Dubrook Concrete

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 18, 1993

311 N.L.R.B. 1289 (N.L.R.B. 1993)

1289
311 NLRB No. 181
DUBROOK CONCRETE
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
In par. 3 of sec. II,A, of the judge’s decision, April 29, 1992,
should be substituted for July 29, 1992. We find that this inadvertent
error by the judge does not affect the result here.
We agree with the judge’s findings that the Respondent did not
establish that it had an honest good-faith belief that Smith engaged
in the picket line misconduct and that the General Counsel has
shown that Smith did not do so. In these circumstances, we find it
unnecessary to pass on the judge’s inference that the Respondent
‘‘used Ghobashi’s dubious identification as a pretext for ridding the
plant of this union leader,’’ i.e., Smith.
2 The General Counsel filed a motion to strike fn. 6 of the Re-
spondent’s brief, which concerns an ‘‘Offense Report’’ by Officer
Shann. He notes that the report was not entered into the record dur-
ing the hearing and contends that it constitutes an improper attempt
to supplement the record, as defined in Sec. 102.45(b) of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, with materials that would have been readily
available to the Respondent at the time the case was tried.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed a motion to reopen the record to
admit the offense report of Officer Shann. It claims that the report
has a bearing on Smith’s testimony and will help the Board to make
a specific finding ‘‘as to the time of the incident’’ involving Smith’s
alleged misconduct. In its motion, the Respondent states that the
‘‘Offense Report and testimony of Officer Shann had not been ob-
tained for, nor presented at the hearing, because prior to the hearing,
there was no dispute about when the incident occurred.’’
We deny the Respondent’s motion because it has not established
that the evidence is newly discovered, that it has become available
only since the close of the hearing, or otherwise satisfies the require-
ments of Sec. 102.48(d)(1) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations. In
view of our denial of the Respondent’s motion, we grant the General
Counsel’s motion to strike. 1 All dates are in 1992 unless otherwise indicated.
Dubrook Inc., d/b/a Dubrook Concrete and Drivers,
Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union #639,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–
CIO. Case 5–CA–22905
August 18, 1993
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND RAUDABAUGH
On March 3, 1993, Administrative Law Judge Marion C.
Ladwig issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed
an answering brief and a motion to strike. Thereafter, the Re-
spondent filed a brief in reply to the General Counsel’s an-
swering brief, an objection to the General Counsel’s motion
to strike, and a motion to reopen the record. The General
Counsel filed a response to the Respondent’s motion to re-
open the record, and the Respondent filed a reply to the Gen-
eral Counsel’s response.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered the
decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and
conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Dubrook, Inc., d/b/a
Dubrook Concrete, Chantilly, Virginia, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order.
Bruce E. Goodman, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Michael L. Goldberg and Steve A. Mandell, Esqs., of
McLean, Virginia, for the Respondent.
James F. Woodward, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARION C. LADWIG, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Washington, D.C., on December 15–16, 1992.1
The charge was filed August 6 and the complaint was issued
November 5.
The Company on May 4 discharged and refused to rein-
state driver William Smith, a member of the bargaining com-
mittee, following an economic strike. Nonstriker Emad
Ghobashi had reported that he saw a picket throw a rock
through his driverside truck window, shattering the glass, and
had identified Smith as the person who threw the rock.
The Company contends that it has an honest, good-faith
belief that Smith engaged in the picket line misconduct, even
though (a) it found no rock in the truck cab, (b) the incident
occurred after dark, (c) before being identified by Ghobashi,
Smith informed the Company that he was not there at the
time (having gone with another picket for coffee), (d) the
Company failed to question Smith about his absence before
deciding on May 1 to discharge him, (e) the Company re-
vealed to the arresting police that the rock thrower was
named ‘‘Buck’’ (the nickname of a second employee), and
(f) the Company was later informed that a third employee
had admitted throwing a handful of rocks that could have
broken the window (a possible explanation for no rock being
found in the cab).
