Driven Innovations, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 30, 2015

No. 77073701 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2015)

This Opinion is a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: June 30, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Driven Innovations, Inc.
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Serial No. 77073701
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Mike Rodenbaugh of Rodenbaugh Law,
for Driven Innovations, Inc.
Seth A. Rappaport, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 103,
Michael Hamilton, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Rogers, Chief Administrative Trademark Judge, Richey, Deputy Chief
Administrative Trademark Judge, and Bucher, Mermelstein and Wolfson,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Wolfson, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Upon receiving Applicant’s statement of use after approving the mark in this
application for publication and the issuance of a notice of allowance, the Trademark
Examining Attorney determined that it was “clear error” under Section 1109.08 of
the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (“TMEP”) (January 2015) to have
failed to refuse registration on the basis of descriptiveness during that initial
examination, and he refused the mark under Sections 1, 2, 3 and 45 and Section
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2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.1 In this appeal, we hold that an applicant may not
separately challenge, either by petition to the Director or on appeal to the Board,
the Office’s determination of “clear error.” Instead, an applicant’s recourse is to
appeal the substantive refusal to the Board. To the extent that two earlier Board
decisions,2 reflective of then current Office practice, suggest that an applicant could
petition the Director for review of a “clear error” determination, we now expressly
overrule those decisions because current Office practice does not allow such
petitions. We also affirm the descriptiveness refusal on its merits.
BACKGROUND
Driven Innovations, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal
Register of the designation DOTBLOG (in standard characters) for “providing
specific information as requested by customers via the Internet,” in International
Class 42.3

1 Although the Examining Attorney noted in the Final Office Action dated November 15,
2013, that a descriptiveness refusal should have issued during initial examination, he did
not expressly state that a “clear error” was made. However, it is not imperative for him to
have done so. As explained in In re Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1373 (TTAB
2006), “[g]iven the procedural posture of the application, it should have been obvious to
applicant that the examining attorney made the [Section 2(e)(1)] refusal under the ‘clear
error’ standard.” (holding that the lack of a statement in the Office action that a
substantive refusal was made under the ‘clear error’ standard did not excuse applicant from
following procedure or enable Board to consider applicability of the standard). Jump
Designs is discussed more fully, infra.
2 In re Sambado & Son Inc., 45 USPQ2d 1312 (TTAB 1997) and In re Jump Designs LLC,
80 USPQ2d 1370 (TTAB 2006).
3 Application Serial No. 77073701 was filed on December 29, 2006, based on Applicant’s
bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. A statement of use was filed on September 9,
2012.
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The Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s designation
under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), having
determined during examination of Applicant’s statement of use that the applied-for
mark merely describes the subject matter of Applicant’s services. Registration has
also been refused under Trademark Act Sections 1, 2, 3 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
53, 1127, because the term fails to function as a service mark to identify and
distinguish Applicant’s services from those of others and to indicate the source of
Applicant’s services.
When the refusals were made final, Applicant appealed and filed a request for
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. We affirm the refusal under Section
2(e)(1), and for the reasons discussed below, have treated the refusal to register
under Sections 1, 2, 3 and 45 not as a separate ground but as an elaboration of the
descriptiveness refusal.
DISCUSSION
A. Clear Error Standard and Review
We first address a procedural matter regarding the application of the “clear
error” standard during prosecution. As the examination history shows, the
Examining Attorney originally approved the mark in the application for publication,
and after the time for opposition had passed without an opposition being filed, the
Office issued a notice of allowance setting the time for Applicant to file its
statement of use. After Applicant filed its statement of use, the refusals that are the
subject of this appeal were raised and ultimately made final.
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Section 1109.08 of the TMEP provides that examination of a statement of use is
generally limited to determining issues related to the statement of use itself, but a
refusal unrelated to the statement of use may be made if the failure to issue the
refusal at the time of the initial Office Action was a clear error or evidence
supporting a new refusal or requirement becomes available during the time that
has elapsed since initial examination. Thus, if the examining attorney determines
that a clear error was made during initial examination, i.e., an error that, if not
corrected, would result in issuance of a registration in violation of the Trademark
Act or applicable rules, the examining attorney must issue any refusals or
requirements, even if they could or should have been previously raised during
initial examination of the subject application. TMEP § 706.01.
Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney’s failure to refuse registration
under Section 2(e)(1) at the time of the initial Office Action was not a clear error,
and thus making such refusal during examination of the statement of use was
improper. Applicant seeks the Board’s review and determination regarding whether
the failure to issue the refusal during initial examination (or at any time prior to
the issuance of the notice of allowance) was a clear error. The Examining Attorney
contends that because the clear error standard is merely an internal,
“administrative guideline,” it is unnecessary to provide Applicant with a showing of
clear error, and Board review of the Office’s decision to issue the refusal following
examination of the statement of use is unavailable.
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The basis for the application of the clear error standard has evolved over time.
Citing the Eighth Edition of the TMEP (in effect from October 2011 to October
2012),4 Applicant argues that where a descriptiveness refusal is not issued until
examination of the statement of use, the evidence of descriptiveness must be
“substantial and unequivocal,” and there is no clear error if “reasonable minds could
differ” as to the propriety of the refusal. However, the current version of the TMEP
requires neither “substantial and unequivocal” evidence as a prerequisite to a
finding of clear error, nor a finding that reasonable minds could not differ as to the
result. Rather, it merely defines clear error as that which, if not corrected, would
result in the improper issuance of a registration. Further, the current TMEP states
explicitly that the determination of whether to issue a refusal is within the
discretion of the Office and that the standard of clear error is an internal guideline
only:
The term ‘clear error’ refers to an administrative internal
guideline used by the USPTO to determine whether an
examining attorney should issue a refusal or requirement
that could or should have been raised in a previous action.
…
The internal “clear error” standard is merely an
administrative guideline. It does not confer on an
applicant any entitlement to a showing of clear error, nor
does it impose a higher standard of proof on the
examining attorney than is otherwise required to
establish a prima facie case for the refusal or
requirement.
TMEP § 706.01.

