
payroll clerk a written order to stop his $10-per-month dues
deduction.
Noting the absence of any requirement in the Union’s by-
laws that a resignation take any particular form, and Pierce’s
clear expression of intent to resign, I find that Pierce had,
in fact, effectively resigned on or about July 12. Electrical
Workers IBEW Local 340 (Hulse Electric), 273 NLRB 428
(1984); Electrical Workers IBEW Local 66 (Houston Light-
ing), 262 NLRB 483 (1982).
About July 15, Pierce received a letter from the Union
stating that internal union charges had been filed against him,
alleging that his acceptance of the upgrade was detrimental
to the interests of the Union and in violation of his member-
ship obligations.4 On July 25, he was informed that a hearing
on the charges would be held on August 1. He did not attend
the hearing and, on August 21, received a notice that he had
been suspended from the Union for a period of 12 months
and fined $109.20 per week for each week in which he
served as a temporary supervisor. This was the amount by
which his pay increased for such service. The letter included
a warning that if he failed to comply with the order, legal
action would be taken to collect the fine. Pierce appealed the
Union’s action; his appeal was denied.
Notwithstanding Pierce’s notice to stop his dues, the Em-
ployer’s agreement to stop dues deductions immediately on
a unit employee’s upgrade to temporary supervisor, and the
completion of a form intended to instruct data processing to
make the necessary change, the $10 dues were erroneously
deducted from Pierce’s July wages and turned over to the
Union. Pierce asked Detter to return them. Detter replied, ac-
cording to Pierce, that he would return Pierce’s $10 when
Pierce paid the Union what he owed, $2000. Pierce never re-
ceived his refund.5
Between April and July, Robert Burris told Roger Wolfe,
union vice president, and others, that he was dissatisfied with
the job the Union was doing in representing the employees.
Finally, on July 18, he told Wolfe ‘‘that he might drop out.’’
Wolfe replied, ‘‘Go ahead, we don’t care.’’ Burris directed
the payroll office to stop his dues deductions, told Wolfe that
he had done so and was again told, ‘‘I don’t care.’’ He be-
lieved that he also told Wolfe specifically that he had
dropped out and was no longer going to be affiliated with
the Union. Thereafter, he paid no dues and, while it was pos-
sible for a member to pay dues directly to the Union rather
than by payroll deduction, he never received any notice from
the Union asserting that he was delinquent in dues pay-
1167E. I. DUPONT NEWPORT LOCAL 9 (DUPONT & CO.)
6 The foregoing is as described in Burris’ testimony on cross-examination,
testimony consistent with his pretrial affidavit. Wolfe did not testify.
7 In 1986, James Smith, an electrician serving as a temporary supervisor
(and a union member), received a grievance concerning the sizes of gloves
stocked by the Company. He signed the grievance as the supervisor who re-
ceived it and met with the employee and the union representative at the first
step to gather information about the situation, which was beyond his ability
to correct. He signed a written reply, which had been prepared from informa-
tion he provided, and he attended the second-step meeting.
8 In 1988, a temporary supervisor in the maintenance department had simi-
larly prepared such reviews. The Union objected and Mike Cullen,
McClellan’s counterpart in maintenance, and Ed Connolly, the Employer’s
production and employee relations superintendent, agreed that temporary su-
pervisors would not perform this function. Those reviews were discarded and
reissued by a permanent supervisor. McClellan was not part of, or aware of,
that determination.
ments.6 Based on the foregoing, I find that Burris, like
Pierce, unequivocally expressed his intention to resign from
the Union and that the Union understood what his intentions
were. Burris effectively resigned from membership.
In late October, Burris accepted an upgrade to temporary
supervisor. On November 1, he received a notice of charges
against him, identical to those served on Pierce. On Novem-
ber 13, he was advised of a hearing, to take place on No-
vember 20. He did not attend the hearing and, on November
30, was informed of his 12-month suspension and fine of the
difference between what he made as a rank-and-file em-
ployee and what he earned as a temporary supervisor,
$109.20 per week. Like Pierce, he was told that the Union
would take legal action to enforce the fine if he failed to
pay. He filed no appeal.
D. Authority of the Temporary Supervisors
In NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 340 (Royal
Electric), 481 U.S. 573 (1987), the Supreme Court limited
the application of Section 8(b)(1)(B) in cases involving union
discipline of supervisor-members to situations meeting the
precise language of the statute, where the supervisor was the
employer’s representative for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining or the adjustment of grievances. It thus becomes nec-
essary to determine whether the Employer’s temporary super-
visors were supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11)
and whether they served as management’s representative for
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment.