The primary issues are (1) whether the Company, the Re-
spondent, has established its honest belief that Smith engaged
in the misconduct, (2) if so, whether the General Counsel
carried his burden to establish that Smith had not, and (3)
whether the discharge violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs
filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Company, a corporation, produces and distributes
ready-mix concrete at its facility in Chantilly, Virginia,
where it annually receives goods valued over $50,000 di-
rectly from outside the State. The Company admits and I
find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the
1290 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Discharge of William Smith
Smith drove a concrete mixer truck since 1988, except for
about 2 or 2-1/2 years as dispatcher. He campaigned for the
Union and served as the union observer in the July 12, 1991
election, which the Union won. The Company filed election
objections and did not begin bargaining until it withdrew the
objections in December 1991. Smith served on the negoti-
ating committee until the employees struck for a contract on
Monday evening, April 27. (Tr. 104, 169–171, 188.)
During the 4-day strike, as General Manager Thomas
Ogorchock testified, there were typically 15 or 20 police at
the picket line ‘‘Pretty much all the time.’’ They consisted
of state police and sheriff deputies from Loudoun and Fairfax
counties. (Tr. 7, 155, 158.) (The map shows that Chantilly
is in Fairfax County, near the Loudoun County line.)
On the evening of July 29, Smith (with picket Eddie
Lopez) drove to a 7-Eleven store about 2 miles away to get
coffee for the pickets. As credibly testified by Smith (who
impressed me most favorably as a truthful, forthright wit-
ness), he asked the police remaining at the picket line if they
would like a cup of coffee, but they declined. (Tr. 172–174,
198–199.)
After dark, while Smith and Lopez were away (for about
15 to 20 minutes) and after the remaining police had left,
nonstriker Emad Ghobashi returned with his mixer truck. It
is undisputed that the pickets at the cul-de-sac blocked his
entrance to the plant driveway and that while he was
stopped, something struck his driverside window, shattering
the glass. Ghobashi then proceeded toward the plant yard and
reported to Area Manager Rick Huckleby and President Paul
Ogorchock. Paul Ogorchock called the police. (Tr. 13–26,
52–56, 107–114, 126–127, 174, 183, 198–199.)
Huckleby parked the truck under a light near the shop
where the truck was inspected, but no rock was found. He
then walked to the cul-de-sac where the strikers were pick-
eting. On the way he saw the first police car entering the
premises. (Tr. 110–113, 127, 133.)
I note that Huckleby clearly falsified his pretrial affidavit
(G.C. Exh. 3), dated October 5. On page 1 Huckleby claimed
that when Ghobashi drove his truck to the yard that evening,
he stopped in front of Huckleby, jumped out, and ‘‘explained
how Bill Smith threw a rock [emphasis added] into the driv-
er’s side window.’’ On page 2 of the affidavit, Huckleby
claimed that ‘‘As I approached the cul-de-sac, I saw Bill
Smith and I asked him to explain what happened in order to
see what he would admit [emphasis added].’’
In fact, Ghobashi did not name Smith as the person who
threw a rock and Huckleby did not ask Smith at the picket
line to explain ‘‘to see what he would admit.’’ Ghobashi,
who had been employed only a month, did not know Smith’s
name. As Huckleby admitted at the trial, Ghobashi merely
described the rock thrower as ‘‘a guy with a beard that
smiles a lot,’’ and Huckleby did not know from that descrip-
tion who Ghobashi was talking about. Ghobashi conceded
that many of the pickets that evening were wearing beards.
(Tr. 13, 32, 35–36, 109.)
As Smith credibly testified, he and Lopez returned with
the coffees and two hot chocolates shortly before the first po-
lice car (followed by others) drove by the pickets into the
plant premises. Smith placed one of the coffee cartons on the
hood of his car and was handing out the coffee when
Huckleby arrived, observing Smith with the coffee. As ‘‘ev-
eryone was just walking around getting the coffee,’’
Huckleby asked Smith what was going on and Smith an-
swered, ‘‘I don’t know, I just got back, so what’s up?’’
Huckleby continued asking what happened and Smith said he
did not know, that he was not there. (Tr. 174–176, 200–207.)