4 Applicant filed its statement of use on September 9, 2012.
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In two seminal cases, In re Sambado & Son Inc., 45 USPQ2d 1312, 1314-15
(TTAB 1997), and the later In re Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1373 (TTAB
2006), the Board declined to consider the procedural issue of whether the examining
attorney properly applied the “clear error” standard, although in both cases the
Board did address the applicants’ challenges to the substantive refusals.5 In
Sambado, the applicant initially sought to register its mark on the Principal
Register. It amended the application to the Supplemental Register in response to a
descriptiveness refusal issued during examination of applicant’s statement of use. It
also filed a petition to the Commissioner requesting review of the Office’s
determination that clear error was committed in failing to issue the Section 2(e)(1)
refusal during the initial examination. The petition was dismissed as premature
and the application was finally refused registration on the Supplemental Register
on the ground that the proposed mark was generic. On appeal, the Board found that
the determination of clear error “is properly reviewable on petition to the
Commissioner,” and noted that the applicant should have waited to file its petition
until after issuance of a final refusal of registration by the examining attorney. In
Jump Designs, the Board reiterated that even in cases where the examining
attorney had not enunciated a finding of clear error, an applicant’s remedy for a
perceived misapplication of the standard (as in the situation where an examining
attorney issues a refusal during examination of the statement of use) would be by