On the basis of the entire record, I must conclude that Re-
spondent’s temporary supervisors satisfy the requirements of
Sections 8(b)(1)(B) and 2(11) during the periods of their up-
grades.
Here, it is clear that the temporary supervisors exercise es-
sentially the same authority as permanent shift supervisors.
There is no dispute concerning the 2(11) authority of the per-
manent supervisors. The temporary supervisors are told that
their authority equals that of permanent supervisors when up-
graded; Pierce and Burris were told that they were ‘‘in
charge.’’
Pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure, the prac-
tice of the parties and their discussions in 1979 and 1980,
shift supervisors, whether permanent or temporary, handle
first-step grievances. The Union has even sought to have
them be present at the second-and third-step meetings on
grievances arising during their upgrades. This is most signifi-
cant because shift supervisors, whether permanent or tem-
porary, are expressly designated as management’s representa-
tives at the first step of the contractual grievance procedure
and are recognized as such by the Union. They are respon-
sible for attempting to adjust any such grievance or for sub-
mitting a timely written response if no adjustment can be
reached.7 This authority places them squarely within the
ambit of Section 8(b)(1)(B).
When the annual performance review period fell during
Burris’ tenure as a temporary supervisor, McClellan directed
him to prepare the reviews.8 While Pierce had no occasion
to do this, he did have an opportunity to direct the prepara-
tion of a review praising an employee who caught a mistake
in production. He met with the employee and his review was
placed in the employee’s personnel file.
The issue of the temporary supervisors’ disciplinary au-
thority appears to be largely responsible for the Union’s ob-
jections to temporary supervision. In May 1988, before the
Union’s resolution against cooperation in the temporary su-
pervisor program, an employee objected to the Union over
a written warning given him by a temporary supervisor. The
Union protested, precisely because it had been issued by a
temporary supervisor, and McClellan agreed that, ‘‘in the fu-
ture, temporary supervision will not be required to write or
present a written progress report [warning].’’ While it ap-
pears that this agreement was intended to preclude temporary
supervisors from issuing written warnings, and not merely
permit them to decline to do so, as the wording implies,
Burris issued such a warning to an employee in January
1990; the Union objected to Connolly, asserting that it was
contrary to their practice. On the other hand, temporary su-
pervisors, including Pierce, have orally admonished employ-
ees they felt were out of line and have the authority to rec-
ommend discipline to McClellan when they feel it warranted.
McClellan reviews the disciplinary recommendations of all
shift supervisors to determine whether they are consistent
with prior actions.
As previously noted, temporary supervisors are hourly
paid, unlike permanent supervision, but receive 10 percent
more than the highest paid nonsupervisory employees. In the
cases of Pierce and Burris, the temporary supervisor’s slot
paid $109 more per week than they had been making. They
work out of an office, where they spend a substantial part
of their time. They maintain time records, record overtime,
assist and guide employees in their work, troubleshoot the
operation, and, it appears, do not regularly perform produc-
tion work. From about 5 p.m. until 7 a.m., they are the only
supervisors, and the highest ranking persons, in the plant. At
such times, they may call McClellan if extraordinary prob-
lems arise; they do not often do so.
Shift supervisors, whether permanent or temporary, assign
job tasks at the start of each shift and may reassign employ-
ees during the shift. While much of this is routine, based on
instructions left by McClellan concerning the work to be
done and the workers’ usual job assignments, some discre-
tion is involved. Some assignments are based on the super-
visor’s observations of an employee’s particular skills or
physical limitations. Shift supervisors similarly assign some
overtime, determining when it is necessary by the number of
workers present during a given shift and calling in employees
according to an established company procedure.
When an employee asks to be excused because of illness,
it is the Employer’s practice to allow that employee to leave.
1168 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
9 Pierce and Burris had been members when, or shortly before, they were
upgraded. I cannot find that their resignations, which the Union, by fining
them, has refused to recognize, removes them from the category of supervisor-
member considered in Royal Electric and its predecessors or bars a finding
of violation herein.
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objec-
tions to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of ap-
peals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor
Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.’’
The request to leave is directed to, and granted by, the shift
supervisor. The shift supervisor also schedules leave, essen-
tially based on seniority and company policy.