Huckleby did not admit at the trial Smith’s saying that he
had not been there. Huckleby instead claimed that when he
talked to Smith and several other pickets, ‘‘I asked them all
what had happened and their response was nothing hap-
pened’’ (Tr. 114). I note, however, that in his affidavit,
Huckleby admitted that when he asked Smith what happened,
Smith ‘‘claimed he did not know what I was talking about
and that he had not been there [emphasis added].’’ Some of
the other pickets said ‘‘nothing happened.’’ (G.C. Exh. 3, p.
2.) (By his demeanor on the stand, Huckleby did not impress
me as being a candid witness.)
I discredit Huckleby’s claim that Smith answered that
‘‘nothing happened’’ (which would have been an acknowl-
edgment that Smith had been present at the picket line when
Ghobashi returned). I also discredit Huckleby’s claim that
‘‘Not that I can recollect’’ were any of the pickets drinking
coffee (Tr. 122), as well as the claim by Thomas Ogorchock
(who followed Huckleby to the picket line) that ‘‘I didn’t no-
tice any’’ strikers drinking coffee (Tr. 114, 143, 149). As in-
dicated, Smith credibly testified that Huckleby observed him
with the coffee, and ‘‘everyone was just walking around get-
ting the coffee.’’
After several minutes, Sheriff Deputy Allen Shann ap-
proached in his cruiser from the plant and shone his alley
light around the pickets. Ghobashi (sitting in the back seat)
pointed out Smith (who wears a beard) as the rock thrower.
Shann asked Smith for his identification. By that time, about
seven or eight other state and county police, who had fol-
lowed Shann into the plant premises, returned to the cul-de-
sac. Smith recalled that he put his coffee cup down on the
back of one of the police cars. (Tr. 26–37, 115, 176–177,
203, 206–207.)
Shann stated that Smith was probably going to be arrested
for destruction of property. Smith said he did not understand.
Shann stated the man in the car (Ghobashi) said Smith had
thrown a rock and broken his window. It is undisputed, as
Smith credibly testified, that he said that was untrue, ‘‘Let
the man look at me in the eye and tell me he saw me throw
a rock . . . . I wasn’t even here. . . . Let’s go take a lie
detector test right now.’’ Shann refused. (Tr. 28–29, 116–
117, 177–178, 203.)
Around midnight, after Shann failed to return with an ar-
rest warrant, Smith promised another policeman that he
would be there the next morning (Tr. 179–180). I infer that
by the time Smith arrived Thursday morning, April 30, Sher-
iff Deputy Foster had already conferred with the Company.
Foster had been given two employee pictures, one of a sec-
ond employee and one taken of Smith when he was working
as a dispatcher in the office (Tr. 181–182).
Foster arrested and handcuffed Smith and took him in the
back seat of the cruiser to the police station. On the way
1291DUBROOK CONCRETE
Foster stated, ‘‘They called you Buck.’’ Smith leaned toward
the front seat and said, ‘‘No, I am Bill Smith.’’ Foster was
looking down and Smith saw the two pictures that Foster had
in his folder. Foster stated, ‘‘Boy, you guys do look alike,
you could be brothers’’ and closed the folder. (Tr. 180–181.)
(Foster did not testify.) Smith was charged with willful dam-
age to the truck—bases on an affidavit by Deputy Shann,
who relied on Ghobashi’s identification of Smith (G.C. Exh.
4).
Thus, Smith had protested both to Huckleby and to the po-
lice that he had not been present. Yet the Company gave him
no opportunity to explain his absence from the picket line
before it decided on Friday, May 1, to discharge him. (On
that date the Union made an unconditional offer to return to
work and the strike ended. Smith had not been permanently
replaced.) Thomas Ogorchock did ask Smith on Monday,
May 4, if he had broken the window, but this was when the
Company was discharging him, 3 days after the discharge
decision was made. Huckleby did not ask Smith whether he
had broken the window until July 23, after Smith had been
acquitted in the criminal trial. (Tr. 7, 119–120, 162–163,
187, 210, 213, 217–219.)
It was then, as Huckleby admitted, that Smith informed
Huckleby that a third employee had told Smith and his wife
that that employee had thrown ‘‘a hand full of rocks and it
is possible that [the third employee] could have broken the
window’’ (Tr. 120–121). Smith credibly testified that he, his
wife, and others were sitting in a restaurant when the third
employee told Smith (Tr. 212):
I really feel bad for you, Bill, and I said well I feel bad
for me too, I said it is just a load of bull, and he said
no, he said you don’t understand, he said I feel bad for
you because I think I did it [referring to breaking the
window]. [Emphasis added.]