5 The Board did remark, in a footnote in Sambado, that the Trademark Examining
Operation was considering a review of the application of the clear error standard, and that
it was expected to issue formal guidelines on the subject. 45 USPQ2d at 1314 n.4.
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way of petition to the Director (previously known as the Commissioner). As noted,
however, the Board then reached the applicant’s argument on the substance of the
refusal.
Although the cases suggested discretionary review could be had by way of a
petition to the Director, the Sixth Edition (2010) of the TMEP was amended to
specifically state that a petition to the Director is not appropriate where the refusal
is based on substantive grounds, including Section 2(e)(1):
The question of whether a refusal or requirement was
procedurally proper is reviewable on petition under 37
C.F.R. § 2.146. However, “[q]uestions of substance arising
during the ex parte prosecution of applications, including,
but not limited to, questions arising under §§ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
and 23 of the Act of 1946, are not considered to be
appropriate subject matter for petitions. ... ” 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.146(b). Thus, the Director cannot consider on petition
whether the issuance of or failure to issue a substantive
refusal was a “clear error.”
TMEP § 706.01.
The current version of the TMEP continues to follow the Sambado and Jump
decisions, insofar as it notes the Board’s involvement in review of a substantive
refusal made during examination of a statement of use is limited to determining
“only the correctness of the underlying substantive refusal of registration.” TMEP
§ 706.01. The current TMEP also contains the above-referenced limitation on an
applicant’s right to petition the Director.
In light of these developments, we take this opportunity to clarify whether an
applicant may, at the Board, challenge the USPTO’s determination that the
examining attorney committed “clear error” by failing to make a substantive refusal
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during initial examination (that is, at any time prior to issuance of a notice of
allowance), which he or she then made during examination of the statement of use.
We hold that an applicant may not directly challenge the Office’s determination
under the clear error standard and that the only way an applicant may challenge a
refusal that was issued during examination of the statement of use under the clear
error standard is by appealing the merits of that final refusal to the Board.6
We recognize that this leaves applicants without recourse to specifically contest
the application of the clear error standard, but applicants are not entitled to an
additional layer of review, between the examining operation and the Board
regarding a substantive refusal just because there is an ancillary procedural
component that necessarily goes along within it. Although the USPTO does have a
policy that all possible refusals and requirements should be issued in the first Office
action, doing so is not a requirement of statute or regulation, and the Office has the
inherent discretion to issue a requirement or refusal that it finds is correct at any
stage in the prosecution of an application. Cf. Last Best Beef LLC v. Dudas, 506 F.3d
333, 84 USPQ2d 1699, 1704 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that the USPTO acted within its
inherent authority to cancel the issuance of two registrations issued in violation of a
specific federal statute and noting that “federal agencies, including the USPTO,
have broad authority to correct their prior errors”); BlackLight Power, Inc. v. Rogan,

6 We note that the Board can only decide whether an applicant at the Board may challenge
an examining attorney’s reliance on the clear error standard. However, the TMEP is
explicit that the Office will likewise not entertain a petition to the Director challenging an
examining attorney’s internal determination that a clear error was committed.
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295 F.3d 1269, 63 USPQ2d 1534, 1537-38 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming that USPTO
officials reasonably acted within their authority when withdrawing a patent from
issuance in order to fulfill the USPTO’s mission to issue only valid patents).
Allowing an applicant to seek review of the procedural propriety of raising a
substantive refusal during examination of the statement of use is tantamount to
holding the Office to a higher standard of proof for the refusal. Adjudication of the
substantive refusal implicitly decides the propriety of the refusal. Thus, the
applicant’s remedy is to contest the substantive requirement or refusal itself, as
such review subsumes the question of whether the failure to issue such requirement
or refusal would have resulted in issuance of a registration that was in violation of
the applicable section of the Lanham Act. As noted above, we therefore overrule
Sambado and Jump Designs to the extent discussion therein, of any ability to
challenge a clear error determination in an appeal to the Board or by way of petition
to the Director, is in conflict with current Office practice.
Accordingly, we decline to consider Applicant’s claim that the Office erred in
finding that failing to raise the Section 2(e)(1) ground for refusal during
examination of the statement of use was a clear error.
B. Failure to Function
Turning next to the refusal under Sections 1, 2, 3 and 45, we find the refusal has
not been fully articulated. The evidence shows that the term “.blog” has been
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proposed as the “new generic top-level domain (new Domain Extension) for blogs”7
and that it is likely that ICANN will launch the extension “.blog” as a new generic
top-level domain name (“gTLD”).8 The Examining Attorney argues that the applied-
for mark “would be seen by consumers as a gTLD,”9 and that because Applicant is
providing “Internet-based services that are broad enough to include providing
specific information about websites with the gTLD .BLOG or specific information
about the gtLD [sic] .BLOG at the request of customers,”10 the term DOTBLOG does
not function as a service mark. While we agree that a mark composed solely of a
gTLD (even with DOT spelled out) may fail to function as a trademark for domain
name “registry operator or registrar services,”11 Applicant is not offering domain
name services that are the same as, or related to, registry operator or registrar
services for a potential “.blog” gTLD. Thus, although Applicant’s designation
DOTBLOG, if considered apart from the identification of services, may be seen as a
unitary gTLD similar to .com, .net, or .biz, nothing in the record reflects that the