As the Board has repeatedly stated, the statutory indicia
set forth in Section 2(11) are listed in the disjunctive and
only one of such indicia need be present to confer super-
visory status on an individual. Opelika Foundry, 281 NLRB
897, 899 (1986), and cases cited therein. In this case, the
temporary supervisors have the authority to adjust grievances
at the first step, a function which brings them within both
Sections 2(11) and 8(b)(1)(B). Paperworkers Local 1575
(Scott Paper), 284 NLRB 1019 (1987). They also have au-
thority to discipline employees or, at least, to effectively rec-
ommend discipline. Cannon Industries, 291 NLRB 632
(1989). This authority, as well as their authority to assign
and direct employees, I find, is more than routine. The as-
signment of work is based, at least in part, on their knowl-
edge of the employees’ work skills and physical capabilities
and thus requires the exercise of some discretion. Rose Metal
Products, 289 NLRB 1153 (1988). Their discretion is best il-
lustrated by the fact that, for many hours in the workday,
they may be the only supervisors, and the highest rated per-
sons, present in the plant. Whatever occurs during such peri-
ods, unless of an extraordinary nature, they resolve. Iron
Mountain Forge Corp., 278 NLRB 255 (1986). Moreover,
they are considered to be supervisors by both management
and the Union; it is precisely because they exercise super-
visory authority during their upgrades that the Union objects
to the program.
E. Conclusions
In this case, the Union fined, as its members, persons
found to be supervisors within the ambit of Sections 2(11)
and 8(b)(1)(B). The Union’s resolution, and its discipline of
Pierce and Burris, were expressly intended to directly dis-
courage them and other employees from serving in such ca-
pacities.9
Moreover, the fines, and the threats to enforce them with
legal action, occurred in the context of an existing collective-
bargaining relationship, albeit one without a recently nego-
tiated contract, and clearly constitutes an attempt to dictate
the Employer’s choice of representatives. See Royal Electric,
supra; Carpenters District Council of Dayton (Concourse
Construction), 296 NLRB 492 (1989). Such conduct restrains
or coerces an employer in the selection of his representatives
for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances and violates Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. The
refusal to return Pierce’s dues money, while de minimus in
and of itself, is in the nature of additional discipline and a
further violation of that section.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
By fining supervisor-members in order to discourage them
from serving as supervisors, and by refusing to return dues
money erroneously deducted from a supervisor-member, the
Union has restrained and coerced the Employer in the selec-
tion of his representatives for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining and the handling of grievances and has engaged in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(b)(1)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom. Specifically, it must cease and desist
from restraining or coercing the Employer by fining or other-
wise disciplining members or former members who accept
upgrades to supervisory positions, by refusing to return dues
money deducted erroneously from the pay of such super-
visor-members and by engaging in any like or related con-
duct. It must also be ordered to rescind the fines assessed
against Steven Pierce and Robert Burris, notify them that that
has been done, refund the July 1989 dues of Steven Pierce
and post appropriate notices, the affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the Act’s policies.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended10
ORDER
The Respondent, E. I. DuPont Newport Union, Local 9,
Newport, Delaware, its officers, agents, and representatives,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Restraining or coercing the Employer by fining or oth-
erwise disciplining members or former members who accept
upgrades to supervisory positions or by refusing to return
dues money deducted erroneously from the pay of such su-
pervisor-members.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
the Employer in the exercise of rights protected by the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the fines assessed against Steven Pierce and
Robert Burris.
(b) Refund the July 1989 dues erroneously deducted from
the pay of Steven Pierce.
(c) Remove from its files any reference to the unlawful
fines of Steven Pierce and Robert Burris and notify them that
this has been done.
(d) Post at its office in Newport, Delaware, copies of the
attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’11 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized rep-
resentative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employ-
ees and members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
1169E. I. DUPONT NEWPORT LOCAL 9 (DUPONT & CO.)
(e) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient cop-
ies of the notice for posting by E. I. Dupont De Nemours
and Co., if willing, at all places in the Holly Run plant
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
(f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce E. I. Dupont De Nemours
and Co. by fining or otherwise disciplining members or
former members who accept upgrades to supervisory posi-
tions or by refusing to return dues money deducted erro-
neously from the pay of such supervisor-members.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or co-
erce the Employer in the exercise of rights protected by the
Act.
WE WILL rescind the fines assessed against Steven Pierce
and Robert Burris.
WE WILL refund the July 1989 dues of Steven Pierce.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the un-
lawful fines of Steven Pierce and Robert Burris and we will
notify them that this has been done and that the charges and
fines against them will not be used against them in any way.
E. I. DU PONT NEWPORT UNION LOCAL 9