When later questioned by Huckleby, the third employee (who
does not wear a beard) denied being the picket who broke
the window (Tr. 121–122, 209).
B. Company’s Defenses
1. Legal standard
Both the General Counsel and the Company cite Rubin
Bros. Footwear, 99 NLRB 610, 611 (1952), approved in
NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. 21, 23 (1964), as applica-
ble. Under that decision,
[T]he honest belief of an employer that striking em-
ployees have engaged in misconduct provides an ade-
quate defense to a charge of discrimination in refusing
to reinstate such employees, unless it affirmatively ap-
pears that such misconduct did not in fact occur . . .
once such an honest belief is established, the General
Counsel must go forward with evidence to prove that
the employees did not, in fact, engage in such mis-
conduct.
2. Honest, good-faith belief
The Company contends that its reliance on Ghobashi’s
‘‘consistent identification of Smith’’ warrants its honest,
good-faith belief that Smith engaged in the picket line mis-
conduct.
Regarding his identification of Smith, Ghobashi testified at
the trial (Tr. 21–23):
I am positive he is the one that threw the rock, be-
cause he is the one who stepped forward and I saw him
when he threw the rock through the window.
. . . .
Did the rock go inside the cab, or did it drop on the
outside?
No, inside. [Emphasis added.]
He later claimed, ‘‘I believe [the rock] is big enough to fit
his hand . . . it could be held in one hand’’ (Tr. 85).
If this testimony were true, the rock would have been in
the cab. Yet, when Huckleby was asked if he looked for a
rock, he admitted (Tr. 133): ‘‘I looked in the truck, there was
nothing in the truck.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Apparently contending that there was enough daylight for
him to be ‘‘100 percent’’ sure that Smith was the one who
broke his window, Ghobashi claimed that it had ‘‘started
[emphasis added] getting dark’’ (Tr. 29, 37). To the contrary,
in the July 23 criminal trial, both Ghobashi and Huckleby
testified that it was dark (G.C. Exh. 2, pp. 17, 28). Also,
Thomas Ogorchock admitted that it was dark (Tr. 165).
Apart from the asserted identification of Smith, I discredit
Ghobashi’s claims that it had just started getting dark and
that he saw a rock being thrown through the window into the
cab.
The Company in its brief ignores Huckleby’s admission in
his pretrial affidavit that Smith stated he ‘‘had not been
there.’’ It instead (at 11) relies on Huckleby’s discredited tes-
timony that Smith said that ‘‘nothing happened’’—falsely
implying that Smith acknowledged being present at the pick-
et line when Ghobashi returned.
The Company argues (Br. at 12) that it reasonably became
‘‘convinced that Smith was indeed the perpetrator of the rock
throwing incident,’’ pointing out that Huckleby spoke to
Ghobashi that evening about his identification of Smith, that
both Huckleby and Thomas Ogorchock spoke to Ghobashi
the next day (evidently in the meeting with Sheriff Deputy
Foster), and that ‘‘Ghobashi remained positive in his identi-
fication of William Smith’’ (Tr. 118–120).
In making this argument, the Company ignores the evi-
dence that Sheriff Deputy Foster was informed, obviously by
the Company, that the rock thrower was nicknamed ‘‘Buck’’
and that Foster was given the two pictures, one of the second
employee and one of Smith. I find that this undisputed evi-
dence indicates that the Company and Ghobashi—contrary to
their denials—had misgivings about the identification of
Smith as the person who broke the window in Ghobashi’s
truck.
I reject the Company’s contention in its brief (at 15) that
it ‘‘met its burden of demonstrating that when it declined to
reinstate William Smith, it did so in an honestly held, good
faith belief that Smith had engaged in picket line misconduct
which was unprotected by the Act.’’