7 At https://www.google.com, attached to the June 4, 2014, denial of Applicant’s request for
reconsideration. See also Internet evidence attached to final Office Action dated November
15, 2013, discussing the anticipated “.blog” domain, such as at http://icannwiki.com and
http://blogdomains.co/.
8 Applicant contends, however, that consumers are unlikely to be aware of the status of
ICANN’s new gTLD procedures or that “.blog” is intended as a gTLD. Applicant’s relies on
an article from www.Afilias.com entitled “dot Brand or dot What?: Afilias new gTLD
Research Report 2013” This survey reports on a poll of 2,000 U.S. adults taken in December
2012 to determine consumer attitudes to the new gTLDs. The survey found that only 22% of
adults overall were aware that ICANN was planning to launch new gTLDs.
9 Examining Attorney’s Brief at (unnumbered) p. 15, 11 TTABVUE 15.
10 11 TTABVUE 16.
11 TMEP § 1215.02(d) defines a “registry operator” as one who maintains the master
database of all domain names registered within a TLD, and a “registrar” as an entity
through which domain names may be registered.
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recitation of services “providing specific information as requested by customers via
the Internet” should be understood to encompass registration of .blog domain
names, maintaining a database of .blog domain names, or the provision of domain
name services that are related to those activities. Applicant’s recitation of services
does not indicate that it would have any role in establishing such a domain, in
registering blog names for such a domain, or that Applicant would otherwise be
involved in administering the anticipated “.blog” domain. Accordingly, the failure to
function ground under Sections 1, 2, 3 and 45 as stated by the Examining Attorney
in his refusal is ultimately inapplicable to the facts set forth in the application, and
we do not consider it further as a separate basis for refusal. Instead, as discussed
below, the arguments advanced by the Examining Attorney all speak to alternate
theories under Section 2(e)(1), and we have considered them on this basis. The
likelihood that such a domain will be established supports one of two equally
plausible grounds for finding Applicant’s mark to be descriptive. We have not
otherwise considered the refusal under Sections 1, 2, 3 and 45.
C. Descriptiveness
Trademark Act § 2(e)(1) prohibits registration of an alleged mark which is
merely descriptive of the applicant’s goods or services. A term is deemed to be
merely descriptive of goods or services if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of
an ingredient, quality, characteristic, feature, function, purpose or use of the goods
or services. In re Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 102 USPQ2d
1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012). See also, In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960,
82 USPQ2d 1828 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009
Serial No. 77073701
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(Fed. Cir. 1987). It is not necessary that a term describe all of the properties or
functions of the goods or services in order for it to be considered merely descriptive
thereof; rather, it is sufficient if the term describes a significant attribute or feature
about them. Moreover, whether a term is merely descriptive is determined in
relation to the goods or services for which registration is sought. See Chamber of
Commerce, 102 USPQ2d at 1219.
Applicant has applied to register the designation DOTBLOG for “providing
specific information as requested by customers via the Internet.” The Examining
Attorney argues that Applicant’s applied-for mark is merely descriptive of a service
that provides information regarding weblogs. A weblog, or “blog,” is an online
journal that is shared with others on the Internet.12 It is also used as a verb to
mean “to read, write or edit a shared online journal.”13 The Examining Attorney
argues that Applicant essentially summarizes blog posts from the Internet as
requested by customers, and that consumers “will see the commercial impression of
the mark as lying solely in the descriptive wording BLOG” because the term DOT in
the adopted term has no trademark significance other than as the “articulation of
the dot that appears before wording in a web address.”14 As noted above, the
Examining Attorney further argues that Applicant is providing Internet-based

12 At http://www.freedictionary.org; attached to October 5, 2012 Office Action. According to
the Wikipedia entry submitted by Applicant, the term “weblog” was coined in 1997; shortly
thereafter it was shortened to “blog” and is used both as a noun and a verb. At
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog; attached to Applicant’s April 5, 2013 response.
13 At http://www.freedictionary.org; attached to October 5, 2012 Office Action.
14 11 TTABVUE at 6.
Serial No. 77073701
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services that are broad enough to include providing specific information about the
anticipated “.blog” domain. In this regard, the Examining Attorney argues that
Applicant’s mark “is also descriptive because .BLOG (DOTBLOG) is a generic top-
level domain (gTLD) that will soon be active and available to consumers, and it is
intended for blog-related services and goods.”15 Applicant argues that it “does not
provide blogs, nor or [sic] any service that is a feature of blogs or blogging”16 and
that its applied-for mark as a whole “is unitary, with the word DOT suggesting an
online service related to blogs.”17
Although Applicant does not operate a blog on the Internet, Applicant provides
information that may be derived from blogs or be for blogs. Applicant’s specimens of
use, which are copies of webpages from its website, start with the tag line, “Need to
know what the buzz is within the blogosphere?”18 As explained in these webpages,
“DotBlog is a service in which we use proprietary search techniques to find relevant
and current blog posts relating to any given search query.” A search query “can be
any term, phrase, business, product or name.” Applicant provides its clients with a
“synopsis of what the blogosphere is blogging about you, your business, any given

15 Id.
16 Appeal Brief p. 6, 9 TTABVUE at 7.
17 Id.
18 We take judicial notice of the definition of “blogosphere” from www.merriam-webster.com.
The term is defined as “all of the blogs on the Internet as a collective whole.” Judicial notice
may be taken of dictionary evidence that is available in print format. University of Notre
Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff'd, 703
F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also, TBMP §712.01 (3d. ed. rev. 2012).
The pages bear the following URLs: http://www.dotblog.net/how-it-works/,
http://www.dotblog/about-us/, and http://www.dotblog.net/.
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industry or any given product.” Applicant offers a choice of three plan levels: at the
first level, a summary report of 20 blogs is provided; at the second level a more
detailed report of 50 blogs is provided, and at the highest level, Applicant will
“research 100 related blog posts” and provide “information at a corporate level.” As
shown by Applicant’s specimens, given the meaning of the word BLOG, its use in
the applied-for mark immediately describes Applicant’s information services. See,
e.g., In re Carlson, 91 USPQ2d 1198 (TTAB 2009) (“Of course, specimens and
promotional material may be used to prove that a mark is merely descriptive, and
statements made in them can show that a term describes a feature or characteristic
of the goods or services.”); In re Hunter Fan Co., 78 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB
2006) (finding that the applicant’s use of applied-for mark, as evidenced in its
specimen of use, “highlights the descriptive nature of this term”); see also Chamber
of Commerce, 102 USPQ2d at 1220 (content of applicant’s website and articles
discussing the activities of chambers of commerce constituted substantial evidence
supporting the Board’s determination that NATIONAL CHAMBER is merely
descriptive); In re Nett Designs, 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (looking at applicant’s advertising brochures in connection with determining
whether consumers would perceive mark as descriptive); In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588
F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (CCPA 1978) (in descriptiveness case, Court stated,
“Evidence of the context in which a mark is used in labels, packages, or advertising
materials directed to the goods is probative of the reaction of prospective consumers
to the mark.”).
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As for the term DOT, it represents the standard pronunciation of the
punctuation mark (a period) that separates different address levels in an Internet
address,19 and, as used in the mark, would be perceived as merely indicating the
online nature of Applicant’s services. That is, the term DOT in Applicant’s applied-
for mark advises prospective purchasers that Applicant’s services may be requested
and provided via the Internet.20 As Applicant notes, “Many consumers have come to
understand the presence of the word and/or the punctuation mark ‘dot’ suggestively,
to refer generally to online services.”21 The third-party registrations submitted by
Applicant of marks that start with DOT corroborate this meaning of the term DOT.
See Institut National Des Appellations D’Origine v. Vintners International Co., 958
F.2d 1574, 22 USPQ2d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]hird party registrations
show the sense in which the word is used in ordinary parlance and may show that a
particular term has descriptive significance as applied to certain goods or
services.”). Applicant relies on these registrations to show that marks containing
the term DOT have been registered without a disclaimer of that term. However, the
vast majority of the prior registrations are compound word marks and are thus