To the contrary, I find that the Company evidently doubts
both Ghobashi’s identification of Smith as ‘‘Buck’’ and his
veracity when he claimed that he saw a rock go through the
truck window—when no rock could be found in the cab. It
failed to investigate Smith’s insistence that he had not been
1292 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
there, even though Huckleby observed Smith handing out
coffee from the carton on the hood of his car, suggesting that
Smith had in fact been away from the picket line, getting
coffee for the pickets.
I infer that the Company used Ghobashi’s dubious identi-
fication as a pretext for ridding the plant of this union leader,
who had successfully campaigned for the Union, had served
as the Union’s election observer, and had been serving on
the negotiating committee that had been unsuccessful in
reaching a collective-bargaining agreement with the Com-
pany.
3. No affirmative proof
The Company contends in its brief (at 15) that ‘‘Having
demonstrated at the hearing that [it] had an honest and good
faith belief that Smith had engaged in the misconduct—
throwing a rock through Ghobashi’s truck window—it be-
came the General Counsel’s duty to demonstrate ‘affirma-
tively . . . that such misconduct did not occur.’’’ The Com-
pany further contends (Br. at 16) that the General Counsel
did not ‘‘offer any evidence which would show ‘affirma-
tively’ who aside from William Smith, did throw the rock
through Ghobashi’s window.’’
To the contrary, I have found that the Company has not
demonstrated that it had such an honest, good-faith belief. I
therefore find that the General Counsel did not have the bur-
den of affirmatively proving that Smith did not engage in the
misconduct. Furthermore, the General Counsel had no burden
of proving ‘‘who aside from William Smith’’ engaged in the
misconduct. That was not in issue.
Moreover, I find that the credible evidence clearly shows
that Smith did not break the window because he was not
present at the time. He was on a ‘‘coffee run’’ to get coffee
for the pickets.
I reject the Company’s challenges to Smith’s credibility.
By his demeanor on the stand, Smith impressed me most fa-
vorably as a truthful, forthright witness.
In challenging Smith’s testimony that he asked the police
if they wanted coffee when he and Lopez left the picket line
to get coffee, the Company relies on Huckleby’s testimony
(‘‘I recollect’’ that the Loudoun County police were there
‘‘up to about 7 o’clock’’) and Thomas Ogorchock’s testi-
mony (‘‘That is my best recollection’’ that the Loudoun
County sheriff’s department left at 6:30).
Even if this testimony by Huckleby and Thomas
Ogorchock were credited, despite their discredited denials
that they saw coffee at the picket line that evening, it would
not establish that police from the other two jurisdictions (the
state police and the Fairfax County police) did not remain.
As indicated above, Thomas Ogorchock admitted that the
typically 15 or 20 police at the picket line included state po-
lice and sheriff deputies from Loudoun and Fairfax Counties.
I find that even if the Company did establish that it held
an honest belief that Smith had engaged in the misconduct,
the General Counsel has affirmatively proved that he did not
do so.
I therefore find that by discharging and refusing to rein-
state Smith on May 4, the Company discriminated against
him in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1).
CONCLUSION OF LAW
By discriminatorily discharging and refusing to reinstate
William Smith on May 4, 1992, the Company engaged in un-
fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged and re-
fused to reinstate an employee, it must offer him reinstate-
ment and make him whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from date of dis-
charge to date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any net
interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Dubrook, Inc., d/b/a Dubrook Concrete,
Chantilly, Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging, refusing to reinstate, or otherwise dis-
criminating against any employee for supporting Drivers,
Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union #639, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO or any other union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer William Smith immediate and full reinstatement
to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substan-
tially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority
or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and
make him whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him, in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to the unlawful
discharge and notify the employee in writing that this has
been done and that the discharge will not be used against
him in any way.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board
or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
1293DUBROOK CONCRETE
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
(d) Post at its facility in Chantilly, Virginia, copies of the
attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’3 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT discharge, refuse to reinstate, or otherwise
discriminate against any of you for supporting Drivers,
Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union #639, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer William Smith immediate and full rein-
statement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists,
to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed
and WE WILL make him whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits resulting from his discharge, less any net in-
terim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL notify him that we have removed from our files
any reference to his discharge and that the discharge will not
be used against him in any way.
DUBROOK INC., D/B/A DUBROOK CONCRETE