19 As defined at http://www.dictionary.com, attached to Applicant’s April 5, 2013 response.
20 We are unpersuaded by Applicant’s argument that the term “dot” would be perceived as
meaning “dotting the Internet” or otherwise have meaning as a double entendre.
21 9 TTABVUE 13.

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treated as unitary marks; no disclaimer of DOT would have been required.22 See
generally TMEP § 1213.05(a).
Considering Applicant’s applied-for mark in its entirety, we find that each
component has retained its character as merely descriptive or without trademark
significance in relation to the services, and that the composite term does not present
a new meaning that is not itself merely descriptive. See, e.g., In re Oppedahl &
Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 71 USPQ2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (PATENTS.COM
held merely descriptive of computer database management software); In re Tower
Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1316-17 (TTAB 2002) (SMARTTOWER merely
descriptive of commercial and industrial cooling towers); In re Sun Microsystems
Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1084 (TTAB 2001) (AGENTBEANS merely descriptive of computer
programs for use in developing and deploying application programs). Consumers
will immediately understand the term DOTBLOG, when used in association with
Applicant’s services of “providing specific information as requested by customers via
the Internet,” as describing a website that may feature information for blogs, or be
related to blogs, regardless of the domain in which the blogs reside.
Alternatively, in anticipation of ICANN’s activation of the .blog gTLD,
consumers are also likely to perceive the mark as related to information gleaned
from the “.blog” domain. When used in association with Applicant’s services, which,

22 To the extent Applicant is arguing that there is no likelihood of confusion between the
marks, because consumers “have come to distinguish between the large number of various
marks and/or TLDs that contain the word ‘Dot’,” 9 TTABVUE 13, this argument is
misplaced because there is no refusal under Section 2(d).
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according to Applicant’s own promotional statements, focus on the searching of
blogs, even for those who see the term DOTBLOG as a top level domain name
extension, the mark would still be considered merely descriptive because consumers
would perceive the mark as conveying the impression of “providing specific
information” from searches of sites on the “.blog” domain. Cf. In re theDot Commc’ns
Network LLC, 101 USPQ2d 1062, 1067 (TTAB 2011) (finding the term “.music” to
engender the commercial impression of a top-level domain name and be merely
descriptive of Internet services having applications related to music).
The evidence of record shows that the term DOTBLOG immediately describes a
key aspect of Applicant’s Internet-based services, namely, that Applicant provides
specific information as requested by customers via the Internet after conducting
searches of websites, some of which may be blogs (whether or not they ultimately
contain the extension “.blog” as their gTLD) and some of which may not be blogs but
contain specific information about blogs. Accordingly, when considered as the
coupling of a term (“DOT”) that indicates Applicant provides an Internet-based
service with a term (“BLOG”) that describes places on the Internet, regardless of the
domain in which those webpages reside, DOTBLOG is merely descriptive of
Applicant’s services of “providing specific information as requested by customers via
the Internet.”
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark DOTBLOG under Trademark
Act § 2(e)(1) is affirmed. The refusal to register Applicant’s mark DOTBLOG under
Sections 1, 2, 3 and 45 is inapposite for reasons discussed above and has not been
Serial No. 77073701
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considered other than as an alternative basis for affirming the refusal under Section
2(e)(1).